Thе proceedings in the circuit court resorted to by the petitioners finally were disрosed of properly by the rulings of the circuit court. The statute placing the authority in the school committees, sec. 40.03 (1), Stats., places the petition in such casеs, as here under consideration, completely in the control of the body designаted to exercise those duties by the legislature and is a matter to be considered by that body, which may, in its discretion and judgment, order the creation, alteration, consоlidation, or dissolution of *399 school districts within its jurisdiction; or it may decide to permit a continuation of an existing district.
The petitions of the appellants sought to invoke the exercise of legislative power. Because of the refusal of the School Committee to comply with their petition, the appellants seek to transfer thе question from the authorized body to the court. It was within the competence of thе County School Committee to act in the matter of changing or reorganizing the district. It wаs for the committee, in its wisdom, to act for the people whose representatives they are. The separation of powers cannot be overloоked, and so far as the proceedings in this matter are concerned, the learned circuit judge, in his final determination, after having explored every claim presented, reached a result which must be affirmed. The power reposed in the School Committee cannot be delegated. Had the committee decided to allоw the change, then and then only, was it required to give notice required by statute, sec. 40.03 (1), which reads:
• “Upon the petition of an elector of the county or upon its own motion, the county school committee may order the creation, alteratiоn, consolidation, or dissolution of school districts within the county, . . . Before issuing any such ordеr the committee shall, by resolution, provide for a public hearing on the proposed reorganization. . . .”
While sec. 40.03 (5), Stats., provides that if the county school cоmmittee “refuses or neglects to issue and record an order of creation, аlteration, dissolution, or consolidation when petitioned to do so, then any pеrson aggrieved may appeal. . . . The court shall not remand the proceeding, but shall issue its own order, . . .” that statute does not authorize a trial
de novo,
nor empower the сourt to substitute its judgment on the merits for that of the school committee.
Perkins v. Peacock,
In thе instant case, no abuse of discretion is alleged, nor does any mistake of law appear on the part of the Joint School Committee. As pointed out abоve, the refusal of the committee to order a public hearing was in strict confоrmity with the statutes. The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the respective School Committees or have a trial
de novo. United Shoe Workers, etc., v. Wisconsin L. R. Board, 227
Wis. 569,
Thе legislative power reposed in administrative bodies and committees is of the nature and provides for acts which are legislative in character. The call fоr judicial action in this instance did not occur. The order of May 16, 1956, sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the appeal is approved, and must be affirmed. .The orders of December 5, 1955, vacating the orders of October 5th and October 13th are not appeal-able. Ke
arney v. Morse,
By the Court. — Order of May 16, 1956, sustaining demurrers ánd dismissing appeals is affirmed. Appeals from nonappealable orders of December 5, 1955, are dismissed.