RON GERMADNIK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ERIN AULD, Defendant-Appellee.
CASE NO. 2017-T-0113
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY, OHIO
July 9, 2018
2018-Ohio-2889
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.
[Cite as Germadnik v. Auld, 2018-Ohio-2889.] OPINION
Judgment: Affirmed in part and reversed in part; remanded.
Randil J. Rudloff, Guarnieri & Secrest, P.L.L., 151 East Market Street, P.O. Box 4270, Warren, OH 44482 (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Erin Auld, pro se, 7057 West Boulevard, Apt. 175, Youngstown, OH 44512 (Defendant-Appellee).
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Ron Germadnik, appeals from a decision of the Trumbull County Court, Eastern District, awarding a judgment in favor of appellee, Erin Auld, in the amount of $4,445.00, plus costs and interest, in relation to an eviction action and resulting counterclaim.
{¶2} Mr. Germadnik rented property to Ms. Auld for $485.00 per month. Their agreement provided for late charges of $25.00 per month. Ms. Auld failed to pay the full monthly rent from July 2016 through April 2017; she made several partial payments
{¶3} On April 25, 2017, Mr. Germadnik filed a claim in the small claims division of the trial court for back rent and late fees in the amount of $4,625.00, plus interest and costs. Ms. Auld filed a counterclaim on May 15, 2017, alleging damages in the amount of $5,485.00 for unlawful eviction, trespassing, damaged and stolen property, lost wages, sexual and verbal harassment, and failure to return her security deposit. Neither party was represented by counsel.
{¶4} A hearing was held on October 10, 2017, the transcript of which has not been provided to this court for review. The small claims court issued a journal entry thereafter, ultimately ruling in favor of Ms. Auld. The court found that Mr. Germadnik was entitled to a total of $4,210.00 ($3,960.00 in back rent and $250.00 in late charges) but that Ms. Auld was entitled to $3,885.00 in compensatory damages plus an award of punitive damages in the amount of $4,770.00 for “plaintiff‘s malicious acts in this self help eviction.” It was therefore ordered that Mr. Germadnik‘s award was set off against Ms. Auld‘s award, resulting in a judgment against Mr. Germadnik in the amount of $4,445.00, plus costs and interest from October 10, 2017.
{¶5} Thereafter, Mr. Germadnik retained counsel. Upon his request, the small claims court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on November 13, 2017.
{¶6} The court found that, due to Mr. Germadnik‘s “calculated campaign to remove [Ms. Auld] extra judiciously,” Ms. Auld suffered $820.00 in damages to personal
{¶7} The court further held that Mr. Germadnik “egregiously violated all of the prohibitions of
{¶8} This matter is now before this court on Mr. Germadnik‘s notice of appeal. He has assigned one error for our review:
{¶9} “The small claims court division erred in holding that appellee was entitled to an award of punitive damages against appellant in the sum of $4,770.00.”
{¶10} All of Mr. Germadnik‘s arguments raise questions of law, which are reviewed de novo. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147 (1992); see also Wren v. Tutolo, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2012-G-3104, 2013-Ohio-995, ¶8.
Compensatory Damages
{¶11} Mr. Germadnik initially raises an issue regarding the award of compensatory damages. Because Ms. Auld was afforded the opportunity to respond in her brief on appeal, we will address the issue raised and argued. Mr. Germadnik argues the trial court
{¶12} In support of his argument, Mr. Germadnik cites to Simon v. Durham, 98 Ohio App.3d 828, 831 (8th Dist.1994), which held that the trial court was prohibited from awarding damages in excess of the amount demanded by a plaintiff. The Simon Court reached this decision by relying on former
{¶13} The current version of
{¶14}
{¶15} In her counterclaim, Ms. Auld requested a total of $5,485.00 for unlawful eviction, trespassing, damaged and stolen property, lost wages, sexual and verbal harassment, and failure to return her security deposit. She later filed an accounting with the trial court, the total of which remained $5,485.00; that total includes a request of $2,000.00 for “pain and suffering due to sexual harassment, verbal assault, and loss of home/animal endangerment.” Mr. Germadnik filed a response, in which he denied the factual basis for Ms. Auld‘s request but did not take issue with the fact that this language was not specifically pled in her counterclaim. Additionally, Mr. Germadnik does not assert that he raised any relevant objection at the hearing, and, in the absence of a transcript, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings in this regard. Ostrander v. Parker-Fallis Insulation Co., 29 Ohio St.2d 72, 74 (1972). Finally, we note that a request for damages due to an “unlawful eviction” does, by its very nature, imply a disruption of one‘s normal living routine.
{¶16} There is no basis for this court to conclude the small claims court erred in awarding Ms. Auld $2,000.00 for the complete disruption of her normal living routine, even though that specific statement was not included in her counterclaim.
{¶17} This argument is not well taken.
{¶18} Mr. Germadnik next asserts the small claims court erred in awarding punitive damages to Ms. Auld because small claims divisions do not have jurisdiction to award punitive damages.
{¶19} The small claims divisions of municipal and county courts have limited subject-matter jurisdiction.
{¶20} A small claims court may award “double damages,” as authorized by
The double damages recoverable under
R.C. 5321.16(C) are simply a measure of the damages allowable and are akin to liquidated damages rather than punitive damages. These additional damages serve to compensate injured tenants for the temporary loss of the use of that money given to the landlord as a security deposit and for the time and inconvenience of having to sue for the recovery of money wrongfully withheld. In addition, the possibility of double damages creates an incentive for landlords to comply with the law.
{¶22} The award of punitive damages made by the small claims court was in error.
{¶23} We must remand this matter to the small claims court to vacate the punitive damages award. Mr. Germadnik‘s award for past due rent and late charges, in the amount of $4,210.00, should only be set off against the amount awarded to Ms. Auld for compensatory damages, which was $3,885.00. Therefore, the trial court shall enter judgment in favor of Mr. Germadnik in the amount of $325.00, plus costs and interest.
{¶24} The remaining arguments raised by Mr. Germadnik are hereby rendered moot.
{¶25} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court, Eastern District, is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This matter is remanded for the trial court to enter judgment consistent with this opinion.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J., concurs,
DIANE V. GRENDELL, J., concurs in judgment only in part and dissents in part, with a Concurring/Dissenting Opinion.
{¶26} I concur with the judgment that reversal of the compensatory damages award is unwarranted and the determination that the award of punitive damages must be reversed. I write separately, however, to emphasize the impropriety of addressing arguments not raised as separate assignments of error. Additionally, I dissent from the decision to remand this matter to the lower court since reversal and modification of the punitive damages award is more consistent with the purposes of judicial economy.
{¶27} First, a review of the appellant, Ron Germadnik‘s, brief reveals that although he asserts a sole assignment of error taking issue with the lower court‘s award of punitive damages, he raised various arguments within that error relating to compensatory damages. Despite this procedural deficiency, the majority has chosen to address the merits of these issues within the context of the assignments of error raised by Germadnik.
{¶28} It is not the role of this court to raise assignments of error on appellant‘s behalf in order to create compliance with the appellate rules. As has been clearly held, “[a]ppellate courts review assignments of error—we sustain or overrule assignments of error and not mere arguments.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Neal, 2016-Ohio-64, 57 N.E.3d 272, ¶ 38 (4th Dist.); Gill v. Grafton Corr. Inst., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1094, 2011-Ohio-4251, ¶ 17 (“[w]e are disinclined to consider this argument because it does not correspond with the assignment of error“). The fact that Germadnik may have raised arguments within his brief in favor of his claim for compensatory damages does not change the fact that his assignment of error addresses only punitive damages. By
{¶29} If this court addresses assignments of error not specifically raised by appellant, even if the issues were raised by him, it also prevents the appellee from having a fair opportunity to brief these issues. While the appellee may have been aware of the general arguments raised by the appellant, since assignments of error, rather than arguments, formulate the basis for this court‘s analysis and decisions, this puts the appellee at a disadvantage. Thus, this court should decline to address arguments that are not properly raised in an assignment of error, as required by
{¶30} Further, the decision of the majority to remand this matter to the trial court with instructions for the court to enter judgment as described in the opinion is unnecessary and inefficient. This court has the authority under
{¶31} In addition to the fact that this court has previously declined to remand in similar situations, it is also worth noting that vacating the judgment and entering the proper award without a remand advances the principle of judicial economy. As this court has emphasized, judicial economy and efficiency are principles that must be considered by the courts when issuing any decision. See Painesville City Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emps., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-100, 2006-Ohio-3645, ¶ 15.
{¶32} For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the judgment of this court to reverse in part, in relation to punitive damages, but disagree with the decision to order an unnecessary remand. To the extent that the majority affirms the award of compensatory damages, I concur in the judgment solely for the reasons outlined above.