OPINION BY
¶ 1 Aрpellant John Getty (“Husband”) seeks to appeal a trial court order regarding the equitable distribution of marital property owned by Husband and Apрellee Michelle Getty (“Wife”).
¶ 2 The following summary of the factual and procedural histories underlying this matter is sufficient for our disposition. Following an equitаble distribution hearing, the trial court entered an order distributing the couple’s marital property, which, inter alia, awarded Wife 65% of Husband’s City of Philadelphia Employees Deferred Compensation Plan and the same percentage of his pension plan. Trial Court Order, 12/21/04.
¶3 On December 29, 2004, Husband filed a motion for rеconsideration in which he argued, inter alia, that, to the extent Wife is entitled to 65% of his deferred
¶4 Thereafter, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the court directed Husband to file a statement of matters complained of on appeal, and Husband timely complied. The trial court followed by filing an extensive opinion in support of its decisions, аnd this appeal followed.
¶ 5 Before we can consider the merits of the issues raised by Husband, we must determine whether this appeal is propеrly before the Court.
¶ 6 After an appeal is taken, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701(b)(3) allows a trial court to grant reconsideration of its order where:
(i) an application for reconsideration of the order is filed in the trial court or other government unit within the time provided or prеscribed by law; and
(ii) an order expressly granting reconsideration of such prior order is filed in the trial court or other government unit within the time prescribеd by these rules for the filing of a notice of appeal or petition for review of a quasijudicial order with respect to such order, or within any shorter time provided or prescribed by law for the granting of reconsideration.
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3)(i) and (ii). Here, Husband timely filed a motion for reconsideration, аnd the trial court issued an order expressly granting reconsideration within thirty days of its original order, which, therefore, means that the court filed its order granting rеconsideration within the time for appeal prescribed by Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). As such, the court acted within its authority when it granted reconsideration of its ordеr. Thus, we turn to the remainder of Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3), which provides as follows:
A timely order granting reconsideration under this paragraph shall render inoperative any such notice of appeal or petition for review of a quasijudicial order theretofore or thereafter filed or docketеd with respect to the prior order.
*871 The petitioning party shall and any party may file a praecipe with the protho-notary of any cоurt in which such an inoperative notice or petition is filed or docketed and the prothonotary shall note on the docket that such notice or petition has been stricken under this rule. Where a timely order of reconsideration is entered under this paragraph, the time for filing a notiсe of appeal or petition for review begins to run anew after the entry of the decision on reconsideration, whether or not that decision amounts to a reaffirmation of the prior determination of the trial court or other government unit. No additional fees shall be required for the filing of the new notice of appeal or petition for review.
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) (emphasis added); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1930.2(d) (“The time for filing a notice of appeal will begin to run anew from thе date of entry of the reconsidered decision, or, if the court does not enter a reconsidered decision within 120 days, from the 121st day.”)
¶ 7 We find the languаge the Supreme Court employed in fashioning Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) to be clear and unambiguous.
¶ 8 For these reasons, we quash this appeal.
¶ 9 Appeal quashed. Motion to Dismiss dismissed as moot.
Notes
. A final divorce decree was entered on December 27, 2004.
. We note that Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 108 governs the date of entry of an order. As to civil matters, the following rule dictates when аn order was entered:
The date of entry of an order in a matter subject to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure shall be the day on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket that notice of entry of the order has been given as required by Pa.RCiv.P. 236(b).
Pa.R.A.P. 108(b).
. The trial court’s order states that the court granted in part and denied in part Appellant’s motion for reconsideration. However, in the same order, the court modified its original order. Therefore, technically speaking, in its January 20, 2005, order, the trial court granted reconsideration in full, and at the same time, the court granted Husband’s requеst, in part, to modify the court’s original order.
. This Court may raise matters regarding its jurisdiction sua sponte. See Tohan v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
.The Rules of Appellate Procedure are to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Statutоry Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1901 etseq. See Pa.R.A.P. 107. Subsection 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act provides as follows:
When the words of a [rule] are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). It is only when the words of a rule are not explicit that we may ascertain thе intent of the Supreme Court by considering factors outside the words of the rule. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c).
. It is worth noting that, in his brief to this Court, Husband purports to appeal from both the Dеcember 21, 2004, and the January 20, 2005, orders of the trial court. See, e.g., Husband's Brief at 2. As detailed above, Husband never properly appealed from the Janu-аiy 20, 2005, order.
. Wife filed in this Court a motion to dismiss in which she essentially argues that Husband failed to file his appellate brief in a timely fashion. Given our disposition of this matter, Wife's motion to dismiss is moot.