OPINION
In Case No. 02-3558, Gerald Sswajje petitions this Court for review of the April 22, 2002, order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing as untimely his appeal of the March 7, 2001, order of the immigration judge, which had denied his application fоr asylum and withholding of deportation. In Case No. 03-3023, Sswajje petitions this Court for review of-the December 27, 2002, order of the BIA denying his motion to reconsider its April 22, 2002, order. Having had the benefit of oral argument and having carefully сonsidered the record on appeal, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we are persuaded that the BIA committed no error of fact or law and did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Sswajje’s appeal as untimely and later denied Sswajje’s motion for reconsideration.
I.
Gerald Sswajje is a native and citizen of Uganda. On March 7, 2001, an immigration judge conducted a merits hearing on the government’s removability claim and on Sswajje’s application for asylum and withholding of removal or, alternatively, for voluntary departure. (A.R. 94.) 1 Attorney Dennis Muchnicki, who represents Sswajje before this Court, also represented Sswаjje at the immigration hearing. (A.R. 139.) On the day of the hearing, the immigration judge sustained the charges of removability, denied the asylum application as untimely and denied the applications for withholding of removal and for voluntary departure. (A.R. 123-24.)
After delivering his findings, the immigration judge engaged in the following colloquy with Sswajje and his counsel, Mr. Muchnicki:
JUDGE TO MR. MUCHNICKI
*479 Q. You’re reserving his right to appeal?
A. Yes.
JUDGE TO MR. SSEWAJJE [sic]
Q. Now, sir, your lawyer is indicating he is reserving your right to appeal my decision, which has found that you have not met yоur burden. And the Court denied all your applications for relief.... Now, Mr. Muchnicki is an experienced immigration attorney. He knows that to effectuate a valid appeal, he has to file your appeal no later than April 6th of this year, at the Board of Immigration Appeals in Falls Church, Virginia. That application has to be completely filled out and all the appropriate fees paid or waived. He also understands that if he doesn’t get this to the Board by that date, it will be deemed abandoned and the Court’s decision will become final. That means you can’t wait until April 5th or 6th or even the 4th to mail your appeal. It will get there too late.
(A.R. 260-61.)
Despite the clear admonition of the immigration judge to file the appeal by April 6, 2001, Mr. Muchnicki did not mail Sswajje’s notice of appeal to the BIA until April 7, 2001. (A.R. 89.) The BIA received the notice of appeal on April 9, 2001. (A.R. 85.)
The INS moved for summary dismissal of Sswajje’s BIA appeal on the ground of untimeliness. (A.R. 83.) Mr. Muchnicki filed an opposition on Sswajje’s behalf, admitting that he had made an error calculating the due date of the аppeal due to a distracting “mini-crisis” in his law practice. (A.R. 44-52.) On April 22, 2002, the BIA issued an order dismissing the appeal as untimely. (A.R. 2.)
On May 21, 2002, the same day Sswajje noticed his appeal to this Court in Case No. 02-3558, Sswajje filed a motion with the BIA for reconsideration of its April 22, 2002, order dismissing his appeal of the immigration judge’s order. (J.A. 4-5.) In that motion, Sswajje argued that the late-filed appeal of the immigration judge’s decision was excusable because his attоrney had miscalculated the due date and because the merits of his immigration case allegedly showed he would face certain persecution if he were returned to his native Uganda. On December 27, 2002, the BIA dеnied the motion to reconsider because Sswajje had “established no error of law or fact” in the BIA’s April 22, 2002, order. Specifically, since Sswajje’s reconsideration motion confirmed that his appeal was untimely due to his counsel’s error, the BIA had not committed a factual error in its April 22, 2002, order. (J.A. 3.)
II.
Federal Regulations in effect at the time of Sswajje’s immigration proceedings in 2001 provide that the BIA has appellate jurisdiсtion from decisions of immigration judges in asylum cases, deportation cases and removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(b), 3.3(a)(1), 3.38(a) (2001). An appeal is not deemed properly filed unless it is received at the BIA within the specified time for appeal. Id. § 3.3(a)(1). To effectuate a timely appeal of the decision of an immigration judge, the petitioner has to ensure that the BIA receives the notice of appeal “within 30 calendar days after the stating of an Immigration Judge’s oral decision....” Id. at §§ 3.3(a)(1), 3.38(b)-(c), 240.15. The decision of the immigration judge becomes final upon expiration of the time to appeal if no appeal has been taken. Id. at §§ 3.39, 240.14. The BIA has the *480 authority to summarily dismiss any appeal that is untimely. Id. § 3.1(d)(2)(F).
It is undisputed that Sswajje filed his notice of appeal too late. Since the immigration judge had rendered an oral decision on March 7, 2001, Sswajje was required to have filed his notice of appeаl by no later than April 6, 2001. He did not even mail the notice of appeal until April 7, 2001, and the appeal was not filed by the BIA until April 9, 2001. Sswajje nevertheless argues that the BIA should have entertained the untimely appeal bеcause of “extraordinary and unique circumstances,” namely, the excusable neglect of his attorney in missing the appeal deadline and the strong likelihood that he will be persecuted if he is denied an aрpeal and returned to Uganda.
Sswajje’s first argument is merit-less in light of this Court’s holding in
Anssari-Gharachedaghy v. INS,
Sswajje also cannot rely on the alleged merits of his asylum application to show unique and extraordinary circumstances. This approach effectively would require the Court to review the decision of the immigration judge. This Court has no jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s decision, however, because Sswajje failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies by filing a timely appeal to thе BIA.
See Perkovic v. INS,
III.
BIA regulations authorize a motion for reconsideration of a BIA decision and provide that such a motion “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). The BIA’s decision to deny a motion for recоnsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Dawood-Haio v. INS,
*481
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sswajje’s motion for reconsideration because the motion alerted the BIA to no legal or factual arguments that had not already been presented to the BIA in response to the INS’s motion for summary dismissal of the untimely appeal of the immigration judge’s order. Perhaрs recognizing this fact, Sswajje’s attorney, Mr. Muchnicki, now argues that his failure to file a timely appeal amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, which should have excused his client’s noncompliance with the appeal deadline. Sswajje cannot avail himself of this argument, however, because he did not raise it in the BIA proceedings. There, he argued only that the merits of his immigration case justified an excеption to the appeal deadline and that Sswajje should not be punished for his counsel’s “simple” mistake. He never argued that his counsel’s mistake rose to the level of a deprivation of due process. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to entertain Sswajje’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Cf. Harchenko,
[7,81 The proper avenue for raising ineffective assistance of counsel is by filing a motiоn to reopen proceedings with the BIA.
Matter of Lozada,
19 I & N. Dec. 637, 639,
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Gerald Sswajje’s petitions for review of the BIA orders in Case Nos. 02-3558 and 03-3023 are hereby DENIED.
Notes
. All references to "A.R.” refer to the administrative record for Case No. 02-3558. References to J.A. refer to the Joint Appendix for Case No. 03-3023.