117 Ky. 593 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1904
Lead Opinion
Affirming.
The appellant is an assessment or co-operative fire insurance company, organized under subdivision 5, c. 32, Ky. St., having its chief office and1 principal place of business in Louisville, Ky. The corporation having refused' to list its personal property for taxation as by law required, the city of Louisville arbitrarily assessed it with the sum of $50,000 for the years 1899, 1900, 1901, and 1902. Appellant having refused to pay the tax so assessed, this action was instituted for the purpose of enforcing payment.
No claim is made by appellant that it did not own the personalty with which it was assessed. It claims, however, that, being a co-operative insurance company, without stock, inasmuch as its various members pay taxes upon the property insured; therefore to tax the personalty of the corporation would be double taxation. It is difficult to understand the reasoning upon which this claim is predicated. Section' 171 of the Constitution provides that “taxes shall be uniform upon all property subject to taxation within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.” Section 172: “All property not exempt from taxation by this 'Constitution shall be assessed for taxation at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale. . . .” And section 174: “All property, whether owned by natural persons, or by corporations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, unless exempt by this Constitution, and all corporation property shall pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual property. Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prevent the General Assembly from providing for taxation based on income licenses or franchises.” Section 181 provides that the Legislature “may, by general laws, delegate the power to county, town,
It is further contended by appellant that, inasmuch as it was required by an ordinance of the city of Louisville I to pay a license for carrying on the business of a fire in- / surance company for the years wherein the ad valorem tax is sought to be collected, that fact makes the collection of the ad valorem tax double taxation. After the passage of the act for the government of cities of the first class in 1898, the municipality sought to tax certain business by . means of a license, which was to be in lieu of the ad valorem tax prescribed by the Constitution.
The judgment of the chancellor is affirmed.
Rehearing
Response by
to petition for rehearing.
We have read with interest the petition for rehearing, and have reconsidered the questions raised, but are unable to see that any reason exlists' for modifying the opinion which we .rendered herein. The clerical error in appellant’s corporate name did not vitiate the tax bills. The sense is perfectly apparent. The city taxes in the same way as appellant, all iike corporations. The fact that as to other corporations unlike appellant a different system is devised does not affect it, as no injustice is thereby done it.. The Legislature may properly classify taxpayers in devising an equal system of taxation.. No right of appellant under the federal or State Constitution appears to have been violated. This question was considered on the original hearing, but omitted from the opinion.
The petition is. overruled.