129 Ga. 502 | Ga. | 1907
(After stating the facts.)
But a comparison of the provisions in the charter of the Town of Decatur with the provisions in the charters of the towns of Union Point and Waycross relatively to that subject will demonstrate that they are not analogous. The act of the legislature approved December 19th, 1893 (A. 93, p. 206), amending the charter of the Town of Decatur, provides that “The mayor and council of said town shall have full power and authority to open, lay out,, to widen, straighten, or otherwise change streets, alleys, and squares in said town of Decatur. Whenever the said mayor and
In the section of the charter quoted we find both the power to open streets and provision made for the assessment of' damages sustained in consequence of the exercise of that power. What other conclusion can be reached from the grant of power to open streets, and the provision for the assessment of damages sustained in consequence of such opening, than that there was a manifest legislative intent to confer the power to condemn property or easements therein? It will not do to say that “Here is no provision for ‘taking’ any land and paying for the land- so taken. Provision is made only for damages and benefits. And damages and benefits to whom? Not to persons whose lands have been taken, but for ‘the owners of lots fronting on said streets, alleys, or squares.’ ” If this section of the charter had gone no further than. to provide for the opening of streets and the assessment of damages sustained in consequence thereof, such a contention might have been sound; but in connection with the provision for the assessment of damages, we find' the further provision that the “mayor and council shall have the right to decline to accept any property assessed for public purposes, as above provided, whenever in the'opinion of said mayor and council the price fixed, or award made, is too high or unreasonable.” ' Beading this last provision in connection with what precedes it in the extract from the charter quoted, it seems to us that the conclusion is unavoidable that there was a plain legislative intent to grant the power to the town
Judgment affirmed.