141 N.Y. 514 | NY | 1894
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Before a real estate broker can recover his compensation, he is bound to prove that he found a purchaser and produced him to his principal, ready and willing to purchase the real estate upon his terms. (Rapalje on Real Estate Bro. § 72; Coleman v.Garrigues, 18 Barb. 60; Mortin v. Bliss, 57 Hun, 159;Wylie v. Marine Bank,
It is contended on behalf of the defendants, that the plaintiff utterly failed to show that he produced any purchaser to the defendants, ready and willing to enter into contract with them. They were entitled to know who the proposed purchasers were, and with whom they were expected to enter into contract; and so long as there was uncertainty as to the purchasers, the plaintiff could not claim performance of his contract and demand his compensation.
Now, from the evidence furnished by the plaintiff, who can we say were the purchasers? It is impossible to say from his evidence. Although he furnished certain names to Haskin as the purchasers, yet when he came to furnish his bill of particulars he omitted one of those names and inserted another. The names of the members of the purchasing syndicate as given by Lewis differed materially from those given by the plaintiff to Haskin at the time of the interview with him; and Lewis testified that the syndicate was not full; and, therefore, the persons who were to make the purchase were not then known. He was then forming a syndicate for the purchase of the property, and he got a portion of the persons he named together in his office, and each one of them consented to subscribe for one share. But it does not appear what proportion *520
of the property or of the purchase price constituted one share. The whole matter seems to have been incomplete, nebulous and uncertain. Neither the plaintiff nor Lewis knew who the purchasers were really to be, and they did not produce them to Haskin or name to him who they were. Before the syndicate of purchasers was fully formed the defendants sold the real estate to another person, and that ended their relations with the plaintiff. (Sussdorff v. Schmidt,
Therefore, without examining other objections made to the plaintiff's recovery, we think he utterly failed to show that he had performed his contract, and hence he should have been nonsuited at the trial.
It is now claimed, however, that the motions for a dismissal of the complaint and for the direction of a verdict were ineffectual, and are not now available to the defendants because no grounds for the motions were stated. A motion to direct a verdict for the defendant is in substance a motion for a nonsuit, and must be governed by the same rules. (Bissel v. Campbell,
Therefore, as the plaintiff wholly failed to show performance of the contract on his part within the rules of law applicable to such a case, he should have been nonsuited; and the judgment must, therefore, be reversed, and a new trial granted, costs to abide event.
All concur.
Judgment reversed.