350 F.3d 845 | 9th Cir. | 2003
Lead Opinion
ORDER AND AMENDED OPINION
ORDER
The Majority Opinion filed July 14, 2003, slip op. 9435, and appearing at 335 F.3d 1009, is amended as follows:
1. Change Heading III from “HI. CHALLENGE TO APPLICABILITY OF STREAMLINING REGULATIONS” to “III. REGULATORY CHALLENGE” and insert at slip op. 9446 before paragraph beginning “We now turn to the Carriches’ regulatory challenge.”
2. Move the following paragraph from slip op. 9445 and insert as last paragraph of section II at slip op. 9446: “Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA did not violate the Carriches’ due process rights by streamlining their appeal.”
3. Insert the following paragraph at slip op. 9450 before the paragraph beginning “The Carriches’ situation.... ”
“Although we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to review the streamlining decision here, we express no opinion on whether the BIA may use streamlining procedures for cancellation of removal cases involving hardship decisions. Our opinion should not be read as an endorsement of streamlining in those cases. We also express no opinion on whether, although rare, a truly novel case could arise for which a decision to streamline could be found erroneous as a matter of law under the third prong of the BIA regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7)(ii)(A).”
4. Amend the second sentence in the last paragraph at slip op. 9452 to read as follows:
“Accordingly, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review whether the BIA improperly streamlined this appeal of a cancellation of removal decision in which only the discretionary ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ factor is in dispute.”
With these amendments, the panel has voted to deny the petition for panel re
Nelson so recommends. The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.App. P. 35. The petition for panel rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are denied.
OPINION
In this case of first impression in the Ninth Circuit, we are presented with constitutional and regulatory challenges to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) recently-adopted streamlining procedures. Under those procedures, a single member of the BIA may affirm the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”), thus bypassing the traditional three-judge review. In such a case, the Board affirms without opinion and the IJ’s opinion becomes the final agency action.
The streamlining process was invoked in the case of Gerardo Bibiano Falcon Car-riche and Theresa Vianna De Falcon Car-riche (“the Carriches”), who now appeal the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (“INS”)
The Carriches argue that the BIA’s streamlining procedures violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process and that, even if streamlining is constitutional, the discretionary nature of the hardship inquiry precludes streamlining in cancellation of removal cases. We join our sister circuits in holding that streamlining does not violate an alien’s due process rights. See Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 376-79 (1st Cir.2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832-33 (5th Cir.2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir.2003); Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney General, 327 F.3d 1283, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2003). We also conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the specific decision to streamline the Carriches’ case because their claim is based on an alleged error in
I. The Streamlining Regulations
A dramatic increase in caseload prompted the INS to establish the streamlining procedures in 1999. In considering changes to its adjudication process, the INS documented the exploding caseload— from fewer than 3,000 new appeals in 1984 to in excess of 28,000 appeals in 1998. See Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed.Reg. 56,135, 56,136 (Oct. 18, 1999) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3) (“Streamlining Final Rule”). That number now exceeds 34,000. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, Statistical Year Book: 2002, at 49 fig. 23, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/ fy02syb.pdf. This increase, coupled with “[fjrequent and significant changes in the complex immigration laws,” resulted in a heightened “need for the Board’s authoritative guidance in the immigration area....” Streamlining Final Rule, 64 Fed.Reg. 56,136. In an effort to meet its “overriding objective of providing fairness in adjudicating appeals,” the BIA decided to limit the use of three-judge appellate panels to cases with “a reasonable possibility of reversible error in the result below.” Id.
Although an IJ’s decision is ordinarily reviewed by a three-member panel, the streamlining regulation authorizes a single BIA member to affirm the IJ’s decision without opinion in specified circumstances: if “the [BIA] Member determines that the result ... was correct; that any errors ... were harmless or nonmaterial; and that (A) the issue on appeal is squarely controlled by existing [BIA] or federal court precedent and does not involve the application of precedent to a novel fact situation; or (B) the factual and legal questions raised ... are so insubstantial that three-Member review is not warranted.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(ii).
If an individual BIA member streamlines a case, the Board issues a form order containing the following language: “The Board affirms, without opinion, the result of the decision below. The decision below is, therefore, the final agency determination.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(iii). Streamlining thus elevates the IJ’s decision to the final agency action that is reviewed by the court of appeal, but it does hot mean that the BIA has adopted, or entirely approves of, the IJ’s determinations; it only means that the BIA deemed any errors by the IJ to be harmless. Id.; see also Fajardo v. INS, 300 F.3d 1018, 1019 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s order, which therefore constitutes the final agency decision under review.”).
II. Due Process Challenge
The Carriehes claim that the streamlining procedure is unconstitutional because it deprives aliens of due process as
Alien petitioners like the Carriches have understandable concerns about the streamlining process, particularly in light of the congressional limitations on federal court review.
The First Circuit’s opinion in Albathani was the first to address this issue. Its careful reasoning is persuasive and, like the other courts of appeal that followed, we embrace its rationale. As the First Circuit held, any difficulty engendered by the court of appeals reviewing a “BIA decision without knowing its basis” does “not render the scheme a violation of due process or render judicial review impossible. Nor does the scheme violate any statute.” Albathani, 318 F.3d at 377.
We note here that the Carriches received a full hearing before the IJ, a detailed and reasoned opinion from the IJ, the opportunity to present their arguments to the BIA, and a decision from a member of the BIA. Although they were afforded a hearing and a reasoned decision from the INS, the Carriches argue that they were entitled to an additional procedural safeguard — namely, review of their appeal before three members of the BIA. Their assertion that “it takes at least three board members to identify, shape and determine important issues” in every appeal finds no support in the law. Nor is there any support for their assertion that a single board member will not conduct the required review of the I J’s decision.
The Carriches received all of the administrative appeals to which they were entitled by statute, see 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(ii)(A), § 3.1(b), and the Constitution does not require that the BIA do more. See Albathani, 318 F.3d at 376 (“An alien has no constitutional right to any administrative appeal at all.”). The streamlining regulation does not implicate or restrict any right of review in the court of appeals. Acknowledging that “administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties,” Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) (internal quotations omitted),
Nor is it a due process violation for the BIA to affirm the IJ’s decision without issuing an opinion. The IJ’s decision becomes the final agency action when a case is streamlined. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(iii). Thus, the streamlining procedures do not compromise our ability to review the INS’s decision, to the extent we have jurisdiction to do so, because we can review the IJ’s decision directly. See Georgis, 328 F.3d at 967 (“Since we review directly the decision of the IJ when a case comes to us from the BIA pursuant to § 1003.1(a)(7), our ability to conduct a full and fair appraisal of the petitioner’s case is not compromised, and the petitioner’s due process rights are not violated.”)
The practical effect of this regulatory scheme is that, unless the BIA opts for three-judge review, the IJ’s decision becomes the BIA’s decision. In this way, the streamlining procedures are similar to the BIA’s already-familiar practice of adopting the IJ’s opinion without issuing a separate opinion where the IJ’s reasoning is sufficient. See Alaelua v. INS, 45 F.3d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that the BIA may adopt the IJ’s decision without issuing an independent, reasoned opinion because “[t]he adoption of a lower tribunal’s reasons is a valid practice on review”); see also Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[W]e join eight of our sister circuits in ruling that the Board ... may simply state that it affirms the IJ’s decision for the reasons set forth in that decision.”). Although the streamlining procedures allow a board member to affirm the IJ’s decision based on different reasons than those set forth by the IJ, the BIA is cognizant of this possibility and knows the risk it takes in declining to articulate a different or alternate basis for the decision. See Albathani, 318 F.3d at 378 (“[I]f the BIA does not independently state a correct ground for affirmance in a case in which the reasoning proffered by the IJ is faulty, the BIA risks reversal on appeal.”)
Analyzing the due process claim under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), as the Carriches urge us to do, does not yield a different result. Under the Mathews three-part test, we must consider: “[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893.
Although we have no doubt that the Carriches have a substantial interest in remaining in the United States, the other two factors favor the government. The Carriches have not demonstrated either that there is a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation or that additional safeguards are required for the streamlining procedure to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. As discussed above, the alleged risks of erroneous deprivation are mitigated through the regulatory structure itself. Petitioners receive a reasoned decision from the IJ and have the option to seek reconsideration from the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5). And, in cases where the courts of appeal have jurisdiction, petitioners are also entitled to an additional level of review.
As to the final Mathews factor, the Car-riches have not demonstrated that the Government’s interest in reducing the financial and administrative burdens im
In a variation on their due process challenge, the Carriches also posit that streamlining is never appropriate in cancellation of removal cases because of the discretionary nature of the decision. In particular, the Carriches assert that whether “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” exists is such a fact-oriented inquiry that every cancellation of removal case is necessarily novel, and thus summary adjudication, even if correct, is arbitrary and a denial of due process. The Carriches also contend that the fact-oriented, discretionary nature of the inquiry makes cancellation of removal cases inappropriate for streamlining under the criteria set forth in the regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (a)(7)(ii)(A) (providing that a case may only be streamlined if it “does not involve the application of precedent to a novel fact situation”).
The Carriches’ due process challenge fails. We recognize that cases, by their very nature, are not manifestations of abstract legal principles. Still, not every case is novel in the eyes of the law. As the Department of Justice noted in comments on the proposed regulations, “while the facts of each case are different, the legally significant facts often fall into recognizable patterns, and that where this occurs, a novel fact situation may not be presented.” 64 Fed.Reg. 56,140. In the universe of removal cases, not every case presents a factual situation that requires the BIA to establish and reassess the boundaries of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard. It is neither arbitrary nor a violation of due process for the BIA to decide that a particular case clearly falls within, or outside, those boundaries.
Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA did not violate the Carriches’ due process rights by streamlining their appeal.
III. Regulatory Challenge
We now turn to the Carriches’ regulatory challenge. They maintain that, under the third prong of the regulation, every appeal involves a “novel fact situation,” which is a non-discretionary factor that is reviewable. Before we address the Car-riches ’ argument that the regulations do not permit streamlining for cancellation of removal cases because of their novel factual nature, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider the decision to streamline the Carriches’ case. See Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.2003). Relying on Heckler v. Chaney and its progeny, the government argues that we lack jurisdiction because the decision to streamline is “committed to agency discretion by law” and therefore unreviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 823, 832-33, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (the “APA”).
Although we agree "with the government’s ultimate conclusion, we do not embrace the government’s argument that the streamlining decision is inherently discretionary. Indeed, portions of the stream
Specifically, IIRIRA eliminated our jurisdiction to review “discretionary decisions involved in the cancellation of removal context, including the ultimate discretionary decision to deny relief.” Romero-Torres, 327 F.3d at 890. We may, for example, review whether an alien has met the “ten years of continuous physical presence” requirement because this is an objective, factual inquiry. See Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1150-51. Likewise, we have jurisdiction to review a non-discretionary question such as whether an adult daughter qualifies as a “child” under the statute. See Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir.2002). But we may not review whether an alien has demonstrated “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” because this inquiry is discretionary in nature. See Romero-Torres, 327 F.3d at 892.
In situations where we have appellate jurisdiction, IIRIRA requires the consolidation, in a single petition for review from a final order, “all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The Supreme Court interpreted less sweeping language in the predecessor to IIRIRA as enabling an alien to bring a challenge to “all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (internal citation omitted).
The nature of the streamlining procedures, however, makes our review impermissible here, and both impractical and unnecessary in other situations.
The Carriehes’ position that the streamlining procedures should never be applied to cancellation of removal cases focuses exclusively on the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement, a determination that we are without jurisdiction to review. Indeed, the Carriehes rely on the discretionary nature of this requirement as the primary reason why each cancellation of removal case is unique and thus impossible to streamline. This circular logic does not save the day. To assess whether streamlining was appropriate, we would necessarily be engaged in a merits analysis of the hardship claim. Because we lack jurisdiction to review the merits of the IJ’s discretionary decision regarding the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement — the only aspect of the cancellation of removal decision at issue in the Carriehes’ case
Although we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to review the streamlining decision here, we express no opinion on whether the BIA may use streamlining procedures for cancellation of removal cases involving hardship decisions. Our opinion should not be read as an endorsement of streamlining in those cases. We also express no opinion on whether, although rare, a truly novel case could arise for which a decision to streamline could be found erroneous as a matter of law under the third prong of the BIA regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7)(ii)(A).
However, such review would be unnecessary and duplicative. Any concern that the petitioner does not know the “real” reasons for the BIA’s decision falls by the wayside when we review the merits of the case.
Thus, where we can reach the merits of the decision by the IJ or the BIA, an additional review of the streamlining decision itself would be superfluous. See Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d at 967 (“For our purposes here (and in many cases it seems), it makes no practical difference whether the BIA properly or improperly streamlined review of [the alien’s] case.”); Cf. Garcia v. Attorney General, 329 F.3d 1217, 1223 (11th Cir .2003) (reviewing streamlining in the context of a due process claim). Indeed, judicial review of the streamlining decision would be akin to the “strange, one-step-removed” basis of review that the Supreme Court held would serve no purpose in ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 279, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987).
The juxtaposition between the Carrich-es’ case and those cases where we do have jurisdiction to review the merits reinforces our analysis here. Accordingly, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to review whether the BIA improperly streamlined this appeal of a cancellation of removal decision in which only the discretionary ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ factor is in dispute. The Car-
The petition is denied in part and dismissed in part.
. Pursuant to the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan, as of March 1, 2003, the INS was abolished and its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. See 6 U.S.C. § 542. Because the agency was known as the INS while the IJ and BIA considered the Carriches' case, we refer to it as the INS here.
. The streamlining regulations were first adopted in 1999. The Department of Justice issued final amended regulations in August 2002, effective September 25, 2002. The amended regulations expand the summary af-firmance procedure, limit the BIA’s de novo review, and reduce BIA membership from 23 to 11 members. The Carriches' case was decided under the 1999 regulations.
. The streamlining process is intended to “enable the [BIA] to render decisions in a more timely manner, while concentrating its resources primarily on cases where there is a reasonable possibility that the result below was incorrect, or where a new or significant issue is presented.” 64 Fed.Reg. 56,136. The INS designed the rule to meet four goals: (1) to promote uniformity by providing better quality BIA decisions in the cases that three-member panels decide; (2) to improve timeliness and fairness of decisions; (3) to assure correct results; and, (4) to eliminate the BIA's backlog. Id. Although a stated goal of the new regulations is to eliminate the BIA’s backlog, we observe that the practical result may be to shift the backlog directly to the courts of appeal. See Albathani, 318 F.3d at 377 n. 9.
. We acknowledge the American Immigration Law Foundation’s thoughtful and thorough amicus curiae brief, which details structural objections to the streamlining regulations.
. Amicus curiae's broader argument, namely that in numerous cases the Board members are not adhering to regulatory prerequisites, is not before us in this case. Russian River Watershed Prot. Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136, 1141 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1998) ("Generally, we will not consider on appeal an issue raised only by an amicus.”).
. The provision interpreted in Chadha stated that a petition for review in the Court of Appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation ... made against aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 242(b) of this Act.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 937, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (repealed 1996)).
. We observe that in addressing the streamlining regulations, the other circuits do not specifically analyze the jurisdictional issue. With the exception of the Eleventh Circuit, the other circuits have considered streamlining regulations only in the context of asylum and withholding of deportation petitions for which judicial review is still permitted under IIRIRA. See, e.g., Albathani, 318 F.3d at 378; Soadjede, 324 F.3d at 833; Georgis, 328 F.3d at 967; Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1289. In those cases, the streamlining and the merits issues collapse into one analysis and thus the issues surrounding jurisdiction over streamlining, however decided, would not prevent review on the merits. Apart from the Carriehes’ challenge, the only other court of appeals case related to streamlining and cancellation of removal is Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Attorney General, 321 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2003). In Gonzalez, the Eleventh Circuit ad
. The “concurring dissent” asserts that we retain jurisdiction here because the Carriehes do not directly challenge the merits of the IJ's decision but rather assert that their appeal was inappropriate for streamlining because it raises "novel” questions that are not "squarely controlled” by BIA precedent. Framing the question in this manner does not avoid the jurisdictional bar because this approach, like a direct challenge on the merits, requires a merits analysis. Calling it something else does not change the legal character of the challenge. In order to determine whether the streamlining regulations were properly applied in such a situation, we would need to look at BIA precedent regarding the existence of exceptional hardship and apply it to the facts of the petitioner's case. As we concluded in Romero-Torres, Congress has expressly precluded us from doing so. See 327 F.3d at 892. Whether a factual situation concerning exceptional hardship is "novel” or "squarely controlled by precedent" is a decision that Congress assigned exclusively to the BIA. See id. The fact that the appeal was streamlined does not restore jurisdiction that was removed by statute. See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 270, 107 S.Ct. 2360 (rejecting the proposition "that if the agency gives a ‘reviewable’ reason for otherwise un-reviewable action, the action becomes reviewable.”)
. The Carriehes rely upon cases suggesting that the BIA must explain how it balanced the particular facts of each case in reaching its hardship determination. See, e.g., Velarde v. INS, 140 F.3d 1305, 1310-11 (9th Cir.1998); Gutierrez-Centeno v. INS, 99 F.3d 1529, 1532-33 (9th Cir.1996); Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir.1981). But these cases, which were decided before IIRI-RA removed our jurisdiction to review discretionary determinations of the BIA, are not persuasive here. See Romero-Torres, 327 F.3d at 889.
. Given that we have jurisdiction to review non-discretionary decisions by the IJ but lack jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions in the context of cancellation proceedings, a potentially anomalous situation could arise where both discretionary and non-discretionary issues are presented to the BIA and the BIA's streamlining procedure prevents us from discerning the reasons for the BIA's decision. For example, assume that the IJ denies a petition for cancellation of removal on the ground that the petitioner failed to establish hardship. The BIA designates the case for streamlining and a single member affirms the IJ. Although no reason is required, the BIA in fact internally reasons that the petitioner failed to meet the ten-year physical presence requirement, a legal determination that is subject to judicial review. Because no reasoned BIA decision is given, the IJ'S decision is controlling and no judicial review is available because the ultimate hardship decision is discretionary. In another troubling scenario, if the petitioner presents new and legitimate arguments to the BIA but is simply met with an "Affirmed without Opinion” decision, the petitioner may also be faced with a jurisdictional default in the court of appeals. We do not address such situations here, however, because only the discretionary "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” factor was in dispute before the BIA.
Concurrence in Part
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
With respect and with the recognition that “[i]t is bad for the mind to continually be part of unanimity,”
Because I conclude that the BIA appropriately streamlined this case, I too would deny the petition. Thus, I concur in the end result the majority reaches. The critical difference between my analysis and that of the majority is that I would deny the entire petition on the merits rather than deny it in part and dismiss it in part for lack of jurisdiction.
I agree with the conclusion that the streamlining procedures do not violate due process. In the interest of brevity and to focus my discussion on the major difference between my reasoning and that of the majority’s, I will not dwell on the problems with the majority’s analysis of the risks posed by the streamlining regulations.
I. WE HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE DECISION TO STREAMLINE BECAUSE THE STREAMLINING CRITERIA ARE NON-DISCRETIONARY
The majority acknowledges the streamlining criteria but then subsequently ignores them in its analysis. However, “[fjacts do not cease to exist because they are ignored.”
In determining whether we have jurisdiction, the critical question is whether the criteria are discretionary or non-discretionary.
One fact-specific exception exists. The first criterion requires the BIA member to evaluate whether the result was correct. The BIA’s evaluation of this factor may, but will not always, be a discretionary decision. The decision will be discretionary under the following facts. Assume that an IJ concluded that an alien met the statutory prerequisites for cancellation of removal but denied relief as a matter of discretion. Further assume that the alien believes that the IJ’s discretionary determination was error and therefore appeals the BIA’s decision to streamline. Before us, the alien would assert that his case did not meet the first streamlining criterion because the result was incorrect.
The evaluation of the first criterion will not always be discretionary, however. If the alien asserts that the result was incorrect because the IJ’s non-discretionary determination was error, then the BIA’s evaluation of that criterion is similarly non-discretionary. For example, if an IJ denied relief because of an erroneous conclusion that the alien had not established the requisite time in this country to qualify for relief,
The majority tries to shoehorn the Car-riches’ case into the narrow factual exception described above. However, as discussed above, the third criterion is non-discretionary — we can determine whether precedent controls by applying the law to the facts.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, we need not reach the merits of the hardship decision. We need only ask if the BIA’s precedent covers the petitioners’ situation.
In addition to the plain language of the streamlining regulation, decisions of our sister circuits support the conclusion that we have jurisdiction to review the decision to streamline. The majority cites to no other court that has concluded it lacks jurisdiction to review the decision to streamline because no such court exists.
I agree with the majority that sometimes the streamlining claim will fall by the wayside. When an IJ’s decision contains an error that we can address, we need not reach the decision to streamline.
II. THE BIA MAY STREAMLINE CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL CASES AND IT PROPERLY STREAMLINED THIS CASE
Because I conclude that, with one fact-specific exception, we retain jurisdiction to review streamlining decisions, I would reach the merits of the Carriches’ claim. The Carriches argue that cancellation of removal cases always involve novel fact patterns and that precedent can never control. I would reject the Carriches’ claim on the merits and hold that the BIA properly streamlined the case.
Although cancellation of removal cases are fact-intensive, they do not always involve legally novel factual situations and are sometimes squarely controlled by precedent.
. Christopher Morley, American novelist, journalist, and poet (1890-1957).
. The majority declares that the "risks of erroneous deprivation are mitigated through the regulatory structure itself." However, the majority chooses not to address the risks presented by the interplay between the streamlining regulations and the jurisdiction-stripping rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRI-RA”). Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), does not authorize us to ignore those risks. Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Thus, I would address these risks directly. However, in so doing, I would conclude that other factors mitigate and outweigh them.
The most serious risk of erroneous removal of an alien arises from the fact that the procedures conceal the basis for the BIA's decision. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(iii) (1999). We can never know whether the BIA’s decision was based on a discretionary judgment or a non-discretionary one. As a result of this anomaly, the procedures permit a situation in which no basis for affirming would exist, yet the IJ’s decision would be affirmed. For example, assume an IJ denies relief on two grounds: a non-discretionary ground (ground A) and a discretionary ground (ground B). ■ The BIA streamlines, secretly reasoning that, although ground B — the discretionary ground — was error, the error was harmless because ground A was correct. When the case reaches this court, we do not know that the BIA rejected ground B. We do know, however, that we cannot review ground B. Further assume that we review ground A and conclude that it was error. Thus, no basis for affirming the IJ’s decision would exist because the BIA rejected ground B and we rejected ground A. At this juncture, we would have two choices: (1) we could presume that the BIA had not rejected ground B and affirm (erroneously removing the alien) because we ourselves could not review that ground, or (2) we could conclude that the case required remand.
I would conclude that this risk is mitigated because we must choose the second option: we must remand to the BIA and allow it to adopt or reject the IJ's original discretionary decision, as only it has the power to do. Because of the peculiar design of the streamlining regulations, we can no longer tell when an error is harmless. Thus, our harmless error analysis is the first of two primary factors that mitigate the risk introduced by the streamlining regulations. The second factor is the BIA’s own practices that allow it an opportunity to correct its errors. See Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of
. Aldous Huxley, Note on Dogma, in Proper Studies 205 (1927).
. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(h).
. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(A)-(D) (listing the four statutory prerequisites that an alien must show to establish eligibility for discretionary cancellation of removal relief).
. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(iv). The three-member panel may also decide to streamline the case but only pursuant to the same criteria. Id.
. IIRIRA altered substantially the jurisdictional landscape for immigration appeals to this court. See Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir.2003). It divided the world of immigration claims between claims asserting error in discretionary decisions and claims asserting error in non-discretionary decisions. IIRIRA only divests us of jurisdiction over the former category, not the latter. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); see also Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that IIRIRA “limits judicial review of decisions committed to the unfettered discretion of the INS”). Cf. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (stating that the "theme” of IIRI-RA is protection of the executive's exercise of discretion from judicial review).
. Cf. Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1169 ("IIR-IRA eliminates judicial review of certain enumerated decisions entrusted to executive discretion; it does not eliminate judicial review of all decisions bearing any relationship to” discretionary forms of relief).
. Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2002); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001).
. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(ii).
. Zazueta-Canillo, 322 F.3d at 1169 (holding that a BIA decision was non-discretionary because it is “an application of law," and thus we have jurisdiction); Barahona-Gomez, 236 F.3d at 1120 (“Formal procedural rules also govern the BIA’s actions. These are quasi-judicial functions, not discretionary acts.”) (internal citation omitted).
.133 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.1997).
. Id. at 1150. Whether the case satisfies the mandatory streamlining criteria is not “subjective” either. See id. at 1151.
. Of course, this necessarily implies that the alien would also contend that the IJ's discretionary error was not harmless.
. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l).
. The majority takes issue with my decision to frame the question in this manner. I find this quite surprising. I frame the question in this manner for two reasons. First, because the plain language of the streamlining regulations require it. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(h). Second, because the Carriches claim that their case did not meet this criterion. As I will demonstrate in the last section, determining whether precedent controls does not require reassessing the merits of the hardship determination. The majority's analysis distorts the third criteria such that it resembles the first: a question of whether or not the merits of the hardship analysis was correct. If the Department of Justice wanted to allow streamlining as long as the result was correct, it would have done so. It did not. I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis because it ignores the plain language of the streamlining criteria.
. Cf. Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir.1999) (noting that “the objective of plaintiffs in this case was not to obtain judicial review of the merits of their INS proceedings, but rather to enforce their constitutional rights to due process in the context of those proceedings") (internal quotation marks omitted).
. Cf. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 495, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991) (noting that petitioners were not requesting a substantive declaration but, instead, "if allowed to prevail ... would only be entitled to have their case files reopened and their applications reconsidered in light of the newly prescribed INS procedures”).
. It is ironic that the majority relies on Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887 (9th Cir.2003), to support its holding. The majority’s reliance on Romero-Torres only underscores the analytical flaw in its analysis. Romero-Torres established that we lack jurisdiction to review whether an alien established “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” because it is a discretionary decision. Id. at 892. As illustrated above, the streamlining criteria, with one fact-specific exception, are non-discretionary. Thus, the majority's analysis actually ignores the fundamental discretionary/non-discretionary distinction that Romero-Torres used to reach its holding.
. Ciorba v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir.2003) (evaluating the BIA’s decision to streamline a case and concluding that streamlining was proper).
. See Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 329 F.3d 1217, 1222-23 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (concluding that petitioner's constitutional claim that her case was improperly streamlined failed because her case met the BIA's streamlining criteria); Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 & n. 7 (11th Cir. 2003) (rejecting petitioner’s claim that BIA failed to comply with the streamlining regulations and concluding that a basis existed for both affirmance of the IJ's decision and for the BIA's decision to streamline); Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1333-34 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (evaluating alien's claim that the BIA violated due process by improperly streamlining alien's case, concluding that case was properly streamlined, and thus concluding that court lacked jurisdiction because alien did not present a substantial constitutional claim).
. See Fajardo v. INS, 300 F.3d 1018, 1019 n. 1, 1022 (9th Cir.2002) (remanding based on IJ's incorrect determination that a motion to reopen was not timely and declining to base decision on petitioner's claim that BIA improperly streamlined case). Cf. Ciorba, 323 F.3d at 546 (concluding that the claim that the case was improperly streamlined lacked merit because there was no underlying error in the IJ’s asylum decision); Flores-Leon v. INS, 272 F.3d 433, 441 (7th Cir.2001) (declining to reach a claim that the BIA improperly summarily dismissed petitioner's appeal because the court "examined and rejected every claim that[petitioner] contends the BIA neglected").
. Cf. ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987) (concluding that an agency's decision not to grant a motion to reconsider was committed to agency discretion because there are no appropriate standards to apply, and the court can review the original order instead).
. 328 F.3d 962 (7th Cir.2003).
. Id. at 967 n. 4.
. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7)(ii)(A). For example, In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (2001), controls this case. In that case, the BIA held that the petitioners failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship under the following circumstances: the petitioner lived in this country for twenty years and was thirty-four years old; although his wife and infant child returned to Mexico because she was not eligible for cancellation of removal, petitioner had an eight-year-old and a twelve-year-old child, both United States citizens, who would be adversely affected by moving to Mexico; the petitioner was gainfully employed in the United States;
Although differences exist between this case and Monreal-Aguinaga, these differences weigh against the Carriches or are legally insignificant.
Monreal-Aguinaga stated that a "lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return are factors to consider only insofar as they may affect a qualifying relative, but generally will be insufficient in themselves to” establish hardship. Id. § III, ¶ 2.
Contrary to the assertion of amicus, the record did not show that the Carriches would be unable to find employment in Mexico. Rather, it showed that finding work might be difficult. For example, Mr. Falcon Carriche previously worked in Mexico. Some of his brothers in Mexico had jobs. He testified that others had difficulty finding work, in part, because they were "lazy.” Even under a more lenient hardship standard, we concluded that “[difficulty in finding employment ... is ... mere [economic] detriment, relevant to a claim of hardship but not sufficient to require relief.” Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1981). Thus, the facts in this case do not bring it outside the reach of Monreal-Aguinaga.
. Gutierrez-Centeno v. INS, 99 F.3d 1529, 1535 (9th Cir. 1996).
