106 Ga. 296 | Ga. | 1898
Emma Parrott sued the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company for damages sustained by her, growing out of the homicide of her husband by the defendant company. She .died pending the suit, and her administrator was made a-party. The petition alleged, that the deceased was driving a team of mules, and a wagon upon the public road in the village of Union Point, from, the vicinity of the .stores on the south side of the railroad-crossing to the north side thereof, the crossing being a regular public crossing 100 yards, east of the depot of' the defendant. As deceased approached the crossing the railroad. eastward was hidden from his sight for a distance of half a mile by two cottonseed-warehouses erected on the right of way with the knowledge and consent of the company, and by bushes left growing on the right of way,, and by a freight-car left standing-near the crossing and the seed-houses. No'train was due from the east at the time that deceased started to cross the track, and his attention was fixed upon another train of defendant, which was shifting near the crossing and to the westward of it. Just as the deceased got upon the crossing a train approached from the east, thirty minutes behind its schedule time, running at the rate of thirty miles an hour. There is no blow-post erected at said crossing, and in approaching the same no signals were given and the speed of the train was not
The collision ¡not having occurred at a public road crossing, ■ the defendant was under no statutory duty to give a signal or ■ check' the train in approaching thereto. Civil Code, § 2222; Comer v. Shaw, 98 Ga. 543. Within the limits of'incorporated ■ cities and towns, and outside Of such limits wherever a line of railroad crosses-a road which has been established pursuant to law, a railroad oompany, in the operation of its trains, is bound to give such signals and perform such acts as are required by ; statute in the 'latter case, and those which may be required by : such reasonable regulations as the municipal authorities may prescribe in the former. A failure in either case to comply ■ with the requirements of the law applicable would amount to negligence in law. In the case of Comer v. Shaw, cited supra, Chief Justice Simmons uses this language: “ Where a railroad- • crossing' is in a populous locality and is much used by the -public, even though the provisions of [Civil Code, § 2222] are - not applicable, greater care is required of railroad companies with respect to speed and signals than is to be expected at places where the railroad is crossed by unfrequented country roads not established bj’- law' as public roads; but non-compliance at ¡ such a place with the statutory requirements applicable to public roads established by law is not, as a matter of law, negligence per se. It is generally for the jury to say whether under ; such circumstances the railroad company was negligent or not.
Judgment affirmed.