49 Miss. 80 | Miss. | 1873
delivered the opinion of the court;
The statement of this case conducts to its certain solution. By policy No. 27, dated December 1st, 1870, W. H. Jones was insured against loss, by fire, in the Georgia Home Insurance Company, in the sum of $2000, as follows: t; $1200 on a gin house leased by him; $200 on the gin and gearing therein; $400 on cotton, ginned and unginned, packed and unpacked therein, and $200 on the cotton press contiguous thereto.” This policy, by its terms, was in force “ from the 1st diiy of December, 1870, at 12 o’clock, noon, until the 1st day of March, 1871, at 12 o’clock, noon,” and was “ to be paid within sixty days after due proof of the amount” of loss, in case of fire. The property thus insured was totally destroyed by fire on the 6th day of February, 1871. Due, proof of loss was made within a few days after the fire.
In. default of payment, suit was instituted to recover the insurance, in June, 1871. The issue was tried before th^ .circuit judge of Warren county, without a jury, which was waived by stipulation. No fault, neglect or omission was imputed to the plaintiff, but a defense was predicated upon the following facts : J. R. Powell, of Alabama, being the .owner of three plantations in Washington county, Miss., leased the same to James M, Qslin, in 1870, for three years,
By an oral agreement in January, reduced to writing November 15th, 1870, Oslin sub-let one hundred acres on the “ Rose place,” to W. H. Jones, free of rent on condition of putting the same under, fence. Jones was “ to have the use of the gin upon said tract of land,” and timber for building and fencing.
On the 17th day of January, 1870, Oslin gave an agricultural lien upon the crops grown on the above plantation, to McOutchen & Co., and on the same day a concurrent lien to Richardson & May. These liens included “ one gin stand, in the gin house on the “Rose plantation.” Under date of November 21st, 1870, a deed of trust was executed by Oslin further to secure McOutchen & Co., and others, for advances and supplies, embracing crops, stock, farming implements, and aleo “ gin stand and band in gin house on the “Rose place,” and running gear and cotton press on the “Rose place.”
By policy No. 3119, the Planters Insurance Company insured Oslin in the sum of $2400, as follows: “ $600 on his gin stand, cotton press, running gear and gin bard, and $1800 on thirty bales of cotton in seed, lint, or bales, all contained in his horse-power gin house, occupied by the assured, and situated on the “Rose plantation,” in Washing-, ton county, Miss., for three months, commencing at noon on the 21st day of February, 1871.” Loss by this policy was payable to McCutchen & Co.
Jones was examined as a witness, and testified, that the fire occurred during his absence in Vicksburg, from whence he returned after the fire: “ The gin house and contents, including the gin stand and gearing, and about eighteen thou
McOutchen testified for defendant, that, about January 8th, 1871, “ Ool. J. P. Powell and William McOutchen, of the firm of McCutchen, Folkes & Co., went up to the plantation, and Col. Powell entered upon and took possession of the three places, as for a forfeiture of the lease; Oslin having forfeited his lease by non-payment of rent for the year 1870. There was no objection made by Oslin’s agent, or any one
The circuit Judge found generally for the plaintiff, but by request, he stated his conclusions of fact separately from the conclusions of law, as follows : “The plaintiff rented of Oslin the ‘Pose plantation,’ in Washington county, taking possession January l, 1870, but the contract was not reduced to writing, until November 15th ; Jones supposed Oslin to be the owner of the place; having put up a cotton press, repaired the gin house, put in a gin and gearing to run the same, for his benefit as lessee. Jones applied to defendant for a policy of insurance, on his interest in the property thus enumerated; the policy was issued December 1,1870, for three months for $2000 ; the property insured included twelve bales of cotton unginned ; all burned February 6,1871; in November, 1870, Oslin effected an insurance with the Planters’ Ins. Co. on this same property, with other property, for the benefit of Mc-Cutchen & Co.; there was also an agricultural lien and subsequently a mortgage, covering, as was claimed, Jones’ improvements and interest in the crops he made, and a short time before the fire, it appears that Oslin surrendered his interest in the ‘Rose plantation,’ and McCutchen & Co. became his successors under Col. Powell, the owner, and claimed
The following are the conclusions of law of the circuit judge:
“1. That at the time the insurance was effected by Jones, he had an insurable interest in the property of greater vlaue than insured.
2. That no fraud being claimed by the Georgia Home Ins. Co. in obtaining the insurance by Jones, and no objection being made to the preliminary proof of the loss, Jones was entitled to recover for the amount of his loss proven as against said insurance company.
3. That Oslin could not encumber in any way Jones’ interest in property acquired by agreement or lease, as sub-lessee of Oslin, and hence Oslin’s chattel-mortgage to Mc-Cutchen, Folks & Co. gave them no interest in Jones’ property embraced in the policy in this suit. .
4. Oslin, having a three years’ lease of the “Rose place” at the time he sub-leased it to Jones, the latter was not necessarily evicted by Oslin surrendering his lease or selling out to McCutchen, Folkes & Co.; on the contrary, Jones, the plaintiff, being in the possession and using the same at the time the tire occurred, was entitled to recover from the Georgia Home Ins. Co. the amount of his loss of the property so insured.”
Judgment followed for the full amount of the insurance,
A motion for a new trial was made on the ground that the decision was contrary to the law and the evidence. This motion was overruled, and thereupon a writ of error was prosecuted.
The following statements present, somewhat fully,, all the facts of this case. The testimony and the rights of Jones are thereby isolated, and made to stand out prominently, amidst the numerous liens, mortgages, and counter claims, sought to be created by Oslin, and now interposed to defeat the action of the plantiff.
If there was cotton in the gin house, of the share of the hands, sufficient to pay him the indebtedness of $2000, then he had an interest, still exclusive of the $1600 on the gin house of $3470. Or, to the $2010, if we add the $1600, on the gin house, he then had an interest of $3610, and this interest in the gin house, may be conceded to Jones either as an interest in its use, or by way of mechanic’s lien, for the repairs, which he says he put upon it to a large amount.
In November, 1870, Oslin left for Texas and has not returned. Powell and McGutchen went to the plantation in January, 1871, and took possession without demand, and without objection from Oslin’s agent; who this agent was, or whether he was present, is not stated. It does not appear whether Jones was present, or was spoken to on that occasion. Neither does it appear, that any allusion was made to, or anything done, specifically, about Jones’ occupation and use of the gin, gin stand, gearing, press, and cotton in
It would seem that he was unmolested and wholly undisturbed in his possession and use of the property claimed, and insured by him, either by Powell and McCutehen, or by Green, who was placed in charge of the plantations and of the ungathered crops, as the agent of McCutehen. It no where appears that the connection of Jones with the property insured by him was severed or interfered with, until he voluntarily left after the fire. Indeed, according to the testimony, it is evident that Jones continued his active interest in, and oversight of, this property, until its destruction, after which he was still there guarding his interests. The material question in the case is, did Jones have an insurable interest in the property upon which he obtained a policy ? The answer is furnished by the testimony of Jones himself.
In the view taken of this case, it is unnecessary to discuss rules of law which might arise under a slightly different state of facts.
What is an insurable interest ? Code, 1871, § 1603 ; Carter, v. Home Ins. Co., 12 Iowa, 287; 1 Ph. on Ins., 107, 108 ; Tyler v. Ætna Ins. Co., 16 Wend., 238; 7 La. An., 29; 7 B, Mon,, 470, 14 Md., 285.
Was there a forfeiture in this case? Lynd v. Hough, 27, Barb., 415 ; Spear v. Fuller, 8 N. H., 174; 3 B. & A., 299 ; 3 Dana, 586 ; 3 Cush., 236 ; 1 Sand.,. 237; 2 Story Eq., Jur., § §1314, 1315, 1316 ; 15 John., 278.
Error is not shown. 41 Miss., 104; 44 ib., 449 ; ib., 731; ib., 789; 45 ib., 558; 46 ib., 573.
Judgment affirmed.
A petition was filed for a re-argument upon the grounds stated in the following opinion of the court:
■ On petition for re-argument. The grounds of this application are these : 1. A demurrer undisposed of. 2. A special plea without a replication; and, 3. Upon the merits.
There was the usual plea of non-assumpsit, which involved the whole merits of the controversy, and the cause was fully tried upon every question to which the action could give rise.
The special pleas presented us were issue, or new matter, not raised by the general issue.
To the first special plea, there was a demurrer, and the counsel for the plaintiff in error in his abstract, says, that, thereupon the second special plea was filed. The inference is, that, the first special plea and demurrer were thus disposed of. Without a replication to the second special plea, the cause proceeded to trial, verdict and judgment. There was a motion for a new trial, and a full bill of exceptions, presenting the whole case between the parties. From the time it was filed until the case reached this court, no attention was paid to the special pleas or demurrer; no reference was made to them ; they in no way involved the merits, or presented any question which was not raised and adjudicated.
The facts surrounding the technical points in this case, on which a re-argument is asked, are believed to be unlike the cases referred to by counsel in support of the petition. In the case at bar no injustice has been done; no questions remain undisposed of; there was no impediment to a full and perfect investigation; from the record and the bill of exceptions, it is evident the demurrer and the special pleas were waived by mutual consent. For this reason, and because no injustice has been done, and no part of the merits admitted on the trial by reason of the demurrer undisposed of, and the want of a replication, justice does not require a re-argument, much less a reversal of the judgment.
In Armstrong v. Barton, 42 Miss., 507, there was judgment final on demurrer to special pleas, When there was a good plea of payment not replied to, and no general issue.
Hogue v. Lewellen, 42 Miss., 302, Was the case of a plea of payment, without replication, and no general issue. Held: A discontinuance. And such only is the case in 4 How., 852.
Bryman v. Brown, 6 How., 319, was the case of an executor pleading specially to a note, the failure of consideration and judgment without replication.
The demurrer in Cassedy v. Jackson, 45 Miss., 397, involved the merits to a large extent,
Mayfield v. Barnard, 43 Miss., 271, was disposed of finally oh demurrer, with other demurrers undisposed of, Held: To be error.
The reasoning in Waterbury v. McMillan, 46 Miss., 635, proceeded expressly upon the theory that the demurrer undisposed of involved the merits to some extent at least.
There was no general issue in Hatch v. Roberts, 41 Miss., 92, but several special pleas, to which there Was a demurrer, without disposing of which, there was a trial. Held: To be erroneous. The precedents do not seem to warrant the application of the rule invoked by counsel, to the extent asked upon the facts of the case at bar, where no injustice has been done, by ignoring the technical points raised for the first time in this court, and when the merits are in no way involved thereby. But., § 622, Code of 1871, is conclusive on this point,
Upon the merits, it is not considered necessary to add anything to the views expressed in the opinion affirming the judgment, Be--argument refused.