Geraci v. Eckankar

interests; Savings v. Allstate parties the re- & Loan Ass’n have balanced Whitestone assignment mortgage Ins., 332, quest partial of a 321 N.Y.S.2d 28 N.Y.2d 694, payment pro- prerequisite to of insurance N.E.2d ceeds was reasonable. Whitestone explains: it has been further and From this rule DECISION

improperly mortgagee deduced rights thus nothing impair to his could do properly granted judg- The district court he at the time of loss. And of course fixed mortgagee ment for insurer where bid the waiver, estoppel, assignment, or could: full amount of the secured debt the fore- by discharge debt. as here closure sale. added).

Id. (emphasis Affirmed. Assignment Mortgage

II. Partial

Mortgagee argues that insurer also justified requiring mortgagee to

was not mortgage “partial assignment” of the

give a poli prerequisite payment under the

as a

cy. Mortgagee asserts that the lаw does mortgages. partial assignment of

provide for partial the use of But caselaw illustrates GERACI, Appellant, A. Carol Goldberg, States v. assignments. See United v. (E.D.Pa.1965) 251, F.Supp. assignment percent of 25 inter (recognizing ECKANKAR, nonprofit a California (3d mortgage), aff'd, F.2d 575 est in a Respondent. corporation, 919, Cir.1966), cert. 386 U.S. No. CX-94-1506. (1967); v. Massa 881, Hill 17 L.Ed.2d 790 Ins., Marine chusetts Fire & 195 Ark. Appeals of Minnesota. Court (involving par 113 S.W.2d 17, 1995. Jan. Wright, N.Y. Barile assignment); tial (involving par N.E. March Review Denied partial made assignment tial where insurer debt); Marine Midland mortgage payment on Assocs., Na t'l Bank v. Roosa Constr. (N.Y.App.

A.D.2d 284 N.Y.S.2d

Div.1967) mortgagee’s par (deciding whether mortgage injured other assignment of

tial

interests). “boot- argues that insurer

Mortgagee also delay resulting payment

strapped” to avoid into a defense order

foreclosure disagree

liability Again, claim. we for the justified in insist-

and hold that insurer was assignment the mort-

ing partial where the extent of insurance

gage debt exceeded insur- have been unfair to It would

due. liability pay than its

er require it to more simply the full policy to secure

under it would

assignment mortgagee offered. And ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‍require mortgagee unfair

have been assignment of the mort-

give a full insurer mort- only partial payment of the

gage upon assignment would partial Here a

gage debt. Marshall, Duddleston, E.

David J. Thomas PLC, Mackall, Moore, Minne- & Crounse appellant. apolis, for Hoffman, Nolan, Larkin, Daly & Dayle Bloomington, respondent. Lindgren, for RANDALL, by and decided Considered P.J., EDWARD D. SCHUMACHER and MULALLY,* JJ.

OPINION SCHUMACHER, Judge. appeals partial A. Geraci from the

Carol summary judgment, arguing that the district (1) granting summary judg- in erred gender terms ment on her and conditions claim, claim, and discrimination defamation estoppel there promissory claim because fact; genuine issues of material were concluding that the of the First Amendment I, Article States Constitution and United in- of the Minnesota Constitution Section discharge- religious employer sulates a from non-minister; brought and a based (3) refusing to allow discover evidence her to pretext discharge-based claims. affirm.

FACTS Eckankar, Respondent a non- California corporation, is church profit an hierarchial in religion. It has churches and subordinate groups and local 48 states numerous headquarters are throughout the world. Its in Hope Temple and the in New of ECK ECKists believe: Chanhassen. are com The universes the SUGMAD hierarchy highly evolved plete with a * Const, VI, court, serving pursuant judge pointment to Minn. art. of the as Retired by ap- Appeals judge of the Minnesota Court of according headquarters. Eckankar’s Because govern all the

beings who wоrlds n * * member, own IT longer laws of their worlds. was no a she terminat- singularly and divine nature. rules ed. principles democratic found There are no sued, alleging statutory sex discrim- here. claims, reprisal ination as well com- Twitchell, Shariyat-Ki-Sugmad, Paul defamation, promissory mon law claims for Book One 35 estoppel, intentional infliction of emo- rules for the ECK chela are The laws and eventually tional The district court distress. give harmony, puri- simple. These are to claims, granted summary judgment on all ty, perfection of the Soul. relating except for claim a defamation Id. at 100. calling co-worker her insubordinate. Claims graduate cum is а 1986 laude Carol Geraci involving suspension from member- University City of New York with dismissal, (gender ship including I Count degree computer science. She became discrimination), (reprisal), II Count 1986 and a second member of (intentional Count V infliction of emotional thereafter, Shortly May initiate distress), under the were dismissed Estab- job systems applied and was hired as a lishment of the States Consti- Clause United analyst headquarters. at Eckankar’s She tution the Minnesota Constitution be- then from New York Minnesota. moved analyzing pretext question cause would $22,000 per year position help- included entanglement cause and excessive- excessive computer system. ing a install ly of its burden Eckankar’s exercise Geraci, Shortly hiring Eckankar before involving gender beliefs. Count I discrimina- systems analyst, Tillery. hired another David employ- in of tion and conditions terms University from the of De- Tillery graduated was the court ment dismissed because found college, primarily in After he laware question present that a fact Geraci failed to computers. programmed He also mainframe pretext prong on the of the McDonnell- supervising employees in experience had (defamation) Douglas III test. Count was Tillery systems. sys- administering became opin- were dismissed because the statements tems of the nеtwork and imme- administrator Finally, ions and were not actionable. Count complete diately had access the network. (promissory estoppel) IV was dismissed be- complete given access until Geraci was “promise” not clear and defi- cause was she for Eckankar for 11 months. had worked as a matter nite and therefore not actionable asked to learn the new net-

When Geraci found there no of law. district court was work, Wollan, Eric supervisor, told her her appealed. just delay, reason and Geraci for on her own time. Till- to read the manuals $25,000 annually. ery paid was her situation with the

Geraci discussed ISSUES members of Eckankar. president and board concluding in 1. Did court err the district 21, 1991, On Geraci notified Eckankar’s June present sufficient evi- that Geraci failed her spiritual and board members of leader genuine issue of dence to raise a material alleged legal complaints violations. On proffered as to Eckankar’s busi- fact whether placed July was a leave of Geraci on for discrimina- pretext ness reasons were spiritual director by Eckankar’s of absence tion? in persisted that she services and warned feelings spiritual her on the trying impose concluding in 2. Did court err the district Eckankar, suspend- would she be dirеction complained of statements were August, or ed excommunicated. defamatory? of her membership was terminated because concluding in Did court err the district teachings of Eckan- disregard of the sacred promissory estoppel that Geraci’s claim kar her failure to manifested work promise was definite failed because the harmony her co-workers. Church mem- and clear? employment bership prerequisite was a system computer access to before Geraci the Minnesota Constitution bar 4. Does judicial discharge-based experience because he more network review оf Geraci’s had supervising employees. administration claims? The court that Geraci was unable “to found ju- Establishment bar 5. Does the Clause pattern salary job duty inequali- show or discharge-based of Geraci’s dicial review ty not offer gender” based and did “suffi- claims? cient the existence of a evidence to establish applying court err in 6. Did the district question genuine material fact on the issue of analyzing test when Eekankar’s Smith pretext.” clause defense? Free Exercise appeal, On claims that she set forth probative sufficient evidence on issue of ANALYSIS pretext summary judgment to defeat the mo- appeal summary judgment, On tion, Tillery including the facts that was not any there we whether are issues determine qualified responsibili- greater more nor had of material fact and whether the district Geraci, Laurence, Dorothy than ties an correctly applied the law. State employee, paid was less than the (Minn. French, Cooper v. supervised. disagree. four males she 1990). argues summary judg improper on her condi ment was terms and manager, The fact that one female claim, discrimination tions 70-person paid organization, was less claim, promissory estoppel and her defama supervised than the is not males she suffi tion claims because thеre were material is present question cient to on the a fact issue fact. sues of pretext, especially when there was a busi paid it why ness reason less: law, 1. Under Minnesota it is an Moreover, temporary position. Geraci’s male employment practice employee for an unfair she, replacement paid less than commen was respect to to terms or con discriminate addition, experience. In surate with his employment on the ditions of basis of sex Tillery while Geraci were hired at the except occupation when based on a bona fide chart, organizational same level on the Till- 363.03, al qualification. Minn.Stat. subd. ery experience systems in significant had l(2)(e) (1992). For indirect discrimination administration; Thus, none. Geraci had it claims, adopted three-part has Minnesota the appears legitimate this a business was deci McDonnell-Douglas Sigurdson test. v. Is give Tillery responsibility sion to more (Minn. 715, County, anti 386 N.W.2d 719-21 $3,000 him pay more than Geraci. We note 1986). test, an employee this must Under Tillery supervise that Geraci and did not discrimination; present of prima a facie case employees. Tillery, other worked persuasion the then the burden of shifts to projects; supervising with others while legitimate employer present a nondiscrimi tо therefore, improper it to take was not into actions; natory for its and the burden reason supervisory Tillery’s prior experi account employee then to the to show that returns ence. justification employer’s pretext the is for Id. at 720. discrimination. review, By of con notice judicial pre- tends that of this claim The district court found that review was Geraci prima gender improper grounds case of on facie discrimi- constitutional because sented employment regard per to her condi- the context Geraci’s was nation with terms and vasively disagree. If an religious. because was a mem- em tions of group; qualified; ployee’s may relying resolved protected ber she was claims be qualifications, paid proof, religion on neutral the despite but she was methods Sny Black v. given computer prevent access to clauses do not review. less and less the der, 715, counterpart. (Minn.App.1991) system Eckan- than her male N.W.2d Tillery (citing acknowledged paid kar more Minker v. Baltimore Annual was Confer Church, Geraci, given 894 F.2d than stated that he was ence United Methodist 1354, (D.C.Cir.1990)), pet. complete rev. assignments and received 1360-61 different (Minn. 1991). 29, proven question can be false is of law. Ang. Geraci’s or denied job disparity pay, Id. were on based duties, system. computer to the and access Here, that a the district found disparity allege that the Eckankar did not job by Tillery an statement to unidentified reasons, but because based on was employee that an was not [Geraci] candidate experience. in- Tillery’s superior Because “technically strong” was not actionable be did involve ecclesi- quiry into these issues Tillery cause did not refer matters, proper. judicial review astical name. There is no indication the record job knew or knew that the candidate defamatory if it 2. A is statement Thus, Eckankar. the that Geraci worked for party; has been communicated to a third defamatory because Gera- statement false; the indi tends harm community reputation in the could not ci’s reputation and him or her lowers vidual’s Stuempges, 297 have been affected. See Stuempges v. community’s estimation. N.W.2d Co., 252, Parke, Davis & N.W.2d 1990, (Minn.1980). cir Next, Before some federal court found that opinion courts that statements of cuit held that Geraci did not “have the tech- statement that, absolutely protected from defamation were or to do expertise nical to work Huyen v. under the First Amendment. something” defamatory suits was not because Driscoll, 76, (Minn.App. alleged lack of without context of Inc., ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‍1991) Newsweеk, (citing Janklow expertise there could be no harm technical (8th denied, 1300, Cir.1986), cert. reputation. F.2d record does Geraci’s 272, 107 S.Ct. 93 L.Ed.2d underlying 479 U.S. facts of state- provide the this Evans, (1986); Ollman v. 750 F.2d possible It is that Geraci did not have ment. (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. U.S. work expertise technical on “it” and (1985)), pet. 86 L.Ed.2d 278 105 S.Ct. not actionable because thus the statement is 1992). (Minn. Feb. Stuempges, rev. denied it is true. See Co., Moreover, reputation v. Lorain Journal 497 U.S. Milkovich cannot (1990), 111 L.Ed.2d 1 injured tell from state- no one can be opin clear all Supreme lacking made that not Court in what Geraci is technical ment area protected and that distinction ions were expertise. Sеe id. by the opinion employed

between fact and Finally, district court found that 18-21, 110 was artificial. Id. at lower courts poisoned “had the statements that Geraci only The that at 2705-07. Court held S.Ct. control,” board,” influ of “a bad “out of concern public matters statements about “emotional,” ence,” player” “not a team capable being proven or false and not of true her published would tend to lower wei’e rea interpreted cannot be statements that community. court con reputation in the The sonably stating protected are as facts cluded, however, these claims were not that Amend under First defamation actions facts thеy do contain actionable because Id.; Bank also McGrath v. TCF ment. see proven that can be factual connotations or Sav., (Minn.App.1993), 808 N.W.2d false. (Minn. modified, as 509 N.W.2d 365 aff'd 1993). however, stated, argues that the court should that Geraci has This court these prong test and that are still have used four pre-Milkovich test case law reputation. A harm her would a statement statements instructive to determine McGrath, prong use the four court need not pursuant to district actionable Milkovich. test; 808; only Huyen, See Huyen, at it is a tool. N.W.2d N.W.2d at addition, the is not issue state N.W.2d 80. The four-factor test examines the 80. (2) rep (1) would harm her precision, verifi whether the statements specificity ment’s utation, (3) statements are literary whether ability, and social context of the made, subject claim because defamation public it context. which was speech. of McGrath, protection free a First Amendment’s Whether 502 N.W.2d public interest. not of stating facts These statements were interpreted can be statement Minn., promise provide employment University 465 N.W.2d and definite Hunt v. Cf. of years.” summary judg- (qualifications pub for two We conclude (Minn.App.1991) interest). Second, appropriate because the court cor- ment was employee public lic is of rectly applied the law and there were no reasonably inter the statements could not be See, McGrath, of fact. stating e.g., material issues preted as facts. (“troublemaker” N.W.2d at not ac 4. The court found that (state tionable); Huyen, 479 at 80 Geraci offered sufficient evidence to establish referring ac ments to “insufficient level of genuine of a issue of material the existence countability,” authority,” “un “uneven use of discharge- regarding the merits of her fact actionable); willingness participate” based claims and whether her excommunica Transp. Chicago Northwestern Lund & discharge. pretext tion was a for her Co., (Minn.App.1991) 467 N.W.2d court, however, inquiry ruled thаt into Eck- (“favoritism,” “move-ups,” “brown nose” not termination, proffered ankar’s reasons for (Minn. actionable), pet. rev. denied June is, excommunication, impermis 1991); Metropolitan Airport Lee v. the United and Minnesota sible under States Comm’n, (Minn.App. 428 N.W.2d Constitutions. 1988) “b-tch,” (“fluffy,” flirtatious not action pro The Minnesota Constitution able). But see Weissman v. Sri Lanka Cur vides: (Minn. House, Inc., ry 469 N.W.2d right every worship man to God (“dishonest” actionable). App.1991) according to the dictates of his own con- allegedly argues Geraci that other infringed; never nor shall science shall be defamatory statements were not considered attend, any compelled man erect or be statements, by the district court. These support any place worship, or to main- presented were not to the district any religious ministry, tain or ecclesiastical response court Geraci’s to Eckankar’s mo consent; any against his nor shall control summary judgment. appellate tion for An rights of or interference with the of con- scope court’s of review is limited to issues permitted, any preference or be science be by and decided the trial court. considered any given law to establishment Co., Krueger Casualty v. State Farm Fire & liberty worship; or mode of but the (Minn.App.1993). Be hereby conscience secured shall not be so presented these were not cause statements construed as to excuse acts of licentious- court, to or decided the district we decline justify practices ness or inconsistent with review. peace safety or state. Next, argues I, art. 16. The freedom of Minn.Const. request two-year for a Eckankar’s time com four-prong conscience clause has a test: implied reciprocal mitment from objector’s sincerely whether belief is promise employ that Eckankar must Geraci held; regulation whether the burdens the years. beliefs; minimum for a of two Geraci cites no religious exercise of whether the theory precedent for her and we decline to regulations compelling; is state’s interest adopt it. regulation and whether the state uses the Hill-Murray least restrictive means. Fed’n promise expected which is to induce [A] Sch., Hill-Murray High Teachers v. 487 promisee, definite action the and does of (Minn.1992). 857, N.W.2d 865 action, binding injustice if

induce the can only by promise. enforcing be avoided The Minnesota Constitution af Co., 387, greater protection religious of freedom v. Cowles 479 N.W.2d fords Cohen Media (Minn.1992) (Second) (citing Restatement than the United States Constitution. State v. 391 (Minn. 90(1) (1981)). 393, promise Hershberger, § 462 N.W.2d 397 of Contracts 1990).1 must be definite and cleаr. Id. The district The First Amendment limits government prohibiting from the exercise of court determined that there was no “clear decided, Hershberger Hershberger, At the Su- free exercise issues. 462 N.W.2d 1. the time analyzing preme Court used the Smith test when

399 16, sincerely beliefs held. precludes that Eckankar’s are religion. Section Eckankar, infringement or an interference application “an of Act to even Further Id. Government religious freedom.” with excessively burden reli however would its prac- religious not prohibit do actions that Hill-Murray, In the Minneso gious beliefs. Minnesota Consti- tices could still violate the Supreme application ta Court concluded religious they interfere with those tution lay employees Relations to of the Labor Act Moreover, the practices. Id. Constitution parochial not of a school would violate legisla- as the prohibits judiciary, as well the terms and First Amendment because ture, violating rights. free exercise from employment were “not doetri- conditions of Cathedral, 363 Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas nally negotiable.” 487 [were] related 1038, 191, 1037, 190, 4 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. 80 also found that (1960). 1140 “to Hill-Murray power require still had the dispute that Eckankar’s Geraci does religious compliance doctrine” and could held, sincerely con- religious are but beliefs who any person “remove fоllow the fail[ed] Hu- application of the Minnesota tends Here, religious standards.” Id. Eckankar Rights exces- man Act to Eckankar does not discharged it Geraci because religious sively Eckankar’s beliefs. burden litigation longer of no a member. Further Geraci, Hill-Murray, argues that relying on require would a court Geraci’s claims “may treats application affect how Eckankar monitoring of question Eckankar’s it its reli- employees, but not affect its does doctrine, its adherence to church reasons for gious disagree. We belief.” excommunication, veracity and the of Eckan- by recognizing that Minneso begin matters, respоnses. kar’s On such “the state (Act) Rights has been held ta Human Act in. may require no minimum more basis applied on its and as constitutional face reasoning may supervise than it doctrinal private companies whose owners held strict Rayburn v. doctrinal content.” General Sports religious by McClure v. beliefs. State Adventists, 772 Seventh-Day Conference Club, 844, Inc., 854 Health 370 N.W.2d & (4th Cir.1985) (citing F.2d Serbian (Minn.1985); v. Porter State Johnson Milivojevich, 426 Diocese v. U.S. Orthodox Farms, Inc., (Minn.App. 696, 720, 2372, 2385, 49 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 1986). appli eases not involve an Those did (1976)), cert. U.S. Act to a church and are cation of the begin If courts L.Ed.2d addition, exempts Act controlling. question a church’s basis doctrinal respect religious organization with to reli decisions, may compelled to con church be religion qualifications is a bona gious when govern religious its beliefs with form qualification.2 occupational Minn.Stat. fide majority beliefs. See or the culture’s ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‍ment’s 1(2) (1992). 363.02, Geraci has subd. Cathedral, 344 U.S. v. St. Nicholas Kedroff brought discrimination. a claim L.Ed. S.Ct. Thus, is not whether the issue be (religious organizations free should impermissibly permissibly or discriminated also manipulation”); control or see “secular religion, against on the basis Gedicks, M. Toward Constitu Frederick Eck- court can resolve whether whether the Religious Group Jurisprudence against Geraci on tional ankar discriminated reprisаl (explain gender Rights, or whether there was Wisc.L.Rev. basis violating Amend polygamy Eckankar’s First due without ing Mormons’ abandonment religion. interference). right ment to the free exercise of There a ten government we cannot. We hold eradicating between discrimination sion religion; how free permitting the exercise compel Eradication of discrimination is case, ever, weighs in favor Club, this balance Sports & ling interest. Health state Amendment. objection the First 854. There is no 370 N.W.2d at . 338, Amos, S.Ct Bishop v. 483 107 a reli U.S. Supreme held that such 2. The Court has (1987). exemption the Es gious does not violate based L.Ed.2d 97 273 Presiding Corporation tablishment Clause. 400 (not- J., (Scalia, prohibits dissenting) 114 at S.Ct. 2515

5. The Establishment Clause ”). conclude, law-making “respecting ing an establishment of Court’s “snub of Lemon We Const, however, analysis I. religion.” type U.S. amend. The dis- that under either discharge-based may dis- trict court held that Geraci’s the courts not review Geraci’s charge-based the Establishment claims were barred under claims. judicial

Clause because review would consti- test, entanglement. tute excessive con- gov Under the Lemon applying that the court erred in pur tends ernment action must: have a secular claims, prevent religion this clause to review of pose; neither inhibit nor advance ' arguing only effect; that the clause bars review of primary as its not create employment involving decisions ministers entanglement between church and excessive clergy. responds KuHzvian, courts Lemon v. 403 state. U.S. jurisdiction exercising 612-13, abstain from must 745 91 S.Ct. 29 L.Ed.2d doctrine, (1971). Grumet, any involving church governmental power over Under faith, discipline they or whether or not in- religiously must be exercised in a neutral clergy. at-, volve a member of the manner. 114 S.Ct. at 2491. -U.S. First, Geraci’s reliance on the “minister” parties agree The that the Minneso exception misplaced. to Title VII is The fifth Rights purpose ta Human Act has a secular recognize circuit was the first court to this primary and that its effect is nоt to inhibit exception. Army, v. McClure Salvation religion. question is whether there is (5th Cir.), F.2d 553 cert. 409 U.S. entanglement gov or excessive whether 34 L.Ed.2d 153 religiously ernmental action is neutral. applying court McClure found that Title VII governmental Whether action causes exces to the would violate ministers entanglement depends sive on the nature of exercise clause. Id. at 560. The free administration, religious the intrusion into expressly addressing refrained from purpose the character and of the involved relationship. church-non-minister Id. at 555. institutions, resulting relationship and the attempts Later cases made to determine religious authority gov and the between whether there was church-minister rela Lemon, 614-15, ernment. 403 U.S. at tionship apply bright-line in order to rule. S.Ct. at 2112. See, e.g., Rayburn, at F.2d (McClure exception dependent upon ordi Supreme The Minnesota Court has held nation, upon position); but function of EEOC that the First Amendment does bar Baptist Theological v. Southwestern Semi application private of Title VII to businesses (5th (or Cir.1981) nary, 651 F.2d whose owners hold sincere beliefs. working support person dained ministers Chib, 854; Sports & Health 370 N.W.2d at seminary nel in do not fall under McClure Farms, 'Here, Porter exception regulations apply). thus EEOC however, the institution involved is a church progeny conclude that McClure and its governmental and the action intrudes into only dispose do not of this case because it is the administration of that church. Accord- exemption a narrow to Title VII order ingly, Sports & Health and Porter Club religious employers’ accommodate free exer dispositive. Farms are not rights. cise

Second, If claims involve core of eccle we note that the district court and issues concern, government entanglement parties applied both the Lemon test. We siastical vitality prevents judicial question continuing Lemon’s subse review. Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 721-23, quent Supreme at 2386- to the Court’s decision U.S. S.Ct. — Minker, 1360; Black, Grumet, U.S.—, 87; 894 F.2d at Board of Educ. 2481,129 (1994), dispute, 720. If can L.Ed.2d 546 where the N.W.2d at S.Ct. Lemon, proof, rely on neu be resolved on neutral methods of court did not used Minker, judicial permissible. trality principles analyzing review is when the Estab —id., at-, 1360, Black, F.2d at 471 N.W.2d at 720. lishment Clause. See U.S. Id.; and state laws and is retroactive. found Geraci eral district court that The Harris, member v. dispute fact that her also Brown-El F.3d “does not the see Cir.1994) (Act (8th of her ship retroactively). was a condition applies that, claims be employment.” Eckankar Generally, required apply court is the a requirement a membership is cause church time it its law that in effect the renders because employment, it terminated Geraci McClelland, 393 decision. McClelland v. parties ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‍The were excommunicated. (Minn.App.1986),pet. way a to deter unable we cannot devise and (Minn. 17,1986). Here, the denied Nov. rev. was a if reason for termination mine this compel the applied court should have district question without pretext for discrimination we that ling interest test. Because conclude and ing the reasons for the excommunication are discharge-based claims barred Geraci’s Minker, veracity See the of those reasons. by the and Minneso Establishment Clause (inquiry into church’s 894 F.2d at 1360-61 however, Clause, ta’s Freedom of Conscience rejecting person pastorship, reasons for moot. the issue is entanglement). pretext, even for would cause in re- argues that the court erred by the searching inquiry is barred Such stricting discovery pretext. Be- on issues of First Amendment.3 court cause we determined that the district that district Geraci contends the correctly judicial determined that review Ex correctly that Free court concluded discharge-based claims was constitution- of her did not bar review ercise Clause barred, ally conclude the court we likewise responds that the district claims. Eckankar restricting its did not abuse discretion test, erroneously applied the Smith court discovery were dismissed. once those claims compelling interest test instead of the favor, do rule in Eckankar’s we Because we would that enforcement of Geraci’s claims expression and not its freedom of address excessively Eckankar’s exercise burden association claim. religious freedom. Div, Dept. Employment In DECISION Smith, Human Resources v. U.S. correctly The court dismissed Ger- district (1990), 108 L.Ed.2d 876 employment, and conditions of aci’s terms Exercise Supreme held that the Free Court defamation, estoppel promissory claims application of a does bar Clause ma- genuine were no issues of there because thаt applicable state law generally neutral correctly applied the fact the court terial of reli incidentally burdens the free exercise properly The dismissed law. 878-79, 110 at 1600. S.Ct. gion. 494 U.S. judi- discharge-based because Here, applied the Smith the district court by the was forbidden United cial review does that enforcement test determined and Minnesota Constitutions. States rights. exercise bar Eckankar’s free Affirmed. Religious Congress, passed re Act of which Freedom Restoration RANDALL, concurring Judge, specially. compelling interest test stored result, 103-141, I concur in the but conclude Pub.L. No. Free Exercise Clause. (codified prima fаcie did not even make as 42 U.S.C. Carol 107 Stat. 1488 2000bb). showing employment discrimination under all fed- legislation applies to Supreme United Court Dayton trine. Id. The States Rights Chris- Comm’n Civil Ohio jurisdiction Inc., agency may Sch., exercise held that a state parochial would school tian preliminarily investigate "the contract over claim pregnant teacher's renew a allegedly * * *, doctrines, because, discharge [the teacher’s] circumstances of its under only age the ascribed reli- preschool ascertain whether stay should home mothers gious-based fact the reason for reason S.Ct. U.S. children. 477 Dayton's discharge" violating in- 2720-21, without First teаcher 91 L.Ed.2d 512 Moreover, vestigation. the Court stated bring claim. discrimination then threatened decision, adequate op- Dayton an will no doubt "receive Dayton its nonrenewal rescinded portunity either to raise its constitutional claims" did not resolve because she fired the teacher Id. level or in state court. doc- at the administrative internally church dispute as mandated Further, McDonnell-Douglas. undisputed Tillery’s facts works. and Geraci’s duties only employer legitimate responsibilities. show that the had involved different skills and Kolstad, non-discriminatory for its Tillery’s reasons decisions. See 457 N.W.2d at 734. supporting I find no issues of material fact responsibilities slightly higher additional and prima facie case. surprising income were not in view his superior experience. prima

To establish a facie case of discrimi- nation, plaintiff present proof must supporting prima Rather than facie case discriminatory Sigurdson v. motive. Isanti discrimination, pres- the facts (Minn.1986)(“A County, 386 N.W.2d exactly type employers ent of factors and prima may facie case be established direct managers regularly legitimately and use in motive”). discriminatory evidence of Where delegating authority setting employee and in plaintiff produce cannot such direct evi- salaries. dence, plaintiff may present prima still (1) by showing plaintiff facie case that: ais protected group; plaintiff of a

member

sought qualified opportunities and that others; employer made available to

despite being qualified, plaintiff was denied opportunities; plaintiff

these and after opportunities

was remained avail- given persons able or were to other Greg COPELAND, al., Appellants, et plaintiffs qualifications. wage Id. For dis- v. claims, plaintiff crimination must show employer paid wages different BROADCASTING, INC., HUBBARD d/b/a employees opposite equal sexes for work KSTP-TV, al., Respondents. et jobs skills, effort, requiring equal and No. C4-94-1629. Foods, responsibility. Fairway Kolstad Inc., (Minn.App.1990). 457 N.W.2d Appeals Court оf of Minnesota. Here, Tillery, the record shows who was Jan. not, given opportunities qual- Geraci was was ways Tillery ified in not. Geraci was approximately years experience

had eleven

computer systems analysis, programming ‍​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‍computers, supervising employ-

mainframe

ees, computer network administration. hired, recently

When Geraci was she had

graduated college, experience had some computer design programming, experience in computer

had no network ad- termination,

ministration. After Geraci’s replacement given responsi-

male was some formerly performed by Tillery

bilities

Geraci, paid substantially than less Ger- experience.

aci because he had even less sought had to show that she qualified opportunities that the em-

ployer making available to others. See

Sigurdson, Tillery at 720. had

experience computer maintaining networks qualified employ-

and was to administer the computer

er’s network here. Geraci did not experience administering computer

have net-

Case Details

Case Name: Geraci v. Eckankar

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Minnesota

Date Published: Jan 17, 1995

Citation: 526 N.W.2d 391

Docket Number: CX-94-1506

Court Abbreviation: Minn. Ct. App.