Germantown Central School District v. Public Employment Relations BoardGermantown Central School District v. Public Employment Relations Board
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent Public Employment Relations Board which found that petitioner had committed an improper employer practice.
Annual deficits in their school lunch program motivated the School Board members of petitioner to obtain a technical review of its cafeteria operation by the State Education Department’s Bureau of Food Management and Nutrition. In February 1989, the Education Department report and recommendations for cost savings and increased pupil utilization were reviewed by the cafeteria committee and the cook-manager, Elaine Banks, a member of the Administrative Supervisory Association (hereinafter ASA), her collective bargaining organization, and elementary school principal John Smith, who was also the designated spokesperson for ASA at the school. When Banks indicated that she was unable to implement the recommendations and make the cafeteria self-sustaining, petitioner explored the possibility of using an independent contractor to operate the cafeteria and in early April 1989 met with Quality Food Management (hereinafter QFM), which made suggestions and proposals.
On October 18, 1989, an improper practice charge made by ASA and Smith was filed with respondent Public Employment Relations Board (hereinafter PERB) charging petitioner with a violation of the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law § 209-a [1] [d]) for "failure to negotiate the sub-contracting of unit member Banks’ position to private firm”.
We agree with petitioner’s argument that it was statutorily
It has been long established that subcontracting services that merely substitute private employees for public employees resulting in the same work being performed in the same place is an executive decision which implicates the terms and conditions of employment and is therefore a mandatory subject for negotiations (Matter of City of Poughkeepsie v Newman,
Here, however, the termination of the school lunch program was not the result of acts or decisions, unilateral or otherwise, on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had in good faith passed and submitted to the voters for approval a budget which provided funding for the program. The termination occurred by operation of law and public policy, as the result of the voter defeat of the school budget and the requirements of a contingency budget (Education Law § 1709 [22]; § 2023). The budget defeat was an outside act beyond the control of petitioner and the ASA. As a result, the lunch program, and with it the job lost by an ASA member, could not be restored through collective bargaining regardless of any concessions
Accordingly, we hold that there was no violation of the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law § 209-a [1] [d]) resulting from petitioner’s failure to negotiate the issue. The absurdity of PERB’s decision is reflected in the relief granted which orders, inter alia, payment to Banks of the very same lost pay and benefits which petitioner had been statutorily precluded from paying during the school year in question.
Cardona, P. J., Mikoll, Mercure and Casey, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is annulled, with costs, and petition granted.
Notes
. ASA amended the charge on November 3,1989 to allege that the work in issue was performed exclusively by unit member Elaine Banks.
. While PERB speculates on appeal that petitioner could have sufficiently reduced expenses and/or increased prices to have eliminated continued subsidization of the lunch program, the record contains no such evidence. Contrary thereto, the record contains evidence demonstrating the impossibility of achieving a self-sustaining level by those methods. The decision of the Assistant Director adopted by PERB concluded that petitioner’s assertion that it was statutorily precluded from continued operation of the program was supported by law (see, 7 Ed Dept Rep 153-157 [Formal Opns of Counsel No. 213]).