301 N.W.2d 349 | Neb. | 1981
This is an appeal from an order of the District Court granting in part and in part denying relator’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting that the respondent be ordered to give physical custody of the parties’ minor child to relator. The District Court ordered that the respondent should have legal and
The parties were married in Indiana in July 1968. The respondent testified that when she first became pregnant with the child whose custody is at issue, relator abused her physically and verbally and stated that he wished the baby would die. She further testified that when she was 614 months pregnant his abuse forced her to leave him and move home with her parents where the baby was born in August 1970. After the baby was born the relator visited respondent and the baby but refused to take them home with him. Several weeks later respondent went back to relator and lived with him until January 1971 when he went to Afghanistan. Respondent stated that when relator left he sold their belongings, and respondent and the child had to move in with respondent’s parents because relator left her no money. Relator returned to the United States in August 1971 and lived with respondent and the child until the divorce in May 1976.
In November 1976 respondent took the child to a psychiatrist who diagnosed the child as being under a great deal of stress and having symptoms of anxiety and regressive behavior. He has been receiving psychiatric care since. The record shows that the child fears that the relator may try to kill the respondent and take him to Afghanistan. The child testified that his fears were
“The general rule is that a judgment of a state court which had jurisdiction has the same credit, validity, and effect in every other court in the United States which it had in the state where it was pronounced.” Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 125, 230 N.W.2d 472,474 (1975). However, “[i]t is the position of this court that when a court’s jurisdiction is invoked by a habeas corpus petition seeking custody of a child, the child becomes a ward of the court and the prime consideration is the welfare of the child.” Copple v. Copple, 186 Neb. 696, 700, 185 N.W.2d 846, 849 (1971). Although the District Court found there had been a significant change in circumstances, in a habeas corpus proceeding the court is not
“‘The welfare of minors is not to be determined by legal technicalities, or by adversary rights as between the parents or other custodians, or by contumacy .or other reprehensible conduct of the parents which does not have a direct bearing on the children’s welfare.’” Copple v. Copple, supra at 699-700, 185 N.W.2d at 849. The record shows that the best interests of this child require that his permanent custody be transferred to respondent. This portion of the District Court’s judgment is affirmed.
Respondent filed a cross-appeal with this court assigning as error the following: That the trial court erred by finding that the Ohio court had jurisdiction to modify the custody provisions of the original decree; that the court erred in granting relator temporary custody for the purposes of visitation; and that the court erred in requiring respondent to pay the costs of the action, including $1,000 to be applied as relator’s attorney fee, and not allowing respondent an attorney fee from relator. The matter of whether or not the Ohio court retained jurisdiction in this matter is moot. The record shows that in November 1977 respondent submitted to the jurisdiction of the Ohio court, and she will not now be heard to say that the court had no jurisdiction over her.
The record also establishes that any contact with the relator is harmful to the child. The child suffers from emotional and psychological disorders which worsen whenever the child is forced to see the relator. The child’s performance in school and his relationships with others manifest the child’s psychosis resulting from
Respondent’s assignment that it was error for the District Court to award relator $1,000 in attorney fees is well taken. “It is the practice in this state to allow recovery of attorneys’ fees only in such cases as are provided for by law, or where the uniform course of procedure has been to allow such recovery. As a general rule of practice in this state, attorneys’ fees are allowed to the successful party in litigation only where such allowance is provided by statute.” Higgins v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 95 Neb. 3, 7, 144 N.W. 1037, 1039 (1914); Shepard v. Shepard, 145 Neb. 12, 16, 15 N.W.2d 195, 198 (1944); Hawkeye Casualty Co. v. Stoker, 154 Neb. 466, 485, 48 N.W.2d 623, 634 (1951).
There is no statutory authority for awarding attorney fees in a habeas corpus proceeding in this state. Therefore, that portion of the judgment awarding to relator attorney fees is reversed with directions to enter a judgment that each party pay his own attorney fees.
Affirmed in part, and in part REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS.