Case Information
‐ ‐ cv Georges United Nations
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit A UGUST T ERM No. ‐ ‐ cv
D ELAMA G EORGES , individually and on behalf E STATE OF D ESILUS G EORGES and all others similarly situated; A LIUS J OSEPH , individually and on behalf E STATE OF M ARIE ‐ C LAUDE L EFEUVE all others similarly situated; L ISETTE P AUL , individually and on
behalf E STATE OF F RITZNEL P AUL all others similarly situated; F ELICIA P AULE , individually behalf all others similarly situated; J EAN R ONY S ILFORT , individually behalf
all others similarly situated, ‐ Appellants
U NITED N ATIONS ; U NITED N ATIONS S TABILIZATION M ISSION IN H AITI ;
E DMOND M ULET former Under ‐ Secretary ‐ General United Nations Stabilization Mission Haiti; B AN K I ‐ MOON Secretary ‐ General Nations, Defendants Appellees
On Appeal District Southern New York
A RGUED : M ARCH 1, D ECIDED : A UGUST
Before: C ABRANES P ARKER L YNCH Circuit Judges
On appeal from January judgment of the District for Southern District of New York (J. Paul Oetken, Judge ) dismissing plaintiffs’ action lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Convention Privileges Immunities of Nations (the “CPIUN”), Apr. U.S.T. principal question presented by appeal whether UN’s fulfillment its obligation under Section “make provisions appropriate modes settlement disputes arising out contracts other disputes private law character which [UN] party,” well as “disputes involving any official [UN] who by reason his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has been waived Secretary General,” condition precedent its immunity under CPIUN, provides “shall enjoy every form legal process except insofar particular case expressly waived its immunity.”
Because we hold fulfillment obligation immunity— because find other arguments unpersuasive—we AFFIRM Court’s judgment.
B EATRICE L INDSTROM (Brian Concannon, brief ), Institute for Justice & Democracy Haiti, Boston, MA, for Plaintiffs ‐ Appellants.
Ira Kurzban, Kurzban Kurzban Weinger Tetzeli & Pratt P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiffs Appellants.
Jeffrey Brand, Center for Law & Global Justice, University San Francisco School Law, San Francisco, CA, for ‐ Appellants
E LLEN B LAIN (Jeannette Vargas, brief ), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for Southern New York, New York, NY, Amicus Curiae United States America
Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Sharon Swingle, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, States Department Justice, Washington, DC, Amicus Curiae America Mary E. McLeod, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, Henry Azar, Jr., Attorney *4 Adviser, United States Department of State, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae United of America
J OSÉ A. C ABRANES Circuit Judge :
The principal question presented by appeal whether fulfillment by Nations (“UN”) of its obligation under Convention Privileges Immunities Nations (the “CPIUN”), Apr. U.S.T. “make provisions appropriate modes settlement of” certain disputes immunity under CPIUN, which provides “shall enjoy immunity every form legal process except insofar any particular case has expressly waived immunity,” such *5 UN’s alleged disregard its obligation “compel[s] conclusion that UN’s does exist.”
We hold fulfillment obligation immunity. For this reason—and because find plaintiffs’ other arguments unpersuasive—we AFFIRM January judgment States for Southern District New York (J. Paul Oetken, Judge ) dismissing action against defendants UN, Stabilization Mission Haiti (“MINUSTAH”), UN Secretary ‐ General Ban Ki ‐ moon (“Ban”), former MINUSTAH Under ‐ Secretary ‐ General Edmond Mulet (“Mulet”) lack subject matter jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND citizens or Haiti who claim they “have been or will sickened, or have family members
who died will die, direct result cholera” epidemic ravaged Republic Haiti since October In putative class action, seek hold defendants responsible their injuries, end, assert various causes action sounding tort contract against them.
*6 Specifically, plaintiffs allege that, October 2010, “[d]efendants knowingly disregarded high risk transmitting cholera Haiti when they deployed personnel from Nepal Haiti, knowing Nepal country which cholera endemic where surge infections had just been reported.” According plaintiffs, defendants only failed test screen these Nepalese personnel prior their deployment, allowing them carry into Haiti strain cholera epidemic’s source; they stationed them base banks Meille Tributary, which flows into Artibonite River, primary water source “tens thousands” Haitians. From base, defendants allegedly “discharged raw sewage” “disposed untreated human waste,” “created high risk contamination.” Eventually, contend, “human waste base seeped into contaminated Meille Tributary” and, ultimately, Artibonite River, “resulting explosive massive outbreaks cholera throughout entire country.”
Defendants did enter appearance before Court. But March executive branch government (the “Executive Branch”) submitted statement *7 of interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, in which it took the position that defendants “immune from legal process and suit” pursuant to the UN Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031; the CPIUN; the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (the “VCDR”), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227. [10]
The District Court agreed the Executive Branch. Accordingly, on January 2015, it dismissed action lack subject matter jurisdiction. [11] With respect to the UN MINUSTAH, District Court relied 2 CPIUN. To reiterate, 2 provides UN “shall enjoy immunity from every form legal process except insofar any particular case expressly waived immunity.” District Court reasoned that, because “no party contend[ed] UN ha[d] expressly waived immunity,” “immune from [p]laintiffs’ suit.” With respect Ban Mulet, relied Article VCDR, provides “[a] diplomatic agent shall enjoy [a receiving State’s] civil *8 administrative jurisdiction,” except circumstances undisputedly presented here. [14] District Court concluded that, because Ban Mulet both held diplomatic positions at time plaintiffs filed their action, they were immune well. [15] timely appealed. [16] Defendants did enter an
appearance before this Court either, but Executive Branch “submit[t]ed amicus curiae brief, pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 517 , [their] support.” [17]
DISCUSSION
Under principles long standing, “[w]hen Court reviews dismissal complaint for lack subject matter jurisdiction, review factual findings clear error legal conclusions de novo , accepting all material facts alleged complaint true drawing all reasonable inferences plaintiff’s favor.”
On appeal, raise three principal arguments. First, they argue erred holding *9 MINUSTAH immune because the fulfilment of its obligation under Section of the CPIUN to provide appropriate dispute ‐ resolution mechanisms a to its Section immunity. Second, they argue the District Court’s holding error because UN materially breached CPIUN by failing to fulfill its obligation, such it no longer entitled to benefit of immunity under Third, they argue Court’s application CPIUN to dismiss their action violated their constitutional right access to federal courts. We address each argument turn.
I. Condition Precedent
Plaintiffs’ first argument requires us interpret CPIUN, so we begin by describing framework governs any such inquiry. “The interpretation a treaty, like interpretation a statute, begins its text,” “[w]here language [a] treaty plain, court must refrain amending because do *10 so would be make, construe, a treaty.” [21] Additionally, because “[a]s a general matter, a treaty is a contract . . . between nations,” it is “to be interpreted upon principles which govern interpretation of contracts writing between individuals.” [22] Further, “while interpretation a treaty is a question of law courts, given nature document and unique relationships it implicates, Executive Branch’s interpretation treaty is entitled great weight.” [23]
*11 Here, application of two particular “principles govern interpretation of contracts” [24] demonstrates why first argument is unavailing. first such principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius —
“express mention of one thing excludes all others” [25] —which known negative implication canon. [26] This principle has guided federal courts’ interpretations of treaties over century. [27]
As noted above, 2 CPIUN provides “shall enjoy every form legal process except insofar in any particular case it expressly waived immunity.” [28] Especially when coupled compulsory *12 “shall”— which “is universally understood to indicate an imperative or mandate” [29] —Section 2’s “express mention of” UN’s express waiver as a circumstance in “shall [not] enjoy immunity” negatively implies “all other[ ]” circumstances, including UN’s failure fulfill its 29 obligation, are “exclude[d].” [30] It necessarily follows fulfillment 29 obligation not a condition precedent 2 immunity.
This conclusion buttressed second principle contract interpretation relevant our analysis—that “conditions precedent most contractual obligations are favored must be expressed in plain, unambiguous language.” [31] To manifest *13 their intent create condition precedent, “[p]arties often use language such as ‘if,’ ‘on condition that,’ ‘provided that,’ ‘in event that,’ ‘subject to.’” [32] No such language links Sections 2 29 CPIUN. Of course, “specific talismanic words are required.” [33] But “there [also] no . . . [other] language [in CPIUN] which, even straining, could read as imposing” fulfillment 29 obligation as condition 2 immunity. [34]
It significant Executive Branch’s interpretation CPIUN—an interpretation “entitled great weight” [35] — accords our own. Executive Branch sees “[n]othing 29 . . . [that] states, either explicitly implicitly, *14 compliance terms is a precondition to UN’s immunity under Section 2.” Neither do we.
Plaintiffs’ arguments to contrary unconvincing. For example, argue that “[t]he UN’s post ‐ ratification practice pursuant . . . Section . . . demonstrates that entitlement immunity premised provision alternative dispute settlement.” Plaintiffs’ chief example supposed practice UN’s statement before International Justice that immunity “ does leave plaintiff without remedy [because] event that asserted, claimant seeking redress against Organization shall afforded appropriate means settlement [under Section 29].” This statement, however, suggests most UN views “more than merely aspirational”—as “obligatory perhaps enforceable.” It does way suggest views condition 2. argue “foreign signatories repeatedly held availability alternative dispute settlement material international organizations’ *15 entitlement to immunity,” and that “these foreign courts’ views provide persuasive authority case, per the direction of the U.S. Supreme Court.” This argument misleading. Supreme Court has indeed held that, “[i]n interpreting treaty, the opinions of our sister signatories are entitled to considerable weight.” But so holding, the Court was obviously referring the opinions of states that are parties the treaty that being interpreted regarding that same treaty , not the opinions of states that happen have ratified the treaty issue regarding another treaty entirely Most of examples fall into the latter category— they cases the courts states have ratified the CPIUN, *16 but they pertain to unrelated agreements, including the agreement between France the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; the agreement between Italy the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute regarding headquarters in Rome. Another the examples appears to have involved the CPIUN, but the portion the holding relevant *17 to the plaintiffs’ argument is based on an interpretation of the state’s constitution rather than the CPIUN itself.
As we have seen, whether a term constitutes a condition depends on the particular language of the instrument that is being evaluated. For the most part, plaintiffs not suggested that the aforementioned agreements contain language that even comparable—much less identical—to that found Sections of the CPIUN. Thus, reliance on cases interpreting those agreements misplaced.
do argue that the agreement between France UNESCO, issue in UNESCO Boulois Cour d’Appel [CA] [Court Appeal] Paris (Fr.), June is “virtually identical” the CPIUN. Notwithstanding textual similarities between the two treaties, we do not find the French court’s interpretation relevant this case. The France UNESCO agreement arose in a materially different context than CPIUN: a bilateral agreement between France UNESCO whereas CPIUN a multilateral treaty signed a number countries. That a French court interpreting an agreement between France agency found that agreement required establishment alternative forum dispute resolution little bearing interpretation case.
For these reasons, we hold that UN’s fulfillment obligation not condition immunity.
Holdings, Inc. F.2d (3d Cir. (relying “the structure Agreement whole” determining one agreement’s provisions precedent). But argued structures cited agreements similar CPIUN. Reply foregoing analysis consistent our decision Brzak Nation 2010), held purported inadequacies dispute resolution mechanism did result waiver absolute suit.
II. Material Breach next argue “[t]he District Court’s finding erroneous because 29 material term to whole.” According to plaintiffs, UN’s material breach obligation means it “is no longer entitled to performance duties owed to under” CPIUN, including immunity. We need not reach merits this argument, however, because plaintiffs lack standing raise it.
As have recently reiterated, “absent protest objection by offended sovereign, [an individual] has no standing raise violation international law an issue.” have not identified sovereign has objected alleged material breach. To contrary, United States has asked us affirm Court’s judgment, no other country expressed an interest litigation.
*20 It is true that there is an exception this rule where a treaty contains “express language” “creat[ing] privately enforceable rights , or some other indication that intent treaty drafters confer rights that could be vindicated in manner sought by affected individuals,” such plaintiffs this case. [53] “[B]ut [plaintiffs have] identified, nor can locate,” such indication CPIUN, “[s]tanding is therefore lacking.” [54]
It position case law described above is “inapposite.” [55] They contend that, “[r]egardless whether treaty provides enforceable private right action, individuals may invoke breach responsive posture.” [56] In support position, cite law review article stating “case law consistent [the] understanding treaty may enforced defensively even when there no private right action.” But same article makes clear what means “defensive enforcement,” it *21 contends “can found in two types cases”: those in which private party uses treaty (1) “to defend against claim by government” or (2) “to defend against claim by another private party under state or federal law.” Neither these situations presented here. No claim been asserted against plaintiffs; rather, it plaintiffs who have asserted claims underlying this action. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ argument fails even own terms. III. Right Access Federal Courts
Lastly, argue erred “because violated U.S. citizen Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights access federal courts applying case.” This argument fails convince.
As stated Brzak Nations we rejected virtually indistinguishable challenge application CPIUN, argument does little more “than question why immunities general should exist.” But “legislatively judicially crafted immunities one sort another have existed since well before framing Constitution, been *22 extended and modified over time, and are firmly embedded American law.” Plaintiffs’ argument, if correct, would seem defeat not only immunity, but also “judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity, and legislative immunity.” Plaintiffs do not persuasively differentiate quotidian constitutionally permissible application these doctrines from application CPIUN here.
CONCLUSION
We have considered all plaintiffs’ arguments appeal find them without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM District Court’s January judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ action lack subject matter jurisdiction under CPIUN.
[1] reads follows: [UN] shall make provisions appropriate modes settlement (a) disputes arising out contracts other disputes private law character [UN] party; (b) disputes involving official [UN] who by reason his official position enjoys immunity, if been waived Secretary General. art. VIII, §
[2] Id. art. II, §
[3]
[4] A ‐ 17–18.
[5] A 66–78.
[6] A ‐
[7] id.
[8] A ‐ 16–17.
[9] A Developments surrounding these allegations remain ongoing. See, e.g. Jonathan M. Katz, Facing Stern Report, U.N. Admits Role Haiti Cholera Outbreak N.Y. Times, Aug. A1.
[10] Executive Branch Statement Interest Georges United States No. CV ‐ (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2014), ECF No. 21. provides “[t]he Solicitor General, or any officer Department Justice, may sent Attorney General any State or district United States attend interests United suit pending court United States, court State, or attend other interest States.” U.S.C. § 517.
[11] Georges Nations F. Supp. 3d (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
[12] art. II, §
[13] Georges F. Supp. 3d
[14] VCDR art.
[15] See Georges , F. Supp. 3d
[16] A ‐ 502–03.
[17] Letter Behalf Amicus Curiae United States America Georges v. United Nations No. ‐ ‐ cv (2d Cir. June 2015), ECF No. 179; see Brief Amicus Curiae America, Georges Nations No. ‐ cv (2d Cir. Aug. 2015), ECF No. (“Government’s Br.”).
[18] Mantena Johnson omitted).
[19] As discussed above, requires “make provisions appropriate modes settlement disputes arising out contracts other disputes private law character [UN] party,” well as “disputes involving official [UN] who by reason his official position enjoys immunity, if been waived Secretary ‐ General.” art. VIII, §
[20] Abbott Abbott U.S. (2010) omitted); accord Alvarez Machain U.S. (1992) (“In construing treaty, construing statute, first look terms determine meaning.”).
[21] Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, S.p.A. , 347 F.3d 448, 457 (2d Cir. 2003); see Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd. , 543 U.S. 14, 32 (2004) (“Where words . . . treaty . . . plain obvious meaning, all construction, hostility with such meaning, excluded.” (brackets internal quotation marks omitted)); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd. , 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (“We must . . . governed text[,] . . . whatever conclusions might be drawn drafting history . . . .”).
[22] BG Grp., PLC v. Republic Arg. , S. Ct. 1198, (2014) (brackets internal quotation marks omitted); see Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. S. Dist. Iowa , U.S. (1987) (“In interpreting international treaty, mindful nature contract between nations, general rules construction apply.” (citation, brackets, internal quotation marks omitted)).
[23] Lozano v. Alvarez , F.3d (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez S. Ct. (2014); see Medellín Texas U.S. (2008) (“It well settled States’ interpretation treaty entitled great weight.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Swarna Al ‐ Awadi (noting “well[ ]established canon deference regard Executive Branch interpretation treaties” omitted)).
[24] BG Grp., PLC , 134 S. Ct. 1208 omitted).
[25] Rivas v. Fischer , F.3d 514, 551 Cir. 2012).
[26] United States v. Bainbridge , F.3d 943, (9th Cir. 2014).
[27] See, e.g. , Tucker v. Alexandroff , U.S. (1902) (relying principle interpreting treaty between States and Russia); Rauscher U.S. (1886) (“[T]he enumeration offenses most [extradition] treaties, and especially treaty now under consideration, so specific, marked such clear line regard magnitude importance those offenses, it impossible give any other interpretation than exclusion right extradition others.”); Cannon U.S. Dep’t Justice, U.S. Parole Comm’n & n.18 (5th 1992); cf. Luigi Crema, Disappearance New Sightings Restrictive Interpretation(s) Eur. J. Int’l L. 692–93 (2010) (noting various international courts, including International Court Justice, European Human Rights, certain arbitral tribunals, relied principle interpreting treaties).
[28] art. II, §
[29] Dallio v. Spitzer , F.3d 553, 562 (2d Cir. 2003).
[30] Cf. Olden v. LaFarge Corp. , F.3d 495, n.2 (6th Cir. 2004) (interpreting phrase “[ e ] xcept provided in subsections (b) (c)” as “demonstrat[ing] Congress intended exclusions mentioned in those subsections exclusive” (emphasis original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Café Erotica Fla., Inc. v. St. Johns County , F.3d (11th Cir. 2004) (applying expressio unius principle statutory phrase “ except those residential districts ” (emphasis original) quotation marks omitted)).
[31] In re Timely Secretarial Serv., Inc. F.2d n.7 (5th Cir. 1993); see Bank N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc. F.3d Cir. 2016) (“Conditions precedent are readily assumed. Thus, determining whether particular agreement makes an event condition, courts will interpret doubtful language embodying promise constructive condition rather than express condition.” (brackets internal omitted)); Navarro F.D.I.C. (7th (“Conditions are generally disfavored; resolving doubts about whether contract contains precedent, interpretations reduce risk forfeiture favored.” (citing Restatement (Second) Contracts § 227(1) (1981))).
[32] Ginett Comput. Task Grp., Inc. , F.2d 1100 (some internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. Labor Relations Auth. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Dep’t Army , U.S. (1988) (describing “only if’” as “the language condition precedent” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bank N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. , F.3d at (describing “if,” “on condition that,” “provided that,” “in event that,” “subject to” “recognized linguistic conventions condition” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Restatement (Second) Contracts § cmt. (1981) (observing that, although “[n]o particular form language necessary make event condition, such words ‘on that,’ ‘provided that’ ‘if’ often used purpose”).
[33] Bank N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. F.3d at
[34] Ginett F.2d
[35] Lozano omitted).
[36] Government’s Br. 10.
[37]
[38] Id. (alterations emphases original) (quoting Verbatim Record, Difference Relating Immunity Legal Process Special Rapporteur Commission Human Rights Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. (Dec. 1998)).
[39] Georges F. Supp. 3d
[40]
[41] Abbott , U.S. (brackets, ellipsis, internal quotation marks omitted). In the foregoing quotation, the Supreme Court likely using “signatories” an informal, almost colloquial way. It not the opinions states have merely signed treaty should find persuasive; it the opinions states ratified treaty. As Vienna Convention on Law Treaties provides, “[t]here shall be taken into account, together context” treaty, “[a]ny subsequent practice application treaty establishes agreement parties regarding interpretation.” Vienna Convention Law Treaties, art. 31(3), May U.N.T.S. (emphasis supplied); see Mora New York F.3d n.19 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Although not ratified Vienna Convention Law Treaties, our relies upon it as authoritative guide customary international law treaties, insofar it reflects actual state practices.” quotation marks omitted)). A state does become party until “ ratifies thus becomes bound by, treaty question,” Hollis O’Driscoll n.2 (emphases supplied), “ signing [the] treaty serves only authenticate [the] text, does establish [its] consent bound.” Id. (emphasis original) (alterations internal omitted).
[42] Pls.’ Br. 31; A ‐ 342–43.
[43] Pls.’ Br. 31; A ‐ 349–51. Plaintiffs also refer to Maida Administration International Assistance Cass., maggio RDI 546, ILR 510, a decision from Italy’s highest court is now over years old. See do not include in their appendix a copy Maida in English Italian; instead, they include chapter book in which Maida discussed. A ‐ 359–63 (quoting Riccardo Pavoni, Italy in The Privileges Immunities International Organizations in Domestic Courts 155–63 (August Reinisch ed., 2013)). Here what the chapter’s author to say about Maida : “As early Supreme Court denied immunity to International Refugee Organization (IRO) in labour dispute, grounds arbitral process envisaged IRO’s Staff Regulations was unlawful The Court’s basis pioneering finding not straightforward It probably influenced assumption implied waiver arising repeated references applicability Italian legislation legal instruments regulating IRO’s activities Italy But mentioned necessity secure individual right access justice.” A (emphasis supplied) (quoting Pavoni, ante note 160). pertinence instant appeal case does appear been directly discussed—and whose holding ambiguous but likely grounded implied waiver, concept issue here—is, say least, unclear.
[44] Pls.’ Br. 31; A 349–51. That case, Stavrinou v. Nations, (1992) CLR ILDC (Cyprus 1292), a case the Supreme Court Cyprus. rely on Stavrinou the proposition the Supreme Court Cyprus only granted immunity to the UN because an alternate forum was available. We note, however, the availability alternate forum was held relevant only to the question whether the grant immunity UN violated Cypriot constitution. Id. (describing Supreme Cyprus holding grant absolute “did not encroach upon right access courts protected Cypriot Constitution, because mechanism internal UNFICYP settling disputes local personnel ensured ‘[t]he applicant left without remedy’”). That decision did purport interpret therefore inapplicable instant case.
[45] Clukey v. Town Camden F.3d (1st Cir. (“To determine whether provision creates condition precedent, necessarily must focus closely specific language.”); see also ante notes 20–22 accompanying text (discussing importance focusing particular language treaty).
[46] An agreement’s “overall structure” may inform whether term constitutes precedent. Univ. Emergency Med. Found. Rapier Invs., Ltd. (1st 1999); see Suburban Transfer Serv., Inc. Beech
[49] Br.
[50] Id.
[51] States Garavito Garcia —F.3d—, WL *3 Cir. July 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Emuegbunam (6th (“It well established individuals no standing challenge violations international treaties absence protest sovereign involved.” omitted)).
[52] Government’s (“Because [plaintiffs] party [the CPIUN] they may independently assert alleged breach insist upon their own preferred remedy.”).
[53] Suarez , quotation marks omitted).
[54] Garavito Garcia WL at *3; see Medellín U.S. at n.3 (“[T]he background presumption international agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do create private rights provide private cause action domestic courts.” (brackets internal omitted)).
[55] Reply
[56] Id. at
[57] Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, International Law Home: Enforcing Treaties U.S. Courts Yale J. Int’l L. (2012)).
[58] Hathaway et al., ante note 84.
[59] We express no opinion regarding soundness distinction drawn article between offensive defensive enforcement treaties.
[60]
[61] Brzak
[62] Id.
[63] Id.
[64] argue that “[t]he further erred holding [individual defendants] Ban Mulet are immune suit.” But plaintiffs’ only contention support argument “UN officers are not entitled immunity under when UN itself not entitled immunity under CPIUN.” Id. Because we already rejected argument entitled immunity, must reject their argument Ban Mulet entitled well.