Gibbs v. MaseGibbs v. Mase
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- Before:
- Dupont
The plaintiffs, a husband and wife, appeal from the order of the trial court which reduced the sum of a prejudgment remedy of attachment of the defendant’s property. This court previously decided that the appeal was untimely and therefore dismissed the appeal. Gibbs v. Mase, 10 Conn. App. 144, 523 A.2d 506 (1987). After reconsideration, we find that the untimely filing of the appeal was not a jurisdictional defect because of our Supreme Court’s holding in Giordano Construction Co. v. Ross, 182 Conn. 577, 438 A.2d 772 (1980), and that the plaintiff’s appeal was properly before this court.1 This opinion, therefore, supersedes our previous opinion.
*291The plaintiffs purchased a home which was built and sold by the defendant. After subsequently discovering defects in the home, the plaintiffs brought a five count complaint2 against the defendant, claiming unworkmanlike construction, breach of warranty, and a breach *292of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
On August 21,1985, the defendant brought a motion to dissolve or modify the ex parte prejudgment attachment. A probable cause hearing was held on November 6, 1985, in which the parties introduced expert testimony as to damages. The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs did not establish that they would prevail on their CUTPA claim. Moreover, the trial court found that the reasonable cost of correction, with interest and costs, was $2500. The trial court therefore granted the defendant’s motion, and reduced the amount of the attachment to the sum of $2500.4
The sole claim of error raised by the plaintiffs on appeal is that the trial court erred in holding that they did not establish probable cause that the defendant had violated the provisions of CUTPA.
I
Before we reach the substance of the plaintiffs claim, we must determine if the trial court’s action was an appealable final judgment. City National Bank v. Davis, 181 Conn. 42, 44, 434 A.2d 310 (1980); Babiarz v. Hartford Special, Inc., 2 Conn. App. 388, 390, 480 A.2d 561 (1984). Not all orders which grant or deny *293a motion to modify a prejudgment remedy are final judgments. A defendant may bring a motion for the modification of a prejudgment remedy pursuant to either of two statutes:
In the present case, the trial court’s order which reduced the amount of the attachment of the defendant’s property was issued when it granted the defendant’s motion. That motion, however, does not indicate which section the defendant relied upon.6 In order to determine whether the trial court’s action was an *294appealable final judgment, therefore, we must first determine which section applies to the defendant’s motion.
In City National Bank v. Davis, supra, 46, our Supreme Court distinguished the two sections by stating that orders under
The defendant in the present case filed his motion to dissolve or modify the prejudgment order less than three months after the trial court’s original prejudgment order. We find that this prejudgment order was promptly contested, and that the defendant’s motion was brought pursuant to
*295II
The plaintiffs’ principal argument is that, by proving that the defendant had signed a contract in which he had made statements that certain work would be performed on his property which was subsequently not performed, they clearly established probable cause that the defendant had violated the provisions of CUTPA. That statute provides that “no person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”
In deciding prejudgment remedy motions, the trial court “must evaluate the arguments and evidence produced by both parties.” Augeri v. C. F. Wooding Co., 173 Conn. 426, 429, 378 A.2d 538 (1977). The trial court, however, need not make a full and final decision on the factually and legally complex issues as were raised by the plaintiffs’ CUTPA claim, as the probable cause hearing “is not intended to be a full-scale trial on the merits.” Id. Rather, the trial court, in ruling upon the defendant’s motion, need only weigh the evidence presented and “determine probable success by weighing probabilities.” Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 176, 474 A.2d 795 (1984). The trial court necessarily has broad discretion in reaching this determination, and is not to be overruled in the absence of clear error. Id.; Augeri v. C. F. Wooding Co., supra.
Our role in reviewing the decision of the trial court is even more circumscribed than that of the trial court. *296Babiarz v. Hartford Special, Inc., supra, 393. As such, we are not to duplicate the trial court’s weighing process. Instead, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s conclusion was reasonable. Id. “In the absence of clear error, this court should not overrule the thoughtful decision of the trial court, which has had an opportunity to assess the legal issues which may be raised and to weigh the credibility of at least some of the witnesses.” Augeri v. C. F. Wooding Co., supra.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA, the trial court must determine: “ ‘ “(1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)].” ’ ” Sportsmen’s Boating Corporation v. Hensley, supra, 756, quoting McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Conn. 558, 568, 473 A.2d 1185 (1984).
The fact that the trial court found that the plaintiffs had established probable cause that they would prevail on the breach of warranty counts of their complaint does not imply or necessitate an automatic finding by the trial court of a violation of CUTPA. The plaintiffs must also establish that the breach of warranty offended public policy, was immoral or unscrupulous, or had an injurious effect on the consumer. In its memorandum of decision, the trial court noted that after hearing the witnesses, it attributed very little weight *297to the testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses. The reasonable cost of correction resulting from the defendant’s breach of warranty was assessed to be only $1750. The trial court could reasonably have concluded, therefore, that the defendant’s breach of the contract was not offensive to public policy. We find, therefore, that the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs would not prevail in their CUTPA claim was reasonable.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
Although we are bound to follow the precedent established by our Supreme Court in Giordano Construction Co. v. Ross, 182 Conn. 577, 438 A.2d 772 (1980), it is our opinion that it might be appropriate for the Supreme Court to reconsider the per curiam holding of that case. In Giordano, the court held that an “untimely filing of an appeal is merely an irregularity and not a jurisdictional defect.” Id., 579. In reaching the conclusion that “[t]he fact that the appeal statute specifies a time period in which to take an appeal does not mean that an appeal taken beyond the specified time is void”; id.; the court cited as authority LaReau v. Reincke, 158 Conn. 486, 493, 264 A.2d 576 (1969). That case, however, involved an appeal brought beyond the twenty-day time period prescribed by our rules of practice. Time limitations set forth in our rules of practice are not legislatively created *291conditions precedent to the jurisdiction of this court. Id., 492. In our opinion, however, if a statute, such as
The granting or denial of a prejudgment remedy is an order issued prior to final judgment. Appeals from such orders presently exist under the statutory authority of
In the first count of his revised complaint, the plaintiff alleged negligence and unworkmanlike construction. In the second count of the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached an express warranty in violation of
In reducing the amount of the attachment to $2500, the court found the reasonable cost of correction to be $1750, and thereafter added a reasonable allowance for interest and costs.
Although a defendant in an action is able to bring a motion for modification of a prejudgment remedy pursuant to either
The defendant’s motion is entitled “Motion to Dissolve or Modify a Prejudgment Attachment Granted Without Hearing.” The motion does not, however, indicate which section it was brought under.