134 Ga. 87 | Ga. | 1910
The Georgia Fire Insurance Company filed a petition seeking to enjoin the mayor and council of Cedartown from collecting ad valorem taxes on certain personal property consisting principally of notes, mortgages, securities, and money. The in
In the Civil Code, § 2008, which makes provision in regard to the incorporation of insurance companies in this State, one requirement is that the petition for incorporation shall state that the applicants “have given thirty daj^s notice of their intention to apply for said charter, by the publication of said petition in the newspaper publishing the legal advertisements of the county where the principal office of said company is to be located, once a week for four weeks before the filing of said petition.” The statements of the petition are required to be verified by affidavit. This shows a location in a particular county, and thus indicates the domicile of the corporation there; but the law makes no requirement for naming in the petition for incorporation a particular house or locality in the county as the home of the companj\ Belatively to the question of liability for taxation, if it'has two offices or places for the transaction of business in that county, the question which is the principal office is one of substance and of fact, rather than one of mere declaration. A corporation may establish its principal office at a place within the county, inside of a municipality or outside of it. So an individual may live without the limits of an incorporated town, although he may transact business therein. If his residence is outside of the incorporation, personal property which would be considered as located at the place of his residence would not be subject to municipal taxation. But if an individual actually lives in a city all the year round, he can not escape municipal taxation on personalty by renting a room outside of the city, declaring it to be his home for the purpose of evading taxes, and going there and transacting business for an hour or two at a time two or three times a year. Neither can a corporation avoid municipal taxation, if its actual principal' office is in a town or city in the county of its incorporation, where all of its business is transacted and its of
In the case at bar, the application for the charter did not have to fix the exact location of the principal office in Polk county, except as above stated. The meeting for organization took place at what is claimed to have been a temporary or branch office in Cedar-town. One section of the by-laws provided that an annual meeting of the stockholders should be held “at their home office in Polk county, Ga., at the home of W. S. Coleman, one and one quarter miles south of court-house, or with branch offices at Cedar-town, or other places in Georgia as may be determined by the directors.” Another section provided for meetings of the board of directors, but did not state in terms where they should take place. Another, which was headed, “Place of meetings of stockholders and directors,” stated that “The meetings of the stockholders and the .board of directors, both regular and special, shall be held at the home office in Polk county, Georgia, or with the branch office at Cedartown or other places in Georgia.” Still another provided, • that the president should appoint from the board of directors an
There was sufficient evidence to authorize the presiding judge, passing on the question of fact only so far as to decide the application for interlocutory injunction, to hold that, relatively to. liability to taxation, the office in Cedartown was the principal office. In the petition and in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error it was said that the branch office in Cedartown had been moved to Atlanta; and a witness so stated; and in the brief it was asked, if the principal office were declared to have been in Cedartown, where is its home office now? It may be that the office or place of business remaining in Polk county would authorize the bringing of suits there; but that does not affect the question now under consideration. The minutes which were introduced in evidence show that at a stockholders’ meeting a motion was made and adopted, authorizing the board of directors to look into the advisability “of moving the home office, . . . from its present location at the home of W. T. Coleman to the city of Atlanta,” leaving the
The ruling now made in no way conflicts with former decisions of this court, to the effect that the venue of suits against a domestic corporation is in the county where its principal office is located by its charter (McCandless v. Inland Acid Co., 115 Ga. 968 (42 S. E. 449)) ; or that if the charter is silent on the subject, and a principal office for the purpose of electing its officers and of conducting its financial affairs has been located by the corporation itself in a certain county, it may be sued there, and can not avoid the jurisdiction by setting up that it was incorporated as a coal-mining company, and that its mining operations are conducted in another county. Dade Coal Co. v. Haslett, 83 Ga. 549 (10 S. E. 435). See also, on the subject of venue, McCall v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 120 Ga. 602 (48 S. E. 157). That the venue of suits against a corporation is in the county of its residence or principal place of business fixed by its charter does not give it the power to locate in a municipality of that county its office where practically all of its business is done, its officers keep their offices and perform their duties, and its active financial operations are conducted, but obtain exemption from municipal taxation by claiming a “home office” outside the corporate limits, and- holding meetings of stockholders and directors there. In Jossey v. Georgia & Alabama Ry. Co., 102 Ga. 706 (28 S. E. 273), an injunction was prayed to prevent a railway company from removing its “principal office” from a certain city. The defendant denied that it intended to do so, but alleged that it intended to maintain its principal office at that place, and to establish branch offices only for administrative purposes elsewhere. In discussing the case, Atkinson, J., said: “Are the offices intended to be removed corporate offices in the proper sense? The office of the president of the company, and the offices of that class of officers who stand for and represent the corporate entity must be there located. The books of the company showing the subscription to its stock must be there kept for the information of its stockholders and shareholders. There must be transacted the corporate
Classification of property for purposes of taxation is not permitted in this State. The property of one person must be taxed just like that of another. Discriminations and preferences are not allowed. Propertjr is simply propertjr, and must bear its proportionate share of the public burdens, according to its value, regardless of contentions to the contrary, whether they come from what is called an “infant industry” or from an “industrial giant.” As the business of one.class of persons or corporations may be quite different from that of another, the constitution has permitted legitimate classification in regard to taxing occupations or businesses; but property of the same value must be taxed to the same extent within the taxing district, and can not be exempted in whole or in part merely because it is owned by one person or corporation or by another. The constitution declares that “All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” Civil Code, § 5883. The next section of that instrument (Civil Code, § 5884) specifies what property the legisla
The ruling in Georgia Railroad and Banking Co. v. Wright, 125 Ga. 589 (54 S. E. 52), to the effect that the General Assembly is not required by the constitution to impose a tax on shares of stock in domestic corporations where the property of such corporations is taxed in the hands of the company (though they may do so), on the ground that a share of stock is in the nature of a symbol showing the interest of the shareholder in the company and its property, and that taxation of both the property and the symbol of interest in it would practically amount to double taxation, has no application to this case. A creditor is not a joint owner of property with his debtor, nor is the evidence of indebtedness a symbol of an interest in the debtor’s property. If so, then all bankers, brokers, and money lenders, in the absence of express legislative mention of the subject, most likely would decline to pay taxes on the notes and credits held by them, on the ground that their debtors had paid ■taxes on the property held by the latter. Nor is there any similarity between this question and the one whether the constitution, in referring to property for taxation, intended to include public
What has been said is controlling, and further discussion of details would be useless.
Judgment affirmed.