161 Ga. 281 | Ga. | 1925
Lead Opinion
Section 44 of the general tax act of December 19, 1923, as amended by the act of August 18, 1924, levies “Upon each person, firm, or corporation dealing in coal, coke, wood, or lumber, . . whether for themselves or as agents or as brokers, in cities of more than 1,000 inhabitants, and not more than 10,000, $10.00;
Does this tax impose a burden on interstate commerce, and is it thereby rendered unconstitutional and void because in conflict with the commerce clause of the Federal constitution? Manufacture is not commerce. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 (9 Sup. Ct. 6, 32 L. ed. 346); U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (15 Sup. Ct. 249, 39 L. ed. 325); Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238 (22 Sup. Ct. 120, 46 L. ed. 171); McCluskey v. M. & N. Ry. Co., 243 U. S. 36 (37 Sup. Ct. 374, 61 L. ed. 578); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A.
What we rule above is not in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U. S. 50 (42 Sup. Ct. 244, 66 L. ed. 458); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (42 Sup. Ct. 397, 66 L. ed. 735, 23 A. L. R. 229); Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291 (44 Sup. Ct. 96, 68 L. ed. 308); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189 (45 Sup. Ct. 481, 69 L. ed. 909). The import of these cases is fully disclosed by a brief consideration of the last-cited ease. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States held that buying goods for shipment and shipping to markets in other States constitutes interstate commerce, and that legislation restricting and imposing burdens upon this right to buy for shipment and to ship imposed burdens upon interstate commerce and rendered such legislation violative of the commerce clause of the Federal constitution. In those cases the burdens imposed upon the right to buy and ship goods from one -State into another State were direct burdens. The Supreme Court of the United States was not dealing with indirect burdens, such as storage charges for grain in warehouses where a part of the grain reached the elevator, or was destined to leave it, through the channels of interstate commerce. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (24 L. ed. 77). That court held such a regulation admissible because interstate commerce was affected only incidentally and remotely, and no restriction on buying and shipping was involved. See Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452 (21 Sup. Ct. 423, 45 L. ed. 619); Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365 (39 Sup. Ct. 114, 63 L. ed. 300); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., supra. So we are of the opinion that wholesale lumber dealers, doing business in the cities of this State, who buy lumber in wholesale quantities from manufacturers in this State for sale and
Does this statute violate art. 7, sec. 2, par. 1, of the constitution of this State, which declares that “All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects”? A graduated occupation tax, -based on the population of each county or city in which the business is carried on, does not violate this clause of the constitution. Adams Motor Co. v. Cler, 149 Ga. 818 (102 S. E. 440); Richardson v. Barclay & Brandon, 155 Ga. 331 (116 S. E. 807). The fact that no tax is imposed on country dealers, and on dealers in cities of less than 1,000 inhabitants, does not render this statute obnoxious to the above provisions of the constitution. A classification of lumber dealers for the purpose of _ taxation into country and city dealers is not unreasonable and arbitrary; and the fact that no tax is imposed on the country dealers, but is imposed upon city dealers, does not violate this provision of the constitution. Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229 (116 S. E. 795).
Classification based upon the population of territorial divisions is one of the commonest forms of classification; and such classification has met the approval of this court in a number of cases. So we held that the act of August 13, 1924 (Acts 1924, p. 87), which provides for putting county officers upon salaries in counties in this State, which had by the census of 1920, or which may have by any future census, a population of 200,000 inhabitants or more, did not violate the provision of the State constitution requiring general laws to have uniform operation throughout the State. Abbott v. Commissioners, 160 Ga. 657 (129 S. E. 38). This section of the general tax act in effect classifies dealers in the commodities therein specified into several classes. One of these classes embraces dealers in cities of less than 1,000 inhabitants; and does not impose upon dealers in this class any occupation tax. It is well settled that the legislature can classify occupations and impose an occupation tax upon members of one class and not on those of another class. It next classifies dealers in cities having more than 1,000 inhabitants and not more than 10,000 inhabitants. It imposes
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. For the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion in the case of Wright v. Hirsch, 155 Ga. 229 (supra), we dissent from the ruling announced in the second headnote and the corresponding division of the opinion.