Appellants were jointly tried for and convicted of the malice murder of Gene Ray Jarrett, Jr.; the aggravated assault of his brother; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 1
The State presented evidence that the decedent was shot with a .30-30 Winchester rifle as the two victims closed their family-owned liquor store around midnight on March 26, 1988. The surviving victim identified appellant Phelps as one of the two men involved in the shooting. Other witnesses testified that appellant George had a .30-30 Winchester rifle on the afternoon of March 26 and that George told people on March 27 that he and Phelps had planned to rob the liquor store and that Phelps had killed the two men working there. Prior to his arrest, George told police he knew about the murder and gave a detailed description of the weapon used, the number of shots fired, and the wounds suffered. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find both men guilty of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
Jackson v. Virginia,
1. George seeks review of the denial of his motion in limine to exclude from evidence a statement he gave the investigating detective one month after the crimes were committed. George maintains his statement should be suppressed because it was not preceded by a reading of his Miranda rights.
Following a
Jackson-Denno
hearing in which it was adduced that George had made several telephone calls to police in which he alluded to his knowledge regarding the murder and suggested a time and location to meet the investigating officer in order to give a written state
*810
ment, the trial court ruled that
Miranda
rights were not necessary inasmuch as George was neither in custody nor the focus of the investigation at the time he made his statement.
Lobdell v. State,
supra, Div. 6;
Boutwell v. State,
2. Appellant Phelps protests the admission of George’s statement into evidence on the ground that it was not properly redacted. See
Bruton v. United States,
3. Both appellants contend the denial of their motions to sever their trials was error. Upon review of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions to sever.
Harrell v. State,
4. Appellant George maintains the trial court should have granted a mistrial sua sponte pursuant to OCGA § 17-8-75 when, in her closing argument, the prosecuting attorney allegedly commented on George’s decision not to testify by addressing the jury as if she were George, and allegedly injected George’s character into evidence by the statements she then made to the effect that George was “cocky.”
The code section in question is designed to prohibit counsel from stating prejudicial facts which are not in evidence. [Cit.] However, it is permissible for counsel to draw deductions from the evidence regardless of how illogical or unreasonable, and this is a “matter for reply by adverse counsel, not for rebuke [or mistrial] by the court.” [Cit.] [Adams v. State,260 Ga. 298 , 299 (392 SE2d 866 ) (1990).]
The remarks made by the prosecuting attorney were logically inferable from the evidence presented. The presentation of the inferences as if they were coming from George did not amount to an impermissible comment upon his decision not to testify.
5. (a) Both appellants contend the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that if they should find beyond a reasonable doubt “that the defendants or either of them . . . did . . . commit the offenses, . . . [the jury] would be authorized to find the defendants
*811
guilty.” Phelps contends that the trial cóurt’s error in giving such a charge was compounded by the failure to instruct the jury that the conviction of one defendant did not necessitate the conviction of the other. See
Lanzo v. State,
*811 (b) Phelps’ enumerated error concerning the charge on the admission of evidence of a similar transaction against George is without merit. When the evidence was admitted, the trial court twice reminded the jury that it was to consider the evidence only against George and not against Phelps.
(c) Appellants’ assertions that the trial court impermissibly commented on their guilt by instructing the jury that punishment and multiple convictions were not their concern are without merit.
Wilson v. State,
6. After publication of the guilty verdicts, the trial court polled the jury at appellants’ request.
2
Inasmuch as neither appellant imposed any objection to any aspect of the poll, we have no basis for further review.
Tucker v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes were committed shortly after midnight on March 27, 1988. Appellants were tried May 22-26, 1989, and were sentenced to life imprisonment for malice murder, followed by 20 years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault and five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Appellants’ amended motions for new trial were denied on June 1, 1990, and their notices of appeal were filed June 29. George’s appeal was docketed in this court on September 14 and was orally argued November 14; Phelps’ appeal was docketed on September 26 and submitted for decision November 9, 1990.
The questions propounded to each juror by the trial court were found to meet the minimum requirements of a defendant’s right to a poll of the jurors in
Burnett v. State,