314 F.3d 125 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, ROTH and ROSENN,(cid:13) Circuit Judges.(cid:13) (Filed: December 20, 2002)(cid:13) JOANNE SORRENTINO, ESQUIRE(cid:13) (ARGUED)(cid:13) ROBERT FRANCIS GOLD, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Gold and Albanese(cid:13) 48 South Street(cid:13) Morristown, NJ 07960(cid:13) Counsel for Appellants(cid:13) MICHAEL E. UNGER, ESQUIRE(cid:13) (ARGUED)(cid:13) PAMELA A. WHIPPLE, ESQUIRE(cid:13) Freehill, Hogan & Mahar(cid:13) 850 Bergen Avenue(cid:13) Jersey City, NJ 07306(cid:13) Counsel for Appellee(cid:13) OPINION OF THE COURT(cid:13) BECKER, Chief Judge.(cid:13) 46 U.S.C. S 183b, a statute that regulates the contractual(cid:13) limitations on time for passengers to bring a lawsuit(cid:13) against maritime carriers, provides that carriers may not(cid:13) impose time-bars of less than one year. This minimum one(cid:13) year time-bar is tolled, however, for injured minors(cid:13) pursuant to S 183b(c); in such cases, the clock starts(cid:13) ticking only when the minor’s "legal representative has been(cid:13) appointed," so long as such appointment occurs within(cid:13) three years of the minor’s injury. Id. This appeal concerns(cid:13) the application of this statute to the personal injury claims(cid:13) of Christian Joseph Gibbs, a minor, and his parents(cid:13) Suzanne and Richard Gibbs (collectively, "the Gibbses"),(cid:13) who challenge the District Court’s dismissal of their lawsuit(cid:13) against Carnival Corporation, d/b/a Carnival Cruise Lines(cid:13) ("Carnival"), charging Carnival with negligence, infliction of(cid:13) emotional distress, and breach of contract in connection(cid:13) with injuries suffered by Christian Gibbs aboard one of(cid:13) Carnival’s cruise ships on August 25, 1998.(cid:13) 2(cid:13) The passenger ticket contract between the Gibbses and(cid:13) Carnival included a provision that contained the minimum(cid:13) one year limitation allowable under the statute. The(cid:13) Gibbses and Carnival disagree as to when (or whether)(cid:13) Suzanne Gibbs was appointed guardian ad litem of(cid:13) Christian in order to serve as his "legal representative."(cid:13) Carnival contends that the appointment occurred on March(cid:13) 25, 1999, the date of a letter from the Gibbses’ attorney(cid:13) informing Carnival that he "has been retained by Suzanne(cid:13) Gibbs, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Christian(cid:13) Joseph Gibbs." Under this interpretation, the one year(cid:13) time-bar to file suit would have ended on March 25, 2000,(cid:13) well before the Gibbses filed this action before the District(cid:13) Court on August 21, 2000. The Gibbses respond that this(cid:13) letter has no legal effect, and that under New Jersey Court(cid:13) Rule 4:26-2, a parent of a minor "shall be deemed to be(cid:13) appointed guardian ad litem of the child" in negligence(cid:13) actions only "upon the filing of a pleading or certificate(cid:13) signed by an attorney." According to this Court Rule, the(cid:13) Gibbses submit, Suzanne Gibbs was appointed legal(cid:13) representative of Christian Gibbs only when the complaint(cid:13) was filed in the District Court. Since they commenced this(cid:13) suit within the three-year period available to appoint a legal(cid:13) representative for an injured minor under S 183b(c), they(cid:13) dispute Carnival’s claim that the time had run.(cid:13) The District Court declined to resolve this aspect of the(cid:13) dispute. Instead, it concluded that the March 25, 1999(cid:13) letter from the Gibbses’ attorney to Carnival was legally(cid:13) binding and estopped the Gibbses from arguing that the(cid:13) New Jersey Court Rule applied. Determining that the March(cid:13) 25, 1999 date of the letter is the time that Christian Gibbs(cid:13) received a legal representative, the Court granted Carnival’s(cid:13) motion to dismiss the case because it was filed after the(cid:13) one year time-bar expired.(cid:13) Before we address the estoppel issue, however, we must(cid:13) first clarify the appropriate choice of law. Although it(cid:13) appears that the District Court considered this case to be(cid:13) one that sounded in admiralty, it did not specify whether it(cid:13) applied the federal admiralty law of estoppel or New(cid:13) Jersey’s standard. This omission is reflected in the briefs of(cid:13) the parties, which referred only to New Jersey law. At oral(cid:13) 3(cid:13) argument before us, Carnival conceded that federal(cid:13) admiralty law governs, but the Gibbses maintained that we(cid:13) should apply New Jersey law. We agree with Carnival.(cid:13) Because Christian Gibbs’s injuries occurred aboard a(cid:13) cruise ship in navigable waters, his cause of action(cid:13) contains the traditional nexus for maritime torts.(cid:13) In order to sustain a claim of estoppel under federal(cid:13) admiralty law, a party must show that it relied in good faith(cid:13) on a misrepresentation of another party, and that this(cid:13) reliance caused it to change its position for the worse.(cid:13) Evidence of detrimental reliance or prejudice is a critical(cid:13) element of estoppel, and Carnival fails to satisfy this(cid:13) burden. Moreover, the District Court should not have(cid:13) precluded the Gibbses from presenting their argument,(cid:13) which we find meritorious, that the time-bar in the(cid:13) passenger ticket contract had not expired because no legal(cid:13) representative had yet been appointed for Christian Gibbs.(cid:13) Accordingly, the Court’s use of equitable estoppel was(cid:13) mistaken, and we will therefore set aside the order(cid:13) dismissing Christian Gibbs’s claims.(cid:13) Having disposed of the estoppel issue, we must still(cid:13) determine whether the Gibbses’ claim is barred by the suit(cid:13) time provision in the passenger ticket contract. This(cid:13) presents the question not directly addressed by the District(cid:13) Court: How is a legal representative "appointed" within the(cid:13) meaning of 46 U.S.C. S 183b(c)? To answer this, we must(cid:13) turn to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, which explains(cid:13) how to determine when a legal representative has been(cid:13) appointed to protect a minor’s interests. The first step of(cid:13) the Rule 17 inquiry is to look to the law of the minor’s(cid:13) domicile to see if the minor already has a legal(cid:13) representative appointed for him. Since Christian Gibbs is(cid:13) a domiciliary of New Jersey, we apply New Jersey Court(cid:13) Rule 4:26-2, which states that a parent is appointed(cid:13) guardian ad litem of her child only upon the filing of a(cid:13) pleading or certificate with a court. Since the Gibbses did(cid:13) not file any papers with a court before commencing this(cid:13) action in the District Court, at the time the complaint was(cid:13) filed no legal representative had yet been appointed for(cid:13) Christian Gibbs under the laws of New Jersey. This takes(cid:13) us to the second step of Rule 17, which is the requirement(cid:13) 4(cid:13) that a district court appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor(cid:13) who is otherwise not represented under the law of the(cid:13) minor’s domicile. The court should take into account all(cid:13) factors relevant to the protection of the minor’s interests(cid:13) when selecting a guardian ad litem, but need not look to(cid:13) the procedures specified in the state law. In this case, the(cid:13) complaint before the District Court specified that Suzanne(cid:13) Gibbs would represent Christian as his guardian ad litem,(cid:13) and there is no reason to suggest that the Court should not(cid:13) have accepted this appointment.(cid:13) Therefore, under the guardian ad litem appointment(cid:13) process envisioned by Rule 17, no legal representative had(cid:13) been appointed for Christian until the Gibbses commenced(cid:13) this lawsuit before the District Court, which was within the(cid:13) three year time period under 46 U.S.C. S 183b(c) to appoint(cid:13) a legal representative. Accordingly, Christian’s claim is not(cid:13) time-barred under the passenger ticket contract and(cid:13) S 183b(c). For these reasons, we will vacate the order(cid:13) dismissing Christian’s claim and remand this action to the(cid:13) District Court for further proceedings.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) On August 25, 1998, while accompanying his parents on(cid:13) a cruise, Christian Gibbs suffered second degree burns on(cid:13) the soles of his feet when he stepped onto the hot surface(cid:13) of the deck of the Carnival vessel, The Destiny . He was in(cid:13) the care of Carnival employees at the time as part of the(cid:13) Camp Carnival child care program. His parents, Suzanne(cid:13) and Richard, decided to interrupt their vacation and return(cid:13) home to New Jersey with Christian to care for his injuries.(cid:13) After engaging in settlement discussions with Carnival,(cid:13) the Gibbses retained the Law Offices of Gold and Albanese(cid:13) ("Gold and Albanese") to represent their interests. On(cid:13) March 25, 1999, Robert Francis Gold, an attorney at Gold(cid:13) and Albanese, wrote to Carnival informing it that the firm(cid:13) "has been retained by Suzanne Gibbs, individually and as(cid:13) Guardian ad Litem for Christian Joseph Gibbs, to represent(cid:13) their interests in connection with certain burn injuries(cid:13) suffered by Christian Joseph Gibbs." Carnival responded(cid:13) with a letter dated April 9, 1999 acknowledging receipt of(cid:13) 5(cid:13) Mr. Gold’s correspondence and asking that any relevant(cid:13) information be forwarded to the company. There was no(cid:13) subsequent contact between the parties until an attorney at(cid:13) Gold and Albanese sent a copy of Christian Gibbs’s medical(cid:13) records to Carnival on or about May 17, 2000.(cid:13) Subsequently, Carnival notified Gold and Albanese by mail(cid:13) that the Gibbses’ claim was time-barred according to a(cid:13) provision in the passenger ticket contract that limited the(cid:13) time available for filing of a suit against Carnival to one(cid:13) year after the date of injury.(cid:13) The Gibbses then commenced this action in the District(cid:13) Court on August 21, 2000, alleging that Carnival was liable(cid:13) for negligence, infliction of emotional distress, and breach(cid:13) of contract. The complaint sought relief on behalf of(cid:13) Christian as well as his parents. Carnival moved to dismiss(cid:13) the case pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Carnival’s(cid:13) motion argued alternatively that: (1) the suit was untimely(cid:13) because of the time-bar provision in the passenger ticket(cid:13) contract; (2) the District Court lacked in personam(cid:13) jurisdiction over Carnival; and (3) the District Court lacked(cid:13) jurisdiction over the claim because of a forum selection(cid:13) clause in the ticket contract specifying a court in Florida as(cid:13) the exclusive forum to resolve disputes arising from the(cid:13) contract.(cid:13) The District Court granted Carnival’s motion on the first(cid:13) ground--untimeliness according to the one year time-bar in(cid:13) the passenger ticket contract. Finding that the passenger(cid:13) ticket contract contained an enforceable provision allowing(cid:13) only one year to file suit on any claims arising from the(cid:13) contract, the Court applied the provision against the(cid:13) Gibbses and dismissed Suzanne and Richard Gibbs’s(cid:13) individual claims. Maritime carriers are entitled to impose(cid:13) contractual limitations on the time to bring a lawsuit so(cid:13) long as the allowable period is no less than one year. 46(cid:13) U.S.C. S 183b(a). Such suit time provisions in passenger(cid:13) ticket contracts must be written in language that meets a(cid:13) "standard of reasonable communicativeness," which(cid:13) involves a liberal examination of the provision for clarity,(cid:13) physical placement, and ease of understanding. Marek v.(cid:13) Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1987); see(cid:13) also Schenk v. Kloster Cruise Limited, 800 F. Supp. 120,(cid:13) 6(cid:13) 122-23 (D. N.J. 1992). The Gibbses are not contesting the(cid:13) District Court’s finding that the suit time provision in their(cid:13) passenger ticket contract is legally valid and binding under(cid:13) federal admiralty law. Moreover, they do not dispute the(cid:13) District Court’s dismissal of Suzanne and Richard Gibbs’s(cid:13) individual claims against Carnival. The District Court(cid:13) correctly dismissed these claims, since this lawsuit was(cid:13) filed just short of two years after their cause of action(cid:13) accrued -- well after the one year time-bar in the passenger(cid:13) ticket contract.(cid:13) The Court also dismissed Christian Gibbs’s claims, but(cid:13) on a different theory. Noting that Christian was a minor(cid:13) and therefore that 46 U.S.C. S 183b(c) applied, the Court(cid:13) read this statute as allowing a three-year period in which to(cid:13) appoint a legal representative for Christian. Once a(cid:13) representative was appointed, the Court explained, the one(cid:13) year time-bar for filing a suit on Christian’s claims would(cid:13) commence. The District Court did not specify what process(cid:13) would be used for determining when a legal representative(cid:13) was appointed within the meaning of S 183b(c). Rather, the(cid:13) Court applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel essentially(cid:13) to preclude the Gibbses from denying that the March 25,(cid:13) 1999 letter from their counsel, Gold and Albanese,(cid:13) constituted the appointment of Suzanne Gibbs as guardian(cid:13) ad litem or legal representative of Christian under(cid:13) S 183b(c).(cid:13) The Court therefore refused to entertain the Gibbses’(cid:13) submission that Suzanne Gibbs was not appointed legal(cid:13) representative for Christian by the March 25 letter because(cid:13) New Jersey Court Rule 4:26-2 states that a parent may(cid:13) become the guardian ad litem of her child in negligence(cid:13) actions only upon the filing of a pleading or certificate(cid:13) before a court. Under this theory, which the Court did not(cid:13) take into account, the Gibbses should be allowed to(cid:13) proceed on Christian’s claim because the complaint was(cid:13) filed before the three years allowed under S 183b(c) to(cid:13) appoint a legal representative for an injured minor. Since(cid:13) the appointment of the legal representative and the filing of(cid:13) the suit occurred simultaneously, the Gibbses argued, the(cid:13) time-bar had not run.(cid:13) 7(cid:13) Instead, the Court looked at the language of the March(cid:13) 25 letter and found that it clearly communicated to(cid:13) Carnival that Suzanne Gibbs had been appointed legal(cid:13) representative of Christian on or about that date. The Court(cid:13) chose to apply the law of estoppel because it believed that(cid:13) allowing the Gibbses to disavow the depiction of Suzanne(cid:13) Gibbs as legal representative for Christian in the March 25(cid:13) letter in favor of their new theory "squarely brings into play(cid:13) the concept of estoppel which goes right to the fairness(cid:13) issue." Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Gibbses(cid:13) should have filed Christian’s claims within one year after(cid:13) March 25, 1999. Since the complaint was not filed in the(cid:13) District Court until August 21, 2000, the Court held that it(cid:13) was untimely. The Gibbses’ appeal of the District Court’s(cid:13) order granting Carnival’s 12(b)(6) motion that dismissed(cid:13) Christian Gibbs’s claims is the issue before this court. We(cid:13) have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and our(cid:13) review over the District Court’s order granting a 12(b)(6)(cid:13) motion is plenary. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp. , 223 F.3d(cid:13) 165, 173 (3d. Cir. 2000). We review the Court’s(cid:13) interpretation of 46 U.S.C. S 183b, like any other matter of(cid:13) statutory interpretation, de novo. See United States v.(cid:13) Zwick, 199 F.3d 672, 678 (3d Cir. 1999).(cid:13) II. Choice of Law(cid:13) In their complaint, the Gibbses invoked diversity(cid:13) jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1332, as the basis of(cid:13) their claim before the District Court. Although both parties(cid:13) refer to this case as one concerning admiralty, they cited(cid:13) only to New Jersey law in the briefs. At oral argument in(cid:13) response to questions from the court, Carnival conceded(cid:13) that admiralty law governs, but the Gibbses maintained(cid:13) their position that New Jersey law governs. Normally, this(cid:13) court would apply the choice of law rules of the forum state(cid:13) -- in this case, those of New Jersey -- in order to determine(cid:13) what substantive law governs a diversity action. See Klaxon(cid:13) Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).(cid:13) However, if the case sounds in admiralty, it would be(cid:13) inappropriate to apply New Jersey law or any other state’s(cid:13) law, instead of federal admiralty law.(cid:13) 8(cid:13) The initial step in the choice of law analysis is to(cid:13) determine whether this case "sounds in admiralty." In(cid:13) Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,(cid:13) 513 U.S. 527 (1995), the Supreme Court summarized prior(cid:13) precedent and articulated a three-point test for ascertaining(cid:13) when a case sounds in admiralty. First, the incident must(cid:13) have "occurred on navigable water or . . .[be an] injury(cid:13) suffered on land [that] was caused by a vessel on navigable(cid:13) water." Id. at 534. Second, a court must"assess the general(cid:13) features of the type of incident involved to determine(cid:13) whether the incident has a potentially disrupting impact on(cid:13) maritime commerce." Id. (internal quotations omitted).(cid:13) Finally, a court must "determine whether the general(cid:13) character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a(cid:13) substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id.(cid:13) (internal quotations omitted).(cid:13) We are satisfied that the Gibbses’ claims sound in(cid:13) admiralty under this analysis. First, the injuries to(cid:13) Christian Gibbs transpired on the Carnival Cruise Lines(cid:13) vessel, The Destiny, which was traveling in navigable(cid:13) waters. Second, ocean-going passenger vessels are clearly(cid:13) engaged in maritime commerce. See East River S.S. Corp. v.(cid:13) Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). Finally,(cid:13) the defective design or manufacture of parts of a boat(cid:13) designed for maritime use, such as the deck of a cruise(cid:13) ship, bears a substantial relationship to traditional(cid:13) maritime activity. E.g., Mink ex rel. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.(cid:13) Genmar Indus., 29 F.3d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing(cid:13) cases where products liability actions involving pleasure(cid:13) craft in navigable waters sounded in admiralty law).(cid:13) Although the Gibbses’ complaint alleged more than mere(cid:13) products liability--they also claimed breach of contract,(cid:13) infliction of emotional distress, and negligence on the part(cid:13) of Carnival employees--the analysis pointing to a nexus(cid:13) with maritime commerce is still present. See Fedorczyk v.(cid:13) Caribbean Cruise Lines Ltd., 82 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1996)(cid:13) (concluding that a slip in a bathtub in a ship cabin"has a(cid:13) nexus to ‘traditional maritime activity"’ despite the fact that(cid:13) the injury was not a uniquely maritime occurrence);(cid:13) Friedman v. Cunard Line Ltd., 996 F. Supp. 303, 307(cid:13) (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that "even assuming that a(cid:13) 9(cid:13) maritime nexus is necessary to establish admiralty(cid:13) jurisdiction over a tort committed on the high seas (a(cid:13) question the Supreme Court left open in East River(cid:13) Steamship Corp. and does not appear to have subsequently(cid:13) addressed), that nexus is established by the role that(cid:13) ocean-going cruise ships play in maritime commerce"). The(cid:13) Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also specifically(cid:13) held that intentional infliction of emotional distress torts(cid:13) that occur on board cruise vessels are governed by(cid:13) maritime law. Wallis ex rel. Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc.,(cid:13) 306 F.3d 827, 840 (9th Cir. 2002).(cid:13) Moreover, as to the contract claims, it is settled(cid:13) jurisprudence that passenger ticket contracts for cruises(cid:13) are maritime contracts governed by federal admiralty law.(cid:13) Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991);(cid:13) see also Schenck v. Kloster Cruise, Ltd., 800 F. Supp. 120,(cid:13) 122 (D.N.J. 1992), aff’d, 993 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1993);(cid:13) Vavoules v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 822 F. Supp. 979, 982-83(cid:13) (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that since 1946, "courts, without(cid:13) exception, have applied federal maritime law in cases(cid:13) involving passenger cruise tickets and other maritime(cid:13) contracts," and citing examples).(cid:13) Since we conclude that this case sounds in admiralty, we(cid:13) apply federal admiralty law and not the law of New Jersey(cid:13) or any other state. That the District Court took this case(cid:13) under diversity jurisdiction, rather than admiralty(cid:13) jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1333, does not affect this(cid:13) determination. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S.(cid:13) 406, 410-11 (1953) (holding that courts apply substantive(cid:13) admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless(cid:13) of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty(cid:13) jurisdiction); Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping, Inc. , 562 F.2d(cid:13) 215, 221 n.11 (3d Cir. 1977). Thus, for cases such as this(cid:13) that sound in admiralty, we need not look to the general(cid:13) choice of law rules articulated in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,(cid:13) 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Klaxon, supra, that typically apply(cid:13) to suits brought in diversity jurisdiction. See Scott v.(cid:13) Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14, 25 (3d Cir. 1968)(cid:13) (noting that "admiralty standards define liability for a(cid:13) maritime tort, whether the proceeding is instituted in(cid:13) admiralty or on the law side of the court").(cid:13) 10(cid:13) III. Estoppel(cid:13) With the choice of law issue resolved, we turn to a review(cid:13) of the District Court’s order dismissing Christian Gibbs’s(cid:13) claims. According to federal maritime law, the doctrine of(cid:13) "equitable estoppel is grounded on a notion of fair dealing(cid:13) and good conscience. It is designed to aid the law in the(cid:13) administration of justice where without its aid injustice(cid:13) might result." Marine Transp. Svcs. Sea-Barge Group, Inc. v.(cid:13) Python High Perf. Marine Corp., 16 F.3d 1133, 1138 (11th(cid:13) Cir. 1994) (internal quotation omitted). In Oxford Shipping(cid:13) Co., Ltd. v. New Hampshire Trading Corp., 697 F.2d 1, 4(cid:13) (1st Cir. 1982), (then) Judge Breyer explained:(cid:13) Traditionally, the doctrine of equitable estoppel(cid:13) operates to preclude a party who has made(cid:13) representations of fact through his words or conduct(cid:13) from asserting rights which might perhaps have(cid:13) otherwise existed as against another person, who has(cid:13) in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been(cid:13) led thereby to change his position for the worse, and(cid:13) who on his part acquired some corresponding right.(cid:13) Id. (quotations and alterations omitted). 1(cid:13) The District Court did not explicitly state the factors that(cid:13) led it to prevent Suzanne Gibbs from asserting that she(cid:13) became the legal representative of Christian Gibbs only(cid:13) when the Gibbses filed this lawsuit. However, what plainly(cid:13) (and understandably) disturbed the Court was that(cid:13) Suzanne Gibbs "could on the one hand assert guardian ad(cid:13) litem status in March of 1999, for purposes of asserting(cid:13) Christian’s interests. And then disavow that status for(cid:13) purposes of resisting the challenge to this lawsuit as being(cid:13) out of time." Finding this to be unfair, the Court "estopped(cid:13) [the Gibbses] from denying that Christian Gibbs had the(cid:13) same guardian ad litem," Suzanne Gibbs, from the date(cid:13) that the March 25, 1999 letter was sent to Carnival.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. We acknowledge that this formulation is not materially different from(cid:13) the New Jersey standard of estoppel cited by the parties. See Barone v.(cid:13) Leukemia Soc. of America, 42 F. Supp.2d 452, 464 (D. N.J. 1998);(cid:13) Highway Trailer Co. v. Donna Motor Lines, Inc., 217 A.2d 617 (N.J. Sup.(cid:13) Ct. 1966).(cid:13) 11(cid:13) Although the Gibbses’ actions might be off-putting, they(cid:13) do not rise to the level of injustice that the law of estoppel(cid:13) is designed to redress. The Gibbses argue that the District(cid:13) Court erred on two scores. First, the March 25, 1999 letter(cid:13) was merely advisory and had no legal weight because of the(cid:13) New Jersey Court Rules on the appointment of guardians(cid:13) ad litem. Second, Carnival exhibited no detrimental reliance(cid:13) on the letter and suffered no prejudice.(cid:13) The Gibbses do not deny that the letter represented(cid:13) Suzanne Gibbs’s purported status as legal representative of(cid:13) Christian, even though they contend it had no legal effect,(cid:13) nor do they dispute that Carnival relied on this letter in(cid:13) good faith. Carnival asserts that its reliance on the March(cid:13) 25, 1999 letter was to its detriment because "[h]ad Carnival(cid:13) known the true legal status of Suzanne Gibbs it could have(cid:13) taken appropriate steps to protect its interests in not only(cid:13) its investigation of the extent of Christian Gibbs’s injury(cid:13) and overall negotiation of the claim, but also in terms of(cid:13) assertion of the time-bar provisions in the passenger ticket(cid:13) contract." [Carnival Br. at 8.] We find this response to be(cid:13) underwhelming. Leaving aside the question whether(cid:13) Carnival could rely on counsel’s representation as to legal(cid:13) status, Carnival fails to present any evidence of detrimental(cid:13) reliance. See Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 663 (1st Cir.(cid:13) 1987) (declining to apply estoppel when the moving party(cid:13) failed to prove that he "relied to his detriment on the(cid:13) interdicted behavior"). And, as stated above, the letter had(cid:13) no legal weight. For these reasons, the Gibbses should not(cid:13) have been estopped from presenting their theory that the(cid:13) appointment of a legal representative for Christian Gibbs(cid:13) did not occur until they filed this lawsuit.(cid:13) IV. Appointment of a Legal Representative(cid:13) Having determined that the application of estoppel was(cid:13) inappropriate, we must now decide whether the District(cid:13) Court was nonetheless correct in dismissing Christian(cid:13) Gibbs’s claims as time-barred according to the provision in(cid:13) the passenger ticket contract limiting the time to bring suit(cid:13) to one year.(cid:13) 12(cid:13) A. The Meaning of 46 U.S.C. S 183b(c)(cid:13) The Gibbses contend that the time-bar was not triggered(cid:13) because Christian Gibbs’s complaint was filed within the(cid:13) safe-harbor of 46 U.S.C. S 183b(c), which mandates the(cid:13) tolling of suit time-bars in passenger ticket contracts for(cid:13) minors who suffer injury aboard maritime carriers. This(cid:13) statute provides in relevant part:(cid:13) If a person who is entitled to recover on any such claim(cid:13) is . . . a minor . . . any lawful limitation of time(cid:13) prescribed in such contract shall not be applicable so(cid:13) long as no legal representative has been appointed for(cid:13) such . . . minor . . . but shall be applicable from the(cid:13) date of the appointment of such legal representative:(cid:13) Provided, however, that such appointment be made(cid:13) within three years after the date of such death or(cid:13) injury.(cid:13) The statute does not specify the process by which a"legal(cid:13) representative" is appointed. Carnival contends that this(cid:13) appointment occurred on or about March 25, 1999, when(cid:13) the Gibbses retained counsel and notified Carnival that(cid:13) Suzanne Gibbs was appointed guardian ad litem for(cid:13) Christian. The Gibbses respond that under New Jersey(cid:13) Court Rule 4:26-2(b)(2), in negligence actions a parent shall(cid:13) not "be deemed to be appointed guardian ad litem of the(cid:13) child without court order" until "the filing of a pleading or(cid:13) certificate signed by an attorney." Id. Therefore, they submit(cid:13) that Suzanne Gibbs was not appointed legal representative(cid:13) of Christian Gibbs within the meaning of S 183b(c) until the(cid:13) Gibbses filed their complaint before the District Court.(cid:13) Since the complaint was filed on August 21, 2000, well(cid:13) before the three-year limit to appoint a legal representative(cid:13) specified in the statute, the Gibbses argue that the time-bar(cid:13) provision in the passenger ticket contract did not expire.(cid:13) While the New Jersey Court Rule is relevant to our(cid:13) inquiry and will be discussed further in the next section, we(cid:13) do not begin our analysis with this Court Rule. Instead, we(cid:13) must look to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, which(cid:13) explains the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, and may(cid:13) therefore be used to determine how a person is appointed(cid:13) a "legal representative" within the meaning ofS 183b(c). We(cid:13) 13(cid:13) apply the Federal Rules instead of the New Jersey Court(cid:13) Rules because state rules regarding the appointment of(cid:13) guardians ad litem are procedural and therefore do not(cid:13) apply, in the first instance, to cases brought in federal(cid:13) courts. See M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174 n.4 (8th(cid:13) Cir. 1977); 6A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and(cid:13) Procedure S 1571, at 511-12 (1991); see generally Hanna v.(cid:13) Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965) (federal courts apply(cid:13) on-point Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of state(cid:13) procedural practices).(cid:13) B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(cid:13) Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 prescribes a two-part inquiry. Rule(cid:13) 17(b) incorporates state law practice and provides,"The(cid:13) capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a(cid:13) representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be(cid:13) determined by the law of the individual’s domicile." Rule(cid:13) 17(c) refers specifically to infants:(cid:13) Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a(cid:13) representative, such as a general guardian, committee,(cid:13) conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative(cid:13) may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or(cid:13) incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person(cid:13) who does not have a duly appointed representative may(cid:13) sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The(cid:13) court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or(cid:13) incompetent person not otherwise represented in an(cid:13) action or shall make such other order as it seems(cid:13) proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent(cid:13) person.(cid:13) Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (emphasis added).(cid:13) Under this two-step process, a federal court must first(cid:13) determine whether the infant has a "duly appointed(cid:13) representative" who has the capacity to bring the action on(cid:13) behalf of the infant. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 869(cid:13) (3d Cir. 1968). Rule 17(b) instructs the court to look at the(cid:13) "law of the individual’s domicile," in this case New Jersey,(cid:13) to ascertain whether a representative has been duly(cid:13) appointed. Hence, we apply the New Jersey Court Rules.(cid:13) 14(cid:13) N.J. Court Rule 4:26-2(b)(2) states that the "Appointment(cid:13) of Parent in Negligence Actions" as guardian ad litem is not(cid:13) consummated until "the filing of a pleading or certificate(cid:13) signed by the attorney" containing certain relevant(cid:13) information, including a statement showing the absence of(cid:13) a conflict of interest between parent and child. Under the(cid:13) plain meaning of this rule, Suzanne Gibbs was not(cid:13) appointed guardian ad litem because she never filed any(cid:13) papers with a court. New Jersey vests sole authority of(cid:13) appointment in negligence actions in courts, not private(cid:13) actors, in order to ensure that the child’s interests are(cid:13) protected. See Moscatello ex rel. Moscatello v. Univ. of Med.(cid:13) and Dentistry of N.J., 342 N.J. Super. 351, 360-61 (N.J.(cid:13) Super. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that a "child’s separate claim(cid:13) for tort damages cannot be prosecuted except by a(cid:13) guardian ad litem" and that a court must authorize a(cid:13) guardian’s settlement of a child’s cause of action). Absent(cid:13) the filing of papers before a court, Suzanne Gibbs cannot(cid:13) be construed as having the capacity to sue on behalf of her(cid:13) son under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b).(cid:13) Next we look to Rule 17(c). It explains that "[a]n infant(cid:13) . . . who does not have a duly appointed representative may(cid:13) sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem." Since(cid:13) Suzanne Gibbs had not been "duly appointed" guardian ad(cid:13) litem under New Jersey law, "[t]he court shall appoint a(cid:13) guardian ad litem for an infant . . . not otherwise(cid:13) represented in an action or shall make such order as it(cid:13) deems proper for the protection of the infant." Fed. R. Civ.(cid:13) P. 17(c). A district court need not look to the state law,(cid:13) however, in determining what factors or procedures to use(cid:13) when appointing the guardian ad litem. See M.S. , 557 F.2d(cid:13) at 174 n.4. Rather, its polestar appears to be the protection(cid:13) of the infant’s interests. See Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d(cid:13) 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1989); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 11-12(cid:13) (6th Cir. 1974). This makes particular sense when(cid:13) appointing a legal representative within the scope of 46(cid:13) U.S.C. S 183b(c), since that statute is designed to protect(cid:13) injured infants by ensuring that proper legal representation(cid:13) is appointed who will advance the best interests of the(cid:13) child. See Fugaro v. Royal Carribean Cruises Ltd., 851 F.(cid:13) Supp. 122, 125 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).(cid:13) 15(cid:13) In their complaint before the District Court, the Gibbses(cid:13) specified that Christian Gibbs is to be represented by(cid:13) Suzanne Gibbs as his guardian ad litem. There appears to(cid:13) be no conflict of interest between Suzanne Gibbs and her(cid:13) son, nor any other reason why she might not protect(cid:13) Christian’s interests. Therefore, we detect no reason to(cid:13) suggest that the District Court should not have accepted(cid:13) the appointment of Suzanne Gibbs as guardian ad litem for(cid:13) Christian in this action. Because no legal representative for(cid:13) Christian Gibbs had been appointed until the Gibbses(cid:13) commenced the instant action before the District Court,(cid:13) where a legal representative was first appointed for(cid:13) Christian, we hold that his claims against Carnival are not(cid:13) time-barred under the special tolling provisions for minors(cid:13) in S 183b(c).(cid:13) V. Conclusion(cid:13) We will therefore affirm the District Court’s order(cid:13) dismissing Suzanne and Richard Gibbs’s individual claims,(cid:13) but will vacate the Court’s order dismissing Christian(cid:13) Gibbs’s claims and remand for further proceedings(cid:13) consistent with this opinion.2 Parties to bear their own(cid:13) costs.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. In its 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss before the District Court, Carnival(cid:13) raised the alternative theory that the Court lacked jurisdiction over this(cid:13) case because of a forum selection clause in the passenger ticket contract(cid:13) specifying a court in Florida as the sole forum in which to bring suit.(cid:13) The District Court noted that it would likely enforce the forum selection(cid:13) clause under the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Carnival(cid:13) Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (validating the identical(cid:13) forum selection clause present in the Gibbses’ passenger ticket contract),(cid:13) but the District Court instead dismissed this case as untimely.(cid:13) Since the validity of the forum selection clause was not raised on(cid:13) appeal, we will not address it here. We note in this regard, however, that(cid:13) should the District Court choose to enforce this clause on remand, our(cid:13) holding in this opinion that the Gibbses have standing to bring(cid:13) Christian’s claims under the terms of the passenger ticket contract and(cid:13) 46 U.S.C. S 183b(c) means that the Gibbses will have the opportunity to(cid:13) re-file Christian’s claim in a Florida court. Further, if this case(cid:13) resurfaces in Florida, that state’s laws on the appointment of guardians(cid:13) ad litem would not be relevant to the standing analysis conducted here.(cid:13) This is because Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b) commands a district court to look(cid:13) to the law of the minor’s domicile, here New Jersey, to determine(cid:13) whether a guardian ad litem has been appointed for a minor. If no(cid:13) guardian has been appointed, then the court acts in accordance with(cid:13) Rule 17(c) under its own consideration of the interests of the minor.(cid:13) 16(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 17
