106 U.S. 458 | SCOTUS | 1882
GEORGIA
v.
JESUP.
Supreme Court of United States.
*462 Mr. Clifford Anderson, Attorney-General of Georgia, Mr. Robert N. Ely, and Mr. Robert Toombs for the appellant.
Mr. Walter S. Chisholm and Mr. Robert Fallegant, contra.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
It does not seem incumbent upon this court to determine some of the questions, however important or interesting as abstract propositions, which counsel have pressed upon its attention. The case, as presented by the record, is within a very narrow compass, as is evident from the statement, already made, of the history and nature of the litigation out of which the present appeal arises.
The action of the court below is assailed by the State upon numerous grounds, separately stated in the assignment of errors. They are, however, all comprehended in the general proposition that the court erred in denying and dismissing the State's petition, filed June 3, 1879, thereby, it is claimed, adjudging that the sheriff could not, pending the possession and control by the receivers of the property, rightfully proceed with the executions for taxes; and in decreeing that the State is not entitled to penalties on its taxes for the years named in the final decree of foreclosure.
Touching the first of these propositions, it may be observed that if it was not a matter wholly within the discretion of the Circuit Court to permit the State to become a party to the foreclosure suit, it is clear that the State did not ask to become, nor was it in any form made, a party to that suit. It is equally clear that it could not have been made a party without its consent. While questioning with great distinctness of language the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to take possession, by its receivers, of the property previously levied on in satisfaction of the several executions for taxes, the State avowed its unwillingness to submit its rights, in the matter of taxes, to the adjudication of any court of the United States. It, therefore, assumed such a position with reference to the foreclosure suit, that, while asking an order to be entered discharging the receivers *463 as to the property levied on, and as to that proposed to be levied on for taxes, it would not be bound by any ruling the court might make. Still, a proper respect for the State seemed to require that the court should, in some form, indicate its opinion touching the formal suggestion that it had overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction, accompanied by a request that the court would revise its proceedings, and not allow the sheriff, having in his hands executions for taxes, to be embarrassed by the actual possession and control, by the receivers of the Circuit Court, of the property of the railroad company. The court below was of opinion that it had jurisdiction to do what had been done, and that it ought not to make any such order as that suggested by the State. But it nevertheless directed that the principal sums, claimed by the State for taxes, should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgage property, next after paying judicial costs. It declined to make any provision for the payment of penalties or interest upon taxes. The record shows that the principal sums declared to be due the State have been received by it. The action of the Circuit Court was based in part upon what were regarded as the settled doctrines of the Supreme Court of Georgia, in respect of the right, under execution, in the ordinary form, and not specially moulded for that purpose, to seize and sell, at different sales, separate portions of a railroad, operated under franchises conferred by the State for purposes of travel and transportation. Without stopping to consider those or any other questions of law supposed to be raised by the State's petition, it is sufficient to say that the order, denying and dismissing that petition, is not one which the State can ask this court to review upon its appeal; this, for the reason already indicated, if there were no other, that the order did not conclude the State it being no party to the suit as to any right acquired in virtue of the executions for taxes. It was not an adjudication or judicial determination of those rights as between the State and the parties to the foreclosure suit. If, by law, the levies, in behalf of the State, were valid to the extent of creating a prior lien in its favor for taxes, or for the penalties or interest thereon, as to which questions we express no opinion, that priority was not affected or displaced by the subsequent possession of the property *464 by the receivers in the foreclosure suit. In no legal sense has the State been injured by the order dismissing its petition. It may not, therefore, claim, as matter of right, that this court shall, upon this appeal, review the action of the court below in declining to surrender possession of the property covered by the levies under the executions for taxes.
In reference to that part of the final decree of foreclosure, declaring, as between the parties before the court, that the State was not entitled to penalties or interest on its taxes, we remark, that if the State, not being a party to the suit, could have appealed therefrom, it has not done so. The petition of Aug. 22, 1879, plainly imports that the appeal prayed for was only from the order of June 6, 1879, denying and dismissing the petition of June 3, 1879. It is, therefore, not competent for this court, upon the present appeal, to review that portion of the final decree relating to penalties and interest on taxes. Whether the State is concluded by any action subsequently taken by it under that decree, or whether the State was, or is, entitled to penalties and interest on its taxes, are questions which do not arise upon this appeal, and are not intended to be decided.
For these reasons the decree must, on this appeal, be
Affirmed.
