RULING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Defendant moves for reconsideration of this Court’s Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 32] filed March 31, 2005. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 33] is granted, and the prior Ruling is vacated in part and affirmed in part.
*272 I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict. Reconsideration “will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.”
Shrader v. CSX Transp.,
II.BACKGROUND 1
Defendant Riddle & Associates, P.C. (“Riddle”), a professional corporation organized under the laws of Utah, operates as a law firm specializing in consumer debt collection. In November 2003, Defendant was retained to recover on Plaintiff Gilbert J. Gervais’s past due account. The most recent activity on Plaintiffs account had occurred in 1993, and by 2003 any litigation to recover the debt was barred by the statute of limitations. On November 7, 2003, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter seeking payment on the debt and offering a discount for prompt payment. From mid-November until the end of November, Defendant also attempted unsuccessfully to contact Plaintiff by telephone eleven times and left several messages. On December 8, 2003, Plaintiff filed the present action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110a, et seq. Defendant filed a counterclaim requesting a declaratory judgment that its collection efforts violated neither the FDCPA nor CUTPA. Defendant and Plaintiff filed a Motion and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Docs. Nos. 17, 20], respectively, and in its Motion Defendant also asserted an affirmative bona-fide error defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. On March 31, 2005, this Court granted Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment for both the FDCPA and CUT-PA claims, rejected Defendant’s bona-fide error defense, and denied Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant now seeks reconsideration of that Ruling.
III.DISCUSSION
The FDCPA prohibits “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. This prohibition includes “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken” as well as “[t]he false representation of ... the character, amount, or legal status of any debt.” Id. §§ 1692e(5), (2)(A). More generally, the FDCPA also prohibits “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Id. § 1692e(10).
A. The False Threat of Litigation Claim Under § 1692e(5)
Previously, in granting Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendant made a false threat of litigation under *273 § 1692e(5). This Court based its conclusion on the content of a letter and several telephone messages that were left with Plaintiff by Defendant. The letter contained a letterhead identifying Defendant as “Attorneys & Counselors at Law,” and the following statements: (1) “[o]ur law firm has been retained to collect from you,” (2) “[o]ur client has agreed to,” and (3) “[i]f you want to resolve this matter, you must either pay the Total Amount Due ... or call our law firm ... and work out arrangements for payment.” (Rul. Mot. Summ. J. 6-7; Riddle & Assocs. Collection Letter 1, Ex. A. to Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J.) The telephone messages stated: “This is the law firm of Riddle & Associates calling you about an important legal matter.” (Rul.Mot.Summ. J. 7.) Upon reconsideration, this Court affirms its prior Ruling.
To evaluate claims under the FDCPA, a court views the facts using the “least-sophisticated-consumer standard.”
Clomon v. Jackson,
As a threshold matter, a court evaluating a claim under § 1693e(5) must determine whether litigation to secure the collection of a debt “[could] not legally be taken or ... is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). To make this determination in the instant case, the Court must evaluate the nature of Plaintiffs debt. Since the last activity on Plaintiffs account occurred in 1993, legal action by Plaintiffs creditor was barred by the six-year statute of limitations by the time Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter in 2003.
See
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42a-3-118. Nonetheless, Connecticut courts have long held that “[t]he Statute of Limitations creates a defense to an action. It does not erase the debt.... [T]he defense can be lost by an unequivocal acknowledgment of the debt, such as ... an unqualified recognition of the debt, or a payment on account.”
Wells v. Carson
In making this determination, courts have been careful to observe that there must be “more than the fact that a collection letter is from an attorney to find a section 1692e(5) violation.”
Kapeluschnik v. LeSchack & Grodensky, P.C.,
No. 96cv2399 (ERK)(CLP),
In addition to the source of the communication, courts look to the content of the communication in order to determine whether “[t]he clear import of the language, taken as a whole, is that some type of legal action has already been or is about to be initiated and can be averted from running its course only by payment.”
Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc.,
After reviewing the applicable precedent, this Court affirms its prior finding that Defendant’s communications constituted a threat of litigation. It is true that past decisions have emphasized the importance of “imminence” in determining whether a threat of litigation exists.
See, e.g., Bentley,
By affirming its prior Ruling, this Court does not hold that every collection letter from an attorney carries an implied threat of legal action. However, debt collectors cannot exploit the naivete of consumers through vague and unnecessary legal references. While all communications from Defendant were honest in fact, the least-sophisticated-consumer standard clearly contemplates that debtors shall be protected from nonfeasance as well as malfeasance.
See Nat’l Fin. Servs.,
In response, Defendant urges that if it did not emphasize its role as a law firm, it would “violate the disclosure requirements of the Connecticut licensing scheme” under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 36a-801. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 7.) However, this Court finds that Section 36a-801 hurts, rather than helps, Defendant’s argument. Section 36a-801 provides:
No person, licensed to act within this state as a consumer collection agency shall do so under any other name or at any other place of business than that named in the license. Any change of location of a place of business of a licensee shall require prior written notice to the commissioner.
Defendant provides that it is authorized and licensed to collect debts under the name of “Riddle & Associates, P.C.” (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 7.) Without more, this information suggests that Defendant’s use of the label “Attorneys & Counselors at Law” in its letter to Plaintiff actually tacks more closely to violating section 36a-801, rather than ensuring compliance. The Court also notes that the phrase “A Professional Corporation” is approximately three-times smaller than the neighboring text that reads “Attorneys & Counselors at Law” and “Our Client: CAMCO-Capital.” (See Riddle & Assocs. Collection Letter 1.) Again, these facts lead the Court to conclude that Defendant’s self-identifying statements, rather than complying with disclosure requirements, instead suggest that the debtor faces the high stakes of litigation and therefore should cooperate. Accordingly, after reconsideration, this Court affirms its prior Ruling granting summary judgment for Plaintiff on his claim under § 1692e(5).
B. The Remaining FDCPA Claims Under §§ 1692e(2)(A) and (10)
Having affirmed its prior Ruling on Plaintiffs § 1692e(5) claim, this Court also affirms its prior Ruling granting summary judgment for Plaintiff on his claims arising under §§ 1692e(2)(A) and (10). Courts have long held that after finding a valid claim under a more specific subsection of § 1692e, such as § 1692e(5), further analysis under § 1692e(10) is “somewhat dupli-cative.”
Kapeluschnik,
With regard to Plaintiffs claim under § 1692e(2)(A), this Court also holds that its finding of a violation of § 1692e(5) is dispositive. Section § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits “[t]he false representation of ... the ... legal status of any debt,” and as one court pointed out, “[c]ommon sense dictates that whether a debt is time-barred is directly related to the legal status of that debt.”
Shorty v. Capital One Bank,
C. The Overshadowing Claim Under § 1692g(b)
The FDCPA requires that a debt collector supply the consumer with a validation notice within five days of an initial communication, informing the consumer that he or she has thirty days to request additional information and/or dispute the debt, and that upon such request and/or dispute the debt collector’s collection activities shall cease.
See
15 U.S.C. § 1692g. The FDCPA admonishes that “[a]ny collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with” the validation notice.
Id.
§ 1692g(b). “A debt collection notice is overshadowing or contradictory if it fails to convey the validation information clearly and effectively and thereby makes the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights.”
Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc.,
Previously, in granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court con- *278 eluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendant’s validation notice contained language that im-permissibly overshadowed or contradicted the apprisal of Plaintiffs rights under the FDCPA. This conclusion was based on the existence of a settlement offer within Defendant’s validation notice. Specifically, Defendant offered Plaintiff the opportunity to satisfy the debt if fifty-percent of the outstanding amount was submitted within thirty days of the date of the validation notice. (Rul.Mot.Summ. J. 14.) This Court noted that under § 1692g, the consumer is entitled to thirty days from the date of receiving the validation notice to dispute the validity of the debt. (Id.) As a result, this Court deemed that the letter contained “mutually exclusive opportunities” that worked to “overshadow and contradict” the apprisal of Plaintiffs statutory right to dispute the debt.
As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that upon reconsideration, the opportunities presented in Defendant’s validation notice were not “mutually exclusive.” Thirty days from the receipt of Defendant’s validation notice and thirty days from the date of the validation notice describe overlapping periods of time. 2 Therefore, according to the plain meaning of the notice, there existed a period of time in which Plaintiff could have disputed the debt or requested the name and address of the original creditor, and at the same time availed himself of the discount.
Ultimately, even if Defendant’s validation notice described “mutually exclusive” opportunities, this Court finds that Defendant’s settlement offer was clearly distinguishable from the apprisal of Plaintiffs statutory rights under § 1692g. As such, merely including a settlement offer within a validation notice does not direct a finding of overshadowing or contradiction. On the contrary, in light of persuasive precedent and policy, this Court concludes that the mere existence of a settlement offer in a validation notice is insufficient to constitute an overshadowing claim under the FDCPA as a matter of law. Other courts in the Second Circuit have held that settlement offers do not overshadow validation notices. For example, in
Omog-beme v. Risk Management Alternatives, Inc.,
No. 01 CY 7293(SJ),
D.Defendant’s Bona Fide Error Defense Under § 1692k
In its prior Ruling, this Court held that Defendant could not avail itself of the “bona-fide error” (“BFE”) defense provided under § 1692k(c) of the FDCPA. Section 1692k(c) provides:
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this sub-chapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
Upon reconsideration, this Court affirms its prior holding.
It is undisputed that Defendant’s communications to Plaintiff were intentional. However, Defendant argues that it is entitled to the BFE defense because it did not subjectively intend to violate the FDCPA. (Def.’s Mot. Recons. 21.) However, as the Seventh Circuit noted in
Nielsen v. Dickerson,
E.Plaintiffs CUTPA Claim
Previously, this Court held that Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA also constituted a violation of CUTPA. In doing so, this Court adopted Plaintiffs novel argument that a violation of the FDCPA constituted the denial of an implied contractual benefit, which in turn satisfied CUTPA’s “ascertainable loss” requirement. However, upon reconsideration, this Court finds that this argument is inapplicable given the facts of the instant case.
CUTPA prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110b(a). To prevail on a claim under CUTPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she suffered “ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal” as a result of the conduct prohibited by the Act. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-110g(a);
see Hin-chliffe v. Am. Motors Corp.,
Plaintiff argues that there exists “a substantial benefit implicit in
every
consumer credit contract, namely: that should the consumer default ... the creditor (its agents and assigns) shall collect the debt” in accordance with the FDCPA. (Pl.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 34.) Therefore, the argument goes, a violation of the FDCPA works to deprive Plaintiff of the “benefit of his bargain.” Certain language in Connecticut case law may suggest that CUTPA’s ascertainable loss requirement is satisfied simply by a deprivation of the benefit of plaintiffs bargain. For example, in
Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso,
although the court denied defendants’ CUT-PA counterclaim because they failed to provide sufficient evidence of damages constituting ascertainable loss, the court indicated that it was a separate issue whether ascertainable loss could be claimed “by virtue of the fact that the plaintiffs failure to install the swimming pool deprived them of the benefit of their bargain.”
Plaintiffs contractual interpretation of CUTPA’s “ascertainable loss” requirement implicates many difficult issues regarding the interaction of the FDCPA, CUTPA, and Connecticut contract law. However, the Court does not need to reach most of these issues because upon reconsideration it finds that Plaintiffs argument is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case. There is no evidence of Plaintiff and Defendant in contractual privity. Assuming that Plaintiff and his creditor entered into a valid consumer credit contract, and also assuming that an implied term of this contract was to collect the debt in accordance with the FDCPA, the reach of this contractual obligation was confined to the creditor and its successors in interest. The original creditor in this case was MBNA, and its successor in interest was CAMCO, which then hired Defendant to collect on Plaintiffs debt. As such, Defendant is not a party to the consumer credit contract, and therefore did not breach any contractual obligation to Plaintiff through its violation of the FDCPA. This situation stands in stark contrast to the cases supporting Plaintiffs contractual interpretation of CUTPA’s “ascertainable loss” requirement. In each of those cases, the parties stood in contractual privity, and the breach of one party supplied the ascertainable loss required by CUTPA. Therefore, upon reconsideration, this Court denies Plaintiffs CUTPA claim and grants summary judgment for Defendant.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration [Doc. No. 33] is granted. The Court has reexamined the merits of Defendant’s claims, and the prior Ruling is vacated in part and affirmed in part. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 18] is granted on Plaintiffs overshadowing claim arising under § 1692g of the FDCPA and Plaintiffs claim under CUTPA, but is denied as to Plaintiffs remaining claims *281 and as to Defendant’s bona-fide error defense under § 1692k. The Court’s prior Ruling granting summary judgment to Plaintiff on his claims under §§ 1692e(5), (10), and (2)(A) of the FDCPA is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The facts in this case are set forth in detail in this Court's Ruling on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 32], familiarity with which is assumed.
See Gervais v. Riddle & Assocs., P.C.,
. While it is true that these periods of time could be "mutually exclusive” if the letter was dated long before it was ever sent and received, it is undisputed that the letter was mailed as of its stated date. (See PL’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 26-7.) For present purposes, there is no reason to doubt that the letter was received within a few days of mailing.