82 Mo. 143 | Mo. | 1884
On June 27th, 1877, George L. Crosby with his wife and their two infant children, in a vehicle crossing a bridge over a stream on a public street in the city of
It is not necessary, we think, to set out the amended petition, which is very lengthy, in order to present what we regard as the controlling questions in the case. The suit is brought by the administrator of the wife to recover for the death of her husband and two minor children, and, also, for special damages to property, and burial expenses alleged as resulting therefrom, occasioned by the wrongful act, neglect and default of the city of Hannibal in negligently constructing and maintaining a bridge over a certain water course in said city. The defendant filed a general demurrer to the petition for the reason that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action which was sustained by the circuit court and upon refusal of plaintiff to amend judgment was entered thereon for the defendant, and the case appealed to this court. The propriety of this ruling is the only question before us.
The petition, we take it by any fair construction, is based upon-sections 2121, 2122 and 2123 of the revision of 1879, or, as it is popularly called, the damage act. The two leading questions presented by the demurrer are first: The right of the plaintiff to maintain the action. Second,
In McNamara v. Slavens, 76 Mo. 330, 331, this court treating of the same subject uses this language: “Neither the husband, nor wife, nor children, had at common law, an action for the death of the husband, or wife, or parent, under the circumstances mentioned in sections 2121, 2122. It is a cause of action created by the statute, and no one can sue unless he bring himself within its terms.” Section 2123 provides that all damages accruing under section 2122
As to the other question, we think it quite manifest that the damage act, or sections 2122, 2123, supra, have no reference to injuries or damages to property of the deceased, but only to personal injuries and such as the injured party, if living, might have recovered and such as the jury may deem fair and just with reference to the injury necessarily resulting to such survivor from such death. Injury or damage to property, as such, is not within the contemplation of the damage act and, consequently, no recovery can be had in such an action for such injury or damage. Section 96 of the administration law has reference exclusively to wrongs done to the property rights or interest of another and by section 97 of same law do not extend to actions for slander, libel, assault and battery, or
The latter survives by special statute, contrary to-the common law and only to the parties or beneficiaries-named in the special statute. Various other questions have been discussed and numerous cases cited, but we deem them unnecessary to the disposition of the case.
It follows, therefore, that there was no error in the ruling of the circuit court in sustaining the demurrer of defendant, and its judgment is, therefore, affirmed.