Gerald Stevens v. State

Case Information

No oral argument requested

Nos. 03-15-00675-CV, 03-15-00676-CV (Houston-sized progress!)

In The COURT OF APPEALS THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS

GERALD STEVENS, Respondent (JP) - Appellant/Respondent (de novo) - Appellant, v.

STATE OF TEXAS, Plaintiff - Appellee/Plaintiff - Appellee. (Brief Due: Nov. 23, 2015)

On Interlocutory Appeal from COUNTY COURT AT LAW NUMBER 5 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

Nos. C-1-CR-15-100025, C-1-CR-15-100026 STEVENS v. STATE (both should be CV)

On consolidated appeal (trial de novo) from consolidated trial in the JP Court in Austin, STATE v. STEVENS

STEVENS'S BRIEF

GERALD STEVENS 3117 Fontana Drive Austin, Texas 78704

RECEIVED NOV 302015 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS INTERLCO UIIE

Identity of Parties and Counsel

Appellant

GERALD STEVENS 3117 Fontana Drive Austin, Texas 78704 jstvs@startmail.com

Appellee

STATE OF TEXAS By: COUNTY ATTORNEY P.O. Box 1748

Austin, TX 78767

Record References

There are five components. 03-15-675-CV is "R.675.page_number(s)." 03-15-675-CV "1 ${}^{\text{st}}$ Supplemental" is "R.675.Supp.1.page_number(s)." 03-15-676-CV is "R.676.page_number(s)." 03-15-676-CV "1 ${}^{\text{st}}$ Supplement" is "R.676.Supp.1.page_number(s)." The Transcript is Tr.page_number(s). Where the item is identical in both Records, "(both)," reference is made to whichever Record has that document. See the Records correlation Index in the Appendix.

Table of Contents

STEVENS'S BRIEF ..... i Identity of Parties and Counsel ..... ii Record References ..... ii Index of Authorities ..... vii Statement of the Case ..... xii Nature of the Case ..... xii Course of Proceedings ..... xii JP court. ..... xii County court - on appeal/trial de novo. ..... xiii JP Court Disposition ..... xiii County Court Disposition ..... xiii No Oral Argument Requested ..... xiii Issues Presented ..... xiv Statement of Facts ..... 1 No Evidence ..... 1 STATE's Facially Insufficient Pleading(s) ..... 2 No Service ..... 2 Summary of the Argument ..... 2 One more time, no evidence ..... 2 One more time, no personal jurisdiction ..... 3 One more time, no competent pleading. ..... 3 Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) ..... iii No Notice. No commercial nexus.

One more time, no Service. ..... 3 One more time, no subject matter jurisdiction ..... 4 One more time, no standing. ..... 4 Fortunately, the stay is automatic ..... 4

Argument ..... 4 No Personal Jurisdiction. ..... 4 Issue 1: Was it error to deny the Special Appearance? ..... 4 STATE filed no original pleading. ..... 4 Nothing signed by an attorney for STATE. ..... 4 No Affidavit. ..... 5 STATE served no original pleading. ..... 5 Not liable in capacity charged - no commercial nexus. ..... 7 "Complaint" asserts only legal conclusions. ..... 8 What does "Transportation" mean? The elements. ..... 8 Removing people and/or property. ..... 9 From one place to another. ..... 9 ** For hire. ${ }^{ }$ ..... 9 Under the choice of law of the "place" called "this state." ..... 10 No evidence - which would look/sound like this. ..... 10 What does "Vehicle" mean? The elements. ..... 10 What does "Motor Vehicle" mean? The elements. ..... 11 Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) ..... iv No Notice. No commercial nexus.

What does "Drive" (in its various grammatical forms) mean? The elements ..... 12 What does "Operate" (in its various grammatical forms) mean? The elements. ..... 13 If STATE would serve a pleading so that such could be addressed, it'd be plain that STATE has never pled a claim. ..... 14 Lack of Notice goes beyond just lack of personal jurisdiction. ..... 14 In short, all that is in the making here is a void judgment. ..... 14 No Subject Matter Jurisdiction ..... 15 Issue 2: Was it error to deny the Plea to the Jurisdiction? ..... 15 No pleading. ..... 15 No standing. ..... 16 STATE's silence from the threshold. ..... 16 There's no evidence of "transportation." ..... 16 Going deeper into the definition - "transport." ..... 17 Black's Law Dictionary. ..... 17 Webster's Dictionary 1828 ..... 17 Hinton. ..... 19 Bearden. ..... 19 A broad definition, and the reason for such. ..... 20 "Transports" in the context of "farm labor contractor." ..... 20 "Transports" and controlled substances - distinguishing "how" and "why." ..... 21 Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) No Notice. No commercial nexus.

"Transports" and taxes. ..... 22 "Transports" and Prohibition-era intoxicating liquors. ..... 23 "Transports" and concealed weapons. ..... 24 In sum, the Transp. Code regulates commerce only. ..... 24 The algebraic dependence of these other terms on "transportation." ..... 25 Subject matter jurisdiction can't be "agreed to." ..... 25 Relieving STATE of Burden; Irrebuttable presumptions. ..... 25 Use of irrebuttable presumptions violates Due Process. ..... 26 The rulings are void. ..... 27 Request for Relief ..... 27 Certificate of Service ..... 29 Certificate of Compliance ..... 29 Appendix Contents ..... i County Court ..... i Index (to .pdf file page numbers of Record(s)) ..... i

Index of Authorities

Cases

Alalunga Sport Fishers, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 247 Cal. App. 2d 663 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1967) ..... 22,23 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). ..... 26 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). ..... 6,15 Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 668 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissent). ..... 14 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1910). ..... 8 Bearden v. United States, 320 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1963). ..... 20 Berheide, United States v., 421 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 2005). ..... 8 Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000). ..... 27 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). ..... 15 Brown v. Oaklawn Bank, 718 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1986). ..... 7 Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). ..... 26 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991). ..... 7 City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005). ..... 16 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). ..... 26 Commercial Equip. Leasing Co., Smith v., 678 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1984). ..... 15 Computize, Inc., v. NHS Comm. Group, Inc., 992 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1999, no. pet) ..... 5 Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634, 641 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissent) ..... 9 Cosio, Chicago, R. I. &; G. Ry. Co. v., 182 S.W. 83 (Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1916, no writ) ..... 9 County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). ..... 26 Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008) ..... 21 Dell Dev. Corp. v. Best Indus. Unif. Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied) ..... 5 Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 344 (1980) (Powell, J., and Stewart, J., dissent) ..... 14 Diebold, United States v., 369 U.S. 654 (1962). ..... 26 Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) No Notice. No commercial nexus.

Dragich v. County of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.App.2d 397, 86 P.2d 669 (Cal. App. 1939). ..... 22,23 Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000) ..... 25 Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978). ..... 26 Fed. Underwriters Exch. v. Pugh, 141 Tex. 539, 174 S.W.2d 598 (1943). ..... 25 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). ..... 7,15 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) ..... 5 Globe Leasing, Inc. v. Engine Supply &; Mach. Serv., 437 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ) ..... 5 GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) ..... 8 Hall v. State, 661 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). ..... 26 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). ..... 7,15 Hammell v. State, 198 Ind. 45 (Ind. 1926). ..... 23 Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334 (1852). ..... 15 Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012). ..... 25 Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932). ..... 26 Hinton, United States v., 222 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2000). ..... 19 In re E.R., 335 S.W.3d 816, 826 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, pet. granted) (dissent, MURPHY, J.), rev'd (dissent fully supported) 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012). ..... 6 In re Marriage of Peace, 631 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ). ..... 6 In re Vlasak, 141 S.W.3d 233 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.). ..... 6 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). ..... 26 Industrial State Bank v. Wylie, 493 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973, no writ) ..... 5 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (opinion by Black, J.). ..... 7,15 Iqbal, Ashcroft v., 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). ..... 8 Johnson, Connecticut v., 460 U.S. 73 (1983). ..... 26 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) ..... 7,15 Kuntoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 937 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1996) ..... 5 Lacross, People v., 91 Cal. App. 4th 182 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2001). ..... 21 Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) No Notice. No commercial nexus.

Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) ..... 26 Lloyd v. Alexander, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 365 (1803) ..... 6,15 Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 (2013) ..... $8,9,10,22,25$ Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proc.). ..... 27 Marshall v. Buntings' Nurseries, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 92 (D. Md. 1978) ..... 20 Maynard v. Texas, 249 S.W. 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 1923) ..... 9 Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 911 F. Supp. 2d 739 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ..... 20 Miller v. Woods, 872 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App. - Beaumont 1994, orig. proc.). ..... 27 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) ..... 7,14 Moore v. Elektro-Mobil Technik GmbH, 874 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied). ..... 5 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ..... 6,15 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) ..... 26 Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999) ..... 6 N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). ..... 7,15 Pennock v. State, 725 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet). ..... 26 Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988) ..... 15 Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007) ..... 14 Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194 (1993) ..... 5 Sacramento Navigation Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326 (1927) ..... 17 Salfi, Weinberger v., 422 U.S. 749 (1975) ..... 26 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) ..... 26 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) ..... 26 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) ..... 7,15 St. Clair Cnty v. Interstate Sand &; Car Transfer Co., 192 U.S. 454 (1904). ..... 9 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ..... 26 Sydnor v Totman, 6 Tex. 189 (1851) ..... 5 Tex. Dept. of Parks &; Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) ..... 25 Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1942) ..... 26 Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) No Notice. No commercial nexus.

Twombly, Bell Atl. Corp. v., 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) ..... 8 Velasco v. Ayala, 312 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). ..... 6 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). ..... 26 Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 28 (1985) (dissent). ..... 14 Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990). ..... 6 Zheng v. Vacation Network, Inc., 468 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). ..... 8 Statutes 49 U.S.C. § 902(i)(1) ..... 9 Tex. Fin. Code § 392.301(a) ..... 7 Tex. Penal Code § 32.43 ..... 8 Tex. Penal Code § 46.15(b)(3) ..... 24 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5069-11.02 (1986) ..... 7 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 501.002(17) ..... 11 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 502.001(25) ..... 11 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 502.001(45) ..... 10 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 503.001(15) ..... 10 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 522.003(11) ..... 12 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 522.003(21) ..... 11 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 541.001(1) ..... 13 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 541.201(11) ..... 11 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 541.201(23) ..... 10 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 601.002(5) ..... 11 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 601.002(8) ..... 13 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 621.001(5) ..... 11 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 621.001(9) ..... 10 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 641.002(2) ..... 13 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 642.001(1) ..... 11 Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) No Notice. No commercial nexus.

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 647.001(4) ..... 11 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 647.001(5). ..... 13 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 683.001(4). ..... 11 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 724.001(11) ..... 13 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 728.001(2). ..... 11 Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 750.003(a) ..... 10 Rules of Civil Procedure Tex. R. Civ. P. 7 ..... 5 Tex. Rs. Civ. P. 99-117a ..... 5 Law Review Articles Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 361 (1960) ..... 16

Statement of the Case

Nature of the Case

"Civil" non-case. One more "no evidence" "transportation" matter.

Course of Proceedings

JP court.

No Notice, as usual.

JP proceeded on "complaint only." R.675.27, R.676.38. In response to court setting, STEVENS filed his Special Appearance and Plea to the Jurisdiction. R.675.34. Denied. R.676.41. Objection to visiting judge denied. R.676.17. STATE's Motion in Limine, effectively denying STEVENS's access to the court to put on his defense, granted. R.676.18.

Trial. STATE submitted no evidence of "transportation," as usual. STEVENS's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Directed Verdict denied. STEVENS negated all remote notion of "transportation." A very bright spot. An historic Instruction: "Transport" means to carry or convey from one place to another. R.676.15 (emphasis added). Request for further clarification via definition of "carry(ing, ier)," denied.

Non-viable "verdict" and "judgment" on both charges. R.675.15, R.676.12,

Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) No Notice. No commercial nexus.

R.675.14, R.676.11.

Appeal Bonds filed. R.675.12, .13, R.676.21, .20.

County court - on appeal/trial de novo. No Notice, of course. CCL Number 5 is apparently proceeding on "complaint only." In response to court setting, STEVENS filed his Special Appearance and Plea to the Jurisdiction. R.675.122. Denied. R.675.228, .229. Interlocutory Appeal initiated. R.675.230.

JP Court Disposition

STEVENS was "convicted" of both "transportation" "charges." Fines and costs of $\$277$ and $\$310.10$ .

That matter is, of course, vacated as a matter of law per the "appeal" for trial de novo.

County Court Disposition

Special Appearance denied. Plea to the Jurisdiction denied.

No Oral Argument Requested

Oral argument is not expected to aid in the resolution of these issues.

Issues Presented

No personal jurisdiction Issue 1: Was it error to deny the Special Appearance?

No subect matter jurisdiction Issue 2: Was it error to deny the Plea to the Jurisdiction?

Statement of Facts

No Evidence

STEVENS very overtly asserts a "no evidence" defense. R.675.34. It matters, then, that STATE filed no response to the paperwork in the JP court or in the County Court, and STATE presented no evidence at either hearing, the one of focus here being the one in the County Court. Tr.all.

As confirmed in the whole of The Record (a generic reference throughout to the combined Records), STATE has no evidence of "transportation." STATE never even tried to prove up such evidence in the JP proceeding, and STATE still has no evidence for trial de novo.

STEVENS was at no time relevant to this matter carrying any passengers or cargo. STEVENS was at no time (1) removing anyone or anything (2) from one place to another (3) for hire (4) under any choice of law. R.675.34, .122.

The hearing was very short, and it begs the question of burden of proof. Tr.all. There was no evidence presented, and STATE carries the burden. STEVENS overtly asserted his "no evidence" defense. R.675.34, .122. In response, STATE went completely silent, filing no responsive paperwork and presenting no evidence at the hearing.

STATE's Facially Insufficient Pleading(s)

STATE has filed no pleading signed by any attorney, much less one with the authority to represent STATE. Cf. R.675.27; R.676.38.

The "complaint" alleges legal conclusions but no facts. The terms "transportation," "vehicle," "motor vehicle," "drive," and "operate" are all terms of legal conclusion. As stated under "No Evidence," STATE alleges no facts of passengers, cargo, or hire. And, there are no such facts for STATE to allege.

No Service

As usual, STATE has once again served nothing on Respondent. The Record contains no Citation, no request for Citation, and no Return of Citation.

Summary of the Argument

One more time, no evidence

One more time, STATE not only never had any evidence of "transportation" but also never had any intent to supply/provide any.

One more time, STATE not only failed to file a written response to STEVENS's Special Appearance and Plea to the Jurisdiction, which very overtly asserts his "no evidence" defense, but also failed to present any jurisdictional evidence whatsoever at the hearing.

One more time, the trial court relieved STATE of its evidentiary burden. STATE has no evidence and no intent even to think about gathering such, much less proving, that STEVENS (1) removed anyone or anything, (2) from one place to another, (3) for hire, (4) under any choice of law, including "this state." There being no evidence of "transportation," there is also no evidence of any "vehicle," "motor vehicle," "driver," or "operator."

One more time, STATE has no intent to prove "transportation," and one more time, the trial court is willfully relieving STATE of its burden, thereby causing vexatious expansion of the litigation.

One more time, no personal jurisdiction

One more time, no competent pleading. STATE has filed no pleading but only a "complaint," which is neither signed by an attorney nor sufficient as an Affidavit, being based on "belief" and legal conclusions instead of facts within personal knowledge.

One more time, no Service. Clearly, STATE still feels it's relieved of its Due Process burden. The very solid and resounding confirmation of the "civil" nature of this matter (these matters) may actually operate to snap STATE out of its daydream of being totally irresponsible regarding Due Process.

One more time, no subject matter jurisdiction

One more time, no standing. There being no "transportation," STATE had no "actual grievance" or any "injury in fact;" hence, no standing.

Fortunately, the stay is automatic

To encourage mitigation of damages, the courts need to encourage Interlocutory Appeal. The automatic stay associated with appeal protects these rebellious, law-defiant trial judges from themselves (to the extent that's possible). Judges without jurisdiction have no immunity.

Argument

No Personal Jurisdiction

Issue 1: Was it error to deny the Special Appearance? R.675.228, .229. R.675.122.

STATE filed no original pleading.

NOTHING SIGNED BY AN ATTORNEY FOR STATE.

While sworn documents may certainly suffice as original pleadings, it's also the case that for STATE to be a Plaintiff, STATE has to have an attorney.

Rowland, 506 U.S. at 201-03 (all artificial entities must have counsel-federal); Tex. R. Civ. P. 7 (corporations must have counsel—state); Kuntoplast of Am., Inc. (same); Computize, Inc. (same); Moore (same); Dell Dev. Corp. (same); Globe Leasing, Inc., 437 S.W.2d at 45-46 (same); ABA Model Rules of Prof'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (material witness can't also be attorney of Record); TEX. DISCIPlinARY Rs. Prof'l Conduct 3.08, 5.05 (same, plus facilitating unauthorized practice); Garcetti v. Ceballos (ethics still matter; "whistleblower" lawyer who testifies against client (STATE) is fortunate still to have license, much less job).

This Record includes absolutely no such document.

No.AFFIDAVIT.

"Belief" does not an Affidavit make. E.g., Industrial State Bank, 493 S.W.2d at 295; Sydnor. "Belief" is the popular standard for "probable cause," R.675.27, R.676.38, but this is a "civil" matter.

STATE served no original pleading.

There is no original petition; leaving Service impossible, anyway. There is no Citation; there is no Return of Citation. Tex. Rs. Civ. P. 99-117a.

To date, STATE has served nothing on Respondent. By acknowledging the content of the Record(s) on appeal, Respondent acknowledges quasi-receipt, but

Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) No Notice. No commercial nexus.

not Service, of anything. Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 837 ("Dunn has admitted receipt, not service.") (emphasis in the original). Cf. In re E.R., 335 S.W.3d 816, 826 (dissent, J. MURPHY) (question of legitimacy of service by publication). "As in Peace, the court noted that actual notice to a defendant of a pending suit, without [']proper notice, ['] is not sufficient. Id." In re E.R., 335 S.W.3d at 832 (dissent, J. MURPHY) (citing Velasco, via the "id.," and Peace). "As McEwen illustrates, the trial court can render a final judgment even if it lacks personal jurisdiction-the judgment is void if challenged, but it is no less final." In re Vlasak, 141 S.W.3d at 237-38.

To satisfy Due Process, STATE must serve at a meaningful time, in a meaningful manner, on a respondent a copy of what STATE has filed. A pleading has meaning sometime after it's been filed, not before. Murphy Bros., Inc. (timing and sequence matter regarding filing and serving; thus, a "ticket" isn't a pleading). And, a pleading has meaning sometime after it's been served, not before. Lloyd, 5 U.S. at 366 ("A citation not served is as no citation.").

An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. A failure of Notice violates "the most rudimentary demands of due process of law." Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550 (Notice, meaningful

time, meaningful manner. 380 U.S. at 552). See also Milliken (Notice, opportunity to be heard, fair play, substantial justice); Int'l Shoe (Notice, opportunity to be heard); Sniadach (Notice, opportunity to be heard); Fuentes v. Shevin (Notice, meaningful time); N. Ga. Finishing (Notice, opportunity to be heard, even for corporations (i.e., the shareholders)); Burns (Notice, opportunity to be heard, on upward departure); Hamdi (denial of access and of opportunity to be heard); Jones (Notice, opportunity to be heard).

Not liable in capacity charged - no commercial nexus. STATE does not allege, and cannot truthfully allege, that Respondent was acting as a fiduciary with respect to the "transportation" system at any time.

There's one and only one way that the Transportation Code works: "federally," as in "by agreement." How do we know? Because it's codified outside the Penal Code.

Given that STATE purports to be able to pursue "criminal" charges arising from the Transp. Code, it follows that the agreement must sound in trust.

Agreements come in only two generic forms: contracts and trusts. And, breach of contract just simply isn't punishable "criminally." Tex. Fin. CODE § 392.301(a) (prohibited debt collection practices); Brown, 718 S.W.2d at 680-81 (applying Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5069-11.02 (1986)) (charging debtor with theft of

the collateral (the car) is a prohibited debt collection practice); Tex. PENAL CODE (no crime based on mere breach of contract); cf. Bailey (breach of contract can't be, and wasn't, criminalized); accord Berheide, 421 F.3d at 540 ("[B]reach of contract is not a crime."). That leaves breach of trust. See Tex. Penal Code § 32.43 (commercial bribery) (i.e., criminal breach of trust).

STATE alleges no trust relationship. Since that's the only capacity in which anyone may ever be subject to any Transp. Code based claim, Respondent is not liable in the capacity sued, as confessed by not only the absence of any competent pleading but also the absence of such content in the "complaint." R.675.27. "Complaint" asserts only legal conclusions. As with "belief," addressed, supra, legal conclusions aren't facts, either. Cf. Zheng, 468 S.W.3d at 186 (construing Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a, likening it to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and citing GoDaddy.com, LLC, 429 S.W.3d at 754, which cites Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56).

What are the legal conclusions? The following terms are legal conclusions.

What does "Transportation" mean? The ELEMENTS.

Per Lozman, (1) carrying (2) passengers or cargo. Per BlACK's, et al., (1) removing people and/or property (2) from one place to another (3) for hire (4) in "this state."

Removing people and/or property.

Transp. Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898, 929, 49 U.S.C. § 902(i)(1), in particular § 302(i)(1). Cornell Steam-boat, 321 U.S. at 641-42 (Frankfurter, J., dissent). Cf. Lozman (passengers or cargo).

From one place to another.

Cf. Maynard (context: unlawful "transportation" of intoxicating liquor). Cf. Lozman. transportation, $n$ . (16c) 1. The movement of goods or persons from one place to another by a carrier. ... .

Black's LaW Dictionary 1638 ( $9^{\text{th}}$ ed. 2009) (all emphasis in original).

** For hire. **

See Lozman, Part IV ("carrying passengers or cargo"). St. Clair Cnty, 192 U.S. at 456-57 (allegations regarding operating a ferry without a license). See also Cosio, 182 S.W. at 85.

Again, there's Black's LaW Dictionary. transportation, $n$ . (16c) 1. The movement of goods or persons from one place to another by a carrier. ... .

Black's Law Dictionary 1638 (all emphasis in original). carrier. 1. an individual or organization (such as a ship-owner, a railroad, or an airline) that contracts to transport passengers or goods for a fee. Cf. SHIPPER. [Cases: Carrier 3, 235.] ...

Id. at 242 (emphasis added).

Under the choice of law of the "place" called "this state."

Where "hire" is be paid with "funny money" (US "dollars," federal reserve notes), this element is satisfied. There is no evidence of "hire" using any medium of exchange, much less any exchange of "funny money," in any amount.

NO EVIDENCE - WHICH WOULD LOOK/SOUND LIKE THIS.

There was no carrying of any passenger or cargo. There was no passenger, no cargo, and no hire. There was no passenger manifest, no bill of lading, and no hire. None was even inquired into at the time of the stop. There was no "transportation," thus all terms dependent on "transportation" also fail.

What does "Vehicle" mean? The elements.

TRANSP. §§502.001(45), 503.001(15), 541.201(23), 621.001(9), 750.003(a). (1) Conveyance (2) used for (not coulda, shoulda, woulda used for, but actually used for) (3) transporting or drawing (4) along a highway. (1) Conveyance (2) used for (not coulda, shoulda, woulda used for, but actually used for) (3)(A) removing people and/or property (B) from one place to another (C) for hire (D) in "this state") (4) along a highway.

Lozman struck the "coulda, shoulda, woulda" concept from "transportation"

(or "vessel"). His floating house "coulda, shoulda, woulda" been a "vessel," i.e., engaged in "transportation," but he never actually used it that way.

Since "vehicle" depends on "transportation," there is no "vehicle," because there is no "transportation."

WHAT DOES "MOTOR VEHICLE" MEAN? THE ELEMENTS.

TRANSP. §§ 501.002(17), 502.001(25), 522.003(21), 541.201(11), $601.002(5),621.001(5),642.001(1),647.001(4),683.001(4),728.001(2)$ . (1) "Vehicle" (2) that has a motor. (1)(A) Conveyance (B) used for (not coulda, shoulda, woulda used for, but actually used for) (C) transporting or drawing (D) along a highway, (2) with a motor. (1)(A) Conveyance (B) used for (not coulda, shoulda, woulda used for, but actually used for) (C)(1) removing people and/or property (2) from one place to another (3) for hire (4) in "this state" (D) along a highway, (2) with a motor.

Since "motor vehicle" depends on "vehicle," which depends on "transportation," there is no "motor vehicle," because there is no "transportation."

What DOES "DRIVE" (IN ITS VARIOUS GRAMMATICAL FORMS) MEAN? THE ELEMENTS.

TRANSP. CODE § 522.003(11). (I.) Being behind the wheel (II.) of a "motor vehicle."

The sole definition for "drive" in the entire "transportation" code is found in the "commercial driver's license" chapter, Ch. 522. (I.) Being behind the wheel (II.) of a (1) "vehicle" (2) that has a motor. (I.) Being behind the wheel (II.) of a (1)(A) conveyance (B) used for (not coulda, shoulda, woulda used for, but actually used for) (C) transporting or drawing (D) along a highway, (2) that has a motor. (I.) Being behind the wheel (II.) of a (1)(A) conveyance (B) used for (not coulda, shoulda, woulda used for, but actually used for) (C)(1) removing people and/or property (2) from one place to another (3) for hire (4) in "this state" (D) along a highway, (2) that has a motor.

Since "drive" depends on "motor vehicle," which depends on "vehicle," which depends on "transportation," there is no "driv[ing]," because there is no "transportation."

Moreover, where there's no "driv[ing]," then no "drive[r's] license" needed.

What DOES "OPERATE" (IN ITS VARIOUS GRAMMATICAL FORMS) MEAN? THE ELEMENTS:

TRANSP. § 541.001(1) (operator - a very confused definition; "drives," having meaning only with respect to a "motor vehicle," is juxtaposed with "physical control of a vehicle"), § 601.002(8) (operator), § 641.002(2) (operator), § 647.001(5) (operator), § 724.001(11) (operate). (I.) Being behind the wheel (II.) of a (A) "vehicle" or (B) "motor vehicle." (I.) Being behind the wheel (II.) of a (A)(1) conveyance (2) used for (not coulda, shoulda, woulda used for, but actually used for) (3)(A) removing people and/or property (B) from one place to another (C) for hire (D) in "this state") (4) along a highway, or (B) "motor vehicle." (I.) Being behind the wheel (II.) of a (A)(1) conveyance (2) used for (not coulda, shoulda, woulda used for, but actually used for) (3)(a) removing people and/or property (b) from one place to another (c) for hire (d) in "this state") (4) along a highway, or (B)(1)(a) conveyance (b) used for (not coulda, shoulda, woulda used for, but actually used for) (c)(1) removing people and/or property (2) from one place to another (3) for hire (4) in "this state" (d) along a highway, (2) with a motor.

Since "operate" depends on both "vehicle" and "motor vehicle," there is no "operating," because there is no "transportation."

If STATE would serve a pleading so that such could be addressed, it'd be plain that STATE has never pled a claim.

Given the habitual lack of service, it's difficult to address the content, but, to address the non-served document in this Record (these Records), it's very plain that all STATE has ever alleged in it's "complaints" has been legal conclusions rather than facts. STATE has no such facts to plead, here, and proved by STATE's silence in the hearing. $\underset{―}{\text{Tr.all.}}$

Lack of Notice goes beyond just lack of personal jurisdiction.

Where there's no pleading filed or served, all that exists is a non-case. $Cf$ . Austin (Blackmun, J., dissent); Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank, 445 U.S. at 353 (Powell, J., and Stewart, J., dissent); Williams, 472 U.S. at 36 (dissent) (citing Austin). Some matters, just like the ones at bar, never stop being non-cases. Cf. Rockwell Int'l Corp. (the final pre-trial order confirmed that this was a non-case).

In short, all that is in the making here is a void judgment. No valid adjudication may be made without personal jurisdiction. See Milliken (the Wyoming judgment was valid because service was valid; hence, the Wyoming court did have personal jurisdiction). [I]t has been settled, that a judgment depending upon proceedings in personam can have no force as to one on whom there has been no service of process, actual or constructive; who has had no day in court, and no notice of any proceeding against him. That with respect to such a person, such a

Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) No Notice. No commercial nexus.

judgment is absolutely void .... Harris, 55 U.S. at 339 (cited in Commercial Equip., 678 S.W.2d at 918, which holds that even a default judgment is void where there is no service). See also Peralta (even "meritorious defense" issue is irrelevant to question of Notice); Lloyd ("A citation not served is as no citation."); Hamdi (habeas proceeding, which is, of course, a CIVIL proceeding); Int'l Shoe; Mullane; Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552; Sniadach; Boddie; Fuentes v. Shevin; N. Ga. Finishing; and Jones.

STATE has yet to serve anything. No Notice, including no Service?-no personal jurisdiction.

No Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Issue 2: Was it error to deny the Plea to the Jurisdiction?

R.675.228, .229. R.675.122.

No pleading. See Issue 1. There simply is no document activating any court's (civil) jurisdiction. STATE has not shown up by counsel from Day One. R.675.27, R.676.38.

No standing. STATE never had any "actual grievance," for STEVENS was never engaged in "transportation." The Record.

STATE's silence from the threshold.

STATE went completely silent to STEVENS's Spec. Appearance - nothing filed; nothing argued; no evidence. Since STATE has a duty to prove standing, and since STATE failed to respond to STEVENS's threshold jurisdictional challenge, STATE confessed having no standing from Day One.

There's no evidence of "transportation." See Issue 1. "No evidence" points must, and may only, be sustained when the record discloses one of the following situations: (a) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact.

City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810 (quoting Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 Tex. L. Rev. at 362-63). The relevant concepts are (a) and (d).

Going deeper into the definition - "transport."

"Vehicle" uses the term "transport." Is "transport" different from "transportation" materially or just grammatically? What do "transport" and "draw" mean? "Draw" can't have a wider scope than "transport," for all the reasons that "transport" is limited to the commercial context.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY.

Regarding "transport," Black's 9th ed. removes the original judicial cites. ^[1] Black's 5th ed. cites Sacramento Navigation Co. v. Salz. "To transport means to convey or carry from one place to another[.]" Salz, 273 U.S. at 329. Note that the "transport" activity was for hire.

WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 1828.

To get still earlier, let's look at Webster's Dictionary of 1828.

TRANSPÖRT, v. t. [L. transporto ; trans and porto, to carry.]

1. To carry or convey from one place to another, either by means of beasts or vehicle on land, or by ships in water, or by balloons in air ; as, to transport the baggage of an army; to transport goods from one country to another; to transport troops over a river.
2. To carry into banishment, as a criminal. Criminals are transported as a punishment for their crimes, which often amounts to banishment. [^0] [^0]: ^[1] Also, the 9th ed. doesn't define "travel" at all.

1. To hurry or carry away by violence of passion.

They laugh as if transported with some fit Of passion. Milton. 4. To ravish with pleasure ; to bear away the soul in ecstasy ; as, to be transported with joy. Milton. 5. To remove from one place to another, as a ship by means of hawsers and anchors. Mar. Dict.

TRANS'PÖRT, $n$ .

[1.] Transportation ; carriage ; conveyance. The Romans stipulated with the Carthaginians to furnish them with ships for transport and war. Arbuthnot. 2. A ship or vessel employed for carrying soldiers, warlike stores or provisions from one place to another, or to convey convicts to the place of their destination. 3. Rapture ; ecstasy. The news of victory was received with transports of joy. 4. A convict transported or sentenced to exile.

TRANSPORTA'TION, $n$ .

[1.] The act of carrying or conveying from one place to another, either on beasts or in vehicles, by land or water, or in air. Goods in Asia are transported on camels ; in Europe and America, either on beasts or on carriages or sleds. But transportation by water is the great means of commercial intercourse. 2. Banishment for felony. 3. Transmission ; conveyance. Dryden.

1. Transport ; ecstasy. [Little used.] South.
2. Removal from one country to another ; as the transportation of plants.

In short, as of 1828, "transport" and "transportation" differed only grammatically.

HINTON.

Transport means to "transfer or convey from one person or place to another: to CARRY, MOVE." [Webster's Third] at 2430. By bringing his package to the post office and beginning the mailing process, Hinton definitely caused the package to be transported by the United States postal system. Consequently, Hinton shipped the package as that term is used in $\S 922(\mathrm{g})(1)\&(2)$ .

Hinton, 222 F.3d at 672 (emphasis added). To hammer the obvious, the Post Office does what it does for hire.

BEARDEN.

Regarding "transport," we find this rather unique hijacking case. Although the district court did define 'extortion,' 'stolen,' and 'kidnap,' as to the other elements of counts one and three it merely read to the jury the statutory language of these counts. This was not sufficient. The jury could have found that appellant himself was transported, (n. 10 omitted) rather than doing the transporting himself. The jury should have been instructed that in order for appellant to have 'transported' the plane and passengers he must have been in actual control or command of the aircraft and that the acts of the crew were not of their own volition but done at his direction.

Bearden, 320 F.2d at 103 (emphasis added). "Transport" is used in the maritime context, and it's inextricably associated with commercial activity, here "passengers," in particular, the intent to interfere with normal commercial, "for hire" activities.

A BROAD DEFINITION, AND THE REASON FOR SUCH.

"The term 'transport' means to move, convey, carry, or ship by any means, or to deliver or receive for the purpose of movement, conveyance, carriage, or shipment." 16 U.S.C. § 3371(k).

Michigan, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 765. This definition intends to control the illegal taking of fish and wildlife; hence, the widest possible net around the concept of "theft," which activity is always commercial in nature.

"TRANSPORTS" IN THE CONTEXT OF "FARM LABOR CONTRACTOR."

The commercial intent element for Marshall, 459 F. Supp. at 97-98 is overtly supplied in the definition of "farm labor contractor." As the court demonstrates soundly, Mireles (1) removed people and property (2) from one place to another (3) for hire. "Transport" is used quite interchangeably in various grammatical forms.

"TRANSPORTS" AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES - DISTINGUISHING "HOW" AND "WHY."

In the area of controlled substances, there's a "crime" that goes by the name "transportation." Cf. Lacross.

Key is this statement: "When defendant was booked, the officers found a [']pay-owe['] sheet among his belongings." Id. at 184. This is the lynchpin for that entire matter, because that proves the intent to distribute, i.e., to sell, i.e., to make a profit. How it's being done (by bicyclist) is quite distinct from why it's being done (for commercial gain).

See also Cuellar. In Cuellar, a money laundering case, hidden in the VW "Bug" was some $81,000. The jury convicted Cuellar, which conviction the Court overturned. " $[H]$ ow one moves the money is distinct from why one moves the money. Evidence of the former, standing alone, is not sufficient to prove the latter." Id. at 556. In Lacross, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 185-87, the California court details the "why." Key is the unwritten presumption of "commercial intent."

This presumption of commercial intent is exactly the same concept that permeates the (Tex.) Transp. Code. Respondent's defense is, "I'm not in "transportation." That overtly rebuts the unwritten presumption.

It's not how one gets from here to there that is subject to STATE regulation; it's why. How is "by car." Why includes commercial motive, i.e., whether it's "for

hire" or not. The Transp. Code exists to regulate only the "for hire" segment of that activity. STATE presented no evidence of hire (or passenger or cargo).

"TRANSPORTS" AND TAXES.

Alalunga Sport Fishers, refers to Dragich. Lozman renders manifest the semantics in this statement from Dragich: "[A]ll vessels are used for conveyance of either property or persons or both." Dragich, 30 Cal.App.2d at 399. Here's that quote in a bit more context.

It is at once apparent that said section was not intended to exempt all vessels of the specified tonnage but only those "engaged in the transportation of freight or passengers". This phrase must be given some meaning. If it be given the broad meaning contended for by respondents, it would only be necessary that the vessel be used for the conveyance of property or persons. But to give this phrase such meaning would be to render it meaningless as all vessels are used for the conveyance of either property or persons or both.

Id. (emphasis added). Given the truism that "all vessels are used for conveyance of either property or persons or both," what Lozman makes manifest is the material difference between the how and the why. Conveying how is "by floating house;" conveying why distinguishes "persons or property" (non-commercial) from "passengers or cargo" (commercial). Part IV of Lozman is all about the why, and, per Lozman, that why (commercial intent) element, is "built into" the very definition of

"transportation." Without commercial intent, there simply is no "transportation." The Dragich intent element is "for hire." The fishing vessel carried property (the fish), and the fisherman definitely intended to profit from that fishing activity. However, because that vessel wasn't hired for the specific purpose of carrying that fish from sea to shore, that fish wasn't "freight" or "cargo;" hence, no tax exemption, after all. See Dragich, 30 Cal. App. 2d at 399-400.

Alalunga Sport Fishers, 247 Cal. App. 2d at 667-68, cites Dragich and defines "transportation" as commercial activity. The point here is that the commercial intent element in Alalugna Sport Fishers, citing Dragich, is "for hire," and, key, without such commercial intent, there simply is, by definition, no "transportation."

"TRANSPORTS" AND PROHIBITION-ERA INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

In Hammell, there being no evidence of "transporting" ("for hire") via any automobile (or truck), the majority focused on the only (other) activity involving (1) removing liquor (2) from one place to another: Hammell's traipse across the back yard. The majority determined that such activity wasn't actually from one "place" to another, per the definitions of "place" and "another." Since (2) failed, that ended the analysis, mooting the need to analyze (3) for any commercial intent.

"TRANSPORTS" AND CONCEALED WEAPONS.

TEXAS distinguishes "transportation" and "travel." Tex. PeNAL CODE § 46.15(b)(3)).

INSUM, THE TRANSP. CODE REGULATES COMMERCE ONLY.

"Transport" and "draw" have to be construed within the confines of that commercial context. How (e.g., by car) isn't either the beginning or end of the analysis, and why (for hire) is both the beginning and the end. STATE doesn't regulate "travel:" (A) removing people (and their property) (B) from one place to another. STATE regulates "transport," "transporting," "transportation," i.e., (1) removing people and/or property (2) from one place to another (3) for hire [(4) in "this state."].

Everything about the Transp. Code is construed properly when understood within its commercial context. "How" (e.g., by car) isn't either the beginning or end of the analysis, while "why" (for hire) is both the beginning and the end. STATE doesn't regulate "travel," which is (1) removing people and/or property (2) from one place to another. STATE regulates "transport," "transporting," "transportation," i.e., (1) removing people and/or property (2) from one place to another (3) for hire (4) in "this state."

The algebraic dependence of these other terms on "transportation." See Issue 1. Until there is evidence of "transportation," i.e., the removing of someone ("passenger") and/or something ("cargo") from one place to another for hire, $cf$ . Lozman, there is no "vehicle," no "driver," no "motor vehicle," and no "operator," as a matter of law.

In sum, STATE has never had any "actual grievance," Tex. Dept. of Parks &; Wildlife v. Miranda (standing, plaintiff must show "actual grievance"), i.e., never had any "injury in fact," Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154-55 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61), which means that the county court has no subject matter jurisdiction. The "ruling" is void.

Subject matter jurisdiction can't be "agreed to." It's ancient that the parties cannot, by agreement or consent, confer jurisdiction on any trial court. Tex. Dept. of Parks &; Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224-25; Dubai Petroleum Co., 12 S.W.3d at 74-77 (Part II) (citing Fed. Underwriters Exch., 141 Tex. at 541, 174 S.W.2d at 600).

Relieving STATE of Burden: Irrebuttable presumptions. By doing anything but dismissing, the JP court and now the County Court

Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) No Notice. No commercial nexus.

have relieved STATE of its burden. Cf. Scott (summary judgment, video of car chase relevant) (citing Diebold, 369 U.S. at 655; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255) (summary judgment presumptions are against m ovant); Sandstrom (presumption that shifted burden of persuasion on culpable mental state violated Due Process); Mullaney (citing In re Winship) (to relieve plaintiff of burden is to violate Due Process); Heiner.

See also Brown, 122 S.W.3d at 799 (burden-shifting nature of mandatory presumptions - homicide context); Pennock, 725 S.W.2d at 415-18 (jury instruction on intent, in full context of case, established impermissible presumption causing egregious harm); Hall, 661 S.W.3d at 104 (citing several cases, including County Court of Ulster County, Leary; Tot, Sandstrom; Johnson; and Mullaney obscenity context - ultimately finding no improper presumption regarding Hall).

Use of irrebuttable presumptions violates Due Process. Despite STATE's total lack of evidence, the county court presumed commercial intent. Tr.all. In other words, so far, the presumption of commercial intent has been rendered irrebuttable, which burden-shifting perspective flatly and flagrantly violates Due Process. See Elkins; Salfi, (in particular part III, which distinguishes Salfi); Cleveland Bd. of Educ.; Vlandis; Stanley.

The rulings are void.

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction renders a judgment void, rather than merely voidable, so that it may be challenged either directly or collaterally. See and compare, Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1985) (on collateral attack judgment was not shown to have been rendered by a court without jurisdiction). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case; it is never presumed and cannot be waived. Tex. Ass'n of Business v. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993). When a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it has no discretion and must dismiss the case as a ministerial act. Qwest Microwave, Inc. v. Bedard, 756 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1987, orig. proc.).

Miller, 872 S.W.2d at 346. See also Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 553-54; Mapco, Inc., 795 S.W.2d at 703 .

As STEVENS asserted from the outset, all that has been produced here is a void judgment.

Request for Relief

STEVENS requests that this Court

• Confirm that "transportation" means removing people and/or property from one place to another for hire, i.e., carrying passengers or cargo (for a fee), in "this state."
• Confirm that "vehicle" means a conveyance of some sort actually used for "transportation."

No Notice. No commercial nexus.

• Confirm that "motor vehicle" means a "vehicle" with a motor.
• Confirm that "drive" means being behind the wheel of a "motor vehicle."
• Confirm that "operate" means being behind the wheel of a "(motor) vehicle."
• Declare that STATE tendered no evidence of "transportation."
• Declare that STATE never satisfied threshold Notice requirements.
• Declare that STATE never proved standing.
• Declare that STEVENS is not liable in the "Capacity" charged.
• Confirm that the rulings are void;
• Vacate the county court's rulings and dismiss.
• Order all Bond amounts returned to STEVENS, with maximum lawful interest to the day of the payment;
• Order STATE to reimburse STEVENS for all relevant costs; and
• Award any and all other relief, at law, in equity, or sui generis, to which STEVENS may show himself justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

GERALD STEVENS 3117 Fontana Drive Austin, Texas 78704

Certificate of Service

By my signature below, I certify that on or about the $\underset{―}{23\mathrm{d}}$ day of November, 2015, I served a true and correct copy of this Brief with its Appendix, either in paper or electronic form, on the following by certified mail or by 3-day or faster delivery:

TRAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY P.O. Box 1748

Austin, TX 78767

DANA DeBEAUVOIR, Clerk COUNTY COURT AT LAW NUMBER 5 P.O. Box 1748

Austin, TX 78767

GERALD STEVENS

Certificate of Compliance

By my signature below, I certify that the font for the body is at least 14point, Times New Roman, that the footnotes are at least 14-point, Times New Roman, and that headings are 14-point, Times New Roman or Arial, and that the word count of this Brief, per section and total, including headings and footnotes, is as follows:

| Statement of Facts | 290. | | :-- | --: | | Summary | 338. | | Argument, Conclusion | $\underset{―}{4,777}$ . | | | 5,405. |

GERALD STEVENS

Appendix Contents

County Court

Rulings (2 pgs) ..... A-1 Transcript (5 pgs) ..... A-3 Index (to .pdf file page numbers of Record(s)) JP Documents (most not filed into JP Record) Page sequence is very unrelated to chronology.

| | R. 675 | R. 676 | | :--: | :--: | :--: | | Cover | $(-100025)1$ | $(-100026)1$ | | County Court's Index | $(-100025)2$ | $(-100026)2$ | | Caption | $(-100025)4$ | $(-100026)4$ | | [Gonzales page ??? | 5] | | | JP Appeal Receipt | $(-6974)6$ | $(-6973)5$ | | JP Case Summary | $(-6974)7$ | $(-6973)6$ | | File jacket notes | $(-6974)9$ | $(-6973)8$ | | Receipt for Appeal Bond | $(-6974)12$ | 21 | | Receipt for Appeal Bond | $(-6973)13$ | 20 | | Non-viable "judgment" | $(-6974)14$ | $(-6973)11$ | | Non-viable "verdict" | $(-6974)15$ | $(-6973)12$ | | Jury Charge | | (both) 13 | | Objection to Visiting Judgment (denied) | | (both) 17 | | Order Granting STATE's M/Limine | | (both) 18 | | Non-viable Discovery Compliance Receipt | | (both) 19 | | Standing Evidentiary Objections | | (both) 22 | | Special Appearance and Trial-time M/Dismiss | (both) 16 | | | Spec. Appear. and Trial-time M/Dir.Verdict | (both) 20 | | | Jury Trial Notice | (both) 24 | | | Unserved Subpoena for Trooper DOLLAHITE | $(-6974)25$ | $(-6973)36$ | | Undated email to DOLLAHITE | (both) 26 | 37 | | Dated email to DOLLAHITE | | (both) 34 | | "Complaint" | $(-6974)27$ | $(-6973)38$ | | Affid. for Warrant | $(-6974)28$ | $(-6973)39$ | | Reply Form | 29 | |

Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) A-i No Notice. No commercial nexus.

| Fine Schedule | R.675 | R.676 | | :--: | :--: | :--: | | | 30 | | | Pre-trial Notice | (-6974) 31 | (-6973) 40 | | Case History Summary | 32 | | | Pre-trial Notice | (both) 33 | 47 | | Special Appearance and Plea to the Jurisdiction | (both) 34 | | | Notice of Submission - Spec. Appear. and Plea/Juris | | (both) 48 | | Order Denying Spec. Appear. and Plea/Juris | | (both) 41 | | Public Information Request | 107 | 50 | | Envelope | 109 | 52 | | Public Information Request (again) | 110 | | | Envelope (again) | 112 | | | Court's Response to PIRs | | (both) 42 | | (and again) | | (both) 44 | | Appeal Bond | (-6974) 113 | (-6973) 53 |

| County Court documents | R. 675 | R. 676 | | :--: | :--: | :--: | | Receipt (County Court) Appeal Bond | (-100025) 114 | (-100026) 54 | | Announcement Notice | (both) 115 | 55 | | Ticket | | (both) 56 | | Waiver of Representation | (both) 116 | 89 | | Notice of Submission, Spec. Appear, Plea/Juris | (both) 120 | 93 | | Special Appearance and Plea to the Jurisdiction | (both) 122 | 57 | | Proposed Order (Spec. Appear. and Plea/Juris) | | (both) 95 | | Standing Assertion of Rights | (both) 154 | 97 | | Standing Objection to Non-judicial Decision-making | | | | | (both) 156 | 99 | | Standing Objection to Use of Private Law | (both) 158 | 101 | | Statutory Challenges | (both) 160 | 103 | | Notice of Submission of Statutory Challenges | (both) 196 | 133 | | Proposed Order (Stat. Challenges) | (both) 198 | 140 | | Motion for Summary Judgment | (both) 200 | 142 | | Notice of Submission (M/Sum J) | (both) 219 | 160 | | Proposed Order (M/Sum J) | (both) 221 | 162 | | Proposed Order (Spec. Appear and Plea/Juris) | 223 | | | Subpoena (DOLLAHITE) | (-100025) 225 | | | Subpoena (DOLLAHITE) | (-100026) 226 | | | Subpoena (DOLLAHITE) | (-100025) 227 | |

Appellant's Brief (STEVENS) A-ii No Notice. No commercial nexus.

Order Memorializing Denial of Spec. Appear. and Plea/Juris ..... $(-100025)228$ Order Memorializing Denial of Spec. Appear. and Plea/Juris ..... $(-100026)229$ Notice of Interlocutory Appeal ..... (both) 230 Visually vibrating copy of Order Memorializing Denial of Spec. Appear. and Plea/Juris ..... $(-100025)233$ (Another of the same) ..... 234 Transcript of Sept. 15 (2015) hearing (Spec. Appear. and Plea/Juris) ..... (both) 235 (vis. vibr.) 170 Notice of Submission - M/Stay ..... (both) 240 Proposed Order (M/Stay) ..... (both) 243 Notice of Intent to Insist Upon Stay ..... (both) 245 M/Stay Accompanying Notice of Appeal ..... (both) 248 County's Confirmation of Appeal (goofy case style) File Jacket ..... $(-100025)251$ ..... $(-100026) 186 County Clerk Certificate $(-100025)252$ ..... $(-100026) 187 $(-100025)253$ ..... $(-100026)188$ R.675.Supp. 1 ..... R.676.Supp. 1 $(-100025)1(-100026)1$ $(-100025)2(-100026)2$ $(-100025)3(-100026)3$ $(-100025)4(-100026)4$ $(-100026)5$ $(-100025)5(-100026)6$ (CM 8906) 6 ..... (CM 9071) 7

Nos. 15-100025,

STATE OF TEXAS, Plaintiff, v.

GERALD STEVENS, Respondent.

In The COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5

TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER MEMORIALIZING

BULINGS IN OPEN COURT DENYING

RESPONDENTS SPECIAL APPEARANCE AND PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

On September 15, 2015, came on for trial this above-styled and numbered matters. The trial was reset, but the court entered rulings on Respondent's Special Appearance and Plea to the Jurisdiction.

The court has denied, of Record, in open court, both Respondent's Special Appearance and his accompanying Plea to the Jurisdiction for each matter.

Therefore, to memorialize the rulings made in open court, it is

ORDERED that Respondent's Special Appearance is denied. It is further

ORDERED that Respondent's Plea to the Jurisdiction is denied.

Signed on this the 23 day of 2015.

Filed For Record

At 111C1C1clock Dana DeBeadvoir County Clerk, Travis County, Texas

JUDGE PRESIDING

ORDER Memorializing denial in open court of Respondent's Special Appearance and of his Plea to the Jurisdiction

No. 154425, 15-100026

STATE OF TEXAS, Plaintiff, v.

GERALD STEVENS, Respondent:

In The COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 5

TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER MEMORIALIZING

RULINGS IN OPEN COURT DENYING

RESPONDENT'S SPECIAL APPEARANCE AND PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

On September 15, 2015, came on for trial this above-styled and numbered matters. The trial was reset, but the court entered rulings on Respondent's Special Appearance and Plea to the Jurisdiction.

The court has denied, of Record, in open court, both Respondent's Special Appearance and his accompanying Plea to the Jurisdiction for each matter.

Therefore, to memorialize the rulings made in open court, it is ORDERED that Respondent's Special Appearance is denied. It is further ORDERED that Respondent's Plea to the Jurisdiction is denied.

Signed on this the 25 day of $$ 2015.

Filed For Record

ORDER Memorializing denial in open court of Respondent's Special Appearance and of his Plea to the Jurisdiction

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2015

$=====$ THE COURT: We're here on Cause Nos. $15-100025$ and $15-100025$ : Mr. Gerald Stevens is the defendant, and he is here; pro se; representing himself: We have Mr. Flores, who is the prosecutor for the state.

The cases are set on jury today for a trial And at this point they would be No: 4 in terms of the cases that could go to trial:

Mr. Stevens, you wanted to make a request to the court: You may proceed: MR: STEVENS: Yes: Under the circumstances, this is the second reset: And I would, at this time, move the court to grant my special appearance and plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss the case.

THE COURT: Okay: I am going to deny your request because only the state can dismiss the case and I do believe I have statutory jurisdiction over the matter.

I can reset your jury case today if you so desire: or you can wait and come back and see if there's any movement of the other cases that are set.

MR: STEVENS: Could there be a phone call? THE COURT: Yes: If you want to give the state your cell phone; they can let you know: Or I can ask

THE STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF TRAVIS I: Rated Vavra; Official Court Reporter in and for the County Court at Law No. 5, Travis County, State of Texas; do hereby certify that the above and foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in this volume of the Reporter's Record; in the above=styled and numbered cause, all of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were reported by me:

I further certify that this Reporter's Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the exhibits; if any; admitted by the respective parties,

I further certify that the total cost for the preparation of this Reporter's Record is $25.00 and was paid by the defendant:

WITNESS BY OFFICIAL HAND this the 15th day of September; 2015:

Karen Laura RAREN VAVRA; Texas CSR 93169 Expiration Date: 12/31/15 Official Court Reporter County Court at Law No. 5 Travis County, Texas P: 0; Box 1748 Austin, Texas 78767 (512) 854 = 9621

FROM:

Gerald Stevens 3117 Fontana Dr. Austin TX 78704

Case Details

Case Name: Gerald Stevens v. State

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas

Date Published: Nov 30, 2015

Docket Number: 03-15-00676-CR

Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.