Gеorge W. Schmidt appeals the district court’s decision upholding the denial of his application for social security disability benefits. Schmidt argues that the Commissioner’s determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
Schmidt was born in 1925. After graduating from college in 1954 he began a career which saw him become a senior vice-president at Montgomery Ward, the manager оf the Singer Company’s North American operations, C.E.O. of the Duplan Corporation, and the owner of his own consulting business. In 1986 he stоpped working due to the health problems which form the basis of his social security disability claim.
*972 Schmidt suffers from coronary artеry disease, high blood pressure, angina, minimal bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, osteoarthritis, and the residual effects of a transient ischemic attack. 1 He also cannot handle stress well because of emotional problems that include оbsessive-compulsive disorder.
Based on this cocktail of maladies Schmidt has twice filed for disability insurance benefits. His initial 1986 aрplication was finally denied after he unsuccessfully appealed to this court and the Supreme Court denied certiоrari.
See Schmidt v. Sullivan,
In the opinion the ALJ first determined thаt Schmidt’s heart problems left him able to perform light work. He then found that while Schmidt’s psychological maladies rendered him unablе to continue in the extremely stressful positions he once held — the interaction of Schmidt’s physical and psychologicаl infirmities put him at risk of suffering a stroke or heart attack if he were placed in extremely stressful situations — he could still handle a numbеr of easily obtainable low-stress jobs. Thus, since none of his illnesses automatically qualified him for disability under the statute and he cоuld find work given his condition, the ALJ denied Schmidt’s claim.
Once this ruling became the Commissioner’s final decision, Schmidt filed an appeal in distriсt court. In yet another exhaustive opinion (this one 40 pages long, but double-spaced), Judge Ruben Castillo rejected the appeal. Schmidt now asks that we, too, review the ALJ’s decision.
We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is reached under the correсt legal standard and if it is supported by substantial evidence.
See Scivally v. Sullivan,
Schmidt raises a host of issues on appeal. After examining the record, we conclude that Schmidt’s contentions wеre very ably handled by Judge Castillo in the district court.
See Schmidt v. Callahan,
That said, our reviеw begins with the assertion that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the impact of Schmidt’s age
2
on his ability to find new work. Schmidt correctly notes that because he was close to retirement age during the period for which he seeks disability, the ALJ needed to dеtermine that his skills were both “readily transferable” and “highly marketable” to avoid finding Schmidt disabled.
Tom v. Heckler,
Schmidt’s argument hits one immediate wall: we did not define “highly marketable” in
Tom.
Instead, we merely held that the ALJ needed tо consider whether an applicant over 60 possessed skills that were highly marketable in addition to skills which were readily transferable.
Tom,
Nevertheless, without defining “highly marketable,”
Tom
did suggest that the term referred to something more than simply readily transferable skills.
Id.
at n. 11. Some other circuits have since buüt on this suggestion, holding that for an applicant’s skills to be highly marketable they must be so sought after that they compensate for the disadvantage of looking for work at an old age.
See, e.g., Preslar v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,
But this is not the case. At the hearing, a vocational еxpert (VE) testified that Schmidt’s skills were highly marketable because despite his age he would “enjoy an advantage over most other applicants” in his search for employment. As this testimony provides substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s finding that Schmidt’s skills were highly marketable no matter which definition of the term we use, we find that the ALJ amply fulfilled his duties and leave the question of the exact meaning of the term “highly marketable” to a ease that demands its answer.
Schmidt next argues that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to consider (and credit) the testimony of Dr. John M. Williams, who Schmidt presented as a VE to testify whether his (Schmidt’s) skills were “transferable.” Schmidt pоints to the ALJ’s statement that “Dr. Williams, as he is prone to do, ... exceeded his field of expertise” to support an assertion thаt the ALJ harbored a prior bias that skewed his evaluation of the offered testimony. Because of this bias, Schmidt asserts the ALJ inappropriately failed to either give weight to Dr. Williams’ opinions or to explain why he ignored them.
This argument misstates the record. The ALJ’s opinion makes clear that he only excluded from consideration those portions of Dr. Williams’ testimony in which he ovеrstepped his role and rendered opinions about Schmidt’s physical ability to continue to work. This ruling was not inappropriate. The ALJ is under no duty to respect expert opinions that are given outside a witness’ field of expertise.
The ALJ’s decision, as more fully discussed in Judge Castillo’s thorough opinion which is reported at
Notes
. A transient ischemic attack is a neurologic abnormality of sudden onset and short duration that reflects dysfunction in the arteries supplying the brain with blood. The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy 1420-21 (Mark H. Beers & Robert Berkow eds., 17th ed.1999).
. Schmidt was 61 in 1986. He’s 75 in this, the year 2000.