[¶ 1] Roger Gibbon appealed from an amended divorce decree dissolving his marriage with Nancy Gibbon and dividing the parties’ marital estate. The triаl court declined to order liquidation of their assets. We hold the trial court did not clearly err in structuring the division of the parties’ marital estate, аnd we reject Roger’s request for this court to order liquidation of the parties’ assets. We affirm.
[¶ 2] Roger and Nancy were married in 1977. During their marriage, thеy engaged in a farming and ranching operation that was part of a joint venture with members of Roger’s family. The trial court initially valued the partiеs’ net worth at $821,447.96 and awarded each party marital property valued at $410,723.98. The court’s initial decree allowed Roger to retain the farming and ranching operation, and awarded Nancy three tracts of real estate cumulatively valued at $106,000, personal property vаlued at $47,525, spousal support of $500 per month for two years, and a $257,198 cash settlement. After crediting Roger for $30,000 already paid to Nancy, the сourt structured the cash settlement to require him to pay Nancy $13,000 by November 1, 1996, $75,000. by April 1, 1997, and $139,198 at six percent interest payable over 15 years with monthly рayments starting July 1,1997.
[¶ 3] Roger moved to amend the judgment, contending he could not operate the farming and ranching operation and satisfy the cash payments required by the decree. Roger asked the court to reconsider the property distribution, or to liquidate the marital estate аnd equally distribute the proceeds to each party.
[¶4] After correcting a mistake in valuation that increased the parties’ net worth to $896,447.96, the court amended the judgment to award Nancy $440,525.00 and Roger $455,-922.96 in marital property. The court’s amended decree changed the award of spousal support to Nancy to a property distribution and'also increased the total cash settlement to $281,000. The court structured the cаsh settlement to include a $56,000 award that Roger already had paid; a $75,000 award at 6 percent interest with $32,500 1 due April 1, 1997, and $37,500 due April 1, 1998; and a $150,000 award at 6 percent interest, payable over 20 years with monthly payments beginning July 1, 1997. The court refused to order liquidation of the parties’ assets.
[¶ 5] Roger contends the trial court erred in dividing the parties’ ■ marital estate and imposing a payment structure that destroyed the viability of the farming and ranching oрeration. He argues the trial court erred in refusing to order liquidation of the parties’ marital estate and an equal distribution of the procеeds. He claims the increased debt load associated with the cash payments to Nancy precludes him from financing the obligations imposed by the amended judgment. He contends the amended judgment leaves him no choice but to liquidate assets awarded to him and to alone suffer the adverse tax consequences of the liquidation. He asks us to direct “the orderly liquidation of the parties’ marital estate, and, after crediting [him] for the amounts he has already paid Nancy ... for property settlement, an equal division of the remaining proceeds.”
[¶ 6] When a divorcе is granted, N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24 requires a trial court to “make such equitable distribution of the real and personal property of the parties as may seem just, and proper.” In dividing the prop
*709
erty, the trial court must consider relevant factors under the
Ruff-Fischer
guidelines.
van Oosting v. van Oosting,
[¶ 7] In divorce proceedings, we have recognized the importance of preserving the viability of a business operation like a family farm, and the potential for economic hardship if those type of entities are divided.
See Linrud v. Linrud,
[¶ 8] The evidence in this record supports the trial court’s decision to structure the property division with an оffsetting monetary award to Nancy. Although Roger presented evidence he could not obtain financing for the cash settlement, there was also evidence that financial statements used by Roger in an attempt to secure financing did not reflect the actual financial picturе for the farming and ranching operation. The evidence supports conflicting inferences about the viability of the structure of the cash settlement chosen by the trial court. The trial court was in the best position to assess the evidence, and in refusing to order liquidation, the court explained:
“In view of the assets of these parties and in view of the way the Court has structured the distribution of the assets to [Nancy], the Court does not feel it is necessary for [Roger] to liquidate his operation. It is apparent to this Court that both of the parties will do virtually anything to make life miserable for the other party even if they have to hurt themselves in the process. It is apparent to the Court that the threat of liquidation falls in that category.”
[¶ 9] The trial court could have structured the payments in several different ways; however, the possibility of implementing a different method for thе distribution is not enough to convince us the method used by the trial court is clearly erroneous.
See Olson v. Olson,
*710 [¶ 10] The trial court’s decision is supported by the evidence, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction the trial court made a mistake in distributing the parties’ marital estate or structuring the payments for that distribution. The trial court’s property division and method of payment, therefore, are not clearly erroneous.
[¶ 11] We affirm the amended judgment.
Notes
. On appeal, neither party has questioned the accuracy of the amount of the April 1, 1997 payment.