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George McGinest v. Gte Service Corp. Mike Biggs
360 F.3d 1103
9th Cir.
2004
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 сoncluding not err in district court did George McGINEST, Plaintiff- liability

Key was immune from as direct- Appellant, fiduciary underlying If the ed trustee. itself is not violation of direction ERISA, compliance the directed trustee’s CORP.; Biggs, Mike GTE SERVICE cannot serve as a basis

with that direction Defendants-Appellees. HBOC, liability. In re McKesson See 31431588, at Litig., Inc. ERISA 2002 WL No. 01-57065. (“Here, alleged *12 no are that would facts Appeals, United States Court of to a conclusion that knew give rise Chase Ninth Circuit. the investment directions received imprudent, the McKesson Plan were Argued and Submitted Dec. any knowledge of the Chase had HBOC Filed March irregularities, accounting abusing Plan Fiduciaries were McKesson continuing to fund the

their discretion pursuant Plan to the Plan

McKesson facts, such is not

terms. Absent Chase

liable, non-conclusory allega- and absent facts,

tions of those Chase should not have claim.”). against defend

III. CONCLUSION Key

Because the Union and are neither fiduciaries, they

fiduciaries nor de facto

cannot be found under liable ERISA. upon alleged,

Based the facts the Oremet comply

Defendants’ decision to with the following terms of the Plan

lawful

merger entirely consistent with fiduciary requirements.

ERISA’s The dis-

trict court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims proper.

AFFIRMED. *3 Hills, CA, plain- for the

Serlin, Woodland tiff-appellant. P. and Thomas L. Nutter

Jennifer Green, Los IV, & Epstein, Becker Brown CA, defendant-appellee. Angeles, *4 REINHARDT, Before: PAEZ, O’SCANNLAIN, and Circuit Judges.

PAEZ, Judge: Circuit McGinest, an African-American George Corporation of GTE Service employee for (“GTE”), under Title VII sued racially work environ- of a hostile creation dis- ment, due to racial promote failure crimination, due promote failure and claims that GTE retaliation. racially hostile work environ- created upon perpetration both its ment based to a adequately respond its failure to and that occurred large number of incidents support year period. over a fifteen claim, McGi- work environment his hostile danger- in placed that he was alleges nest race, of his working conditions because ous pay avail- bonus prevented collecting coworkers, non-African American able to and insults racial forced to endure taunts coworkers, subject- and and by supervisors bathrooms graffiti GTE’s ed to racist Additionally, McGi- on switch boxes. and promotion that he was nest claims denied retalia- 1998 due to his race late complaint; GTE filing tion an EEOC promote it was unable to responds hiring to a him freeze. due court granted The district The court found that Associates, judgment to GTE. Cohn, & A. Mancini David hostile work Serlin, comprising & the incidents Encino, CA; M. Benedon Gerald sporadic, environment claim moving party. Hawaii, Lam v. Univ. of part adequately the most remedied. 40 F.3d n. 2 Moreover, it found McGinest was un- produce

able to sufficient evidence that A. Hostile Work Environment GTE’s stated for failing promote reason McGinest describes a number of events him pretext. was a practices, which alleges cumulative- We rеverse the district court’s dismissal ly created a hostile work environment. of the hostile environment and disparate These events fall roughly into two catego- treatment claims. The district court re- ries: some involved discriminatory treat- questions solved numerous factual in favor through actions, ment concrete while oth- GTE, distinguish failed to between su- ers involved written and oral derogatory pervisors and in evaluating coworkers statements. liability, fully did not consider impact the cumulative of the events that 1. Concrete Actions occurred. Because McGinest has estab- *5 genuine lished issues of fact re- material Events Involving Supervisor Jim Noson garding his hostile work environment supervised Jim Noson McGinest for five claim, as question well as on the of wheth- years, Beach, or six at a facility in Long er the denial of the promotion prompt- was in ending early During 1990s. this by motive, ed a discriminatory these time, Noson in engaged numerous acts of claims must be remanded. racial harassment directed toward McGi- McGinest has to prima failed establish a nest. Although majority of these inci- retaliation, facie case of and so we affirm dents were not accompanied by explicit the district court’s dismissal of this claim. comments, racial McGinest testified at his deposition Noson’s behavior “any and

I. comment that my he was made because of McGinest, According race.” to Noson BACKGROUND forced dangerous McGinest to work under George is an McGinest African-Ameri- proper conditions or without equipment, GTE, can employee of subjected telecommunica- and him to obscene and demean- company.1 tions has worked for ing language. He When McGinest was re- years, for 23 and has to sponsible continued do so project, for a Noson would not during the course litigation. provide of this him McGi- with sufficient crew members lineman, initially nest was hired as a to safely perform job. Noson also subsequently an has worked as outside indicated his desire to fire McGinest on plant occasions, construction worker and relief super- several specifically stated visor. At GTE facilities which that provoke he wished to into McGinest worked, McGinest has he has been one of fighting with another worker so that he few African-American employees. occasion, Be- could fire both of them. On one cause this case was decided on Noson wearing noted that was McGinest judgment, chain, we gold “only evaluate facts drug commented McGinest, light most favorable to the non- gold dealers can afford chains.” nice Verizon, Although by GTE is owned we now which it was sued. continue to refer to it name under removed the overtime to have only was also aimed conduct abusive Noson’s repeatedly complained McGinest and Roberts. Ketchum, coworker a white Matt treatment. McGinest testified about of McGinest. friend the blunt “received although Ketchum McGi- Obey When Coworkers’ Refusal too, was directed it still problem Supervisor nest Was Relief percent .... my race me because Long moved from me, he wouldn’t time, with [ ] if he wasn’t Upon Huntington Beach. facility to Beach bashing.” the same receive with cowork- arrival, he had difficulties his problem had Any time that supervi- under his to work refused ers who complaining *6 ny vehicle that states McGinest McGinest. on the driving time was of his percent to his com- response a never received he safety. for his freeway, he was concerned plaint. garage to the writing request He sent Supervisors Overtime Relief for garage but replaced, the tire to have to non-African-Ameri- From 1995 nothing that there replied was mechanic received overtime supervisors can relief his tire. He also informed wrong with the up for early to set they arrived pay when Roberts, need to about the Don supervisor, occasions, su- relief some their On shift. that “the tire, said Roberts replace the en- to claim an permitted pervisors were money on any spend company wouldn’t they arrived hour of overtime when tire request After McGinest’s any tires.” for their up set early to just five minutes denied, tire to he showed repair was that until the acknowledges shift. GTE agreed who supervisor, another Begg, manager, Mike new arrival tire looked bald. that relief rule an unwritten there was events, weeks after these to three Two overtime for got an hour supervisors was driv- blew out while the tire that even McGinest testified each shift. a wall. into he crashed ing the vehicle and arrival, con- supervisors some Begg’s after injuries at the treated pay, howev- “bonus” overtime get tinued to had injured he leg was and hospital. His Roberts, Don er, supervisor, a neck brace. wear any him claim to allow refused everyone testified almost when he McGinest actually worked overtime that bеtter in vehicles driving around with chal- supervisor. awas relief white em- that when explained He tires. for sev- treatment lenged differential fixed, they get something ployees “want[ ] submitting timesheets paychecks, eral white em- example of a worked, it,” cited an and that he overtime reflected the ployee who had requested new tires I went to management with several differ- around the had, same time that McGinest ent things and nothing changed, over and but who obtained them. had Another co- again.” over worker, Brand, agreed the garage Rather, a complaint McGinest filed with mechanic and the foreman seemed to have the EEOC. Upon receiving a call from the particular problem with three black em- July 1997, EEOC in human resources ployees, McGinest, one whom was not- manager Jeff Nakamura began an investi- ing that they “continuously George treated gation of the incident. Nakamura found in a de[]meaning [McGinest] and[conde- Hughes’s denial this comment oc- scending] my presence.” manner in Brand plausible. curred Based on this belief and testified that the most part they “[f]or the EEOC’s refusal provide him with seemed pretty good myself, be with witness, the name of the Nakamura did ... happen white, [others] we to be pursue the investigation. Nakamura could have been racial. It could have been testified that he years waited two to reini-

just personality.” tiate the investigation “because meantime I thought agency would Derogatory Racial Slurs Com- cooperative by sharing with me the

ments name of the witness so I could do a thorough Derogatory by Statement Coordinator investigation.” Once Nakamura did re- Hughes Tom open investigation, he learned the May Tom Hughes called McGi- name of the witness interviewing sever- nest “stupid nigger” face, epithet al employees. Brand, witness, After was overheard Brand. Hughes confirmed that epithet used, had been had referred McGinest on other occa- Nakamura determined that disciplinary ac- sions brain,” as “stupid” “sparrow tion should despite be taken Hughes’s con- McGinest, had told “you stay should in tinued denial. Hughes was counseled Long Beach you where belong, your against using words, such shown video kind.” *7 harassment, on sexual and received a dis-

McGinest did not report May 1996 ciplinary memo.2 allegation There is no incident immediately because he was so Hughes that engaged in any objec- further enraged he that had to leave the building. tionable conduct following discipline. this The next day, reported McGinest to his by Supervisor Comment Ledbetter immediate supervisor, Deason, Gary that Hughes “always was calling me a name.” McGinest and Brand that in testified pursue he did not January a formal com- Ledbetter, Paul supervi- a plaint with sor, the management because of his was frustrated that McGinest and his futile, conviction it that would be “because crew were not able to perform a work 2. The memorandum read in nity, full: Affirmative Action and Diver- Workforce 15, 1999, sity. Any On June violations further this investigation was held nature you with regarding your could you racial result statement from GTE termination supposedly employee. made to another Network Services. Upon the investigation, disciplinary conclusion of This this will be re- memorandum your which you showed failure to adhere to moved if Com- have no further violations for a pany policy, period I have no but year. alternative to issue of one disciplinary you I your memorandum. am confident will succeed in You will be Company’s policy assistance, reviewed on the any efforts. If I please can regarding Equal Employment Opportu- GTE's feel free to see me. phone call until of this incident aware quoted immediately. They assignment Follow- representative. the EEOC who from guy colored other “The saying, as him De- questioned call, Nakamura I ing said when jump would here to work used did not that he claimed gone it’s DeLeon how Leon. shame a damn It is it. insult, a racial as this inci- Jemima” “Aunt reported intend McGinest downhill.” referring teasing nickname claims rather GTE but management. to dent slow- emphasized worked longer to a commercial no Ledbetter out syrup poured which the with ness had apparently also Ketchum bottle. by Coworkers Comments DeLeon, Naka- “Biscuit.” nickname Tal- occasion, Alex coworker one On ex- DeLeon’s that he found testified mura McGinest, “I’ll referring to said, madge in- nonetheless but plausible, planation man.” a Black I work before retire using phrase.3 stop to DeLeon structed Frick, said coworker, Jim Another contin- DeLeon allegation nois There dumb for that McGinest, “I refuse subsequently. phrase use the ued complained McGinest a bitch.” son Begg. and to Roberts incidents these about Racist Graffiti coworker the walls graffiti saw racist McGinest “Aunt Je- Ketchum called DeLeon Daniel stalls on in the restroom and men’s presenсe times in numerous

mima” included graffiti This occasions. multiple to McGi- referred also DeLeon McGinest. altered sometimes “nigger,” word a number “mammy” on as Ketchum’s nest right.” “white phrase “digger,” and co- a black McGinest of occasions. seeing the testified coworkers Other Jemi- “Aunt phrase note worker old “PONTIAC,” “poor meaning phrase laziness insult, connoting a racial isma” and, Cadillac,”4 in De- it’s a thinks nigger white, Although Ketchum and servitude. Although go home.” “nigger cember was comment that the explained restrooms, used the same managers McGinest, directed and was irk intended it ap- when painted not over was graffiti is friends he because at Ketchum disapproval public no action peared and employees. black taken. DeLeon requested particularly graffiti, racist racist, Similar found phrase because use in GTE present also was “nigger,” word response. you” told “fuck in the blockhouse switch boxes both the comment reported *8 year that one coworker noted A garage. supervisor Begg and Mike manager word History Month during Black and McGinest Roberts, supervised who poster out on was crossed “Black” any disciplin- if unaware DeLeon, was but The place. in its written “nigger” was resources Human was taken. action ary epithet until this displayed poster defaced apparently un- was Nakamura manager ex- he ... understood intelligent person, and originally from that DeLeon 3. GTE notes being was saying, and he actly he was what Cuba, been unaware have hence insult, racist.” although he has phrase racial years. States for over United in the been African-American Washington, Leigh less believ- explanation is somewhat DeLeon’s phrase, seeing this reported who coworker use uncontested light of able weeks before Moreover, complained for he stated “mammy.” phrase clearly racial painted it over. very GTE was "a that DeLeon testified McGinest finally coworker it removed three tion Installer Supervisor. ap- weeks later. plied for position, which would have been a promotion. He passed qualify- only graffiti mentioned this ing exam and was interviewed for posi- management occasion, one April around by tion Begg in October 1998. occasion, 1998. On this McGinest and a reported coworker to A1 Valle that GTE, According McGinest was select- “nigger” word appeared had in the bath- ed for position, Begg when contact- room, and Valle promptly spray-painted ed the human resources department Later, over it. supervisor when Roberts obtain salary authorization he was in- incident, learned about said, he “Oh by formed Casey Larson that there was a

well, I guess I’ll have to it again,” write salary/hiring freeze in place. Nakamura added, “Ah, and then why can’t just we all testified salary that the freeze was due to get along,” in reference to a statement GTE’s financial difficulties. Consequently, made Rodney King being after beaten another employee, Phalen, John Angeles Los police officers. Roberts moved laterally into the position. may not have been aware of precise However, GTE was unable to produce nature of graffiti at the time of these any documentation verifying that there comments, as there is testimony that he salary freeze, was a and Phalen himself merely told that was condescending. testified that he was unaware that there Following this event McGinest “basically freeze, was a despite the fact that it was stopped using this bathroom ... I because allegedly the reason for his transfer. GTE am offended and disgusted seeing claims that it is salary common for freezes “N” word written the bathroom—-I implemented without written notifi- get would upset if I were to see it written.” cation. The record does reflect how “nigger” word graffiti other racist large operation an time, was at this have continued to appear in the bathroom but at least 175 individuals were employed since this incident. in the yards three supervised by Begg. Policy Antidiscrimination The decision not to promote McGinest Although GTE claims that it has a “zero occurred approximately year and a half policy tolerance” fOr discriminatory con- after McGinest filed his EEOC complaint. duct, its written policy, appears which McGinest notes that African Americans have adopted been says nothing GTE, are underrepresented at particularly about zero or about any tolerance ramifica- in supervisory positions, and claims that it tions for such conduct. Nor does the writ- is difficult for African Americans to ad- policy ten detail steps what employee vance. the Huntington yard, Beach should follow if employee feels she or where worked, five or six out of subjected has been to discriminatоry employees American, were African conduct, stating only, you “If ques- none supervisors. tions concerning equal employment oppor- *9 tunity, discrimination, or affirmative ac- McGinest initially a complaint filed with tion, discuss them your 3, with supervisor or EEOC on June con- After human resources representative.” ducting an investigation, the EEOC deter- mined that the supported find- a B. Failure to Promote ing that “respondent acted in violation of In September 1998, GTE vacancy a had Title VII of the Rights Civil Act of 1964.” in the position of Outside Plant Construc- McGinest an filed additional complaint re- 1112 summary grants readily court too a the when After promote. to failure garding providing of the risk it runs judgment, notice, McGi- to Sue Right issued

EEOC discriminatory behav- for shield protective Begg. Mike supervisor and sued GTE nest has determined society our ior summary judg- granted court district extirpated. be all claims. as defendants to the ment judgment timely appealed III. appeal district not GTE, did for Begg. against claim of his dismissal court’s ENVIRONMENT WORK HOSTILE Act Rights Civil Title Under VII II. employment 1964, “an unlawful it is of discrimi ... employer an practice DISCUSSION respect to individual any against nate actions vio that GTE’s alleges conditions, terms, or compensation, his from free invidious right lated of such because employment, of privileges raises He workplace. § discrimination 2000e- 42 U.S.C. race.” individual’s 1) cre Title VII claims: separate three encom (2003). 2(a)(1) prohibition This environ racially hostile aof ation envi a hostile work of creation passes of 2) on account promote ment; failure guaran ronment, VII’s violates Title which 3) on account promote race; failure and in an environment to work right of “the tee de novo review intimidation, We retaliation. of ridi discriminatory free for sum Bank, of a motion grant FSB court’s district Sav. cule, Meritor insult.” and v. Columbia Schnidrig 2399, judgment. 65, mary 57, Vinson, S.Ct. 477 U.S. v. (9th 1406, 1408 Cir. Inc., Mach, long (1986). have F.3d “Courts L.Ed.2d 1996). racial in which workplace that a recognized a form constitutes hostility pervasive evaluating motions In Graphic Com v. Woods discrimination.” employment in the context judgment (9th 1195, Cir. munications, F.2d discrimination, emphasized we 1991). em an zealously guarding importance summary judgment, trial, since discrimi to survive In order to a full ployee’s right aof existence must show difficult frequently are claims nation 1) whether as to dispute factual of the evidence airing genuine a full without prove would man credi African-American reasonable to evaluаte opportunity and sub- objectively so workplace See, e.g., Schni find the witnesses. bility of the to create an racially hostile Lam, jectively 1410-11; 40 F.3d drig, 80 2) environment; working abusive Com v. Merced Sischo-Nownejad 1563; re- adequate to take GTE failed 1104, 1111 whether Dist., 934 F.2d College munity v. action. Steiner disciplinary medial has Supreme Court theAs Co., 25 F.3d Operating Showboat work impact stated, real social “The Faragher (9th Cir.1994); see also 1462-63 a constel depends often behavior place 775, 787, Raton, 524 U.S. Boca City circumstances, ex surrounding lation (1998). 141 L.Ed.2d which are relationships pectations, recitation simple aby fully captured Envi- Hostile Pervasive A. Severe per acts physical or the used words ronment v. Sundowner Oncale formed.” Offshore if an environment determining 81-82, S.Ct. Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. VII, we Title to violate result, so hostile as (1998). aAs 998, 140 L.Ed.2d

1113 whether, consider in light of “all cir the plaintiff A must show that the work cumstances,” Nichols v. Azteca Rest. En environment was both subjectively and ob ter., 864, (9th 256 Cir.2001), F.3d 872 the jectively Nichols, hostile. 256 F.3d at harassment is “sufficiently severe or per Subjective 871-72. hostility is clearly es vasive to alter the conditions of the vic tablished in the instant case through tim’s employment and create an abusive McGinest’s unrebutted testimony and his working Meritor, environment.” 477 U.S. complaints to supervisors and to the 67, 106 (internal at S.Ct. 2399 brackets and EEOC. Id. at 873.

quotation removed). marks The Supreme In evaluating

Court objective has the followed a path” “middle hostil ity of environment, a work regard to the level of hostility or factors abuse be considered necessary include the “frequency establish hostile work environment. discriminatory Inc., conduct; Harr is v. Sys., its severity; 510 Forklift 17, 21, 367, U.S. whether it 114 is S.Ct. 126 physically L.Ed.2d 295 or threatening hu (1993). Simply miliating, causing an aor mere employee utterance; of offensive fense based on an isolated whether it comment unreasonably is not interferes sufficient to with an employee’s create actionable performance.” harassment Nichols, under However, Title VII. Id. F.3d at harass 872 (quoting Harris v. ment need not cause diagnosed psychologi Sys., 23, U.S. 114 S.Ct. Forklift 367). cal 22, Id. at injury. 114 S.Ct. It required 367. is “The level of severity or enough “if such hostile pollutes conduct seriousness varies inversely with per workplace, victim’s making it more vasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” difficult (internal her job, for to do her pride take Id. quotation omitted). marks work, her and to to stay desire on in her Considering the facts in the light most Steiner, position.” F.3d at McGinest,5 favorable to it is clear that the 5. GTE contests McGinest's version of the regarding supervisor relief overtime.” How However, facts. ever, disputes is axiomatic that in both of these pro instances McGinest about material credibility facts and determi- vided deposition testimony detailed describ trial, nations must be resolved not ing on sum- personal regarding observations mary judgment. See, Lam, e.g., 40 F.3d at manner in which employ African-American ‍‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍Indeed, Supreme has Court in- ees were disfavored in relation to em white structed that at summary judgment stage, ployees. testimony This did not consist of ''[t]he evidence of the non-movant to be "conclusory allegations,” mere would which believed, justifiable and all inferences are to be insufficient to defeat a motion sum in his drawn Liberty mary favor.” v. judgment. Anderson Corp. Nat’l Steel v. Golden Inc., 242, Lobby, 255, Co., 496, Eagle S.Ct. (9th Ins. 121 F.3d Cir. 2505, (1986). 91 L.Ed.2d 1997). Rather, The district testimony McGinest's would court, contrary to princi- these fundamental suffice to enable a reasonable trier fact ples, accepted allegations GTE's many occurred, conclude that discrimination had the events attested to McGinest either did without need corroborating further not occur McGinest described were not evidence. See United v. States One Parcel of racially example, motivated. although For Prop., Real (9th 904 F.2d 491-92 Cir. McGinest and 1990). trial, others testified that garage At might trier fact deem foreperson treated employees black testimony worse such credibility, to lack and disre employees, than white the district gard court em- it. ruling on a when phasized deponent's one acknowledgment motion, judgment the district court foreperson's that the against animus empowered black credibility to malte determina employees may have simply per- been due weigh tions or conflicting Liberty evidence. sonality. Similarly, Inc., district Lobby, 2505; court con- 477 U.S. at cluded that "there is credible Indus., Inc., no evidence of see Koracorp also SEC application any differential 1978). 'unwritten rule' Cir. *11 1114 necessary mainte received vehicle his to sur are sufficient described incidents danger in to work forced He was nance. Ac summary judgment. for a motion

vive insults barraged situations ous ain involved McGinest, he was cording to others, Supervisor among by, abuse because, due accident automobile serious he was two-year period, aOver Noson.6 garage supervisor race, both to his pay collecting overtime from prevented that to ensure unwilling personnel to ability that worked.7 before, the district neither noted as regarding Noson allegations the 6. Whether of the the benefit parties had the liability nor court pwposes at trial admissible are of for a Morgan. As in decision Supreme Court’s on principal case question. a close under-developed in result, record Corp. v. the Passenger Railroad is National issue Therefore, the district 2061, upon remand 101, regard. 153 S.Ct. 122 U.S. Morgan, 536 wheth- instance the may in first decide court (2002); the district court er, a case L.Ed.2d regarding allegations Morgan, the its issued under when it of the benefit not did they that sufficiently such related ruling. are Noson summary judgment liability of purposes for be considered can "consideration that held Court Morgan, the In be so, and, they nonetheless whether should if work environ- scope of a hostile the entire of the even if that We note equitably barred. alleged out- claim, including behavior ment for be considered allegations cannot permissible period, is Noson statutory time the side they liability, nonetheless long as of liability, so assessing purposes of purposes limited other at trial for be hostile environ- admissible contributing still to that act an context in the statutory Morgan notes As time purposes. the within place takes ment acts, 2061, does discriminatory the statute 101, 105, S.Ct. discrete period.” 536 out, prior using the points employee dissent As the “bar not 106. L.Ed.2d in evidence guidance background precise as acts [untimely] offer not Morgan does itself 113, U.S. at timely that falls an act a claim.” support of whether evaluate how to on England, 2061; Lyons v. nonethe- can see also statutory period time S.Ct. the outside Cir.2002) (holding 1092, liability Dis- purposes. considered be less permitted a 1127, implies Morgan "appellants that Morgan are n. 2. Op. at under that sent dis- part pre-limitations be the would evidence previous incident offer to claim, the in assignment scheme environment criminatory detail work same hostile claims”). time-barred, The dis- timely no relation "had if it of their prosecution therefore intervening acts, that was McGi- there conclusion the reaches the itself later sent to” at sur- 536 U.S. claim employer. environment the work action taken hostile nest's thus, allegations Additionally, even judgment and 2061. S.Ct. vives time-barred, terms, prema- but are be ordinarily it would own dissent's would that work envi- single type hostile evidence a part of to limit nonetheless ture equita- claim, subject his hostile support in present still at are trial ronment can Indeed, waiver, equitable the dissent estoppel, and claim. environment ble defenses work allegations Noson suggest S.Ct. that the tolling. appears Id. light background most Here, viewing evidence be considered even could not McGinest, possible environ- it is McGinest's hostile favorable early Op. 1990s at 1127-28. in the Noson Dissent concerning See events claim. ment contrary prac- employment position run “part only one unlawful would this are Not Id. also would "single Lyons, claim.” it giving precedent rise to our tice” harassment Feder- role under court’s Noson's supplant 122 S.Ct. 2061. the district early pre- ending 16 to fashion years Civil Procedure several al Rule of spanned things, a 1990s, govern thin- course among involving, other would order trial While to ex- purporting derogatory comment. racially by preemptively ly-veiled the trial fact on the evidence. places potentially reliance admissible dissent clude McGinest, apologize to Noson did ask deprivation of determining whether unsatisfactory response is evidenced supervisors by relief received the overtime comments Noson's it fact considered relevant discriminatory, is not merely “shoptalk” to be and behavior —un- disfa- awarding overtime such practice of this as GTE viewed any dermining claim by the com- ultimately discontinued vored or problem. serious *12 perform job directly affected 2061. We now state explicitly what was the of his refusal coworkers to work under clear from our Ellison, in holding his direction on occasion. allegations of a racially hostile workplace must be assessed from the perspective of a Additionally, McGinest was sub person reasonable belonging to the racial jected to insults, extreme racial as well as or ethnic group of plaintiff.8 the taunts, more subtle by supervisors and graffiti coworkers. Racist “nig such as In Ellison we noted that complete “[a] ger” and right” “white is regularly ap understanding of the victim’s view re- peared in the bathroom and equipment, quires, among other things, an analysis of and on one a management-level occasion the perspectives different of men and employee called “stupid nigger” women.” 924 F.2d at 878. explained: We to his face. Although it is clear that “[n]ot bеcause women are disproportionately every insult or harassing comment will victims rape of assault, sexual wom- constitute a hostile environment,” work en have stronger incentive to be con- “[repeated derogatory or humiliating cerned with sexual behavior. Women statements ... can constitute a hostile who are of victims mild forms of sexual Henderson, environment.” Ray v. may harassment understandably worry 1234, 1245(9th 217 F.3d Cir.2000). whether a harasser’s conduct is merely a In evaluating significance the of prelude to violent Men, sexual assault. the statements in question, we consider who are rarely assault, victims sexual objective the hostility of the workplace sexual view conduct a vacuum from the perspective of the plaintiff. without a full appreciation of the social Nichols, 872; 256 F.3d at Ellison v. Bra setting or the underlying threat of vio- dy, (9th 872, 878-79 lence that a woman may perceive. Ellison, in the context of sexual harass ment, (citations objective omitted). we evaluated Id. at hostility from Our analysis perspective the importance the reasonable woman. of interpreting gender Supreme As the noted, Court has “Hostile discrimination from perspective of a work environment claims based on racial reasonable woman reverberates powerfully harassment are reviewed under same context racial harassment. See standard as those based on Arizona, sexual harass Stingley v. 424, 796 F.Supp. 428- ment.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger (D.Ariz.1992) Corp. v. 29 (noting that “Ellison’s Morgan, 536 10, U.S. at 116 n. 122 S.Ct. reasoning may applied be seamlessly to pany. critical, however, What is perspective whether person of a sharing the char differently McGinest was treated See, because of plaintiff. acteristics e.g., of the Gillming v. his race. GTE contends that Indus., 1168, McGinest was (8th Simmons 91 F.3d paid nine and a half 1996); hours Bowden, overtime over 1344, Cir. Watkins v. 105 F.3d period six during month the time that 1997). 1355-56 Cir. in On- allegedly place. violations response took cale, This Supreme Court recharacterized the only shows that the are dispute facts re- statement, Harris making it clear that it is garding the alleged extent practice. proper to use an individualized standard upon based plaintiff. characteristics of the 8. Following Supreme ("We Court’s 523 U.S. decision in 118 S.Ct. 998 Systems, moreover, Harris emphasized, which referred to objective se Forklift "an environment person verity that a reasonable judged harassment should abusive,” would find hostile or perspective U.S. at of a person reasonable in the a number of courts plaintiff's refused to position, considering ‘all the cir apply a person reasonable ”). standard based on cumstances.’ ato belonging adjudicator anof claims,” imple- spective environment

racist plaintiff. than the group different the same person menting a “reasonable standard). use of or color” question and race gender beyond *13 It is and de highly offensive is “nigger” word actions or comments Racially motivated vio history of racial a evoking meaning, mildly offen only or innocent may appear This and subordination. lence, brutality, of the a member is to one who sive and most offensive “perhaps word intoler reality be in group, targeted a ... English, in slur inflammatory racial under threatening when or ably abusive bigot and racial hatred of expressive word plaintiff of a perspective from stood F.3d 270 Corp., v. Potomac Swinton ry.” group. targeted of is a member who Cir.2001) original) in (9th (ellipsis 794, 817 attitudes race-based of omnipresence “The omitted); Daso see also marks (quotation Amer of black lives in the experiences and Inc., School, F.Supp.2d 181 The v. Grafton events nonviolent even [may cause] icans (“The ‘nigger’ (D.Md.2002) word 485, 493 threaten degrading, interpreted as to be utter offensive than [a]’mere more Paper v. Int’l Harris offensive.” ing, and lan English in the No word .... ance’ (D.Me.1991) 1509, 1516 Co., F.Supp. 765 terri as or loaded odious as guage is of racial violence “instances (noting Foundry Div. NLRB v. history.”); able of appear might which violence threatened 631, n. 5 Inc., 635 Indus., F.3d 260 Alcon are, to ‘pranks’ as mere observers white a ‘nigger’ is Cir.2001) (“That the word (6th threatening, of observers, evidence black debatable.”). no sin “Perhaps is not slur part attitudes”), in vacated pervasive condi alter quickly can more gle act (D.Me. F.Supp. grounds, other an abusive create and employment of tions “racial (discussing id. 1991); see also of an use than the working environment conduct or nonviolent comments jokes, ‘nig as such epithet racial unambiguously likely more ... are observers which white of his the presence in supervisor ger’ by inci nonthreatening isolated dismiss Rodgers Western- subordinates.” Jersey New v. State dents”); Dickerson 668, Co., F.3d Ins. Southern Life 605, Serv., F.Supp. Human Dep’t of quota Cir.1993) internal (citations and (“The mention (D.N.J.1991) mere omitted). verbal direct The marks tiоn histo long and violent KKK invokes prevalence and on McGinest attack any detrimentally affect ry sufficient evocative of slur a racial containing graffiti as the the same race person reasonable signifi hierarchy are racial and lynchings “Title original). (emphasis plaintiff.”) evaluating the exacerbating factors cant discrimination, sub no racial tolerates VII hostility.9 the racial severity of Douglas McDonnell otherwise.” tle or there court observed 801, district Green, 411 U.S. Corp. v. for a animus racial little evidence (1973). By consider 36 L.Ed.2d described incidents of the severity of number the existence ing both con- approval McGinest, noting with aof perspective from discrimination necessary associa- nois race, “there tention plaintiffs person reasonable drug Americans African between tion of discrimination forms recognize we has Circuit Third dealers.” over hurtful, yet are real “the use of persuasively explained per- solely if considered looked hos- racial also motivated certainly Moreover, might of fact a trier that, Hughes’ tility. use of light of conclude slur, remarks abusive his other racial

1Í17 ” can, ‘codewords’ under circumstances such' Cadillae’ was a “racially joke”); offensive as we here, encounter violate Title VII.” Jones v. City Park, Overland 1994 WL Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 (D.Kan.1994) (recognizing refer- (3d The Third ence to plaintiff as “Aunt Jemima” as one Circuit went on to note: factor in environment). hostile GTE’s at-

[A] jury tempt reasonable could to deny possible conclude racial overtones the intent to of many discriminate is implicit in the comments made to McGi- these comments. nest or There are no uttered in talis- presence indicates a expressions manic willful which must be in- blindness to racial stereotyping.

voked as a condition-precedent to the The district court discounted the application of designed laws to protect insults and hostile actions directed at against discrimination. The words by both Noson and DeLeon, rea themselves are only relevant for what soning that Ketchum, because a white they reveal—the intent the speaker. worker, was also targeted, this behavior A jury reasonable could find that state-' did not constitute actionable racial harass like ments the ones allegedly made in ment.' The district court in erred ignoring this case send a сlear message and carry these interactions for several reasons. the distinct tone of racial motivations First, if racial pervades hostility a work and implications. They could be seen as place, a plaintiff may establish violation conveying the message that members of VII, of Title even if such hostility was not a particular race are disfavored and that directly targeted at plaintiff. See, e.g., members of that are, race therefore, not Woods, 925 F.2d at 1202 (holding that (cid:127) full and equal members of the work- work environment was racially hostile place. where “Woods was surrounded racial (citations Id. omitted)’.10 The reference to hostility, subjected directly to some of McGinest as a “drug dealer” might it”); cer Stingley, 796 F.Supp. at tainly be deemed to be a code word or (finding racial and sexual harassment phrase. fact, reported cases have rec based in part on "use of racist nicknames ognized the racial motivations behind this and slurs about another worker pres in and other comments and slurs experienced ence of plaintiff); Kishaba v. Hilton Ho See, McGinest. e.g., Daniels v. Essex tels Corp., 737 (D.Haw. F.Supp. Inc., Group, 937 F.2d 1990) (“Even Cir. if Plaintiff herself was never 1991) (noting that employer in engaged object harassment, racial might she “not-so-subtle attempt to link drugs ... nevertheless have a Title VII claim if she with the plaintiff simply because is were forced to work in an atmosphere in black”); Swinton, 270 F.3d at 799 (noting which such harassment was pervasive.”). “[rjeference that a to ‘Pontiac’ as an acro McGinest testified at deposition that nym for ‘Poor old nigger thinks it’s a DeLeon racially directed charged com- 10. The Third explained Circuit signifi- clining. however, Regrettably, this in no cance holdings of these as follows: way suggests that discrimination based Anti-discrimination laws and lawsuits have upon race, an gender, individual’s age or 'educated’ would-be violators such that ex- near an end. Discrimination continues to treme manifestations of discrimination are pollute the social and economic main- thankfully Though rare. they happen, still life, stream American and is simply often the instances in which employers and em- masked in more subtle forms. ployees openly use derogatory epithets to 85 F.3d at 1081-82. refer to employees fellow appear to be de- that suggests Instead, evidence him. in order specifically Ketchum at ments friеndships making harassed he was moti- animus racial If McGinest. anger his acts lines, and for racial crossed com- provocative make a harasser vates attempts conduct solidarity.11 Hostile in individual anof presence ments friendships only those punish him, com- to sever such harass anger order certainly “pol- might interracial evaluating the are relevant highly are ments Steiner, 25 workplace,” environment, the victim’s lute[ ] hostile of a creation erred court the district 1463, and F.3d person identity of regardless fact. consider failing di- superficially comments whom judgment, rected. purposes For demonstrates persuasively clear law case Secondly, our environ- hostile work ato subjected he was “consistent individual that an fact presented has He ment. provides alike” women men ly abused several years to fifteen ten past over sexual accusation no defense rang- year, each occurred incidents racial 1463; see Steiner, *15 harassment. racially being called severity from ing racially of use DeLeon’s 1464. id. also poten- a experiencing to names derogatory black goad both to words charged even As life-threatening accident. tially more conduct makes employees white has recognizes, dissent Steiner, the so; as less not outrageous, with fact material of issue genuine a raised or sufficiently severe conduct the were racially hostile aof existence the regard to possi raise indeed might it pervasive workplace. a raise could himself Ketchum bility that Id. discrimination. of claim Measures Analysis of Remedial B. overlooked court district Thirdly, of conclude, purposes for we Because be harassed was that Ketchum testimony suf- judgment, employ black with his association of cause environment, we must work a hostile fered pro to held been ... has VII “Title ees. for is liable whether consider actions employment adverse against tect matter, we preliminary aAs harassment. as close employee’s of taken because ap- overall court’s district address cowork or friends black sociation remediation. question to proach LARSON, EMPLOY ARTHUR ers....” the sufficien- court considered district (2d DISCRIMINATION, § 51.02 MENT on measures remedial cy South & v. Western ed.2003); Taylor cf. elimi- “After basis, stating: event-by-event (7th Cir. Co., F.2d Ins. ern Life McGinest’s which for incidents nating the for judgment VII 1992) Title (affirming inci- аnd those inadequate, wholly is proof be discrimination subjected employee re- adequately has [GTE] to which dents Brosmore marriage); of interracial cause a few on rests case sponded, WL Covington, City v. racially arguably occurrences sporadic under significance (noting (E.D.Ky.1993) district Although conduct.” motivated to interracial due detriment VII Title unrea- appear not does approach court’s harassed association). Ketchum the court blush, led it at first sonable racial slurs white, nor being the environ- impact underestimate directed insulting whiteness or mocking subsequently wore which he gold chain self statement following Noson's example, For day. every af- can drug dealers "only bought him- chains,” Ketchum gold nice ford ment on McGinest and underemphasize ious liability for a hostile environment cre GTE’s responsibility to take remedial ac- by ated a supervisor.12 Nichols, 256 F.3d tion to discourage discriminatory conduct. at 877. Although GTE mentions this de Instead, a court must first assess whether fense in its motion for summary judgment, a hostile work existed, environment it does not raise it before us. In conse then determine whether response quence, we assume that GTE is liable for adequate as a whole. the acts of its supervisors, we leave it to the district

An employer’s court to liability evaluate harass defense if ing conduct is is raised evaluated differently remand. See when Smith v. Mash, harasser is a supervisor as opposed Swinton, Thus, coworker. for the F.3d at purposes of summary judg An employer is vicariously ment liable we for a assume that GTE is liable for the hostile environment created supervi offensive comments coordinator sor, although such liability subject to an Hughes13 and supervisor Ledbetter, su affirmative Nichols, defense. 256 F.3d at pervisor Roberts’ denial of bonus pay for 877 (citing Faragher City Boca Ra McGinest’s overtime while a relief supervi ton, 524 U.S. at 141 sor and refusal provide for McGinest’s 662). L.Ed.2d “If, however, the harasser automotive safety, and the derogatory merely a coworker, plaintiff comments and exposure to hazardous in prove that ... the employer knew dustrial by supervisor situations Noson. should have known of the harassment but *16 did not take adequate steps to address it.” 2. Liability for by Actions Coworkers Swinton, 270 F.3d at 803. “[E]mployers are liable for failing 1. Liability Vicarious by for Acts Su- to remedy prevent or a hostile or offensive pervisors of environment which management- An employer may raise a two- level knew, employees inor the exercise of pronged affirmative defense to avoid vicar reasonable care should have known.” El- employer The 1) must show that Thus, it exer- 12. this distinction is not dependent upon cised prevent reasonable care to and job correct titles or formal structures the within promptly any harassment, 2) invidious and workplace, but upon rather super- whether a that plaintiff the unreasonably failed to take has authority visor the to demand obedience advantage any preventative of or corrective employee. from an Burrell v. Star Nurs- Cf. opportunities provided by employer the or Inc., ery, (9th 170 Cir.1999). F.3d avoid Nichols, harm otherwise. 256 F.3d at The deposition affidavits and transcripts es- 877. tablish that the supervisorial structure of GTE challenges GTE McGinest’s description quite See, was complex. of e.g., Declaration of Hughes supervisor, as his but does not McGinest (explaining assert "I work with five or six Hughes that was a supervisor. not supervisors time”). Our case at one Hughes If engaged law distinguish does indeed supervision between situa- of or had authority over McGi- tion in which nest, harasser supervises plain- the qualify would as McGinest's supervi- tiff, where available, vicarious liability is ver- sor even if the company did not define his sus those situations in which a harasser is a Swinton, role way. 270 F.3d at 803-05. supervisor yet and does supervise the question of who was super- considered a plaintiff. Swinton, See F.3d GTE, 805. An by visor and job whether its categories employer is vicariously liable for by actions satisfy suffice to the demarcations drawn un- supervisor (or who has "immediate succes- der the law case interpreting prop- Title VII is sively higher) authority over the employee.” erly by resolved the district court on a more Faragher, 524 U.S. at 118 S.Ct. 2275. extensive factual record. re- request a mere more than requires (quoting at 881 F.2d Brady, v. lison conduct.”). discriminatory from frain Hotel, F.2d Hacienda v. EEOC Swinton, F.3d Cir.1989)); (9th counseling by 1515-16 action took GTE the knowledge of actual racial had over at 803. GTE by painting DeLeon informed alleg GTE April which of reported events graffiti includ- manager, stopped or measures supervisor remedial these immediate es coworkers suffi therefore harassment, comments the offensive ing liability. Tal- Alex Frick it DeLeon, protect Jim cient Daniel presented has graff- of incidеnt one is clear as as well madge, disputed establish Additionally, GTE sufficient reported. iti was regard fact re- material of regarding issues knowledge imputed had taken measures the remedial adequacy graffiti, because racist maining incidents us, before fact, record on by GTE. oth- the restrooms used also managers liability avoid unable would GTE preva- graffiti where er facilities measures. its remedial through lent. one responded only First, GTE despite liabil avoid reported, may nonetheless graffiti GTE act undertaking should knew harassment fact ity for such Inac- instances. “reasonably calculated other of numerous known measures remedial past Ellison, F.2d a ratification constitutes tion harassment.” to end inde- harassment if such harassment, v. United even Yamaguchi 882; also see Oak- City Fuller Force, ceases. 109 F.3d pendently Air Dep’t States Cir.1995) (9th 1522, 1529 land, F.3d reason “The 1475, 1482 “the exis- condemns VII Title (noting its depends remedy ableness y as every bit harassment, past tence by the (1) harassment ‘stop to: abilit harassment”); of future risk harassment;’ much engaged who person (“When the at 875-76 Nichols, *17 harassers (2) potential ‘persuade ” or where remedy, no undertakes employer Nichols, conduct.’ unlawful from refrain current not end remedy does Ellison, F.2d (quoting at 875 F.3d harassment, future deter harassment employer adequate, 882). To be at harass- past for both attaches liability promptly. intervene must Intlekofer harassment.”). any future ment 773, 778 F.2d Turnage, over painting although Additionally, some include must measures Remedial step, first necessary awas action, Yamaguchi, graffiti disciplinary form taken actions no reveals us before record “propor 1482, which at F.3d recurrent ensure by GTE to the of the seriousness tionate[] it did fact cease,14 would problem (“Title VII at 882 Ellison, F.2d fense,” 876; Nichols, Dan- at 256 F.3d or condoned. message that to send action took no GTE 14. minimum, GTE At a iels, at intolerable, F.2d recognize toor graffiti was such employees the offended graffiti informed have other could kind differed it prevent efforts Snell v. make would bathrooms. in the prevalent Suffolk (2d a man- Cir. and had graffiti, 1104-05 of such County, reappearance 782 F.2d regular heavily emphasized question on 1986). areas in GTE could ager check punishment not did serious problem employees all to ensure basis of this (noting that perpetrators Nichols, if the result at would recur. underlining the caught, checks). theOn spot incidents future conducted employer tolerated neither behavior that such fact Thus, not cease. this case resembles quate, Dan- remedial actions must be designed iels v. Essex Group, in which inadequate only prevent future conduct by the remediation was found where similar racist harasser, but also other potential har- graffiti reappeared after being painted See, asses. e.g., Fuller, 47 F.3d 1528; at over, “the defendant made no virtually ef- Nichols, 256 F.3d 875; Ellison, 924 fort to investigate incidents,” 937 F.2d F.2d at 882. GTE’s actions may have and management neither called a been successful in persuading identified meeting of the workforce to condemn the harassers to cease their activities. But racial harassment nor issued “a warning over a ten-year period, McGinest was sub- announcing employer’s abhorrence of jected to inappropriate comments by a racial harassment,” id. at 1267. minimum of six individuals, and was alleg-

Furthermore, the reactions of edly manage- physically endangered or financially upon ment learning about graffiti indi- harmed through the actions of several oth- cate that the incident was not taken seri- ers. On the us, record before GTE took ously. After being informed about no action to ensure that this level of graffiti, supervisor joked Roberts first harassment did not continue for the rest of he himself was responsible it, and then MeGinest’s tenure at the company.

added an additional “humorous” comment that had racial overtones.15 Rather than IV. remedying the harassment, Roberts’ be- havior appears to have added it. FAILURE TO PROMOTE GTE’s remediation of DeLeon’s racial The remaining two claims raised gives comments also cause for concern. McGinest involve GTE’s promote failure to Although counseling and a warning may him to position of Outside Plant Con- suffice if successful in stopping the harass- struction Installer Supervisor in October ment, Intlekofer, ‍‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍see 973 F.2d at alleges that he was de- did not issue this warning until McGinest nied this promotion because of racial dis- had a complaint filed with the EEOC. In crimination and in retaliation for com- fact, McGinest had informed his manager plaint to the EEOC regarding the hostile or immediate supervisor of the events in- work environment. volving Noson, Hughes, DeLeon, and oth- ers, to no avail. In each of cases, these A. Racial Discrimination GTE did not respond until McGinest initi- *18 ated formal proceedings. This delay does VII, Under Title an individual suf nоt satisfy Title VII’s requirement of disparate fers treatment “when he or she prompt See, remedial action. e.g., Fuller, is ‘singled out and treated less favorably 47 1528; F.3d at Intlekofer, 973 F.2d at than similarly others situated account 778; Steiner, 25 F.3d ” at 1464. of race.’ Jauregui City Glendale, v. of Taken as whole, a GTE’s responses 1128, (9th 852 F.2d Cir.1988) 1134 (quoting were troubling for another reason. We v. Gay Waiters’ Dairy & Lunchmen’s Un have been clear that in order to ion, be ade- 531, (9th 694 F.2d 537 Cir.1982)); 42 us, record before GTE did none along?” of these which was itself an allusion to black- things. strife, white racial the evidence before us im- plies may that Roberts well have understood 15. Since responded Roberts to news of the the graffiti. nature of the objectionable graffiti by quoting Rodney King's question, “Why can’t we just get all 1122 17, 77 S.Ct. 500, n. 508 Co., 352 U.S. R.R. to (2003). 2000e-2(a) Failure § U.S.C. the (1957)). Because 493 443, 1 L.Ed.2d dis- of manifestation common ais

promote the distinction that held Court Dep’t Supreme See Texas of treatment. parate evidence circumstantial and Burdine, direct between v. Community Affairs analytical determining what to 1089, is 67 L.Ed.2d irrelevant 253, not resolve Carlsbad, we need apply, to framework City v. (1981); Warren prop- regarding Jauregui, Cir.1995); arguments (9th parties’ 439, 440-41 F.3d evidence. er characterization F.2d disparate a that establishes plaintiff in Costa “[T]he decision Our employer’s burden Douglas must show case treatment the McDonnell although may be intent discriminate, to “tool useful to is a intent shifting framework16 evidence.” circumstantial judgment summary inferred at the plaintiffs assist England New v. Domingo “noth- trial,” (quoting may Id. reach they so stage (9th Cir. 1429, 1435 Co., F.2d invoke Fish parties compels ing length debate 1984)). parties The presumption.” Douglas McDonnell di adduced McGinest whether question of responding Rather, when at 855. F.3d discrimi evidence or circumstantial rect motion, plaintiff judgment a resolution relevance nation, and how regarding a choice presented is analytical proper question case. her or to establish treatment disparate a by which framework McDonnell using the by proceed may un is confusion Their evaluated. claim may alternatively, framework, or Douglas proliferation considering the derstandable ev- or circumstantial direct produce simply question. on this law conflicting case discriminatory a demonstrating idence Palace, Desert v. Costa See motivated not than likely more reason law Cir.2002) (reviewing case 852-53 may succeed plaintiff (noting that Id. GTE. dе “quagmire a it as describing evidence- sufficient “other introducing by “morass”), “chaos,” characterization,” fies discriminatory circumstantial-of direct 90, 123 S.Ct. 539 U.S. aff 'd intent”). However, the Su (2003). L.Ed.2d McDon- applied court brought much-need district recently preme Court It determined when test. Douglas of law area nell clarity ed case facie prima Costa opinion established en banc our affirmed discrimina- racial due promote failure Palace. Desert pro- aof 1) is a member tion. held Court Supreme Costa, the quali- 2) class; for applied tected should evidence and direct circumstantial 3) rejected job; open fied “Circumstantial alike, noting: treated filling the 4) than rather job; and sufficient, but only inter- any of promoting position per- satisfying certain, be more also manager white transferred viewees, GTE *19 at 123 S.Ct. evidence.” direct than suasive legiti- a produced GTE position.17 into v. Missouri Rogers (quoting Pacific 2154 McDon pretextual. is reason articulated burden Douglas McDonnell Under 16. 802-804, 93 U.S. Corp., Douglas es- nell framework, first plaintiff must a shifting 1817. dis- S.Ct of unlawful case facie prima a tablish shifts then burden crimination. identical is not factor Although fourth legitimate, nondis- a to articulate employer Douglas, it McDonnell employed in the one em- If the the action. for criminatory reason flexible is a the test recognized widely is so, show must plaintiff ployer does mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the ac- explanation that a hiring freeze accounted tion, claiming that it was due a hiring its failure to promote him.

freeze. The concluded, district court how- McGinest, As

ever, argues, produce failed absence evi- of any documentation confirming dence indicating that given reason company hiring freeze was in place GTE pretext, during was a and thus granted sum- the relevant period time is sufficient mary judgment to GTE. raise genuine factual dispute as to Once the defendant produces evidence of whether the asserted reason pretextu

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to al. ‘Indeed, even if such decisions were counter plaintiffs demonstration of a commonly conveyed yard managers by prima case, facie the McDonnell Douglas' word-of-mouth, the fact that a company “presumption of discrimination ‘drops out the size of GTE does not have memoran ” picture.’ Reeves dum, v. Sanderson meeting notes, or other evidence of Prod., Inc., Plumbing 133, U.S. 143, hiring freeze or the financial difficul 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 (2000) ties. that L.Ed.2d 105 allegedly spurred the hiring (quoting St. Mary’s provides freeze Honor Center v. circumstantial evidence Hicks, 502, that- 511, the hiring U.S. 2742, freeze did S.Ct. .not in fact exi st.18 (1993)). 125 L.Ed.2d 407 Because the dis trict court correctly found that the first' “Proof that the explanation defendant’s two steps the McDonnell Douglas is unworthy of credence is [a] form of framework had established, been “the sole circumstantial evidence that probative remaining issue was ‘discrimination vel intentional discrimination, and it may be ” , non.’ Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. quite persuasive.” 530 U.S. at Reeves Aikens, Governors v. 711, 714, U.S. 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Additionally, GTE’s 1478, 103 S.Ct. (1983)). L.Ed.2d 403 permissive response to harassing actions Thus, despite the parties’ vociferous con undertaken coworkers and supervisors, tentions, in this case it is not particularly combined with the absence of black super significant whether McGinest relies on the visors and managers workplace, also McDonnell Douglas presumption or, is circumstantial evidence of pretext. See

whether he relies direct or circumstan McDonnell Douglas, 411 804-05, U.S. tial evidence of discriminatory intent to 93 S.Ct. (noting possible, methods meet his burden. Under either approach, pretext demonstrating include “treat produce some evidence ment of [the employee] during prior suggesting that GTE’s promote failure to term of employment ... and [the employ him was due in part or whole to discrimi general policy er’s] practice with re natory intent, and so must counter spect to minority employment,” such as prima one and the facie case described was well as a news release the California necessarily "not applicable every respect to Public Utilities Commission. These docu- differing factual situations.” McDonnell that, ments allegedly show contrary to the Douglas, 411 U.S. at 1817; 802 n. 93 S.Ct. explanation given freeze, hiring see also Sorema, Swierkiewicz glowing financial health in (2002). 152 L.Ed.2d 1 GTE's However, since- these documents were not suggestion that McGinest does not establish presented court, to the district we do not unpersuasive. fourth factor *20 consider this reaching information in our requests McGinest 18. that we take judicial conclusion. notice of GTE’s Report Annual from 1998 as 1124 provid- McGinest, while promote to failure pat general “a demonstrating

information regarding contention his for blacks”); support ing against discrimination of tern hismet discrimination, has McGinest (holding that racial 443-44 at Warren, F.3d 58 issue factual genuine “a showing of of material issue burden genuine a raised plaintiff discriminatory intent.” showing to by regard motive with employer’s as to fact were 1559. at Lam, employees 40 F.3d white less-qualified that racist with him, combined over promoted evidence); ene Berg and statistical remarks Retaliation B. Improvement Agric. Project River v. Salt pro VII Title 704 of Section (9th 1136, 1143 Dist., F.3d 272 Power & for employee an against retaliation hibits female absence that Cir.2001) (holding 42 discrimination. unlawful opposing establishing factor one supervisors (2003). discrimi 2000e-3(a) Like § U.S.C. promote). to failure for pretext the using may be shown nation, retaliation evidence “very Iittle[ ] held that haveWe shifting burden Douglas McDonnell of fact issue genuine a raise necessary to is facie prima a establish To framework. motive; any indi- employer’s an regarding VII, McGi- Title under of retaliation case may ... motive discriminatory cation protect to 1) acted that show nest must only be can that question a raise to suffice 2) adverse an rights; VII Title his Schnidrig, 80 fact-finder.” by a resolved taken thereafter action employment evidence, direct [the] “When at 1409. F.3d link 3) a causal him; and against than more circumstantial, consists Steiner, two events. the between existed a presumption, Douglas McDonnell the is case facie prima aIf 1464. at F.3d 25 exist always almost will question factual the shifts then established, the burden of nondiscrimi- a any claim respect with explana alternative proffer employer 934 Sischo-Nownejad, reason.” natory employee action, the which its tion Lam, at F.3d 40 1111; also see at F.2d rebut. attempt recognized, court district theAs uncertainty at case. Such close is a first the established has be re- stage judgment the facie prima prongs second' (“We Id. plaintiff. favor solved pre not has However, McGinest case.19 sum- to survive very little evidence require a demonstrate sufficient sented ulti- because precisely judgment mary complaint link between causal only be can one is question mate two Because promotion. denial inquiry’- ‘searching a through resolved a year a by separated events conducted appropriately is most one not establish does timing alone half, the record.”). finder, full upon fact by offer does connection, doubt cast оf factors a number Because v. Villiarimo See explanation. any other its explanation proffered upon enforce its VII to up Title EEOC, machinery set with complaint filing a By action employment adverse An provisions”). action quintessential engaged em likely deter Henderson, reasonably "is Ray v. one § 704. See protected activity,” (“As Cir.2000) protected (9th engaging ployees n. F.3d indicates, 1243; of a clearly, denial filing ... language F.3d statutory Ray, employ activ- adverse protected ais as an qualifies EEOC complaint promotion with Dalton, F.3d See, Bergene, F.3d v. e.g., Hashimoto ity.”); action. ment Mateo, meet- Cir.1997) (holding simply (9th City San 1141; Brooks activity protected counselor EEO ing “in participation it constitutes because

1125 Air, Inc., Aloha Island 1054, 281 F.3d 2061, 153 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d (2002), (9th Cir.2002). Thus, we affirm the creates an unreasonable expansion of Title district court’s dismissal of the retaliation liability VII in the workplace, I must re claim. spectfully dissent from the opinion of the court to the foregoing extent. CONCLUSION We reverse the district grant court’s I summary judgment on the first two Title VII prevents the establishment of counts, and remand to the district court a “hostile work environment” that becomes for further proceedings. McGinest estab- “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter lished the existence of questions material the conditions of employment.” [one’s] of fact regard with whether creat- Bank, Meritor Sav. Vinson, FSB v. ed and failed to remedy a racially hostile 57, 67, 2399, 106 S.Ct. 91 L.Ed.2d 49 working environment. McGinest also has (1986); see 42 2000e-2(a)(1). § U.S.C. shown genuine issue of material fact as to whether GTE’s failure promote him Our evaluation such claims requires was based on racial discrimination. How- an examination of the totality of the circumstances. ever, affirm we the district court’s dismiss- Har v. Systems, ris Forklift al of the retaliation claim. Inc., 17, 23, 510 U.S. 367, (1993) (“[W]hether L.Ed.2d 295

Appellant shall an recover envi on appeal. costs ronment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in determined only looking at all the cir part, and REMANDED. cumstances.”); Fuller City Oakland, v. 1522, (9th Cir.1995) (“Hostili O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, ty [under Title VII] must be concurring part measured and dissenting in part. based on totality of the circum I agree that the court must reverse the stances.”). appraisal This includes consid grant of GTE’s motion for summary judg- eration “the frequency of the discrimi ment and remand for further proceedings natory conduct; severity; its whether it is on McGinest’s hostile work environment; physically threatening or humiliating, regrettably, however, I cannot concur in mere utterance; offensive and whether it the majority’s analysis, and thus dissent unreasonably interferes employ from the reasoning Part I disagree III. ee’s performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. with the court’s reversal of the dismissal 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. on summary judgment of McGinest’s dis- criminatory promote failure to claim and A

thus IV.A.; dissent Part I would affirm. But I agree do that we must However, before considering totality affirm dismissal on summary judgment of of circumstances, we must first deter- McGinest’s retaliatory to promote failure mine exactly which of the plaintiffs claims claim, and thus concur in Part IV.B. of the properly part form a inquiry. Be- opinion court’s as to result analysis. cause the court district dismissed this case I Because believe the majority’s opinion on summary judgment, we review — sidesteps Raytheon Hernandez, Co. v. the evidence in light most favorable U.S.-, S.Ct. L.Ed.2d plaintiff. 357 the Serv., T.W. Elec. Inc. v. Pac. (2003), essentially abandons Nat'l Ass’n, R.R. Elec. Contr. 809 F.2d 630-31 Passenger Corp. Morgan, 536 U.S. Yet even under this defer-

1126 § 2000e- U.S.C. occurred.”1 practice allegation every standard, not ential engage not course, must we 5(e)(1). Of every factual value, is nor face at taken be statute this of interpretations literal overly po- impose to available necessarily claim at 536 U.S. Morgan, See limitations. of regrettably, majority, liability. The tential fact simple the So 115-21, 122 S.Ct. its opposite, the assume to appears discriminatory alleged the of some that suitability of the hardly considers analysis period limitations the outside occurred acts opin- court’s The allegations. McGinest’s ad- their automatically preclude not does all that presume only not appears ion the en- of Rather, “consideration mission. allegation every true, facts are environment work a hostile scope of tire envi- work a hostile of evidence admissible outside alleged including behavior claim, may be liability which upon ronment permissible period, statutory time the sup- legal recognizable nois There based. liability, so assessing purposes for the approach. this port hostile to that contributing act long as precedent of our my review Specifically, statu- within place takes environment kinds two at are least there indicates 105, 122 S.Ct. Id. period.” time tory considered not be may allegations liabil- as judgment environ- work hostile particular ity for act “was First, distant any if ment claim: take however, appears majority, hostile environ- same of the part longer no extreme, implying to an concept re- cannot employee claim, then the ment within occurs single act any long as so R.R. Nat’l aet[].” previous cover for limitations, alleged acts—no all statute Morgan, v. Corp. Passenger part past far in matter how —become L.Ed.2d 118, 122 S.Ct. environment work hostile same of the amount Second, (2002). claims limita- statute It dismisses claim. are insuffi- allegations” “conclusory mere footnote, explicitly ain argument tions Hernandez consideration. merit cient it is conduct because Noson’s considers Inc., Med., Spacelabs part as functioned that it merely “possible” principles these With n. 6. at 1114 Maj. Op. claim. same of the necessary to under- it is mind, I believe controlling apply faithfully duty our It is numer- of McGinest’s review careful take a Mor- believe do not and I precedent, fairly judge one before allegations ous low. pitifully so can be threshold gan’s Title claim. VII strength “possibly majority’s Indeed, I believe standard eviscer- claim” same of the part limitation. Morgan’s ates involving the events urges that es- Morgan contrary, I believe To dis- excluded must be Noson supervisor relatively strin- workable tablishes statutory scope beyond tant acts ... had act “if a [distant] gent standard: environ- hostile rest of ..., or for acts [recent] to the no relation require indeed Title VII does ment claim. inter- reason, as certain such other some shall this section “charge under that a no employer, by action vening days eighty one hundred filed within environ- same hostile part longer employment unlawful alleged after 2000e-5(e)(l). §See here. vant period limitations extends statute 1. The rele- circumstances days certain claim, ment *23 employee then the cannot re- ed—in adjudicating a motion for summary cover for previous acts.”2 Morgan, judgment. Morgan, See 118, 536 U.S. at 118, at 122 S.Ct. 2061. Employ- 2061; Hernandez, S.Ct. 343 F.3d at ers retain additional protections beyond 1116. even principle this ‍‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍because distant acts course, Of determining scope alleged part of a single hostile work events that may be considered for pur-

environment claim “subject also remain to poses of establishing liability does not af- waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling fect Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 when equity so requires.” 121, Id. at 122 and the admissibility of stale evidence for (internal S.Ct. omitted). quotation other purposes. For example, an utter- ance, though time respect, With while the barred for opinion court’s purposes liability, may formally recognizes admissible language, challenge it fails the credibility apply of a it. witness majority The as a appears prior in- argue consistent statement. we need not See take Morgan Fed.R.Evid. seriously 613. because “neither the district court nor the

parties had the of’ benefit that decision. But summary judgment is about estab- Maj. Op. at 1114 n. 6. This is irrelevant. lishing Thus, liability. I must respectfully Morgan imposes a rule of law establishing disagree with the majority’s implication particular when a may fact support a legal that both Morgan and Lyons v. England, And, claim. course, duty “[o]ur is to (9th Cir.2002) 307 F.3d 1092 might be ex- interpret the law.” Seaman v. Comm’r tended to allow time-barred evidence to be Revenue, Internal 479 F.2d used at summary judgment as “back- ground evidence” of a hostile work envi- ronment Maj. claim. See Op. at 1114 n. 6. The majority emphasizes also that Mor- quoted language Morgan, gan with an employer’s deals “liability.” the entire Lyons opinion, dealt only with Maj. Op. at 1114 n. (emphasis in origi- discrete act cases, claims. In such nal). plain- I am unable to recognize the signifi- tiff rely on time-barred evidence as a cance of distinction, such a or why it would “background” help establish that an ad- counsel application of the majority’s verse employment decision was actually nearly nonexistent threshold. The district based on discriminatory animus. See court’s judgment order, which (“In Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1110 the context of we now review on appeal, pre- determined a racial disparate claim, treatment admis- cisely the issue of potential liability. sible background evidence must be rele- Morgan is thus directly relevant, and I vant to determine the question: ultimate respectfully believe that we must deter- whether the defendant intentionally dis- mine which of McGinest’s assertions are against criminated plaintiff because of properly encompassed in his hostile work (internal his race.” quotations and edit environment claim determining before omitted)). marks whether that claim properly survives sum- mary adjudication. For it clearly “[hjostile incor- environment claims rect every consider claim a plaintiff are different kind from discrete acts.” makes—no matter stale or how unsupport- Morgan, U.S. at 2061. S.Ct. 2. may аgree While I with the majority that Supreme turns precedent clear Court into yet rather broad standard has fully to be nothing "implication].” more than an See out, fleshed I respectfully disagree with Maj. Op. 1114 n. its imprecision assertion that such somehow under time-barred are Noson regarding a hostile evidence Morgan,

Under comply enough to stringent standard the stat- beyond may extend environment dictates. Morgan’s related. it is period limitations ute of if if But S.Ct. See id. b claim, it must ato related is un same to that irrelevant

necessarily be oc- involving Noson claims *24 v. Data Assocs. See, Eclipse e.g., claim. culminating in 1980s late the curred 1114, 1119 Corp., General by requested as apologies, dual Noson’s “irrel- “unrelated” Cir.1990) (equating further no makes GTE, McGinest in 1990. time-barred is evant”). evidence So No- by conduct objectionable of allegation be con- cannot Morgan standard under for- The next apologies. since those son isit because judgment summary at sidered oc- conduct discriminatory of notice mal question to the relevant simply EEOC his filed after curred conduct unrelated wholly whether him- fact, McGinest In in 1997. complaint environment. work a hostile amounts any kind no discrimination alleges self evidence” “background very term The he claims when 1990 and between because context little sense makes Con- pay. bonus equal denied have been discriminatory animus “background” no less no possible,3 liberally as as strued unrelated, irrele- established can be suc- elapsed between 1,500 days than may well Such activity. vant and behavior of Noson’s resolution cessful past, liability in the triggered have Strikingly, misconduct. alleged other all plaintiff de- liability upon which full, eight to more than 1,500 amounts days consideration Allowing to act. clined limitations statutory Title VII consecutive evi- “background as stale, events unrelated 2000e-5(e)(l). § 42 U.S.C. See periods. the con- guts judgment at dence” Mor- forth in set the exclusions Each the hos- limitations a statute cept of therefore, apply. gan, context, only environment work tile cannot involving Noson First, the acts by which method aas backdoor serves “re- any reasonably be understood to avoid statements time-barred introduce set- allegations subsequent to” lation summary dismissal. environment work hostile forth ting assertion for the no basis find I also intervening several During claim. to inter- necessary properly we lack facts one at least received years, McGinest n. 6. The Mаj. Op. Morgan. pret trans- one at least job title change in re- information detailed includes record with or worked longer no fer, that he such actions, related amply Noson’s garding at the longer worked Noson, no district majority’s opinion. by the rela- fact, only In location. GTE same regarding findings specific made court all acts and these distant tionship between and where when response, (1) they conduct alleged other occurred, including the alleged conduct (2) em- discriminatory; and years before place seven it “took fact throughout. ployed complaint.” EEOC filed I implication, majority’s Contrary to obligated I feel majority, Thus, unlike estab- can facts alone these not believe do claims McGinest’s whether to determine part may form these facts even below, sume we believe I do not discussed 3. As claim. environment pay claim. unequal single hostile McGinest's consider analysis, I as- purposes of this lish a sufficient “relation” as that term has Court concluded that conduct extending by been defined Supreme Court. See over 400-day period' if separated —even Morgan, S.Ct. 2061. by days within that reasonably time— This every is because hostile work environ- could be part construed as of the same ment claim definition asserted claim. Id. at 122 S.Ct. 2061. against a single employer for discriminato- case, discriminatory conduct ry Thus, conduct. majority’s version separated by 1,500 at least days cannot be of “relation” would be satisfied even if a present understood to a reasonable identi- plaintiff alleged only two instances of dif- ty of time in relation to the 180-day stat- fering forms of conduct, offensive perpe- ute of limitations.

trated people, different in different lo- Second, it is conceded that GTE en- cations, separated by twenty-five years. gaged in “certain intervening action” to *25 Supreme The yet Court has given not us prevent Noson’s conduct from reoccurring. specific guidance on the precise contours For, Id. while GTE concluded that there relation, of a so, sufficient now, for this is was no discrimination, racial it nonetheless job. our Perhaps of adequate evidence required Noson to apologize. Perhaps might relation consist of the following:4 may MeGinest preferred have a stronger an identity offenders, identity response from GTE. But the fact that location, an identity of a sufficiently dis- there are no allegations of harmful conduct tinct harassment, mode of or a reasonable by Noson—or anyone by else for several identity of time in relation to the applica- years necessarily establishes — ble statute of limitations. MeGinest failed intervening response was at least sufficient to submit any such evidence. The offend- to maintain an acceptable work environ- differed, ers place the of the offense dif- full, ment eight for consecutive exhaustions fered, and, even if all the alleged conduct of the statute of limitations.5 was discriminatory by nature, particu- the lar And, form abuse differed. Finally, taken in if Noson’s conduct created the light most MeGinest, favorable to work there hostile environment in even is no identity reasonable of time. Morgan despite GTE’s response, MeGinest had itself provides a guiding example. Based right waived his to bring any result- on a 300 day limitations, statute of ing Title many VII claim times over. is It 4. represents my This list own effort at creating inter- a hostile work environment because preting and applying Morgan’s relation re- ''avoiding a presumably lawsuit” would not quirement. Morgan, 536 at provide "[jsatisfac- sufficiently basis for a exhaustive, S.Ct. 2061. necessarily It is not toiy response.” Maj. Op. at 6. 1114 n. any nor is one necessarily factor sufficient. majority The legal cites no authority for the majority suggests that GTE’s internal quasi-existential proposition subjec- that the understanding of the nature of the conduct tive motivation might for an action somehow displaces somehow undisputed fact very undermine existence action actually intervening took action—twice. See Thus, respect, itself. I find no basis for Maj. Op. at 1114 6.n. It is irrelevant that GTE majority's conclusion that GTE ''did not described "shoptalk,” Noson’s behavior as for respond” to Maj. Noson’s Op. conduct. at subjective characterization did not 1121. The issue here whether MeGi- change the fact that it nonetheless demanded nest felt validated employer, but wheth- put stop Noson major- it. Under the er GTE ity’s remain liable theory, which, for conduct it company in- in an effort to lawsuit, potential stop, stop avoid a tended to and did at undisputably least four re- sponded to years. Morgan, remedied an See instance of offen- 536 U.S. at 122 S.Ct. sive conduct may nevertheless liable for gov judgment (denying to al- equity principles contrary to the case)). How forfeiture ain land ernment allegations these include MeGinest

low case, Title not a VII ever, Parcel One work environment hostile of a part nu more analysis is somewhat five nearly where “redeveloping” arguably claim environ work For, the hostile delay is anced. For, [a] “when later. years demonstrate context, must MeGinest ment federal .... employee, by the caused suggesting more than something lo- discretionary power courts hostility. He experienced that he the circum- light result’ just ‘a cate any hos sufficiently demonstrate 121, also at Id. ease.” to the peculiar stances race.” of [his] “because tility arose quo- (internal citations Holly D. 2000e-2(a)(l); see § if thing U.S.C. omitted). be one might It tations 1158, 1174 Tech., Inst. Cal. the hostile making up acts discrete sexual workplace Cir.2003) (holding, in- regular continued claim environment supervi if context, that even harassment longer significantly period for a tervals occurred, relations sexual sor-employee we Yet 180-day limitation. than conclusory allega than more require at- “we not countenance should a sexual proposed supervisor tions allegations Noson to revive tempts to the responded employee and the liaison experi- 1,500 days of when, least after *26 employ her protect to in order conditions, he overtures working encing acceptable allege interests”). might plaintiff A file ment failed to the EEOC alert to failed a hostile that suggest to detail retroactively in- sufficient now not should He suit. any provide occurred, fail to event long period a so after claims these voke conclu unsupported than thing more calm. apparent not I am it. motivated race that sion reasons, dis- respectfully I these For consid fully majority whether certain that conclusion majority’s agree with For, my requirement. this latter ered the basis may form conduct Noson’s appear claims view, of McGinest’s two environ- work hostile present this standard. under fail they are Instead, I believe claim. ment 2000e-5(e)(l). §by excluded involving McGi- incident is the First that he disputes No one tire. truck nest’s factual certain also would exclude GTE acci- automobile in a serious involved was allegations.” “conclusory as mere claims MeGinest tire. blown-out to a due dent majori- 1116. The

Hernandez, at F.3d accident, before long that not alleges argument. this briefly dispenses ty by tires new denied and was requested McGi- (accepting n. 5 Maj. Op. See least one though at mechanics—even suffice “would it testimony because nest’s bald. they looked that agreed supervisor of fact trier a reasonable enable evi- sufficient produced arguably MeGinest occurred, had that discrimination conclude oc- a denial such suggest dence corroborating for further the need without curred. con- evidence”). majority apparently this incident includes Yet MeGinest forth sufficient set that MeGinest cludes not claim environment to his hostile so allegations detail factual occurred, but denial alleged (rely- id. because See judgment. survive on his based a denial such Real because Parcel v. One States ing United however, MeGinest Unfortunately, Cir.1990) race. 487, 491-92 Prop., submitted no evidence to substantiate this vidual claims of discriminatory treatment charge. claim, He does not instance, must be “supported by facts.” Id. With directly mechanics said did respect allegation, least, McGi- anything to him to suggest that there was nest has failed provide such evidence, a racial component to such a denial. Nor and I do not believe we may consider it as does he present any circumstantial evi- part of his overall hostile work environ- dence that GTE provided mechanical ser- ment claim.

vices in a discriminatory manner. b

Rather, McGinest relies only on the de- McGinest’s claim of position differential testimony Brand, bonus which offers pay overtime presents no support problem. similar Brand, for his claim. who is white, submitted time did sheets agree showing sometimes “seem[edj” several white employees received vehicles driven Afri- more pay overtime than can-Americans McGinest did “given were not over the same (roughly) six-month period time level of in 1996.6 maintenance as vehicles driven Nevertheless, above, as noted employees.” white he explicitly must demonstrate only noted that this only differ- possible one inter- existed, ential but that it pretation arose on account mechanic’s behavior—one race. See 42 2000e-2(a)(l) § that even U.S.C. he acknowledged was not neces- o/his (prohibiting sarily discrimination supported by the facts. “because of For Brand race”). such individual’s conceded that some of the same mechanics also, treated poorly him while they treated Here, McGinest claims that there was аn at least one other African-American em- “unwritten rule” regarding payment ployee “pretty well.” - Ultimately, the best “relief supervisor pay,” whereby arriving that Brand could conclude was that “it *27 even five minutes early would earn em- could have been racial. It could have been ployees a hour full of wages. While his just personality.” By Brand’s own admis- immediate supervisor, Roberts, allowed sion, then, his experience direct and result- others to bonus, claim this alleged he is ing testimony could not form a sufficient prevented McGinest from doing so supporting basis for allega- McGinest’s because of McGinest’s race.7 On the occa- tions. sions attempted McGinest to note the bo- McGinest’s accident was nus undoubtedly a on sheets, overtime his alleges time he traumatic experience. given And that some of Roberts erased it. While this addi- his experiences at contexts, GTE in other tional may information provide context for might he understandably suspect claims, wide- McGinest’s they still rest on the ranging racial discrimination. Neverthe- conclusory allegation wage that the differ- less, our precedent makes clear that indi- ential arose on account of race. evidence, In the absence of additional McGinest, 7. According to practice this meant simple that hourly fact some employees that re- he compensation received no any portion ceive worked, overtime actually more than the hour he ap- others would much less a pear to bonus for the beyond reveal little entire hour. In other fact that some words, he claims that people he was pay denied indeed work more hours than actually completed. work Regardless, sense, this others. pay In this arising differentials distinction does the inquiry. affect For hourly positions from would carry seem to evidence that McGinest pay was denied actual weight less arising than analogous those from pay or bonus of his account race would positions. salaried support his hostile work environment claim. he re- that show time sheets McGinest’s sup- does not Nevertheless, record white other four than overtime First, less ceived of events. version McGinest’s

port direct neither presented he employees, that deposition in a admitted wage that evi- no show nor circumstantial submitted time sheets of race. on аccount Most arose erasures.8 differential relevant any dence must allegation sheets this Therefore, time I own believe damagingly, totality actually of the that he review from our conclusively demonstrate be excluded “relief su- dissent circumstances, I must pay and overtime both received his clearly it. contradicts majority’s This use pay. from pervisor” barred completely he was assertion pay. such receiving

from support find attempts conten- hand, other the other On al- may have admission Begg’s remain- unavailing. McGinest’s are tions some- practice overtime bonus lowed the part as included be ing claims However, McGinest prior time properly we circumstances” “totality of the Begg’s testimo- selectively to read appears some at least example, For may consider. known may have Begg ny. While (“n ,”9 graffiti the bathroom portion — it in stopped past, he in the practice (“n— “P.O.N.T.I.A.C.”), graffiti banner And McGinest manager. became when he (re- Month”), comments Hughes’s History oc- denials alleged specifically ”), stupid “a as to McGinest ferring n— Begg after 1997, well curred (criticizing McGi- comments Ledbetter’s other ended. practice testified other to “the comparing him while nest sup- find no allegations words, McGinest’s here”), De- who used work guy colored testimony. Begg’s port to McGinest (referring comments Leon’s investigated the EEOC Notably, comments Talmadge’s “mammy”), and as determined complaint I McGinest, retire before “I’ll (saying pay.” his due relief paid fact been “had in man”) reasonably may all for a black well, specifically court, as district hostile. racially explicitly, understood “no credible evidence there was found Jemi- “Aunt the term use of DeLeon’s any ‘unwrit- application aof differential *28 of racial evidence may also serve ma” over- supervisor relief regarding rule’ ten to survive hostility sufficient ap- the differential less time”'—much the not direct did DeLeon judgment. A of race. on account arose plication himself, rather at McGinest phrase the compels review careful of McGinest’s. friend coworker a white allegations conclusion: same racially lack truly did Perhaps DeLeon supervisor relief “unwritten” involving nickname. in use motive hostile testimony, by Begg’s unsupported rule are could factfinder reasonable by McGinest’s contradicted directly isolate McGi- it wаs meant conclude extent to the And time sheets. own decorum, and because might sake For EEOC speculated 8. McGinest actual accurately recites opinion Rob- periods in which court's sheets from have time Nevertheless, record, needless avoid the I shall in the entries. words certain erased erts record, language. I there- inflammatory the time appear in they repetition do close cover racial submit the offensive did place use "n —" sheets fore twenty of work —almost worth seven months' slur. during which total time percent of the occurred. supposedly erasures nest referring disparagingly, in his most favorable to Elec., him. T.W. presence, to his friend as an African- F.2d 630-31. Second, “the objective American woman. Moreover, use of the severity of harassment should be judged term may itself reasonably be construed as from the perspective of a per reasonable racially hostile, whether directed at McGi son in plaintiffs position, considering See, nest not. e.g., Woods v. Graphic all the circumstances.” Oncale v. Sun Communications, 1195, 925 F.2d downer Servs., Inc., 75, 523 U.S. Offshore Cir.1991) (upholding hostile work environ 81, 998, 118 S.Ct. (1998) L.Ed.2d 201 judgment ment where prevailing plaintiff (internal quotation omitted).10 Finally, “was surrounded by racial hostility, and McGinest’s evidence “prove that the subjected directly it”). to some of Rob conduct at issue was not merely tinged erts’s upon comments learning of the re with offensive ... connotations, but actual moval of the (“Oh racist bathroom graffiti ly constituted ... discrimination] be well, I guess I’ll write it again. cause of ... [race].” Id. at Ah, why can’t we all just get along?”) (emphasis in original, quota internal arguably exhibited racial hostility as well. omitted). tion While GTE claims that Roberts did not know that graffiti nature, racist in only creates a material dispute factual With these principles mind, I agree precluding summary judgment. with the district court that this case pres- Finally, McGinest offered sufficient sup- ents a question” “close of whether a prop- porting evidence, including an affidavit er review McGinest’s admissible evi- Brand, coworker from which a rea- dence suggests that be held sonable factfinder could conclude that at liable this case. Ultimately, however, I least some employees, including Talmadge am satisfied that presented (“I and Frick refuse to work for that dumb triable issue of material fact on whether he bitch”), son of a may have refused to wоrk subjected to a hostile work environ- with McGinest because of his race. First, ment. opprobriousness of most comments, and the frequency B which they arose, could lead a reasonable Once identifying which assertions are fact-finder to conclude that together they relevant and properly supported, we must amounted to more than “a mere offensive consider whether presented suf- Harris, utterance.” ficient evidence to survive summary judg- 367; S.Ct. Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 ment on his hostile work environment (9th Cir.2001) (describing claim. Because the set of facts I review “n—” as “perhaps the most offensive and *29 differs from that of the majority, I must inflammatory racial English”). slur in conduct an independent analysis. Here, repeated of invocation highly important Three principles upon bear offensive in a language of variety contexts the inquiry. First, because McGinest ap- may be understood to have created a hu- peals from summary judgment dismissal, miliating atmosphere seen as from the ob- we must review the evidence in light jective perspective of a reasonable Afri- 10. While Oncale dealt with sexual harass- same standard as those based on sexual ment, Supreme Court instructs Morgan, harassment.” atU.S. 116 n. "[hlostile work environment claims based on 122 S.Ct. 2061. racial harassment are reviewed under the 81, 118 Oncale, atU.S. can-American. 21, 114 S.Ct. Harris, at 510 U.S. 998; necessarily vicarious

S.Ct. are not Employers work environment hostile a harassment, (requiring howev for coworker ly liable cre enough pervasive or to be “severe defeat can of lack notice er, in which case work or abusive hostile objectively Swin ate claims. environment work hostile the stat Further, environment”). at least alleges at 803. ton, n work colleagues of certai refusal ed supervisors immediate his notified that he may race of because with McGinest bath offensive of instance one atof least with interfere[d] “unreasonably comments, of have DeLeon’s of graffiti, room Harris, performance.” work comments, [McGinest’s] the stated and Talmadge’s Finally, 367. 114 S.Ct. at to work employees of some refusal for both complaints, frequent McGinest’s inci many of these *30 (emphasis Id. graffiti. of the the existence as comments Hughes’s liable for cariously true for omitted). particularly This men these three by Still, comments well. filed after appeared graffiti portion relatively small up a make conclude Thus, I would complaint. allegations. McGinest’s that GTE may not lack claim of notice for ful conduct.” Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d any of McGinest’s allegations. admissible case, In this GTE did formally respond to some of complaints. And There remains one ground additional when GTE acted to address McGinest’s

upon which might GTE succeed sum- specific allegations, discriminatory conduct mary judgment. Where, here, there is particular employee appears to evidence suggesting that a company had have For ceased. example, when GTE sufficient notice of ‍‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍discriminatory conduct, eventually learned identity of a witness it generally may avoid if liability it ade- to Hughes’s comments, it immediately rep- quately responded to the situation. Full- him, rimanded and there no are further er, 47 F.3d at 1527. This be so allegations of against misconduct him. whether the employee offending is a co- Likewise, when spoke GTE to DeLeon worker or a manager, although bur- about the used, nicknames DeLeon, too, proof dens of Swinton, differ. See 270 ceased the offensive Finally, conduct. F.3d at 803 (holding, in coworker harass- when McGinest complained to manage- context, ment that plaintiff must prove ment about the graffiti, bathroom “that the employer knew or should have promptly removed it. known harassment but did not take Taken individually, responses GTE’s adequate it”); steps Nichols, address might perhaps appear reasonable.12 In- 256 F.3d at 877 (holding, in supervisor deed, there is question no they context, harassment that an employer can worked to any cease additional actionable partially by defend proving “exer- by conduct the offending employee. Nev- cised prevent reasonable care to and cor- ertheless, despite efforts, GTE’s opprobri- rect any promptly ... harassing behav- ous comments and behavior continued with

ior”).11 some regularity from 1995 through 2000. In considering adequacy, we examine And considering the totality of the circum- company’s response in its ability to “stop stances, must, as we a reasonable factfin- person harassment engaged who der could conclude that GTE’s corrective harassment.” We must also consider measures inadequate were for failing “to whether response might “persuade impose sufficient penalties to assure potential harassers to rеfrain from unlaw- workplace free from ... harassment.” Id. context, supervisor In the D., a company Holly (finding 339 F.3d at 1178 an ade additionally demonstrate employee that an quate remedial measure where the defendant failed to take steps reasonable pursue com- immediately responded to a harassment claim pany remedies in order to avail itself of this delay caused, after a part, because the Nichols, defense. See 256 F.3d at 877. For plaintiff "declined to provide [evidence] purposes however, simplicity, I address committee”). Moreover, investigating in the only “adequate response” question for intervening period, spe there no further allegation. each allegations cific of discriminatory conduct Thus, Hughes. when viewed within the con might dispute One two-year whether the alone, Hughes’s fines conduct GTE’s re gap Hughes’s between comments sponse appears to the incident reasonable. I response was Hughes reasonable. note, however, would absolutely that one of GTE's reme making any denied racist com- all, requirements, dial Hughes tape ments and GTE provided was not watch a any harassment, concerning witnesses to the sexual quite event. And as soon as it seems witness, identity learned the puzzling. of a GTE imme- diately See, acted reprimand Hughes. e.g., *31 liability without to avoid efforts employer’s circum- of the totality words, the In other a more Nevertheless, upon even a trial. discriminato- the may suggest stances of issues triable analysis, soundly with sufficient based occurred still ry conduct I case, and that GTE’s fact remain severity such material frequency decision po- majority’s the “persuade reasonably concur did therefore remedies summary unlawful from court’s refrain the district to harassers to reverse tential summary en- work precludes hostile This of the Id. dismissal judgment conduct.” grounds. on these judgment claim. vironment 367. S.Ct.

Harris, II C ad- McGinest’s of to my review failed Ultimately, that GTE also claims totality considering evidence, the of Outside missible the position him to promote case” circumstances, a “close reveals on Supervisor Installer Construction Plant respond to to efforts made indeed. GTE disparate race, Title VII account of no one which after complaints, § McGinest’s 2000e- 42 U.S.C. See claim. treatment harassing continued aggressor Glendale, particular City 2(a); Jaurеgui of aas the claim considering But Cir.1988) McGinest. (describing 1128, 1134 present evi- allegations whole, McGinest’s out “singled being as treatment disparate environment an overall of dence sim- others favorably than less treated trig- sufficiently hostile may been (internal of race” account ilarly situated protections. Title VII’s ger omitted)). quotation exclude that we I believe Because in- claim, McGinest support as either allegations some of Douglas McDonnell familiar the voked I conclusory, am merely as barred or time Douglas McDonnell See presumption. majori- in the concur unable regrettably S.Ct. Green, 411 U.S. Corp. v. McGi- agree I do analysis. While ty’s the (1973). with agree I L.Ed.2d forward, I must go claims nest’s some- appear litigants the majority majority’s nonetheless dissent the use about confused what examine properly unwillingness how presumption Douglas McDonnell majority’s inquiry. of that scope discrimina- to other it relates where- precedent dangerous sets a opinion burden-shifting these because And tion. sink’s kitchen present a who by plaintiffs like complicated, are somewhat issues al- and time-barred unsupported worth anal- complete too, in a I, engage majority, judgment can survive legations a different issue, reach ysis of the they some- together” all “taken because conclusion.13 deny an other so each how mesh less evidence go to trial on plaintiff majority's lows I find admit that I must is could—which sug- otherwise or she It confusing as well. than analysis somewhat toBut par- analysis "presumption.” “not why termed method gests that the Op. at To Maj. of GTE’s note ticularly significant.” majority takes extent suggests majority rec- the Douglas and thus nondiscriminatory explanation the extent does not presumption pre- Douglas McDonnell McDonnell ognizes that significant advan- awith provide McGinest attaches, agree with I longer sumption no context, disagree. Successful I tage in this specifically to pertaining issues majority that a subse- presumption, invocation particu- “not become then presumption proffer an employer quent failure Id. larly significant.” explanation, al- nondiscriminatory adequate,

1137 A a hiring freeze accounted for its failure to promote him”); also, see e.g., Jones v. Fla. There question is no that McGinest is a Power Corp., 825 1488, F.2d 1492 class, member of a protected ap- that he Cir.1987) (upholding factual finding that plied qualified to and was supervi- plaintiffs job denial “was not the result of position, sor rejected and that he was from racial discrimination justified but was due position. to a company freeze”). hiring Conse GTE disputes whether McGinest satis quently, we are presented an explana factor, fied “that, fourth rejec after his tion that is “legally sufficient justify tion, position open remained and the judgment for the defendant,” Tex. Dept. of employer continued to seek applicants Cmty. Burdine, v. 248, 450 U.S. Affairs persons of complainant’s qualifica 255, 1089, 101 S.Ct. 67 (1981), L.Ed.2d 207 802, tions.” Id. at For, S.Ct. 1817. so the McDonnell Douglas “presumption while a white supervisor job, received the drops discrimination out of picture.” GTE claims that because it was only a Reeves Prods., Sanderson Plumbing transfer, lateral supervisor was not Inc., 133, 143, 530 U.S. 2097, 120 S.Ct. “treated more favorably.” Chuang v. (2000) (internal L.Ed.2d 105 quotation Cal., Univ. Trustees, Davis Bd. omitted). 1115, 1123(9th GTE takes an overly approach literal B question. Supreme Court In the absence McDonnell Douglas itself McDonnell Doug- indicated that las presumption, the test must “burden practically applied. now merges with the McDonnell ultimate Douglas, 411 burden per- U.S. at 802 n. suading here, S.Ct. 1817. court that [ ]he And has been GTE does victim of contest that intentional qualified McGinest discrimination. for a [H]e favor- (1) promotion, able succeed in this either directly [ ] and that the same job by persuading went to a the court white that a candidate instead. discrimina- There- fore, tory reason likely I more agree that motivated em- successfully (2) ployer or [ indirectly by ] invoked the presumption. showing that the employer’s proffered explanation un- may rebut, however, by setting worthy of Burdine, credence.” forth legitimate, “some nondiscriminatory 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. As to the first meth- reason challenged action.” od, the majority correctly concludes that Chuang, 225 F.3d at pre 1123-24. GTE may present either direct or cir- sented evidence that a “salary/hiring cumstantial evidence of discrimination, so freeze” was in time, effect at the prohibit long as it is sufficient satisfy his ulti- ing hiring outside promotions internal mate burden. Palace, See Desert Inc. v. accompanied by increased pay. Salary Costa, 539 U.S. and hiring freezes, course, are common (2003). L.Ed.2d 84 in the face, business then, world. On its legitimate, is a nondiscriminatory rea son for failing to promote McGinest. See Maj. atOp. (concluding McGi McGinest pieces offers two of evidence nest “must counter GTE’s еxplanation that directly to prove First, discrimination.14 actually suggests a third as agement well: positions past. in the passed that he was over for four other man- did allegation not make this before the district *33 that suggested he others, nor has ter, and and comments the offensive to points

he to dis- intended management upper GTE’s hostile up his make that other evidence instituting the by him against majority criminate The claim. environment work of a triable issue may There freeze. this evidence—or relies specifically to the responses to response whether as to fact “permissive” on GTE’s least his environment meets work hostile allegedly that conclude it—to judg- cases in of purposes Circuit Ninth insufficient burden. promote to to nothing establish discriminatory failure does volving But ment. any discrimi dis- of had management evidence always upper involved GTE that See, e.g., promote to failing decisionmakers. among motive criminatory nation Hawaii, 40 F.3d University Lam v. McGinest. Cir.1994) evidence (finding (9th con- Indeed, suggests the evidence com appointments headed who professor re- management GTE this case. trary in Indeed, biased). in the ab was mittee individu- remedied —each to—and sponded evidence, “statements additional sence it of which of discrimination instance al by nondecisionmakers, nor statements by aware, including formally became the decisional to unrelated decisionmakers comments, comments, DeLeon’s Hughes’s to sat suffice itself, alone] [cannot process these While behavior. Noson’s even regard.” in this burden plaintiffs isfy the to insufficient may have been responses 490 U.S. Hopkins, Price Waterhouse environment work hostile an overall rebut 1775, L.Ed.2d suggest certainly do not claim, they see, e.g., concurring); (O’Connor, J., (1989) kind of any management acted GTE & Trust Nat'l Am. Bank DeHorney v. Therefore, unlike discriminatory intent. Cir. Ass’n, F.2d Sav. McGi- not believe I do majority, to failed plaintiff 1989) (holding evidence his rely on admissible nest race dis facie case a prima make out bootstrap to environment a hostile no evidence there was when crimination claim. treatment disparate the subor between a nexus establish majority also Both deci superior’s racial slur and dinate’s em- may have that GTE rely on evidence terminate). sion number small disproportionately ployed decisionmaker, Here, the immediate ac- majority The Americans. African hiring McGi- recommended Begg, actually Maj. Op. at allegation. cepts allegations no are nest, there First, there is I, cannot. respectfully, But ei conduct discriminatory any engaged record, evidence statistical such no he declined before, during, or after ther had an presumably though McGinest even deci freeze salary/hiring The hire him. discovery. during develop opportunity management, upper came itself sion McGi- court denied Indeed, district co among of harassment and evidence summary judgment request nest’s at McGinest’s supervisors workers information. of such judicial notice take discrimina establish simply does yard correct, as the clearly ruling This See levels. higher extending to those tion disputed reasonably both information has Neither at 467. DeHorney, readily verifiable. and was not evidence any other produced fur- 201(b). court district Fed.R.Evid. to the decisionmakers connecting these statistics concluded ther Ledbet- Hughes, conduct discriminatory it. do not consider I therefore it. support in the record court, no and there were irrelevant they because were not ac as to demonstrate that its actions were not companied by any analysis and because by[McGinest’s motivated race],” consider- they involved county than ation of this evidence would require different us to actually where he worked. Such an evi- “stray[ from] task [our] considering not dentiary ruling is reviewed for abuse of only discriminatory intent but also discrim- *34 discretion, of — which I find none. See Dom inatory impact.” Raytheon, U.S. T.K., ingo 600, (9th v. 289 F.3d 605 -, Cir. 124 S.Ct. at This, the Supreme 2002) (noting limited review “even when Court has told us we cannot do. See id.

the rulings determine the outcome of a

motion for judgment”). Alternatively,

Moreover, attempts this kind of data would shed meet his burden “indirectly by light little on showing McGinest’s disparate treat- that the employer’s proffered explanation ment claim it says because next to nothing is unworthy of Burdine, credence.” about whether GTE used its neutrally ap- 256, 101 U.S. at S.Ct. plicable 1089. McGinest first salary/hiring freeze an effort to asks us to judicial take notice of against reports discriminate Rather, him. it is GTE’s financial health more around the time properly understood as evidence of the salary/hiring freeze. I disparate agree impact, with the tending to show that the majority that deny we must motion, effects of GTE’s employment practice fell reports these are not “capable more harshly on accurаte him. See Raytheon Co. v. — and ready Hernandez, determination” as required by --,-, U.S. 124 S.Ct. 201(b).15 Fed.R.Evid. 513, 519, (2003) (“This L.Ed.2d 357 Court consistently has recognized a dis- McGinest is then left awith simple at tinction between claims of discrimination tack on the credibility of witnesses, GTE’s based on disparate treatment and claims of arguing that the lack of documentary evi discrimination based on disparate im- of a dence freeze suggests that its explana pact.”). tion is “unworthy of Burdine, credence.” 256, 101 U.S. S.Ct. 1089. In revers Unfortunately, McGinest raised the is- ing court, the district majority, too, disparate sue of impact for the first time heavily relies on “the absence of any docu on summary judgment, when he asked the mentation confirming that a hiring freeze court judicial to take notice of the statis- place during the relevant time peri tics. Because McGinest failed to “plead Maj. od.” Op. at 1123 the additional disparate impact theory in ], [his] complaint[ or ... This, make course, known is not even evidence at during discovery [his] intention to pursue all. See Saint Mary’s Honor v. Ctr. recovery on disparate Hicks, impact theory,” 502, 519, he may not rely now on it. (1993) (“It Coleman v. 125 L.Ed.2d 407 is not enough, Quaker Co., Oats (9th 232 F.3d words, in other to disbelieve the employ- ” In light failure, of this er.... (emphasis in original)). Rather, it because GTE has “offered legitimate, simply is an attack on the form non-discriminatory reason for its actions so admissible evidence GTE submitted. It Moreover, such evidence would promote hand, inher- McGinest. On the per- other ently ambiguous in this Perhaps context. haps profit GTE made year precisely that profit year GTE’s suggests that a sala- fiscally because was by, conservative among ry/hiring freeze unnecessary, and was things, other instituting salary/hiring freeze. made-up justification instead a failing asper- simply east majority nor follow “must adjudicators axiomatic non-diseriminatory expla- documentary evi sions regarding rules same pres- Rather, McGinest evi Id. testimonial nation. regarding as [those] dence untrue, it is INS, 222 F.3d ent v. Zahedi dence.” also, e.g., Vera-V Cir.2000); see not done. (9th has 1222, 1233 INS, illegas “trust- of GTE’s examination Even if “documentary evi Cir.2003) (holding no find I would proper, worthiness” credibility same by the judged dence and Na- Begg employees, Two fault. evid testimonial apply standards direct they had kamura, testified ence”).16 other freeze, two while knowledge *35 somehow appears majority But familiar Valle, Brand employees, of disparagement its transformed testimony Corroborating it. into McGi- evidence testimonial GTE’s in hired the man that fact undisputed carry is sufficient that “[p]roof” nest’s pro- a receive not did place Maj. Op. at See persuasion. burden pay increase. aor motion nature the testimonial (describing evi- produce even or unable unwilling the defen- that “[pjroof as evidence GTE’s otherwise, or dence, circumstantial cre- unworthy of explanation dant’s dur- anyone else promoted hired omitted)). This (internal quotation dence” period. time the relevant ing directly trick, it is neat abe precedent, Court Supreme contrary to the fundamental “disregards clearly presump- Douglas McDonnell Once does not a presumption ... principle neutral of GTE’s face vanished tion ignores [the proof, the burden shift to pro- failed justification, hiring repeated admonition Court’s] Supreme evidence of admissible, relevant any duce all times at plaintiff Title VII him. promote discriminatory failure of persuasion.” burden ultimate bears sug- any evidence present Neither did 511, at S.Ct. Hicks, 509 U.S. explanation neutral GTE’s gesting omitted). (internal quotation Burdine, “unworthy of credence.” rejection majority’s Indeed, There- 256, 101 S.Ct. at U.S. described only be can explanation GTE’s dissent fore, respectfully I must credibility determina- independent as district to reverse decision majority’s Court Supreme direct again, But tion.17 claim. dismissal court’s Because way. in the stands authority hir- a neutral submitting burden Ill production, one of “is justification ing suit brings also Finally, McGinest credibility no involve it ‘can persuasion[,] ” See to promote. failure retaliatory Reeves, at 530 U.S. assessment.’ (“It 2000e-3(a) an unlaw- shall § U.S.C. Hicks, (quoting employer for an practice employment ful 2742). Neither 509, 113 S.Ct. light evidence hiring-justification of GTE’s to concern happen cases of these Both is not “court Judges. admonition Immigration own of its treatment credibility determina- indisputable the same to make empowered assert would I including an Op. at any judge, Maj. apply summary judgment. when principles tions” evidence. judge, examines appellate n. 5. surprised particularly I am respect,

17. With credibility weigh the majority would that the

H41 against discriminate any of employ- Bass, [its] Greenberg Encino, CA, & for Defen- ees ... because opposed any he has dants-Appellees. [dis-

criminatory] practice.”)- I agree with the majority’s Before B. FLETCHER, FARRIS, reasoning and conclusion that WARDLAW, we uphold must Circuit Judges. district court’s dis- missal of this claim.

ORDER IV The order entered on January 2004 is converted to memorandum disposition conclusion, I agree that we re- and modified as follows: verse on the hostile work environment claim, but for reasons different from the Delete the first sentence in paragraph 3: majority. I respectfully disagree with the appellants “The have unnecessarily proce- majority on the disparate claim, treatment durally complicated the issues in this affirm. Finally, would I concur in the case.” court’s decision to affirm summary judg- Delete the sentence paragraph line ment dismissal on retaliatory failure to *36 “Further, 7: the SEHO considered promote claim. stay-put part issue as of the due process

hearing.” Delete the first sentence paragraph 4: “All critical issues have been raised and decided in the SEHO process proceed- due ing.” Revise the second sentence in paragraph

Aja TERMINE, through her 4 to read: parties “The appealed Guardian Ad Litem Karen TERMINE; decision in the process due hearing to the Termine, individual, Karen Plain- district court.” tiffs-Appellants, Revise the last in paragraph sentence to read: direct “We that the court district vacate its opinion subject that is the of this WILLIAM S. HART UNION HIGH appeal and reconsider opinion its light DISTRICT; SCHOOL ‍‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​‌‍Westmark Dist., of Vashon Island Sch. record School, Defendants-Appellees. the appeal from process the due hearing No. any 02-56638. additional take at request parties or either of United States Court of Appeals, them.” Ninth Circuit. The clerk shall depublish the order March substitute unpublished memorandum disposition. Marcy Tiffany, J.K. Steven Wyner, M. panel deny has voted petition Wyner Tiffany, Torrance, & CA, for Plain- for panel rehearing. Judge Wardlaw votes tiffs-Appellants. deny petition for rehearing en banc Green, Barrett K. Littler Mendelson, & and Judges B. Fletcher and Farris so rec- CA, Los Angeles, Harold Gutenberg, ommend. notes gave Noson supervisor. the relief when he was sion supervisor, conduct Noson’s about occasion, refused workers several one On person. Bisnar, complained Hank joba carrying out him in to work complaints Because Bri- undesirable. extremely dirty and problem, remedying successful coworker, Brand, testified a white an dis- an internal ultimately filed to work for him refused they also twelve inci- noting complaint crimination cоmplain did not occasion. McGinest same in a him treated Noson had where dents about incident. management manner. GTE claims discriminatory Vehicles Maintenance of find- investigation, internal it conducted con- became 1997 McGinest In March of “shop- merely to be comments ing Noson’s compa- tires on his one of the cerned apologize talk,” requiring Noson ninety wearing out. Since

Notes

notes GTE him. allow informal, reasonably mal “man formally reported not were dents perceive[d] “subjectively that he conclusion whether I need not determine agement.” Id. at be abusive.” environment a differ makes generally distinction case, anti- own in this GTE’s ence because directs specifically policy discrimination working environment a hostile if Even con discrimination discuss employees fail- for only liable is employer exists, “an re or human supervisor your “with cerns of which harassment remedy ing added). (emphasis representative” sources Fuller, 47 F.3d know.” or should knows for fail liable “are employers general, In notes, correctly majority As the a hostile remedy prevent or ing to harassing engages supervisor when management-level of which environment may be generally conduct, employer rea knew, in the exercise or employees envi- for hostile “vicariously liable held Swen have known.” should care sonable Nich- supervisor.” by a created ronment (9th 1184, 1202 Potter, 271 F.3d son Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d Rest. Azteca ols v. internal Cir.2001) original, (emphasis supervisor- 864, 877 omitted). Because quotations then, circumstances, GTE harassment re instructions own followed knowledge for lack not defend manage discrimination, least porting re- Therefore, no notice conduct. known” have reasonably “should ment by super- made the comments quired complaints. the existence Hughes is and Roberts. Ledbetter visors involving the additional Allegations Both case. complicated more a somewhat graffiti the banner graffiti bathroom describe EEOC by McGi- reported specifically Manager,” Hughes “[MeGinestJ’s alleges case, McGinest each But in nest. McGi- he was whether challenges appeared markings offensive This manager. just a manager nest’s to, superviso- by, and accessible used areas genuine there only demonstrates not dis- does which GTE ry employees, At issue. on the dispute factual factfinder Therefore, reasonable pute. then, agree I proceedings, stage exercise “in the that GTE conclude could allega- accept we known” care should of reasonable vi- that GTE would tions as true

Case Details

Case Name: George McGinest v. Gte Service Corp. Mike Biggs
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 11, 2004
Citation: 360 F.3d 1103
Docket Number: 01-57065
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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