Case Information
*0 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON SEAN F. M C Aug 25, 2025 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON MONIQUE GEORGE and No. 1:24-CV-03158-RLP
VESZONO GEORGE,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR Plaintiffs, SUMMARY JUDGMENT v.
MERLY MOZ and MARIAH FRAIDE,
Defendants. BEFORE THE COURT, without oral argument, are Defendants Merly Moz and Mariah Fraide’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17. Plaintiffs
Monique and Veszono George, proceeding pro se , have failed to file any
responsive pleadings. For the reasons set out below, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is granted.
BACKGROUND On May 8, 2021, Defendant Merly Moz purchased a home in Wapato, Washington from Basil George. ECF No. 19, ¶5. Ms. Moz’s daughter, Defendant
Mariah Fraide, lived with Ms. Moz at the home. ECF No. 20, ¶4. Plaintiffs
Monique and Veszono George are the children of Basil George. ECF No. 19, ¶6.
Plaintiffs are Indians. See ECF No. 11. On November 9, 2022, Basil George, with
the assistance of his children, filed a lawsuit in Yakama Nation Tribal Court to
eject Defendants from the home they purchased from him. ECF No. 18-1 at 23-25.
Ms. Moz is not a member of the Yakama Tribe, and the Wapato property is not
located on tribal land. ECF No. 19, ¶¶4-5. Shortly before his death on December 1,
2022, Basil George quitclaimed any interest he still held the Wapato property to
Veszono George. ECF No. 18-2 at 3.
On February 2, 2023, the Yakama Nation Tribal Court issued an order requiring Ms. Moz to vacate the Wapato property. ECF No. 18-3 at 3-5. Yakama
Nation Law Enforcement removed Ms. Moz and Ms. Fraide from the property on
February 7, 2023. ECF No. 18-4 at 2-3. At the time, Ms. Moz had an open lawsuit
against Plaintiffs in Yakima County Superior Court. ECF No. 18-2. Prior to being
removed from the home, Ms. Moz obtained an injunction from the state court
prohibiting Plaintiffs from removing her from the Wapato home. ECF No. 18-5 at
3. After nevertheless being removed from her home, Ms. Moz moved the state
court for an order to show cause for contempt against Plaintiffs. ECF No. 18-4.
Ms. Fraide submitted a declaration in support of the motion. ECF No. 18-4 at 2-4.
In an Order granting the contempt motion, Yakima County Superior Court ordered Plaintiffs to leave Ms. Moz’s property, and imposed ongoing sanctions for each
day Plaintiffs remained on the premises. ECF No. 18-5 at 5-6. After Plaintiffs
refused to vacate the premises, the state court issued a writ of restitution. ECF No.
18-6. On August 2, 2024, Ms. Moz successfully moved for summary judgment in
her state court case. ECF No. 18-11. On October 4, 2024, the state court entered a
judgment awarding Ms. Moz the Wapato property, and $58,438.43 in damages,
costs, and attorney fees. ECF No. 18-12.
Plaintiffs, acting pro se , initiated the instant federal court action that same day, October 4, 2024. ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs’ Complaint states their rights under
U.S.C. Title 25 were violated. Id . at 3. Plaintiffs allege Ms. Moz’s suit in Yakima
County Superior Court was false and malicious, and that the state court lacked
jurisdiction, failed to notify the Yakama Tribal Court, and otherwise behaved
improperly. Id . at 4-6. The only allegation relating to Ms. Fraide in Plaintiffs’
Complaint is that she filed false declarations in support of Ms. Moz’s case. Id . at 5.
Plaintiffs request they be awarded the Wapato property and damages. Id . at 7. In
addition, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint and Request for Injunction on October 4,
again alleging that the state court permitted false filings against them. ECF No. 4 at
5. In this pleading, Plaintiffs assert violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 361,
and the Bill of Rights, as well as U.S.C. Title 25 and unspecified treaties, statutes,
and regulations relating to Indian tribes and the Yakama Nation. Id . at 3.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment will be granted if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” FRCP 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the
Court views the evidence and inferences therefrom “in the light most favorable to
the adverse party”. James River Ins. Co. v. Hebert Schenk, P.C. , 523 F.3d 915, 920
(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jones v. Halekulani Hotel, Inc. , 557 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th
Cir. 1977)). A moving party who does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial can
succeed on summary judgment either by producing evidence that negates an
essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, or by showing that
the non-moving party does not have enough evidence to prove an essential
element. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. v. Fritz Cos. , 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.
2000).
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is unopposed. A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment solely because the opposing party
has failed to file an opposition. Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95, n.4 (9th
Cir. 1994). However, the Court may grant an unopposed motion for summary
judgment if the movant’s papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion
and do not on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact. See Carmen v. San
Francisco Unified School District , 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001); see also North American Specialty Insurance Company v. Royal Surplus Lines Insurance
Company , 541 F.3d 552, 558 (5th Cir. 2008) (if no factual showing is made in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the district court is not required to
search the record sua sponte for a triable issue of fact).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Id . at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
“[P]ro se pleadings must be construed liberally,” Draper v. Rosario , 836 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2016), and “[f]ederal pleading rules . . . do not
countenance dismissal . . . for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting
the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss. , 574 U.S. 10, 11, 135 S. Ct.
346 (2014) (reversing summary judgment on basis that plaintiffs failed to invoke
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their complaint where they otherwise alleged sufficient facts
for such a claim). Still, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not
supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of
Regents , 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Defendants request the Court grant them summary judgment because Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to support a claim for relief. The
Court agrees.
Plaintiffs assert claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, and 361 [1] . However, these statutes define crimes and do not provide a private cause of action
in a civil suit. Plaintiffs also assert their claims arise under Title 25 U.S.C. “Article
1, Section 8, Clause 3.” ECF Nos. 1 at 3; 4 at 3. The Court is uncertain what
specific statute Plaintiffs refer to, but regardless, Plaintiffs do not allege facts
which give rise to any cause of action provided under Title 25 U.S.C. Plaintiffs’
final assertion that unidentified treaties, codes, and/or regulations are involved is
insufficient to place Defendants on fair notice of the claim being asserted.
Still, construing the Complaint liberally, Plaintiffs’ allegations can be read as an attempt to assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim for conspiracy to deprive them
of their civil rights. A § 1985(3) claim requires plaintiffs to allege and prove four
elements:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825,
828-29, 103 S.Ct. 3352 (1983). The second element generally requires evidence
that the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights was motivated by racial animus. Sever
v. Alaska Pulp Corp. , 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).
Reading Plaintiffs’ Complaint generously, they appear to allege Defendants conspired to deprive them of their rights to the Wapato property by filing “a false
suit with malicious intent” which resulted in their loss of the property. ECF No. 1
at 4-5. However, despite many complaints about the state court’s failure to abide
by tribal law, Plaintiffs do not allege Defendants’ actions were motivated by any
racial animus against them as Indians. Nor do they explain what was “falsified,
inaccurate, or illegal” in Defendants’ filings before the state court. Id . Plaintiffs’
failure to allege racial animus or specifically identify the false or fabricated
evidence presented by Defendants in the state court action means they fail to
provide sufficient factual matter to support a plausible claim for relief. See also
Olga C. v. County of Santa Clara , 701 F. App’x 551, 553 (9th Cir. 2017) (plaintiff
failed to allege plausible 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim where plaintiff did not identify
specific false or fabricated evidence submitted to state court).
Even if sufficient allegations could be read into Plaintiffs’ Complaint, their failure to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment means there is no
evidence in the record to support their allegations. Due to Plaintiffs’ failure to state a viable claim, and the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17 is GRANTED .
The Clerk of this court shall enter this Order and judgment in favor of Defendants, forward copies to the parties, and close this file.
DATED August 25, 2025.
_______________________________ REBECCA L. PENNELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
[1] “18 U.S.C. § 361” is a non-existent statute. The Court is uncertain what statute Plaintiffs intended to cite, if any.