10 Mich. App. 726 | Mich. Ct. App. | 1968
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted defendant Paragon Steel Corporation, a Michigan corporation. The pertinent facts are as follows:
Odell Small began working for Paragon Steel Corporation on July 27, 1959, and she did office work. When she was first employed, Paragon Steel had its mail delivered, but a post office box was subsequently rented to enable it to get its mail earlier in the day. Odell Small’s superiors requested her to pick up the mail on her way to work, to which she was agreeable. Thereafter, she picked up the mail daily.
Odell Small would time her departure from home so that she would arrive at the post office after 8:15 a.m. when the mail would be ready. Prior to the arrangement for her to pick up the mail at the post office she reported for work at 8 a.m.
On the morning of April 25, 1960, Odell Small was driving an automobile owned by her in a southerly direction on Schaefer highway, at or near the intersection of St. Martins in the city of Detroit. The individual plaintiff, Louis Gerard, was operating his automobile in a southerly direction on the
Before picking up the mail, Odell Small would stop to pick up a girl friend who lived on Schaefer. She would drop her friend off at her work on Livernois before proceeding to pick up the mail. On this particular morning at the time of the accident, Odell Small was making a left turn into this friend’s driveway.
Appellant insured Louis Gerard’s automobile, and upon payment of collision damage, received a partial assignment of his claim.
. Louis Gerard started a negligence action against Odell Small and Paragon Steel as defendants. Subsequently, appellant intervened in the suit.
Paragon Steel moved for summary judgment of no cause of action against Louis Gerard which motion was granted on July 1, 1966. Appellant had not received notice of the motion for summary judgment. Therefore, Paragon Steel brought a second motion for summary judgment under GCR 117.2(3) urging that there was no genuine issue
On April 3, 1967, the Honorable Cornelia G-. Kennedy, circuit judge, filed her opinion and after reciting the facts ruled therein as follows:
“In view of the fact that Odell Small had not yet deviated from the route she would normally take if she were merely driving herself to and from her employment, and was at the time of the accident engaged in a purely personal pursuit of picking up her friend, the court is of the same opinion as was Judge Brennan, that Odell Small was not in the course of her employment at the time of the accident involved here.
“An appropriate order may be presented.”
On April 20, 1967, the order granting summary judgment of no cause of action in favor of Paragon Steel and against plaintiff intervenor was entered.
The only issue to be resolved on this appeal appears to be contained in the question: Was the employee acting within the scope of her employment at the place and time she allegedly negligently caused the accident in question¶
Under the facts herein, plaintiff-appellant asserts that under the doctrine of respondeat superior the defendant-appellee, Paragon Steel Corporation, is liable for the alleged negligence of Odell Small. ■
Appellant concedes in its brief that an employer is ordinarily not liable for the negligence of an employee who is on his way to and from work. See 57 CJS, Master & Servant, § 570, p 309, and 1 Restatement of the Law (Second), Agency, §233, p 516. However, it is claimed that the instant case presents facts placing it within an exception to the general rule, i.e., the employer was controlling the employee’s personal mission of going to work with a duty expressly directed by the employer,
The change in the conditions of employment occasioned by the new arrangement merely established a new point for her commencement of work, i.e., at the post office instead of the employer’s place of business. Until she reported to the post office she was on her way to work. Inasmuch as the accident occurred prior to her arriving at the post office, we conclude that the general rule applies and the employer is not liable.
Appellant cites the cases of Elliason v. Western Coal & Coke Company (1925), 162 Minn 213 (202 NW 485); Haco Drilling Co., Inc., v. Burchette (Okla, 1961), 364 P2d 674; Riley v. Roach (1912), 168 Mich 294; Clifton v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. (1922), 217 Mich 462; Nord v. West Michigan
The granting of the summary judgment of dismissal was proper. GCR. 1963, 117.2(3).
Affirmed. Costs to appellee.