Appellant Georgia Casualty & Surety Company filed this action in the Superior Court of Evans County against appellee George Allen Randall to recover $18,081.30 in workers’ compensation benefits. Appellant asserted that these benefits were paid to appellee during a period of time in which appellee was not entitled to such benefits. Appellant brings this appeal from the trial court’s grant of appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The facts of this case are essentially without dispute. Appellee was injured during the course of his employment on April 8,1975 and began receiving weekly income benefits from appellant on April 17, 1975 pursuant to an agreement as to compensation, Form No. 16. Appellee is employed by Randall-Lewis Lumber Company; he is co-owner and vice president of the company. Appellant requested an administrative hearing to determine a change in condition based upon its contention that after having been injured, appellee received a salary from the lumber company for the performance of certain executive functions. Appellee contended that this amount was a loan and not a salary. A hearing on this issue was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on August 22, 1978. On October 20, 1978 the ALJ made an award which found that appellee had been overpaid by receiving compensation from appellant in addition to salary from his employer. Appellant was authorized to cease compensation payments, but the matter of appellee repaying appellant for the overpayments was not addressed. No appeal was taken from this award.
Appellant filed its complaint in superior court on June 11, 1980, seeking recovery of the amount paid to appellee as weekly income benefits between April 17, 1975 and October 20, 1978. Appellee answered, declining to repay any amount to appellant. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings. Appellant contended that *533 appellee had received the overpayments and had admitted his refusal to repay. Appellee contended that the matter was res judicata because the ALJ had not ordered repayment and appellant did not appeal the award.
The doctrine of res judicata is applicable to awards of an administrative law judge of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Board”) on all questions of fact in matters in which the Board has jurisdiction.
Woods v. Delta Air Lines,
The State Board of Workers’ Compensation is an administrative body possessing only the power conferred upon it by statute to administer the workers’ compensation act.
Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
Section 17 of the 1978 statute amending the workers’ compensation act provides that “... insofar as any provision of the Act creates a substantive right, it shall apply to any accident or injury occurring on or after July 1, 1978. In all other respects, it shall apply to any action taken on or after July 1, 1978, without regard to the date of accident or injury.” Ga. L. 1978, pp. 2220, 2236. Appellant contends that the 1978 statute created a substantive right in the employer and/or insurer which had not previously existed. We disagree. “Substantive law” is defined as “ [t]hat part of the law which
*534
creates, defines, and regulates rights, as opposed to ‘adjective or remedial law,’ which prescribes method of enforcing the rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1598 (4th ed. 1968). Appellant’s complaint in the case at bar is in the nature of an action for money had and received. See generally
Jasper School District v. Gormley,
“A judgment is conclusive as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue on the trial of the case.”
Doyle v. United Fin. Co.,
The sum and substance of the doctrine of res judicata is that a matter once judicially decided is finally decided. 50 CJS 11, Judgments, § 592; see
Lexington Developers v. O’Neal Const. Co.,
The clear language of the 1978 statute amending the workers’ compensation act expanded the jurisdiction of the Board to include the power to order an employee to repay to an insurer any amount determined to be overpayments of income benefits. The effect of this amendment is to economize on the number of actions necessary to finally resolve all the issues presented in an overpayment situation by eliminating the need for an insurer (or employer) to bring a second action in a different forum in order to recover the amount of the overpayment. Since appellant in this case had the opportunity to litigate the repayment issue at the administrative hearing but failed to do so, that issue is res judicata.
Judgment affirmed.