Case Information
*1 Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
____________
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
Gerald Lee DeCoteau was found guilty of gross sexual imposition in 1996 and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. His habeas petition in November 2012 had six claims. The district court [1] dismissed the petition, finding four claims were *2 time-barred, one was procedurally barred, and the other lacked merit. The district court granted a certificate of appealability whether the statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies on a claim-by-claim basis. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, this court affirms.
AEDPA’s statute of limitations applies to “an application” for a writ of habeas corpus. Its one-year period runs
from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented by filing from such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).
DeCoteau argues that the word
application
at the beginning of the statute
focuses it on the date of the latest claim within the entire application—allowing
review of all claims if at least one is timely. This court reviews de novo the
interpretation of a federal statute.
Borrero v. Aljets
,
“Where statutory language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts—at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to
its terms.’”
Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost
,
The language in § 2244(d)(1) is susceptible to more than one interpretation. As
then-Circuit Judge Alito explained in
Fielder v. Varner
,
The reference to “the latest” date in 2244(d)(1) tells a court how to choose from among the four dates specified in subsections (A) through (D) once those dates are identified . This language does not tell a court how to identify the date specified in subsection (D) in a case in which the application contains multiple claims.
The better interpretation is “subsection (C)’s reference to ‘
the
constitutional
right
’ is
clearly a reference to a singular right, . . . and subsection (D)’s reference to ‘claim or
claims’ indicates Congress meant for courts to determine timeliness on a claim-by-
claim basis.”
Zack v. Tucker
, 704 F.3d 917, 920 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(overruling
Walker v. Crosby
,
If this court adopted DeCoteau’s interpretation, the limitations period would
have little to no significance. A defendant, by filing one timely claim, could resurrect
previously time-barred claims—a result the drafters did not intend.
See
Mayle v.
Felix
,
This court, joining every other circuit to address the issue, holds that the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) applies to each claim within an application.
* * * * * * *
The judgment is affirmed.
______________________
Notes
[1] The Honorable Karen K. Klein, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of North Dakota, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).