Aрpellee Collum initiated the instant personal injury action, naming appellant Georgia Power Company and Jeffrey Bergmann as defendants. Appellee was injured when the vehicle that Mr. Bergmаnn was operating left Roswell Road and struck a “down” guy wire securing appellant’s utility pole. The impact caused the wooden support utility pole to break. The broken pole, in turn, caused an attached “span” guy wire to fall across the roadway. A van driven by appellee struck the fallen “span” guy wire, causing injuries to appellee. In his complaint, appellee set fоrth a negligence theory of recovery against Mr. Bergmann. As against appellant, the complaint set forth theories of negligence and strict liability. Among the allegations of appellee’s complaint were assertions that appellant had been negligent in the following respects: placement of the wooden support pole and, the down guy in close proximity to the roadway; failure to inspect, maintain, discover and replace the wooden support pole which was in a weakened and deteriorated condition; failure to install a reflective covering on the span guy; and use of a wooden support pole, down guy and span guy lacking in sufficient strength to withstand foreseeable forces.
Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, which motion was denied. The trial court issued a certificate of immediate review, and this court granted appellant’s application for interlocutory appeal.
1. In the context of the instant сase, appellant is not being sued as the manufacturer of any defective personal property sold as new property. Accordingly, OCGA § 51-1-11 is inapplicable and appellee
*62
hаs no strict liability claim. “A power company is charged with the duty of exercising
ordinary care
in the construction and maintenance of its wires, poles, transformers and equipment.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Collins v. Altamaha Elec.
Elec. &c
Corp.,
2. In
Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Martin,
In the instant case, it is clear that appellant’s pole did not obstruct or interfere with the
ordinary
use of Roswell Road. “[T]he pole was located behind a curb line which delineated the ordinary use of the road by vehicular traffic. The evidence further showed that if the vehicle in which [Mr. Bergmann] was riding had remained on the paved portion of the road and within the curb, it would not have struck the pole. [Cits.]”
Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Martin,
supra at 882-883. Compare
Kicklighter v. Savannah Transit Auth.,
Appellee asserts, however, that appellant failed to prove that the location of its pole had been approved by any county or municipal authority and that, for this reason, summary judgment was properly denied. The record does reveal that the only evidence submitted by appellant was that its pole had been “properly located” in accordance with certain rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Transportation (DOT). Appellant’s prоof in this regard was uncontradicted. Accordingly, the first issue for resolution is whether appellant’s evidence in this regard was sufficient to show such official jurisdictional “approval” of a utility pole’s lоcation as is contemplated under the principle of non-liability enunciated in Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Martin, supra.
OCGA § 32-6-174 authorizes DOT to promulgate those regula *63 tions pursuant to which appellant’s evidence shows that it located its pole and wires. By its terms, however, OCGA § 32-6-174 relates to DOT’s regulatory authority over utility equipment and appliances “in, on, along, over, or under any part of the state highway system . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) It does not appear that appellant has produсed any evidence indicating that the portion of Roswell Road where the pole and wire were located is in fact a part of the “state highway system,” as opposed to a part of a “county road system” or a “municipal street system.” See OCGA § 32-4-1. If the relevant portion on Roswell Road is not a “state highway,” appellant would not necessarily be entitled to summary judgment based upоn its compliance with DOT’s regulations, assuming the possibility exists that a more restrictive standard for utility pole and wire placement may have been promulgated by the municipal or county authority having jurisdiсtion. However, this remaining possibility is likewise negated by appellant’s evidence. OCGA §§ 32-4-42 (6) and 32-4-92 (10) establish that neither a county’s nor a municipality’s regulations regarding utility pole and wire placement along and over the roads under its jurisdiction may be more restrictive than those that are promulgated by DOT with reference to the state highway system. Accordingly, regardless of whether Roswell Road is in fact a state highway, a county road or a municipal street, appellant’s evidence of its compliance with DOT’s regulations demonstrates, either explicitly or implicitly, the requisite jurisdictional “apprоval” of the location of its pole and wires.
Thus the evidence of record shows that appellant’s utility pole did not obstruct or interfere with the ordinary use of Roswell Road
and
that its location satisfied whatever jurisdictional approval requirements might possibly be applicable. In addition, it has been held, as a matter of law, that “the failure to provide warning signs, lights, guardrails, crash cushions and breakaway type poles would not create an inherently dangerous situation.”
Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Martin,
supra at 883. It follows that appellant is not liable in negligence for the placement of its pole and wires and for Mr. Bergmann’s act of striking the pole.
Ga. Power Co. v. Zimmerman,
supra;
Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co. v. Scogin,
supra. Compare
Lenderman v. Haynie,
3. The remaining issue is whether the absence of any actionable liability in negligence with regard to the pole’s location entitled appellant to summary judgment as to the entirety of appellee’s claim. As noted above, appellee has also asserted that appellant is liable for *64 the consequences of Mr. Bergmann’s act, insofar as the cоmplaint alleges that the pole was negligently maintained.
In
Lyons v. Ga. Power Co.,
It is thus clear that if a pole is struck and breaks solely as the result of “a separate and independent act” of another in which the utility company’s negligence is not a causal factor, then the alleged negligent maintenance of the pole would not be a proximate cause of the resulting injuries.
Mathews v. Ga. Power Co.,
Judgment reversed.