184 Iowa 165 | Iowa | 1918
■ “We organized the very first thing; that was done at the first service we held here at the Evangelical Church. At the first service we held in this church, we elected officers. The officers were elected by the congregation.”
This is the first tangible evidence of the independent organization of the St. John’s Church. There is also evidence tending to show that such organization was not perfected until the spring of the following year, and after the death of the testatrix.
As near as we can make out from the not very clear explanation of the preacher witnesses, the general organ-' ization known as “The German Evangelical Association of Peace” and the one known as “The German Evangelical Lutheran” both profess to be Lutheran, in the sense that they both adhere to the Lutheran faith and practice as they understand it, though one accepts the authority of what is called the “Augsberg Confession,” and the other, the “Heidelburg Confession.” Of the theological differences and distinctions thus arising, we shall not attempt to speak with precision. It is sufficient to say that both lay claim to loyalty to the truth as proclaimed by Martin Luther; both make use of Luther’s Catechism; both have incorporated into their distinctive names the word “Evangelical;” and both prefix to their titles the word “German.” The divergence between these churches seems to be a perpetuation of the division of the Lutheran Church many years ago.in Germany, the country of its origin, over questions pertaining to the sacraments, since which the one faction has retained the more distinctive title of “Lutheran,” while
It is thoroughly well settled that extrinsic evidence is admissible in such oases, showing all the circumstances under which the will was made,- — not to make a will for the testatrix, but to identify the party to whom the bequest is made. It is her intention which is to prevail. Now, it is no doubt true, as appellee contends, that the name given the legatee, “The German Lutheran Church of Audubon,” is not the official corporate name of the appellant. No more is it the true official corporate name of the appellee; and the right of either to receive the fund depends upon extrinsic evidence which will enable the court to find and identify the party which the testatrix had in mind. In re Estate of Johnston, 141 Iowa 109; Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U. S. 586; Preachers’ Aid Society v. England, 106 Ill. 125; Bristol v. Ontario Orphan Asylum, 60 Conn. 472; Woman’s Union Missionary Society v. Mead, 131 Ill. 338; Skinner v. Harrison Twp., 116 Ind. 139; Smith v. Holden, 58 Kan. 535; Missionary Society v. Cadwell, 69 Ill. App. 280; Second U. P. Church v. First U. P. Church, 71 Neb. 563 (99 N. W. 252); In re Welch’s Will, 78 Vt. 16; Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497; Morse v. Stearns, 131 Mass. 389; Tilley v. Ellis, 119 N. C. 233.
Nor is there any occasion to deny the correctness of appellee’s further proposition that, where a bequest or devise is “free from ambiguity, and there is no imperfection or inaccuracy in its language the testator’s intent is to be collected from the words used by her, and parol evidence is inadmissible for the purpose, of adding to, explaining, or subtracting from it;” but the trouble with the appellee’s case is that the bequest which, it claims is not free from ambiguity. It makes no gift in clear and express terms which can be held applicable to appellant or to appellee, without the aid of extrinsic evidence. , Similarity in names — especially in gifts provided for religious and charitable purposes — is often the cause of confusion and controversy, and it is quite the universal rule to give effect to the testator’s intent, as disclosed by .extrinsic facts and circumstances, if the record, taken as a whole, makes it fairly ascertainable. The technically correct or official corporate
It is unnecessary to further extend this discussion. The law applicable to the case appears to be well settled, and the appellant’s claim to be the intended beneficiary of the legacy in dispute is thoroughly well established. The judgment appealed from is, therefore, reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in harmony with the views herein expressed. — Reversed and remanded.