67 F. 399 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Oregon | 1895
This is a suit to foreclose a mortgage executed by the defendant De Lashmutt in 1890 to secure the latter’s note for $25,000, upon which there is now due, principal and interest, about $26,000. The title of De Lashmutt to a part of the mortgaged premises, consisting of the south two-thirds of lot 3 in block 22
It is settled that the deed of a person non compos mentis is void. A person incapable of understanding is incapable of executing a contract or deed. Whatever differences of opinion once existed as to whether the deed of an insane person was void or voidable, the question is authoritatively settled that such deed is absolutely void. Formerly the rule in England was that “the deed, feoffment, or grant which any person non compos mentis makes is avoidable”; but even under this rule, which is now no longer accepted, the doctrine was steadily maintained that, as against the heirs of a lunatic, his deed was invalid. Whatever reasons existed for enforcing a contract against the lunatic himself, they were never allowed in any case to apply to his heir. Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 20; Edwards v. Davenport, 20 Fed. 756; Farley v. Parker, 6 Or. 105. The doctrine of bona fide purchase, which the plaintiff invokes, is not a rule of property. It does not determine the question of title between parties. It is only available by way of defense. It is a shield in the hands of a defendant, to
In the present case the plaintiff is without title or lien. It seeks in effect to acquire a lien upon the property of the defendant Starr by invoking the doctrine of bona fide purchaser. It is not claimed that either this defendant or Ms ancestor committed any fraud or wrong in the premises. The right to relief, as to this defense, rests solely on the ground that complainant and its grantor innocently dealt with the property of another. Such a case is not one for relief upon any principle of equity. When the legal owner is innocent, (lie claim of a subsequent and bona fide purchaser cannot be sustained. The good faith of a purchaser cannot create a title where.none exists. Dodge v. Briggs, 27 Fed. 160. Nor is It material that Bridget Lavin used the §10,000 paid her by De Lashmutt for her maintenance and support. The mere payment of the consideration, without a deed or agreement to convey and such actual performance as would justify a court to decree specific performance, is not enough in any case, and in tbe case of an insane person the reasons for refusing relief are still more imperative. The complainant relies upon the case of Edwards v. Davenport, 20 Fed. 756. In that case money was advanced to an insane person to pay off certain liens upon his property. It was held that the party advancing such money was entitled to be subrogated to all the remedies which the original lien holder had against the property, but only so far as such were valid pre-existing liens, and were to secure the debt of the insane owner. The liens in question were a lien for taxes and a mortgage to secure the debt of another person. To the extent that the money advanced was used to pay taxes the creditor was subrogated to the rights of a lien holder, but no further. . The court said, as to the other lien, that the insane person received no benefit from it. Upon this statement in the opinion the complainant in this case bases its contention that the fact of the receipt of benefits was the decisive point in the case. But such was not the case. The question was simply one of
It follows from what has already been said that the accounting between De Lashmutt and Starr, relied upon by complainant, cannot be set up against the latter’s title. The case admits of but a single question, and that is the question of the mental soundness of the defendant De Lashmutt’s grantor. The exceptions are allowed.