76 Conn. App. 352 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2003
Opinion
Under General Statutes § 20-327b,
On April 27, 2000, the plaintiffs, Michael Giametti and Elizabeth Giametti, filed their initial complaint against the defendant Laura L. Zacks for having misrepresented the condition of residential property that she had conveyed to them.
In response, the defendant denied the plaintiff’s allegations and asserted two special defenses. The first special defense alleged that the defendant’s representa
On April 24, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment. The court first found, for the defendant, that she had no actual knowledge of the infestation at the time she signed the § 20-327b report and that she had not fraudulently misrepresented the condition of her property. It further found, for the plaintiff, that the defendant, in the § 20-327b report, had negligently misrepresented that the property was not infested with ants. The court awarded the plaintiff $4600 for the cost of repairs and treatment of the house. The defendant appeals from the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The record discloses the following facts. In 1998, the plaintiff and the defendant negotiated the sale of a house located at 8 Wood Terrace in East Haven. The defendant had lived there for approximately a decade prior to the conveyance to the plaintiff. On March 2, 1998, the parties executed a § 20-327b report wherein the defendant indicated that, to the best of her knowledge, the house was not subject to any kind of infestation. On March 12, 1998, the parties executed the contract of sale and transferred title to the plaintiff at a closing in May. At the defendant’s urging, the plaintiff hired a professional inspector, Inspections, Inc., to inspect the dwelling as required by the contract of sale. The inspector did not discover any infestation.
Shortly after taking possession, the plaintiff discovered ants throughout the dwelling. He hired Keith Bode, an exterminator, to treat the house for a possible infestation. As a result, the plaintiff discovered that their
In the trial court’s memorandum of decision, it found that the defendant had negligently misrepresented the condition of her property in her § 20-327b report. It based this finding on the credibility of the testimony given by Bode.
On appeal, the defendant challenges both the factual findings and the legal conclusions of the court. Although the defendant does not articulate the basis for her appeal as clearly as she might have, we construe her claimed errors as follows: (1) the court made improper factual findings of negligent misrepresentation, and (2) the plaintiff could not prevail, as a matter of law, without establishing his reliance on her misrepresentations. The plaintiff urges affirmance of the trial court’s judgment in his favor.
Our standard of review of challenges to the court’s findings of fact and legal conclusions is well established. “To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find sup
I
The trial court found that the defendant did not intentionally make any misleading statements or withhold information regarding the condition of the house when she executed the § 20-327b report. In making this determination, the court explained why the defendant was not liable under the common-law theories of fraudulent misrepresentation and nondisclosure, but did not address § 20-327b itself. Nonetheless, it found that the defendant had made a negligent misrepresentation in the § 20-327b report when she indicated therein that the dwelling was “free of termites, insects, rodents and infestation problems.”
We, therefore, must first address what cause of action the plaintiff had under § 20-327b. We hold that the plaintiff could have sought relief under this statute only for a knowing misrepresentation in the statutoiy report.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law. State v. Russo, 259 Conn. 436, 447, 790 A.2d 1132 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 879, 123 S. Ct. 79, 154 L. Ed. 2d 134 (2002). Our Supreme Court recently clarified the process of statutory interpretation in Stale v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 816 A.2d 562 (2003) (enbanc). “The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutoiy language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute
“In performing this task, we begin with a searching examination of the language of the statute, because that is the most important factor to be considered. In doing so, we attempt to determine its range of plausible meanings and, if possible, narrow that range to those that appear most plausible. We do not, however, end with the language. We recognize, further, that the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context of the language, broadly understood, are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute.
“This does not mean, however, that we will not, in a given case, follow what may be regarded as the plain meaning of the language, namely, the meaning that, when the language is considered without reference to any extratextual sources of its meaning, appears to be the meaning and that appears to preclude any other likely meaning. In such a case, the more strongly the bare text supports such a meaning, the more persuasive the extratextual sources of meaning will have to be in order to yield a different meaning.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 577-78.
Our legislature enacted § 20-327b, otherwise known as the Uniform Property Condition Disclosure Act, to reduce the risk of miscommunication regarding residential property between a vendor and a prospective purchaser. The statute requires a vendor of such property to provide “a written residential condition report to the
At the same time that the legislature enacted this statute, it also enacted §§ 20-327d
In sum, the function of a § 20-327b report is to diminish the risk of litigation by facilitating meaningful communications between a vendor and a prospective purchaser. It does not, however, require a vendor to assume the role of warrantor of conditions of which the vendor was in fact unaware.
The trial court properly concluded, therefore, that the defendant in this case had no statutory liability under § 20-327b. This result follows from the court’s finding that she had no actual knowledge of any ant infestation.
II
The trial court also determined, however, that the defendant was hable for having made a negligent misrepresentation on the § 20-327b report. We turn now to the propriety of the court’s conclusion that the defendant should have discovered and disclosed that her house was infested with ants before she signed the § 20-327b report.
A
We briefly address the question of whether § 20-327b governs negligent misrepresentation actions. The statute, on its face, does not govern such actions. Additionally, the legislative history demonstrates the legislature’s intent not to use the statute as a basis for recovery against vendors who negligently misrepresent the condition of a residential property. Representative Eberle explained that the statute “makes clear that the [§ 20-327b] report represents only the seller’s actual knowledge of the property and does not form the basis for any claim of constructive knowledge on the seller’s part.” 38 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 6963. The plaintiffs have not cited authority to the contrary. Accordingly, we hold that § 20-327b does not govern negligent misrepresentation actions.
B
We turn next to the question of whether § 20-327b precludes common-law actions for negligent misrepresentation. The text of the statute and the statute’s legislative history require the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to preclude preexisting common-law actions for negligent misrepresentation.
The statutory scheme contains no language to suggest that § 20-327b was intended to provide the exclusive remedy that a disappointed purchaser of residential property might have. There is every reason to believe that this omission was deliberate.
We are persuaded, therefore, that § 20-327b does not preclude existing common-law actions for misrepresentations made by a vendor regarding the condition of residential property.
C
We finally turn to the critical question in this case. Is the court’s conclusion that the defendant was hable to the plaintiff for negligently misrepresenting the condition of the house legally correct and supported by the record? We conclude that the court’s judgment is not supported by the record.
Our Supreme Court “has long recognized liability for negligent misrepresentation. We have held that even an innocent misrepresentation of fact may be actionable if the declarant has the means of knowing, ought to know, or has the duty of knowing the truth. . . . The governing principles are set forth in similar terms in § 552 of the Restatement Second of Torts (1977): One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors of Notre Dame High School, 202 Conn. 206, 217-18, 520 A.2d 217 (1987); Parker v. Shaker Real Estate, Inc., 47 Conn. App. 489, 494-95, 705 A.2d 210 (1998). A vendor of residential property is liable to a purchaser for a negligent misrepresentation of the condition of the property to that purchaser if the purchaser would not otherwise have agreed to the terms of the sale. See Richard v. A. Waldman & Sons, Inc., 155 Conn. 343, 347, 232 A.2d 307 (1967); Warman v. Delaney, 148 Conn. 469, 473-74, 172 A.2d 188 (1961); Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 721-22, 682 A.2d 1026, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931, 683 A.2d 397 (1996).
The court, therefore, as it did, properly could have accepted Bode’s testimony as evidence that the defendant should have known that the house was infested with ants. It did not, however, make an explicit finding as to reliance. Nevertheless, we can infer from the court’s conclusion that it implicitly found for the plaintiff on the issue of reliance when it concluded that the defendant was negligent. Because we find that the court’s application of the law was legally and logically correct, we must determine whether its findings of fact were clearly erroneous. We conclude that the court’s implied factual findings did not meet this test.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff hired an independent professional to inspect the dwelling. The inspection did not uncover any infestation. Moreover, the plaintiff testified that the inspection lasted for only one hour and twenty minutes and that the inspector told him that he was in a rush. It is also undisputed that the plaintiff did not initially want to obtain a professional inspection and that the defendant urged him to do so. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for us to conclude that the record evinces sufficient facts establishing the plaintiffs reliance on the defendant.
Section 20-327b reinforces our conclusion. The statute emphasizes the significance of an independent pro
We may invoke § 20-327b even though it does not govern common-law misrepresentation because it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature’s statement of policy has carryover relevance to the common law. We presume that the legislature enacts legislation that “renders the body of the law coherent and consistent, rather than contradictory and inconsistent . . . [and that] courts must discharge their responsibility, in case by case adjudication, to assure that the body of the law — both common and statutory — remains coherent and consistent.” (Citation omitted.) Fahy v. Fahy, 227 Conn. 505, 513-14, 630 A.2d 1328 (1993). Under suitable circumstances, our Supreme Court has relied on statutory policy to inform common-law adjudication. Id., 514; see also Olean v. Treglia, 190 Conn. 756, 762, 463 A.2d 242 (1983). This is another such circumstance.
The relationship between the policy of § 20-327b and the common law of negligent misrepresentation persuades us that, in the absence of any other evidence of actual reliance by the plaintiff, he cannot prevail in his negligent misrepresentation claim. Indeed, the plaintiffs claim that he relied on the defendant’s statements is further attenuated by the undisputed fact that the defendant advised him not to do so.
We conclude, therefore, that the findings of fact supporting the court’s judgment for the plaintiff were insufficient to support the judgment. Specifically, the record does not reveal any evidence that the plaintiff, despite the professional inspection, was justified in relying on
The judgment is reversed with respect to count seven of the plaintiffs amended complaint and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment for the defendant.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 20-327b (a) provides in relevant part: “[EJach person who offers residential property in the state for sale . . . shall provide a written residential condition report to the prospective purchaser at any time prior to the prospective purchaser’s execution of any binder, contract to purchase, option, or lease containing a purchase option. A photocopy, duplicate original, facsimile transmission, or other exact reproduction or duplicate of the written residential condition report containing the prospective purchaser’s written receipt shall be attached to any written offer, binder or contract to purchase. Aphotocopy, duplicate original, facsimile transmission or other exact reproduction or duplicate of the written residential condition report containing the signatures of both seller and purchaser, shall be attached to any agreement to purchase the property.”
The plaintiffs’ complaint also named Inspections, Inc., as a defendant. The named plaintiff and Inspections, Inc., however, reached a settlement prior to trial. We refer in this opinion to Laura L. Zades as the defendant.
On October 27, 2000, Elizabeth Giametti withdrew from the action as a plaintiff. We refer in this opinion to Michael Giametti as the plaintiff.
Bode testified that the defendant should have noticed ants throughout the home because of the size of the nests and of the ants themselves.
General Statutes § 20-327d provides: “No provision of section 20-327b or 20-327c: (1) Shall be construed to create any new implied or express warranties on behalf of the seller of the property; or (2) shall be construed to require the seller of the property to secure inspections, tests or other methods of determining the physical conditions of the property.”
General Statutes § 20-327e provides: “The representations made by the seller pursuant to section 20-327b or 20-327c shall be construed only to extend to the seller’s actual knowledge of the property and no constructive knowledge shall be imputed to the seller.”
The regulations accompanying § 20-327b do not further illuminate the scope of the report. Rather, the regulations focus on the responsibilities of a licensed real estate agent or broker to avoid fraudulent misrepresentations or concealments. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 20-328-5a.
The defendant has not argued that, if her statement on the § 20-327b report was a negligent misrepresentation, that it is not actionable as such because it was made as part of her completion of the form itself.
We decline to remand this case for a further articulation of the trial court’s factual findings pursuant to Practice Book § 60-5. DiLieto v. Better Homes Insulaton Co., 16 Conn. App. 100, 104, 546 A.2d 957 (1988). The plaintiff introduced no evidence whatsoever about the effect of the inspector’s report on his alleged reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation. The court’s omission in this case, therefore, did not concern a subsidiary finding of fact. Rather, the court failed to address a necessary condition of law, namely the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ reliance on the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation.