86 N.E.2d 594 | Ohio | 1949
Lead Opinion
The unfortunate claimant herein suffered a disabling injury in an industrial accident, but was it an injury sustained under such conditions and circumstances as to justify or support an award of compensation?
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Ohio in its existing form, a compensable injury is one which is received in the course of and arises out of the employment. Section 1465-68, General Code. If an injury is not sustained in the course of employment and does not arise out of it, no compensation is allowable.
Here, the claimant was a laborer whose duties in and about the industrial plant where he was injured were limited in scope. When he voluntarily, deliberately and without authority or necessity stepped out *460 of the orbit of his employment by attempting to operate the pressing machine — an undertaking altogether foreign to the work he was hired to do — he engaged in a pursuit and exposed himself to a hazard not contemplated by his employment as a laborer. His behavior constituted a material deviation and departure from his assigned tasks.
In our opinion, the instant case is distinguishable on its facts from those cases involving a slight or inconsequential departure from the course of employment. See IndustrialCommission v. Henry,
Upon the undisputed evidence, therefore, the claimant did not sustain an injury in the course of and arising out of his employment within the meaning of those terms as defined and applied in numerous decisions of this court.
For example, see Fassig v. State, ex rel. Turner, Atty.Genl.,
A number of recent cases, factually similar to the one before us, hold that where an employee voluntarily and of his own motion exposes himself to risks patently outside of and beyond the course of his regular *461
employment, and without the knowledge or acquiescence of his employer, and sustains an injury, such injury is not compensable. See Morgan v. City of Guntersville,
It is plain from the evidence that Georgejakakis was injured outside the sphere of his employment; not through an act which he improperly or unauthorizedly did within such sphere. A marked distinction exists between the two situations. SeeLaudato v. Hunkin-Conkey Construction Co.,
This court has held that where an employee is injured in the performance of a voluntary act not approved by or known to his employer and wholly removed from the duties of his employment, such injury does not arise out of the employment and is not compensable. See Highway Oil Co. v. State, ex rel. Bricker,Atty. Genl.,
We, of course, recognize and approve the principle that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of an injured employee, but such liberal construction may not be extended to comprehend a case where the facts clearly show, as here, that at the time and place of injury the employee was designedly engaged in an unauthorized venture in no way connected with or causally related to the work he was hired to carry on.
It must be remembered, too, that the Workmen's Compensation Act does not and is not intended to afford *462 the protection and coverage of a general accident insurance policy.
For the reasons given the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., MATTHIAS, STEWART, TURNER and TAFT, JJ., concur.
Dissenting Opinion
The majority opinion holds that the injuries to claimant did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. It seems to me that his injuries unquestionably arose in the course of his employment.
Rules of common-law liability, originally applicable to the relationship of employer and employee, do not obtain in modern workmen's compensation law. The latter abrogates common-law defenses and imposes liability without fault. Cudahy PackingCo. of Nebraska v. Parramore,
"The modern development and growth of industry, with the consequent changes in the relations of employer and employee, have been so profound in character and degree as to take away, in large measure, the applicability of the doctrines upon which rest the common-law liability of the master for personal injuries to a servant, leaving of necessity a field of debatable ground where a good deal must be conceded in favor of forms of legislation, calculated to establish new bases of liability more in harmony with these changed conditions. Workmen's compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon that of implied contract; that is, upon the conception that the injured workman is entitled to compensation for an *463 injury sustained in the service of an industry to whose operations he contributes his work as the owner contributes his capital — the one for the sake of the wages and the other for the sake of the profits. The liability is based, not upon any act or omission of the employer, but upon the existence of the relationship which the employee bears to the employment because of and in the course of which he has been injured. And this is not to impose liability upon one person for an injury sustained by another with which the former has no connection; but it is to say that it is enough if there be a causal connection between the injury and the business in which he employs the latter — a connection substantially contributory though it need not be the sole or proximate cause."
Here, the claimant assumed without direction or authority the performance of work for which he had not been specifically employed. Neither had he been forbidden to operate the machine. At the time of the accident, he was employed in the metalware department to haul away metal rings pressed out by a machine and in so doing became familiar with its operation. In the temporary absence of the operator of the machine, claimant put it in operation and had pressed out 30 or 35 rings before he suffered the mishap for which he seeks compensation. At the time of his injury he was volunteering service for the benefit of his employer.
The courts have held that an employee injured while voluntarily helping a fellow worker, if the work was reasonably related to his service and performed in good faith in furtherance of his master's business, though not strictly within his line of duty, is entitled to compensation for an injury arising out of the employment. Houser v. Young,
In the case last cited, an employee employed to paint and work on storm windows, in passing a yarn-cutting machine, without authority or request but not forbidden, undertook to help the operator of the machine to untangle a tangled bunch of yarn caught in the machine. While the employee was thus near the knives of the machine, it suddenly started severely mangling the fingers of the volunteer employee. The question was raised whether the employee was injured in the performance of work which was entirely apart from and beyond the scope of his employment and whether the work was undertaken without order or request, and whether the employee was a mere volunteer and officious intermeddler who was not protected by the compensation act of Rhode Island. The court stated that the question before it was "whether the work in question was so entirely apart from the scope of petitioner's employment that he must be considered a mere volunteer or officious intermeddler. It is true, according to the evidence, that petitioner had not performed this type of work previously to the knowledge or with the acquiescence of his employer or of anybody in authority; that he was not directed or expressly requested by anybody to render such assistance; and that it was not a part of his work to operate any cutting machine or to repair or fix machines that were broken or out of order."
The court in conclusion said:
"It also appears that the petitioner was not a malicious intermeddler or skylarker; that he was not drunk or in any way serving his own convenience or interest by performing this act; and that his act, though helpful to the operator, was nevertheless, in effect, performed in the interest of respondent. There *465 is evidence that it was performed to get the machine running, that is, to start production. From this and from the testimony of the assistant superintendent, it is reasonable to infer that petitioner's act was calculated to accelerate the resumption of production and thereby was performed in the interest of the respondent.
"Under all these circumstances, we think that the evidence here does not require the conclusion, as respondent contends, that the petitioner when injured was a mere volunteer or officious intermeddler. Upon our view there was some evidence to show that the petitioner was injured while performing work that came reasonably within the scope of the general employment for which he was hired, although he previously had not performed that particular kind of service. If this be so, there was some competent evidence to support the trial justice's finding and conclusion that petitioner was injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and therefore the decree may stand."
Earlier decisions held the term, "arising out of employment," to be synonymous with the common-law conception of the term, "scope of employment," but this position has been generally abandoned. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Parker,
"In applying the phrase 'out of' employment, the later cases emphasize the importance of the working and environmental conditions. In many cases the injuries *466
are held compensable where the precise cause of the accident is incidental thereto although not strictly relevant to the performance of any duty by the employee." Bethlehem Steel Co.
v. Parker, supra (woman employee while returning to work after obtaining a drink saw open dumb-waiter shaft and not knowing what it was placed her head in the opening and was struck by a descending dumb-waiter); Franck v. Allen.
In view of the recent holdings of many courts under a great variety of circumstances as above indicated, and in view of the liberality with which our compensation law should be construed in favor of injured workmen, I am of the opinion that the claimant's injuries are compensable. *467
