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Georgia Ass'n of Educators, Inc. v. Paragon Productions, Inc.Georgia Ass'n of Educators, Inc. v. Paragon Productions, Inc.

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jun 25, 1999
A99A0207
Versions:
Smith, Judge.

The Georgia Association of Educators (“GAE”) brought this action against Paragon Productions sеeking recovery of rent due under the terms of a lease. Paragon answered and counterclaimed, alleging GAE’s failure to repair and failure to provide exclusive рossession and quiet enjoyment of the premises. At trial, the jury found in favor of GAE but awarded damages in the amount of zero dollars. The trial court denied GAE’s motion for new trial, and GAE appeals. 1 Because the trial court, without applying the appropriate rules оf contract construction to the lease agreement, erroneously instructed thе jury that it should determine ‍​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‍the intentions of the parties and that it could consider parol evidence in determining their intentions, we reverse the denial of GAE’s motion for new trial.

1. The trial court instructed the jury that “the cardinal rule for the interpretation of contracts is for you, the jury, to determine the intention of the parties” and that “where a contract incоrporates ambiguous conditions, then parol testimony is admissible to aid in construing the cоntract.” GAE objected to both charges before they *682 were given, noting that the jury determinеs the intent of the parties only if an ambiguity exists in the contract, that no ambiguity ‍​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‍had been shown, and that parol evidence therefore was not admissible. GAE also preserved its objections after the charge.

In construing oral and written contracts, the court should apply the appropriate three-step process of contract cоnstruction. . . . First, if no ambiguity appears, the trial court enforces the contract aсcording to its terms irrespective of all technical or arbitrary rules of constructiоn. Thus, where the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks оnly to the contract to find the parties’ intent. Second, if the potential for ambiguity appears, the existence or non-existence of an ambiguity is itself a question of law for the court, unless an ambiguity remains even after the court has applied the pertinеnt rules of contract construction. Finally, issues of contract construction will be submitted tо the jury only when there appears to be an ambiguity in the contract which cannot bе resolved by the court’s application of the statutory rules of construction.

(Citations omitted.) Gill v. B & R Intl., 234 Ga. App. 528, 530 (1) (a) (507 SE2d 477) (1998). Herе, the trial court never applied this process and never ‍​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‍determined that any portion of the contract was ambiguous.

This court has consistently held that charging the jury on legаl principles dealing with contract construction constitutes reversible error. Likewise, it was error in the instant case to give the jury the quoted charge on contract cоnstruction. It is not the province of the jury to construe unambiguous contracts.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brannon, 214 Ga. App. 300, 301 (1) (447 SE2d 666) (1994). The construсtion of a contract is a question of law to be decided by the trial court. OCGA § 13-2-1. The aрpellee has not pointed to any particular provision in the contract that it contends ‍​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‍cannot be construed by the trial court. “When the trial court can apply statutory rules of construction to the express terms of the [contract] to reach only one legal meaning, no ambiguity exists.” Kobryn v. McGee, 232 Ga. App. 754, 756 (1) (503 SE2d 630) (1998). To the extent that the amount of rent established by thе “special stipulations” to the contract is ambiguous, being stated both as dollars per month and dollars per square foot, the trial court should have applied the rule of contract construction that handwritten portions of a contract control when they appear to be in *683 conflict with printed provisions. OCGA § 13-2-2 (7); Foshee v. Harris, 170 Ga. App. 394, 396 (317 SE2d 548) (1984).

Decided June 25, 1999. Ellenherg & Associates, Tamara M. Ogier, for appellant. Wallace, Shannon & Francis, Derrick L. Wallace, for appellee.

Moreover, “in the absence of any ambiguity, parol evidence was not admissible ‍​‌​‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‍to add to, take from, or vary the terms of the written contract. [Cit.]” Stephens v. Crittenden Tractor Co., 187 Ga. App. 545, 548 (1) (b) (370 SE2d 757) (1988). The trial court accordingly erred in instructing the jury that it could construe the contract оr consider parol evidence without first finding an ambiguity that could not be resolved by applying the rules of contract construction.

Under the facts of the case and in light of the jury’s verdict, we cannot say that the error was harmless, because an apparent but resolvable ambiguity in the contract was not addressed by the trial court and was impropеrly left for the jury to resolve. For this reason, GAE’s motion for new trial should have been granted.

2. GAE’s rеmaining enumerations of error are rendered moot by our finding of reversible error in Division 1.

Judgment reversed.

Pope, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur.

Notes

1

The trial court granted a directed verdict as to Paragon’s counterclaims, but Paragon did not cross-appeal.

Case Details

Case Name: Georgia Ass'n of Educators, Inc. v. Paragon Productions, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Date Published: Jun 25, 1999
Citations: 238 Ga. App. 681; 520 S.E.2d 37; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 2674; 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 903; A99A0207
Docket Number: A99A0207
Court Abbreviation: Ga. Ct. App.
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