156 Ga. 826 | Ga. | 1923
The Supreme Court of the 'United States has held that classification “ must always rest upon some difference which bears a reason-' able and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without such basis . . arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classification. . . The equal protection demanded by the fourteenth amendment forbids this.” See Leonard v. American Life & Annuity Co., supra; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. ed. 923); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 560 (22 Sup. Ct. 431, 46 L. ed. 679); Gulf &c. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 155, 160, 165 (17 Sup. Ct. 255, 41 L. ed. 666). In Arthur v. State, 146 Ga. 827 (92 S. E. 637), it was said: “ Equal protection of the laws ’ means equal security under them to every one, under similar terms, in his life, his . . property, and in the pursuit of happiness, and exemption from- any greater burdens and charges than such as are equally imposed upon all others under like circumstances. Hence, a statute bearing alike on individuals of each class, or on all districts in like- conditions, does not deny the equal protection of the laws; but such classification must not be arbitrary and without reasonable grounds on which it may be based'.” By reference to section 4424 of the Civil Code of 1910, it will be observed that no cause of action lies against employers generally in favor of the next of kin of employees for a wrongful injury or death resulting from the negligence of the employer. The defendant insists that a common carrier by railroad cannot be singled out and made a class separate from all other employers and made liable in such cases for the benefit of “ the next of kin.” It is insisted that such a classification is arbitrary, and does not rest upon any difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed. Counsel for defendant does not controvert, but freely admits, the
In determining the question raised by the demurrer, as above stated, we proceed on the theory that certain principles involved are settled. “ The rules by which this contention must be tested, as is shown by repeated decisions of this -court, are these: 1. The equal-protection clause of the fourteenth amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in- practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
Common carriers are subject to police regulation; and “while the police power is not unlimited, it does include provisions, in pursuance of the public policy of the State, against such a corporation,” and a statute fixing a liability as stated above is reasonable, and does not deny equal protection of the law because it does not apply to negligent homicides committed by other persons and corporations. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406, 410 (31 Sup. Ct. 59, 54 L. ed. 1088, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 220, 21 Ann. Cas. 815). That case involved the validity of a statute placing telegraph companies in a class as to limiting liability for negligence not shared with any other person or corporation. The ruling upholding the statute was approved in International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 214 (34 Sup. Ct. 859, 58 L. ed. 1276, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 525), by unanimous decision of the Supreme Court. We think the principles ruled in the last-mentioned cases applicable to this case. The classification does not appear to be without a reasonable basis, to wit, the compensation of the next of kin dependent upon the deceased employee for wrongful homicide of employees of common carriers by railroad. Such employees are engaged in an occupation indisputably hazardous. Georgia R. Co. v. Miller, 90 Ga. 571 (16 S. E. 939); and see Thompson v. Central R. Co., 54 Ga. 509; Augusta &c. R. Co. v. Randall, 79 Ga. 304 (4 S. E. 674). The decision is not based on any argument that the police power of the State is unlimited. On the contrary we freely subscribe to what was said by the Supreme Court in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., supra: “ The constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or statutes of the States to the contrary notwithstanding. A statute of a State, even when avowedly enacted in the exercise of its police powers, must yield to that law. No right granted or secured by the constitution of the United States can be impaired or destroyed by a state enactment, whatever may be the source from which the power, to pass such
Judgment affirmed.