108 Ky. 377 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1900
Opinion of the court by
Affirming.
The appellant bank, at a judicial sale under judgment of the Louisville Chancery Court, became the purchaser of a lot of land in Louisvilje, Ky., on August 4, 1890. Under the charter of the city in force in 1890-91, assessments of all lands in the city were required to be made as of the 1st day of September in each year. Act May 12, 1884 (Burnett’s Code, p. 766, sec. 5). There was a provision that the assessment of such property might be either against the owner or holder. Id. p. 773, sec. 9. This would seem to be a provision to prevent assessments being held void by reason of transfers of the title unknown to- the assessor. It was further provided (Id. p. 783, sec. 24): “The fee simple of all lands in the city of Louisville, and the full term and renewal right of every leasehold, carrying
On November 19, 1890, the sale, which had been reported by the commissioner to the court, was confirmed. The assessment was made in the names of Mary C. Best and others, who were the former owners, and the appellee city brought suit to enforce its lien upon the property for its tax bill of 1891, amounting to $322.79, making appellant bank defendant. Appellant answered, alleging that it was a banking corporation of this Commonwealth; that it had accepted the provisions of the act of the General Assembly approved May 17, 1886, and commonly known as the “Hewitt Bill,” in due time, and given its consent to the levying of the tax provided in that law in due form, as thereby provided; that on the 1st day of July, 1886, and on the 1st day of each succeeding year, it had reported to the Auditor of Public Accounts the true amount of its surplus, undivided profits, or accumulations, and how or in what said surplus, undivided profits or accumulations were invested, and had paid into the treasury of the State the amount of tax due thereon as provided ’’n said act, which reports were verified as required by the act, and that appellant had paid to the Commonwealth in each of said years 75 cents on each share of its capital stock equal to $100, and, in addition, had paid the State in each of said years, upon each $100 of so much of its undivided surplus, undivided profits, or undivided accurnu-
The sole question to be disposed of is, whether the vendor or the purchaser at the judicial sale is liable for the taxes upon the land sold which accrued after the sale, but before its confirmation. For appellant it is earnestly contended that the purchaser is liable, and that in this case the purchaser paid certain taxes to the State in lieu of city taxes, and the property so purchased was exempt from taxation by the city. Two cases in this State are relied on in support of this proposition. In Vance’s Adm’r v. Foster, 9 Bush, 389, certain machinery was purchased at a decretal sale, and the purchasers agreed to but did not then execute bond for the amount of their purchases. Before they complied with the terms of the sale, the most valuable part of the machinery was accidentally destroyed by fire, and they afterwards refused to give bond. Upon rule against them to comply with the terms of sale, this court held: “That the sales to appellees being such,
The appellant bank had an equitable title to the extent that it could be compelled to accept the legal title in spite of deterioration or accidental loss, and so as to give this court jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment affecting its rights as purchaser irrespective of the amount of its bid. On the other hand, it acquired no right of possession of the property, nor any claim to the rents and profits thereof from the date of sale; nor did the confirmation which vested it with the legal title as of the date of sale give it any right to rents and profits before such confirmation. Was it, then, within the meaning of the city charter, the owner or holder of the property? The question is a very narrow one, but we have reached the conclusion that it was not. Within the meaning of this stat