On January 10, 1968, Gerald D. Peterson was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of ten years, five years, and one year, respectively.
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Following this court’s affirmance of the narcotics convictions underlying those sentences, Peterson v. United States,
The District Court, Judge William Collinson, dismissed the § 2255 motion without a hearing, holding that (1) the prior state convictions were not constitutionally defective and (2) the argument that Peterson’s sentence was improperly enhanced was without merit, for the District Court would have imposed the same sentence notwithstanding the presentence report. We affirm.
The state convictions which Peterson describes as constitutionally tainted have been upheld as constitutionally valid in previous actions brought by Peterson in federal court. Peterson v. Missouri,
A further reason supports our affirmance. We are required to remand for resentencing where prior constitutionally invalid state convictions may have enhanced the punishment allocated by a federal judge in a subsequent criminal case. United States v. Tucker,
Affirmed.
Notes
. The ten-year sentence was for violating, as charged, 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; the five-year sentence for violating, as charged, 18 U.S.C. § 371; the one-year sentence for violating, as charged, 21 U.S.C. § 331(q) (2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
. The three prior state convictions which Peterson challenged as constitutionally tainted are: (1) a 1954 conviction on a plea of guilty to a charge of auto theft in Buchanan County, Missouri; (2) a 1956 conviction, following a verdict of guilty by a jury, on a burglary charge in Buchanan County; and (3) a 1963 conviction on a plea of guilty to a charge of stealing an auto in Nodaway County, Missouri. The details surrounding these convictions are recounted in Peterson v. Missouri,
. According to Peterson, the presentence report included charges ultimately dismissed and convictions ultimately reversed, in addition to the challenged state felony convictions.
. In his brief, Peterson erroneously suggests that this court’s order of September 14, 1973, issued pursuant to local Buie 9(a), was not an affirmance but simply a dismissal of his appeal for want of jurisdiction. Buie 9(a) of the rules of this court is not confined to dismissals for want of jurisdiction but also provides for, inter alia, summary affirmances.
