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George Lopez v. Dora B. Schriro, Arizona Department of Corrections Director Megan Savage, Warden
491 F.3d 1029
9th Cir.
2007
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 Cir.1987) (9th INS, 1396, 1400 821 F.2d in this case— conclusion The IJ’s similar to that the provide (reversing to access the IJ’s determination refusal Singh’s in a failure of credibility file resulted “did not establish his petitioner the Canadian most with the analo- consistent proof answering ques- to evasiveness in due his —is issue. In that exists on this INS, authority gous Wang v. tions”); 352 F.3d contrast, majority’s conclusion (9th Cir.2003) (upholding the IJ’s 1256-57 an credi- required make adverse to IJ determination credibility on “obvi- adverse in this circumstance is bility determination evasiveness”). option The of conclud- ous single case. to a supported citation not denying case that ing appropriate an cases, majority Rather, cited might that well be access to information corrobo- produce failure to opinion address justifies applica- denial of the dispositive INS, See, Sidhu v. e.g., rating evidence. respect for the administra- promotes tion (9th Cir.2000) 1085, 1089-90 220 F.3d tribunal, injects finality fosters tive inference was an adverse (holding that reasons, certainty. For these measure of failed to the Petitioner when permissible credibility require I not adverse would evidence). Howev- corroborating produce the facts case. under of this determination er, cases are not Sidhu comparable uphold I IJ’s determination would 1) Sidhu reasons: dispositive for two allow to Singh’s refusal to access blatant merely hold that an adverse cases similar file immigration warranted the Canadian permissible credibility determination carry that he failed to determination infor- easily corroborating when available proof. burden of Those cases do produced. mation is not that the is limited to purport to hold IJ credibility determina- an adverse making 2) and, options as the has no other

tion and noted, whether the we do not know

IJ corroborating or dis- would be highlights reason The latter

qualifying. majority philosophical weakness LOPEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, George asy- majority would allow disposition. blatantly per- to refuse applicants lum v. perform immigration authorities mit SCHRIRO,* Depart Dora B. complete investigation applicant’s into Director; Megan ment of Corrections asylum. emphasize I eligibility for Respondents-Appel Warden, Savage, seeking immigration were officials lees. Singh anything. compel produce Rather, merely requested government No. 06-99000. government Singh authorize Appeals, United States Court itself. We this vital information gather Ninth Circuit. deliberately who not reward those should processes we the administrative thwart March 2007. and Submitted Argued eligibility have established assess June 2007. Filed reflect, adverse asylum. our cases As vary- meet with credibility determinations Compare Turcios on review. results

[*] Dora cessor, B. Schriro is substituted Terry L. Stewart, as Arizona for her Depart- prede- ment of Corrections Fed. R.App. P. 43(c)(2). Director, pursuant *3 HAWKINS, MICHAEL DALY Circuit Judge:

Appellant George Lopez (“Lopez”) was convicted in Arizona state court of child felony one-year- abuse and murder of his old son and sentenced to death. In this post-Antiterrorism and Effective Death (“AEDPA”) Penalty Act of 1996 habeas proceeding, presents one certified issue: *4 Lopez whether the state trial court denied rights under the Eighth Amendment by failing mitigation to consider presented at trial. He also seeks to ex- pand the of appealability certificate (“COA”) issues, four include additional including the Arizona Court’s re- view of his death sentence and three inef- fective assistance of counsel claims. We part, affirm in in part, reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The relevant pertaining facts to the son, Anthony, death of Lopez’s are set forth in the opin- Arizona Court’s ion on direct review: Lopez met a woman in 1987 while he Cary Sandman, Waterfall, Economidis, coaching was a coeducational softball Caldwell, P.C., Villamana, Hanshaw & began team. He soon having an affair n withher and Tucson, AZ, for the petitioner-appellant. pregnant she became with his child in December 1987. Five Gorman, Robert J. Attor- State born, months before the child was ney Office, Tucson, AZ, General’s for the left his wife and moved in with the respondents-appellees.

mother her three-year-old son. The baby, Anthony, named was in Au- born gust 1988. year later,

One days nine August 1989, Anthony’s mother apart- left the ment at 10:00 to go a.m. shopping. She HAWKINS, Before: SIDNEY R. took her older child with her left THOMAS, CLIFTON, and RICHARD R. Anthony Lopez’ care. When re- she Judges. Circuit noon, Lopez turned around told her an Opinion HAWKINS; by Judge Partial accident happened. explained had He Concurrence and Partial by Judge Dissent that while he disposing was aof soiled THOMAS. room, diaper Anthony another had point, so Officer Mar- upset came pulled night- bed and

gotten off the Anthony’s moth- ended the interview. dula on himself. stand over had a bruise on his that he er saw evening, Detec- Shortly after 5:00 that his chin. another under forehead Salgado approached tives Miller and Lo- Anthony hos- take to the wanted to She him hospital and asked pez at the refused, Anthony saying pital, but room, adjacent them to a accompany right. all be would room, provided by the emergency then for a while and Anthony She held police offi- hospital paramedics and to be He soon wanted laid him down. Lopez appeared do work. paper cers to she noticed that again and held explained to Lo- calm. Detective Miller him alcohol and bathed hot. She they tape pez that wanted record again told again. him She held him their interview and then asked how take the child to the they should Anthony injured. Lopez stated that Lopez again but refused. hospital, home, Anthony’s mother were he and laun- had to do some Anthony’s mother and when heard a crash bedroom laundry to the dry, Lopez carried the so they investigate, Anthony *5 went to found returned, she he laundry room. When tipped-over lying face down under put to with him and went Anthony left However, in the inter- nightstand. later laundry washing machines. view, Lopez changed story. his He ad- apartment, she returned to When not at home. mitted that the mother was cardiopul- Lopez performing found she Anthony he left on He stated that had (CPR) Anthony. monary resuscitation on diaper. of a disposed while he bed Anthony the emer- They took then returned, Anthony saw with he he When University at Cen- room Medical gency of the in middle drawer one foot (UMC). personnel Emergency room ter reaching piggybank. for a nightstand attempted resuscitate unsuccessfully Anthony, startling him. He at yelled declared dead at 3:36 Anthony; he was Anthony jerked tipped back and then to the police were summoned p.m. on himself. He nightstand over spoke with Mardula hospital and Officer up. face nightstand, under the landed emergency exam- physician, room he did not Salgado Lopez told Detective Anthony’s body injuries ined the the truth had to him and said believe speak if with Lopez he would then asked any wrongdo- Lopez come out. denied in agreed. Lopez he had tears her and said, Salgado ing, Detective eyes, appeared calm and rational. his but with us you’re playing games “George, his Mi- Lopez read Officer Mardula finally now, Lopez admitted George.” then him what randa rights and asked Anthony on the buttocks. that he hit Anthony. Lopez relat- happened had his Lopez Salgado then read Detective previously that he had same facts ed the indicated that Miranda rights. Lopez Anthony’s mother. He stated related and would con- rights he his understood baby and deter- examined the that he He never questions. tinue answer “okay,” closely but mined was attorney nor did he refuse requested an when him. He stated that later watched ques- any of the detectives’ to answer with the helping the mother he was tions, to understand. appeared which he Anthony was noticed that laundry, he the interview concluded The detectives breathing. performed He CPR 7:00 approximately room at and left the and the mother baby and then he hospital. p.m. He be- Anthony to the took Lopez being injuries

While was interviewed aminer who told him that Miller Salgado, Detectives Detective Anthony suffered were not consistent Millstone, a member homicide Lopez’ A telephonic stories. search detail, hospital. arrived Detective Lopez’ apart- warrant was obtained for Lopez point- Millstone interviewed Lopez police ment. went with the offi- edly him if he asked had ever struck apartment cers to the and demonstrated anger. Anthony strik- denied Anthony injured. how was After the ing the child. Detective Millstone demonstration, Lopez was arrested. thought tape that the recorder was af- day, autopsy The next performed candor, Lopez’ so he fecting turned it off on Anthony. found numer- The doctor asked what concerns he had Anthony’s face, chest, ous bruises on answering questions. Lopez about told back and buttocks. had Some bruises Anthony’s the detective he was afraid hours, many occurred within 24 but might tape. mother hear the The detec- Anthony’s were older. skull was frac- tive told that he not going places, tured two of which one had play tape for her nor relate the been with such part caused force that details of the interview to her. the fractured skull had been driven into Detective Millstone then turned on the Anthony the brain. had an also exten- tape Lopez began recorder and to tell hemorrhage sive sepa- the membrane Anthony his version of how received rating brain the skull. injuries. He “I I got angry, got stated: The internal examination revealed that angry at everything, everything that has Anthony’s 10th and 11th frac- ribs were boiling been I’ve very angry over. been *6 injuries tured near his past couple days spine. these of These and moth- [the everybody knows that and corresponded er] it.” knew the bruises on Antho- Lopez day, stated that earlier he ny’s back. These fractures had been given Anthony had a bath and him laid within 24 of caused hours death. The down to him put peed, lotion on and “he 7th, doctor also found Anthony’s 8th so I smacked him.” Lopez Then stated: and 10th ribs had been broken in the “And I smacked him hard and he start- past and were healing Anthony when crying got angry, ed and I I got so Anthony’s died. pancreas was torn in diaper and it away went and threw and two, his bowel and the membrane hold- time, that’s when I saw him.” At this lacerated, place it in were and his Lopez yet recounted another version of spleen gland and adrenal had bled. The Anthony’s injuries. the cause of This injuries peritoni- abdominal had caused time, Anthony after climbed on the injuries tis. All of these had been nightstand yelled him, Lopez at An- caused within 24 of hours death. The thony grabbed lamp as he fell be- Anthony doctor determined that had nightstand. Lopez neath the jumped head, died of blunt-force trauma to the nightstand toward the to prevent it from chest and abdomen. falling Anthony, on but instead he fell on Lopez, State v. 174 Ariz. 847 P.2d top nightstand. radio, Then the (1992). 1078, 1081-83 which on had been the nightstand, fell hit Anthony was indicted on one count of face. first- Detective Millstone degree concluded the at 7:22 interview murder and one count of child p.m. abuse, jury and a convicted him on both spoke Detective Millstone then counts. At an aggravation/mitigation with the treating physician and hearing the medical ex- prior conducted to sentencing, Lo- family and indicated it had consid- friends and cumstances put on numerous pez witnesses, testified that presented who “all evidence the defen- members as ered person liked non-violent who Lopez was a by way mitigation.” dant that he had never acted people and help court The concluded: children or inappropriately toward their victim, The a child of months and community members Various his own. days age, mercy was at the of the concerning Lopez’s service in testified or ability protect with no defendant community military, and the organizations ap- suffering defend himself. His was employment history. positive his and about foreseeable, parent or but defendant’s prison chaplain A testified was selfish concern to shield himself from inmate cooperative and well-behaved a consequences of his own actions study classes regularly attended Bible who deny any hope him caused child inmates, carry and could helped other pain life of his or the surcease given if a helping others out his mission through medical The treatment. Court prison official testi- life sentence. Another cruelty depravity finds cooperative and had fied that innocent, acts defendant’s towards the disciplinary reports. baby outweigh in his care far helpless testimony presented prosecution The might evidence which call for lenien- witness, Hobeich, Dr. expert from an cy. abuse. expertise with child pediatrician imposed penalty. then death An- pain about the Dr. Hobeich testified injuries, thony experienced likely majority Ari- appeal, On direct compared “surgery without which affirmed the zona convic- symp- He also described anaesthesia.” Lopez, tion and 847 P.2d sentence. injuries, Anthony’s toms of child un- majority 1092. The indicated was “hot touch” and including being to the dertaking independent review of the “lethargic” lacking power or ener- record to determine whether the death making cry, for a full more of “cat gy appropriate, and concluded sentence pain to communicate before cry” instead finding supported that the evidence *7 eventually consciousness. Dr. Hob- losing factors, and that the aggravating the two Anthony probably eich testified properly trial court could find hour, pain for at least an conscious and ev- proffered mitigation refuted the record possibility at a and that there was least justices dis- Id. at 1090-92. Two idence. injuries if he had could have survived his of the imposition death sented from received treatment for them sooner. sentence, failure faulting the trial court for court, defense closing arguments to requir- comply with an Arizona statute relied on the evidence counsel findings regarding mitigating ing specific aggravation/mitigation presented (citing Ariz. circumstances. Id. at 1092-93 argu- hearing, but also made substantial 13-703(D)). § Rev.Stat. demonstrate ment that the record did not relief, sought then state collateral Lopez kill his ever intended to son. among things, other number raising, proved found the state had The trial court regarding claims ineffective assistance the defen- aggravating two factors: Following appellate trial and counsel. especially in an committed the offense dant de- hearing, superior court evidentiary manner, heinous, depraved cruel and entirety. Lo- Lopez’s petition in nied its an adult and that the defendant was petition filed a for review pez then age of fifteen. The victim under Court, raising again statutory Supreme cir- court found “(1) a number of ineffective assistance of coun- of his claim cation resulted in a deci- claims, including allegations sel that his to, contrary sion that was or involved an counsel had “abandoned” him at sen- of, application clearly unreasonable estab- tencing stage. Supreme The Arizona law, by lished Federal as determined postcard peti- issued denial States; Supreme Court of the United or petition tion. Lopez’s for writ of certiorari (2)resulted in a decision that on was based the United States Court was an unreasonable determination of the facts also denied. light presented

Lopez then initiated this habeas action proceeding.” State court 28 U.S.C. in federal district court. The district 2254(d). court § found several be claims to unexhausted In assessing whether state dismissed those claims. subse- application court’s of law or determination quently returned to the superior state “unreasonable,” of fact is the court cannot court, which some on proce- denied claims simply consider whether it would have grounds dural others their merits. reached a different outcome on the same Petitions to the Arizona Supreme Court Collins, 333, record. v. Rice 546 U.S. United States Court were 969, (2006) S.Ct. 163 L.Ed.2d 824 also denied. then returned (stating that reviewing minds “Reasonable district court and moved to amend his might disagree the record about” the ulti petition to add these now-exhausted relief). issue is mate insufficient for claims, habeas but the district court denied the Rather, motion, holding application’ “[t]he ‘unreasonable amendment would be futile and would delay requires cause undue clause the state court decision to prejudice to the government. The district be more than incorrect or erroneous.” remaining denied relief on the claims Andrade, 63, 75, Lockyer v. 538 U.S. on their merits. The district court then (2003) S.Ct. 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (citing sponte sua issued a COA on the issue 362, 410, Taylor, Williams v. rights whether constitutional were (2000)). 120 S.Ct. 146 L.Ed.2d 389 violated the sentencing court’s failure to It requires the “objectively decision be give consider and mitigation effect to evi- (citing Williams, unreasonable.” Id. presented dence at trial.1 1495). 410, 120 U.S. at S.Ct. STANDARD OF REVIEW DISCUSSION district court’s denial of habeas Sentencing I. The Alleged Court’s Fail- relief is reviewed de novo. Barker *8 ure to Consider hand Give Effect Cir.2005), (9th Fleming, 1085, 423 F.3d 1091 Mitigating Evidence Presented at nom., rt. denied sub v. Barker ce — Trial Spalding, -, U.S. 126 S.Ct. (2006). 164 L.Ed.2d 796 Lopez’s one certified alleges claim sentencing the state governed court appeal by is failed AEDPA. AEDPA, give mitigat Under consider and effect to all may grant this court not the writ of corpus ing habeas on behalf a person presented. Lopez evidence he relies custody in state unless the adjudi- Oklahoma, state’s principally Eddings on However, 1. The court also durally issued COA as to whether barred. concedes Lopez's rights claim that his were violated that this second issue is either or moot imma- the sentencing improperly when court limited terial since the district court reached the scope mitigation the proce- evidence was claim on its merits. hearing.” presentence (emphasis 71 L.Ed.2d and the 102 S.Ct. U.S. added). (1982), sentencing thereafter, Shortly that a court the court stat- which held petitioner’s not to consider a could refuse ed: emotional distur- upbringing and

unhappy record, For the the Court has read the mitigating evidence. bance as presentence report, the letters and other by documents submitted the defendant Here, however, did sentencing the court in any period the time since the verdict was presenting prevent Lopez not largely presentence it affirma- since the mitigation, in nor did evidence entered — filed, any was tively prepared indicate that there evidence was as well as this Indeed, the sen- having it would not consider. Court’s heard the trial and the stated that tencing expressly aggravation/mitigation hearing May presented all evidence 10th, considered “ha[d] the 1990. mitigation.” by way the defendant added). (emphasis Having referenced the statement, and acknowledges this presentence report, the Court then went usually that a court is deemed also admits clarify, on to consistent with its earlier all to have considered ruling: Clark v.

where the court so states. See count], the murder Court is [the As (9th Cir.1992); Ricketts, 958 F.2d only presented considering those factors 308, 314, 111 Dugger, 498 Parker v. U.S. mitigation hearing. at aggravation/ the (1991) (“We 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 S.Ct. count], child abuse the As [the judge that the trial consid- must assume the considering is information set Court passing all before sen- ered this evidence in presentence report. forth did.”). thing, he tence. For one said rely not upon The Court does Lopez argues that the court’s statement in set forth the defendant’s information this case is insufficient in because presen- or the victim’s statements contradictory statements earli- judge made report. tence aggravation/mitigation er hear- during put statement is When court’s suggested excluding which she context, apparent it is category mitigation evidence”— “whole confining her con- announcing she was at trial but not evidence which was offered evidence that was intro- sideration sentencing hearing. at reintroduced aggravation/mitigation at hear- duced argument genesis is her ing, attempting rather to restate but early proceedings court’s statement not consider the ruling that she would murder “[a]s [the count] presentence report. statements in the considering only presented those factors hearing.” aggravation/mitigation Lopez argues the statement is However, placed when the statement we ambiguous and that should not at least context, carry meaning it does all the speculate to whether assign to it. Lopez would As actually were considered. dis factors however, above, sentencing cussed sentencing beginning At the hear- *9 Lopez’s of susceptible statement is court’s by the court ruled on various motions ing, isolation, only if read in and interpretation by statements himself Lopez to exclude the certainly enough not to overcome is family in appeared the which and victim’s that court knew and presumption the state report. grant- The court presentence the v. Visciot the law. See followed Lopez’s these state- ed motion strike Woodford ti, 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 154 U.S. ments, 537 with the Court’s deci- “consistent (2002). AEDPA, Under we upon in trial L.Ed.2d 279 rely sion to evidence received 1038 do penalty phase hearing.

must more than find the statement witnesses at the ambiguous fact, would have to conclude appears Lopez In it that at one point —we Supreme objec record, that the Arizona Court was similarly in viewed the as one of tively concluding unreasonable the sen post-conviction petitions, his state as- did, fact, tencing court review all the sentencing, imposed serted: “At this court proffered mitigating evidence. See Lock appears the death it penalty; this court yer, Rely 538 at 123 1166. U.S. S.Ct. impose reached its decision to death in ing sentencing express the court’s part phase at the testimony guilt of presen- statements that it had read the added). (emphasis the trial.” reports, ag tence the trial and heard the Lopez court contends that the trial must gravation/mitigation hearing, consid have failed to trial consider the record all presented by Lopez, ered the it of because did find the lack intent to Supreme Arizona concluded that course, kill as a mitigating factor. Of the clearly us record before indicates “[t]he trial court did not specifically discuss all judge that trial considered the miti of mitigating Lopez pre- evidence that presented gating by Lopez.” factors Lo sented, so a failure to this discuss factor pez, 847 P.2d at an 1091. This necessarily does not indicate was not unreasonable determination facts addition, In considered. on the date the Parker, light the record it. See before sentence, pronounced court coun- (assum 314-15, 498 U.S. at S.Ct. argument sel made an before the court judge trial mitigating considered all primarily that was based on the lack passing evidence before sentence because intent kill.3 required he said he did and law state him to).2 light the foregoing, agree we with the district court that the Arizona Su- Moreover, sentencing judge clearly preme objectively Court was not unreason- findings made that were based on trial in determining sentencing able that evidence, thus negating the argument court had all prof- considered court considered evidence from evidence, fered including the ev- aggravation/ mitigation proceeding. presented idence at trial.4 example, For Lopez court found that “willfully intentionally” abused the Meaningful Appellate II. Review child, baby that the was entrusted to Lo- care, pez’s After the district court sua sponte and that denied the child I, protect himself, medical treatment issued COA al- Issue though the actual expand circumstances of the asked this court to A the COA. crime and by aftermath were not panel discussed motions request, denied this but in 2. This court argues “willfully reviews state and intention ally” language Court's decision because it is the last rea- also modifies "caused his Barker, soned decision on this issue. interpretation plau death.” Because either sible, at F.3d 1091-92. The determination ambiguous, of what the statement is at best the trial an strongly found is issue of way historical does not cut one or the other. Parker, fact. at S.Ct. 731. conclusion, agree 4.Because we we this sentencing 3. found court had need not address the district court’s alternate “willfully intentionally physically holding abused that even if trial court had erred the child entrusted to his care and caused his and failed to consider all the evi- Lopez argues death.” presented sentencing, any statement dence simply underscores did not find such error was cured the Arizona kill,” abuse, just "intent intent to independent but the Court's review of the record.

1039 surrounding them its conclusions violated re-raise these issues dicated could brief, process he has done. made it for the impossible which due opening in briefing as a additional in- Supreme perform construe this Court its We expand COA. See However, further motion Lo- dependent duty review. 1(e). COA, To receive Circuit Rule not pez point “clearly does estab- 22— that “reasonable demonstrate Lopez must Supreme precedent setting lished” Court court’s as- jurists find district would sentencing court must forth the record claims de- of the constitutional sessment permit appel- make in sufficient order McDaniel, v. wrong.” batable or Slack 2254(d)(1). § late See review. 28 U.S.C. 484, 1595, 473, 146 120 S.Ct. 529 U.S. The thus district denied (2000). L.Ed.2d 542 claim, noting clearly there was Supreme established Court law or consti- the Arizona argues that Su requirement particular tutional “that a provide meaningful preme Court failed sentencing by produced record be the trial This of his sentence. independent review agree, expressly court.” We have not, Lopez argues, somehow issue important held that that the “[w]hile the certified issue dis encompassed by reviewing appeal record on disclose to contrary, To the dis cussed above. court the considerations which motivated expressly limited its COA trict court ... process the death sentence due does “the sentenc alleged errors committed Rather, Lopez exhaustively raises an en that the require sentencer court[ ].” tirely independent constitutional claim5 analysis mitigating document its each the Arizona Court’s regarding reviewing as a federal court long factor as process, alleging that review state can discern from the record trial court mistakenly determined mitigating all court did indeed consider mitigation,” when the trial court found “no by the evidence offered defendant.” Jef weighed fact factors in (9th Lewis, 411, v. 38 F.3d 418 Cir. fers aggravators. This claim is not against the 1994) banc) (en Florida, v. (citing Gardner unexhausted, only actually it is raised 361, 1197, 349, 51 430 97 S.Ct. U.S. appeal.6 this We there the first time on (1977) (plurality opinion)); see L.Ed.2d 393 deny fore a COA on this issue. Stewart, 1030, also v. F.3d Williams Cir.2006) (“[T]he (9th trial court is attempts sweep also every to ‘itemize and discuss required he did raise below in claim within one ... mitigation’ piece of evidence offered trial court district court: the state reviewing as it clear to long makes] [so constitutionally inadequate findings. made sentencing court considered court that the Lopez argued below that the court’s that was factors it considered and all relevant failure to list the Parker, 321, vens, JJ.)); S.Ct. 498 U.S. at Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 5. 731. government imposing prohibit arbitrary penalty or irrational death error in the Arizona 6. The fashion, Supreme Court has held that and the Lopez alleged in his feder- Court's review "meaningful appellate necessary to review” is petition was the Court's failure to al habeas penalty imposed the death is not ensure that proportionality review of his death conduct Harris, Pulley a manner. v. in such addition, state and sentence. (1984) 104 S.Ct. 79 L.Ed.2d consistently filings, he asserted —con- federal 153, 198, (citing Gregg Georgia, 428 U.S. trary the trial court to his assertion now—that 204-06, (1976) 49 L.Ed.2d 859 96 S.Ct. (erroneous) finding of “no miti- had made an Stewart, Powell, (joint opinion and Ste- gation." *11 1040

offered.”); Clark, opportunity 958 F.2d at 858 n. 5 to hear an issue when Parker, (noting that after is clear it has petitioner presented the state court process require “due clause does not legal with the issue’s factual and basis.” sentencing court to conduct an on-record 359, Thompson, Weaver v. 197 F.3d 364 factor”). each mitigating discussion of Be- (9th Cir.1999). However, may a petitioner cause the district court’s determination on provide further to a in support facts claim the merits this claim is of not debatable court, long federal district so as those facts reason, among jurists deny we the COA legal not “fundamentally do alter the claim on this uncertified claim. already considered the state courts.” 254, 260, Vasquez Hillery, v. 474 U.S. 106 III. Exhaustion Ineffective Assis- (1986). 617, S.Ct. 88 L.Ed.2d 598 Regarding tance of Counsel Claim post-conviction did re seek Investigate Failure to and Present in Superior pursuant lief Arizona Reasonably Mitigating Available Arizona Rule of 32. Criminal Procedure Evidence alleged, things, among He other that he petition, his federal habeas had received ineffective assistance coun that his asserts counsel rendered ineffec- sel violation of v. Washing Strickland by failing investigate tive assistance and ton, 2052, 104 U.S. S.Ct. present all relevant evidence (1984). L.Ed.2d 674 Although the state sentencing, including organic evidence correctly Lopez’s notes that initial bifur dysfunctional childhood, brain damage, petition specifically challenge cated did not assault, good childhood sexual a employ- counsel’s of preparation penal lack ment record and remorse. The district ty phase, eventually court did not reach the merits of this issue was briefed claim, however, because found this court, issue memoranda the state trial had not been exhausted to the Arizona that court ruling did issue a on the merits. Supreme Court. The permitted state court also an evi- dentiary hearing Lopez’s

Because claim. At the the district court dis evidentiary procedural hearing,. Lopez presented missed claim on a evi- ground, apply we proce Slack both the dence about his trial counsel’s failure to ground dural underlying investigate constitu present mitigation for the claim tional to determine if are they debat capital sentencing, expert as well as testi- among jurists able of reason. Valerio mony about an allegedly competent de- (9th Cir.2002). Crawford, 306 F.3d attorney’s fense of investigation duties With respect prong, the substantive presentation of An mitigating evidence. however, we take a “quick look” to expert competent testified that defense determine whether petition facially al duty counsel a had to investigate leges the denial of a right. constitutional background and social history, (internal Id. at 775 quotation marks omit so, result of counsel’s failure do ted). sentencing judge did not discover that Lo- pez grew inup dysfunctional household

In order to fulfill exhaustion re parents with alcoholic began and also quirements, petitioner present must drinking early age. expert at an also the state equiva courts the “substantial testified that trial defense counsel failed to lent” of claim presented federal Connor, 270, provide examining psychologist court. Picard v. (1971). family, S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d 438 medical or social given courts have been history. “[S]tate sufficient

1041 district court rejected claim conclude the erred this on We court The state merits, concluding that evidence Lo- by determining Lopez’s the ineffective as- sufficiently alcohol abuse was pez’s for failure in- sistance of counsel claim to leniency. Lopez to for call substantial vestigate present mitigating and evidence to the denial the appealed then at Lopez unexhausted. did least is- Supreme Court. his statement general allegations the of his coun- make sues, by prejudiced he was Lopez indicated to penalty phase preparation sel’s lack of his [of] “abandonment his trial counsel’s im- (including the Arizona sentencing.” He client at the trial and/or inexperienced to an sub- proper delegation governing fed- identified Strickland as to prepare ordinate and failure mental petition His standard. eral constitutional court experts), health the state record as on the claim fol- for review elaborated a dysfunctional contains some evidence of lows: “quick A look” childhood and alcoholism.7 appear- for all counsel] Mr. Bruner [trial of his federal claim also the merits mitigation prepa- turned over the ances sufficiently alleged has reveals Marshall, junior his coun- to ration Ms. deprivation right. of a constitutional sel, done no serious previously who had Valerio, F.3d at 775. therefore 306 We death including murder trials and/or grant phase penalty COA penalty gave Mr. Bruner di- trials. claim for failure to ineffective assistance [evaluating psychi- rection to Dr. Morris present mitigating evi- investigate and evaluation, than other to atrist] for dence and remand to the district court to know about Bruner wanted Mr. proceedings.8 further dynamics, personality “overall asking for things of this nature. Wasn’t Regarding Defense IV. Procedural Bar case, help to but anything specific to Rebut Testi- Counsel’s Failure learning more about interested mony by Dr. Hobeich Lopez.” makeup Mr. psychological petition, claims that In his federal was not importantly, Dr. Morris Most for also ineffective trial counsel was opinion to or render an asked evaluate testimony state’s failing rebut Mr. given as to the statements Hobeich, witness, Dr. who aggravation Mr. Bruner be- law enforcement. Lo- penalty testimony pain death would not about the presented lieved imposed prepared be in this case and pez’s likely suffered before death. son accordingly. this claim to court first found The district unexhausted, then, procedurally be Lo- The Arizona Court denied independent adequate barred on an pez’s petition. penalty presented recognize counsel that could have been 7. We habeas proceeding, pre- phase mitigation was not court that but to the federal district conceded allegedly defi- sub-parts due defense counsel’s of this claim were ex- sented some presented to by post-conviction performance was not counsel. Howev- cient hausted —that remand, er, independently review the district court can the state courts. On wheth- whether the will need to determine state court record determine court therefore evidentiary hear- actually Lopez, has been exhausted. See Aiken issue er who received Cir.1988) court, (9th supplement Spalding, 841 F.2d entitled to in state curiam). (per an additional evidentia- the record or receive hearing court. See U.S.C. ry in federal (set- 2254(e)(2); § § foil. R.7 U.S.C. Lopez apparently 8. We note that wishes expanding the record ting rule forth the supplement record in federal court with review). prejudice on federal habeas additional —information 32.2(b) 32.1(h), pro- ground. previous state law As with the under Rule and Rule claim, analyze grant we whether to a COA applying hibits the state Rule by applying 32.2(a)(3) 32.1(h) 32.2(b) the Slack standard to the dis- Rule claims. procedural ruling trict court’s *13 provides: Valerio,

underlying claim. constitutional 32.2(a) [preclusion Rule from shall relief] 306 F.3d at 774. apply not to claims for relief on based (h). (e), (f), 32.1(d), In December its (g) Arizona amended Rules and When post>-convictionprocedures, Rule 32 state claim under is to be [these rules] adding a new of avenue relief a death in untimely post- raised a successive or if sentence defendant demonstrates “[t]he proceeding, conviction relief the notice by clear convincing evidence that the post-conviction relief must set forth the claim would underlying facts be suffi- specific the exception substance cient to ... court establish that the would raising and the reasons for not the claim imposed not have penalty.” the death previous petition in the in timely or 32.1(h). Ariz. R.Crim. P. After the district specific exception manner. If the Lopez’s court claim as unex- dismissed appear meritorious not reasons do sub- hausted, Lopez in 1999 to returned state stantiating why the claim indicating court, seeking provision relief this under claim in the not the previous was stated by arguing that his per- counsel’s deficient manner, petition timely or in a the no- deprived formance the state court of evi- summarily tice shall be dismissed. changed dence that would have his sen- that, The district court al- reasoned court, however, tence. The state trial held though the court state did not cite Rule 32.2(a)(3),9 precluded the claim under Rule 32.2(b) 32.1(h) or in ruling, its the court’s concluding the claim could have been pre- 32.2(a)(3) claim dismissal Rule under in Lopez’s post-conviction pro- sented first necessarily meant it “must have concluded 32.2(a)(3) ceeding. See Ariz. P. R.Crim. that the claim failed to excep- constitute an (providing for dismissal a claim 32.2(a) preclusion tion Rule as set forth trial, appeal, “has been waived on inor 32.2(b).” words, in Rule In other any previous proceeding.”). collateral Lo- view, district court’s the state court had pez sought review with the Arizona Su- interpreted require Rule 32 to dismissal Court, preme but refused consider the 32.2(a) showing required under if the un- claim. 32.2(b) der was not satisfied. Lopez then returned district court The district interpretation court’s sought petition to amend his habeas entirely plausible. Although first rejected add this claim. The district court 32.2(b) sentence of amendment, Rule states that “Rule proposed citing the state 32.2(a) procedural apply” court’s shall not default of to claims for relief the claim. Lopez, however, subsections, on argues that based certain including the state 32.2(a)(3) 32.1(h), court’s goes reliance on Rule rule on to state various error, brought because he had requirements that, his claim and concludes “[i]f "32.1(a)(3),” bar; however, actually 9. state procedural court cited quite this is not exist; Rather, which does apparent- the citation is what the court district did. dis- error, ly typographical acknowl- court trict concluded that the state court must edges. 32.2(b) exception found have the Rule did not apply petition, to save new and that argues 10. now why the district court the state court had dismissed by relying 32.2(a). erred ordinarily applicable on theoretical but unstated under the Rule rules.11 The procedural of its own district reasons exception meritorious specific the claim and substantiating permit appear properly declined do why claim was not stated indicating light petition amend his state timely or in a man- petition previous ruling. court’s ner,” to be As claim is dismissed. noted, Object pre- V. Defense Counsel’s Failure state courts are

district court correctly apply state Injuries to know and to Evidence of Prior sumed Arizona, law. Walton See During phase guilt 111 L.Ed.2d 110 S.Ct. trial, examiner, Henry, Dr. the medical (1990), grounds overruled other Anthony testified that suffered from sever *14 584, Arizona, 122 S.Ct. Ring v. 536 U.S. injuries, rib fractures healing including al (2002); 2428, Beaty v. 556 153 L.Ed.2d about face torso. Lo and bruises and Cir.2002). (9th 975, Stewart, 303 F.3d 986 argues that have pez his counsel should Moreover, to the Lopez specifically argued under Ari moved to exclude this evidence that the trial 404(b), zona Rule of Evidence as evidence precluded, finding had the claim erred crimes, wrongs, other or acts not admis of ruling. and not reverse the the Court did person, to of a prove sible the character because the grant We COA grant this a on this and asks court to COA is determination procedural district court’s argues the not issue. He evidence was jurists and reasonable among debatable exceptions, of admissible under alleged deprivation of facially has prove as to absence of mistake or such right, but we nonetheless constitutional accident, proven because the state had This ruling. affirm the district court’s Lo by convincing clear and evidence that court, court, gen sitting as habeas when injuries. State v. pez caused other See erally respects court determinations state 229, Nordstrom, 717, 200 Ariz. P.3d 736 25 Lambert, 357 of law. Powell v. state See (2001). Lopez contends that had this evi (9th Cir.2004); 871, Es 874 see also F.3d excluded, there is a reasonable dence been 62, 67-68, v.McGuire, telle 502 U.S. jury have con probability would (1991) (a 475, feder 116 L.Ed.2d 385 S.Ct. him of a offense—(cid:127) victed lesser-included a state al habeas court cannot reexamine a non-capi child reckless abuse—which of interpretation application and court’s felony. tal law). previously recognized state We have post-con- This claim was raised state if the state exception an to this deference the mer- proceedings and denied on viction “clearly interpretation untenable court’s concluded that de- its. The state court fed subterfuge and amounts to a avoid object not to to the fense counsel’s decision by the of deprivation eral of a state review not fall be- admission of evidence did by the Constitution.” rights guaranteed reasonable- objective standard of low Cardwell, 1253, 667 F.2d Knapp v. ness, even if the was not and that (9th Cir.1982). above, there As discussed admissible, proba- no there was reasonable rul ways are to construe the state court’s The district bility of a different outcome. “clearly make it untena ing that would not court’s rul- court concluded that state ble,” by we bound are therefore contrary nor an unrea- ing was neither interpretation application state court’s (2002), and challenge L.Ed.2d 762 11. does not otherwise Ortiz 1998), Stewart, (9th 32.2(a) Cir. “indepen- 149 F.3d 931-32 application of as an Rule attempt cause ground, nor does he to demonstrate adequate" state law see dent and Smith, procedural prejudice for the default. 122 S.Ct. Stewart v. prior application clearly closing argument established sonable bruises law. grant federal COA because point We out that the victim’s mother was jurists among is debatable issue particularly either not observant or not reason, but we affirm the district court’s Instead, closing credible. the focus of the decision. argument mirrored the crux of Dr. Hen- ry’s testimony: injuries Anthony suf- prong

The first of Strickland considers accidental, they fered required were Lopez’s counsel fell below an ob whether force, great they likely re- jective fail deal standard reasonableness blows, object prior inju quired which, repetitive prose- the evidence of 404(b) ries as Rule evidence. 466 U.S. at argued, required thought. cution effort and 687-88, 104 2052. if S.Ct. Even we as The prosecution argued severity that the court unreasonably sume that the state injuries of Anthony’s simply permit did not determined was not counsel a finding of recklessness —that had object to at failing deficient least intentionally willfully either inflicted evidence, satisfy prong the second child, injuries these on the or that it was Strickland, Lopez must also demon accident, some freak but that there *15 that, probability strate a “reasonable but pointed in prosecution between. The also errors, unprofessional for counsel’s the re out the in Lopez’s inconsistencies state- proceeding sult have of would been police, ments to his reluctance to take the 694, 104 Id. different.” at S.Ct. 2052. child hospital, to the and that ex- Henry’s testimony clearly Dr. focused planation what happened was inconsis- injuries major on the three that ultimately tent with the medical evidence. in injuries Anthony’s resulted to death — Lopez Although argues jury that head, his chest and abdomen. Occasional could found have recklessness but for the healing references older bruises or rib allegedly improper testimony about describing fractures were made when bruises, prior agree we with the district body at condition the time of the objec- that the state court was not autopsy. Dr. Henry also testified that the tively determining unreasonable in that injuries might abdominal have occurred probability there was reasonable earlier, day more than a but that it was guilt phase different outcome on based possible they also had been inflicted record. We therefore affirm the district injuries. around the same time as the head court’s of Lopez’s petition denial on this truly damaging But portion of Dr. claim. Henry’s testimony descriptions was PART, IN AFFIRMED REVERSED injuries other minor or bruises was his —it PART, IN AND REMANDED. Anthony’s testimony consistent that three injuries serious were consistent with THOMAS, Judge, Circuit concurring in injuries, accidental highly unlikely were part dissenting and in part: by nightstand have been caused a falling by as described Lopez, were not in- I in concur the majority’s holdings in blow, by flicted a single by separate but majority Parts opinion. II-V That head, very forceful blows to the chest is, I agree that the district court erred in and abdomen. that concluding Lopez’s ineffective assis- tance of counsel claims for failure to inves-

Perhaps importantly, prosecu- more tigate present tion any Henry’s did not use of Dr. testi- mony unexhausted, prior injuries about were argue Lopez’s agree and I that state of mind. The reference to the is not entitled to remand or relief his for the child’s death that explanation was the Arizona claims review, control, appellate meaningful enraged, him Defendant became lost denied failing lawyer that his deficient quite seriously.” and beat the child State challenge testimony, or Dr. Hobeich’s 131, 1078, 1092 P.2d Lopez, v. 174 Ariz. object lawyer failing his was deficient (1992) (Feldman, C.J., specially concur injuries. prior to evidence of ring). also There was evidence introduced Lopez attempted administer However, because I conclude Anthony stopped breathing CPR when an unrea- successfully demonstrated has visibly upset by Anthony’s Eddings v. Okla- application of sonable homa, behavior 102 S.Ct. 71 death. This is inconsistent 455 U.S. (1982), both the trial L.Ed.2d 1 based on an intentional homicide.

judge’s the Arizona Court’s Although specific in- the formation of rea a miti- failure consider his mens a prerequisite tent to kill is not to the factor, I dissent gating respectfully imposition a death penalty, Tison majority’s opinion. Part I of the Arizona, 107 S.Ct. (1987), specific L.Ed.2d 127 the lack of a I intent to kill is relevant to whether the I concern raised Jus- share the Chief appropriate for an indi- death sentence concurrence, special tice Feldman Notably,' child vidual defendant. most findings namely lack of trial court felony do not abuse murderers receive finding such on mens rea. lack of death, approaching even sentence even problem creates a distinct constitutional undoubtedly though all murders are such *16 evi- Eddings there is no under because penalty eligible. death actually con- dence that the Arizona courts short, case an one. this is unusual factor. mitigating sidered mens rea as a the that Lopez received harshest sentence an in death This is outlier our case impose even empowered the state is record penalty jurisprudence because the for his though never intended victim undisputed to con- parties is all seem —and exempt This him from fact does not die. kill his cede—that never intended to penalty the death means. Howev- trial, prosecution the Throughout son. er, question call into the state does murder emphasized felony that child abuse of mitigation. courts’ assessment Dur- does not include intent element. sentencing hearing, Lopez’s after ing II specific lack of Lopez’s counsel stressed Eddings, contemplat- a Under sentencer factor, prosecu- mitigating intent as a a constitutional ing penalty the death has only argument tion’s in rebuttal was consider, fac- “as a obligation to analysis: from following that knew tor, any aspect of defendant’s character are experience that children vulnerable any of the circumstances or record and An- injury, injure intended that proffers as that the defendant the offense [Lopez] thony, that “we can infer a sentence less than death.” a basis for damage injuries] caused intended the [the (quoting 869 455 U.S. at S.Ct. very familiarity chil- of his with because Ohio, 586, 604, S.Ct. Lockett v. added). Then, ar- while (emphasis dren.” (1978)). Applying 57 L.Ed.2d 973 Supreme the Arizona Court guing before case, sentencing Eddings both “con- prosecution appeal, on direct had judge Supreme and the Arizona Court there little or no evidence ceded that was duty, choosing or constitutional before probable kill and of intent to most sentence, affirming rejected claim, all Eddings death to consider Court then Lopez’s trial coun- factors judge because the trial had made a bare proffered. sel statement that he had considered mitigat- evidence, ing but the trial judge’s because

During Lopez’s sentencing hearing, his final was inexplicable decision without ref- spent argu- trial counsel considerable time to that Specifically, erence evidence. lack Lopez’s specific intent Supreme pointed Court out that the trial against militated the death sentence. Eddings judge jury’s There is no doubt that had overridden the therefore recom- required judge the trial and the Arizona life only mended sentence one Court to consider mens two murders Al- involved case. rea when whether deciding impose committed though Parker had a dual homi- penalty. to affirm the death The whether cide, he received the death sentence for only us, therefore, question before one murder and a life sentence for the did, fact, whether or not state courts aggravating other. Because the circum- Lopez’s argument. consider homicides, applied stances to both the Su- preme Court only reasoned that the expla- In reviewing the state court for a record violation, nation for the potential sentencing differential was Eddings this court must, notes, majority trial correctly pre- judge that the had considered non- judge sume that trial statutory and the state mitigating circumstances and actually all of considered had determined that those circumstances the mitigating arguments pre- that were justified leniency respect to only one arises, This presumption sented. first and Parker, of the murders. 498 U.S. at 316— foremost, from a presumption blanket itself, 111 S.Ct. 731. In Parker there- judges state know and follow It the law. fore, the initial presumption that the trial arises secondarily this case mitigators considered all was judge’s multiple assurances on record point. starting presumption that she considering all of not—and is not—conclusive. proffered arguments. evidence and Par- Furthermore, presumption the Parker 308, 315, v. Dugger, ker U.S. 111 S.Ct. *17 easily rebuttable. Justice As O’Connor (1991) (“We L.Ed.2d must concurrence, wrote in her Eddings that judge assume the trial all considered qualitatively different nature of a death [mitigation] this passing evidence before requires reviewing sentence courts “to re- did.”). thing, sentence. For one he said he any legitimate move for finding basis am- Parker, presume Under we must that biguity concerning actually the factors con- judge trial disingenuous was neither nor by the sidered trial court.” 455 U.S. at mistaken when she stated that she consid- (O’Connor, J., 102 S.Ct. 869 concur- all arguments. ered mitigating result, ring). As a any if there is legiti- however, presumption, The Parker is mate reason to believe that the trial judge neither conclusive nor irrebuttable. a mitigating excluded factor from her con- itself, Parker did sideration, then we should remand for re- rely on judge’s the trial assurance that he sentencing. consequences The of error in had mitigating considered all evidence. a death case are great too to allow for Rather, the Court examined the entire rec- speculation fudging. or ord, reconstructing judge’s trial deci- end, then, In the sion-making process to the Parker presump- determine whether not that process merely or tion allocating included consideration a rule for bur- of non-statutory mitigating dens, factors. The which will determine the outcome (1992) (Feldman, 145-16, P.2d 1078 petitioner or habeas the defendant only if sepa- In his C.J., concurring). specially its to doubt reason legitimate offers however, Feldman noted If, Chief Justice opinion, rate case. particular in a validity 13-703(D) trial any legiti- requires § to point can A.R.S. that petitioner habeas indicates with findings that specific record in the to articulate judges mate evidence any factor or statutory mitigating of factor exclusion judge’s to respect the trial grant evidence, court should then this He also noted in the case. present that is resentencing. for and remand mitigating writ factor lists as the statute that “ of- of the circumstances ‘any

Ill ” (quoting 847 P.2d 1078 Id. at fense.’ two theories case, offers 13-703(G)). In this Justice Feld- § Chief A.R.S. First, he presumption. Parker rebut highly that relevant observed man then record in the one instance points was the Lopez’s offense circumstance would that she judge stated trial which have “may never that possibility factors that mitigating only those consider kill.” Id. an intent formed aggrava- during the presented were articulation statutory to the Contrary impliedly hearing, tion/mitigation judge never Lopez’s trial requirement, adduced evidence exclusion Lo- as to whether finding specific amade that one state- Lopez argues trial. at Anthony or fact, to kill did, intend pez suffice, O’Con- per Justice should ment in- specific lack Lopez’s as to whether speculation, against admonition nor’s sufficiently mitigating tent was or was confidence in court’s undermine the trial leniency. Because for to call compliance. Eddings judge’s trial finding a specific did not articulate judge concludes, Lo- correctly majority theAs factor statutory mitigating to the related out of context. takes statement pez intent, Feldman Chief Justice Lopez’s she was that only point judge’s trial to remand preferred wrote motion consistently would, finding. entry of sentence that were statements strike, ignore certain the tri- whether determination In our As report. presentence included all of actually considered al points other at several clear she made theories, the Arizona proffered judge did not trial proceeding, relevant. highly opinion Justice’s neglect miti- Chief she would imply that mean comply with failure to judge’s trial. The The adduced gating indi- requirements statutory articulation there- Lopez emphasizes, statement consid- failed to might have or con- that she speculation cates fore, not introduce does *18 a miti- intent as specific in context lack of Lopez’s read the it is er when fusion attempt § 13-703 balance. first in the Lopez’s factor gating trial record. entire fails. judge had determined presumption is, trial the Parker if the to That rebut kill intended to actually that either theory, which a second Lopez offers But specific lack of Lopez’s Anthony or that our directs compelling. is more insufficiently mitigating kill to intent sepa- Justice Feldman’s to Chief attention have she should leniency, then for call Arizona Su- concurring opinion rate 13-703(D) that finding §a articulated appeal, direct of his Court’s decision preme judge did the trial effect. Because judge failed the trial noted that which must conclude finding, we any such make finding toas statutorily required make a things happened: either of two one that of Lopez’s mitigating effect potential the by failing statutory error 131, made a state she 174 Ariz. Lopez, v. State mens rea. death, or required finding ultimately to enter a she made a results sufficient by failing federal constitutional error to to death penalty. allow for the consider intent as a factor.1 As the district found in federal possibil- I that latter would conclude the case, can there be little doubt that ity likely, is the more for two reasons. Lopez’s intentional child abuse included noted, Eddings First, requires us to life, disregard Anthony’s reckless suffi- if there is legitimate remand basis for satisfy Eighth cient Amendment re- neglected the finding that sentencer a miti- quirements under Tison. But the conclu- alone, gating factor. Even taken the trial sufficiently sion that had a culpable statutory judge’s failure some raises ambi- guity Tison is not the same Lopez’s satisfy as to whether she included mens rea to mens rea in her aggravation/ mitigation as the conclusion that the circum- holistic balance. Because err we should on the defendant, stances of the crime and of the caution, side of avoiding speculation, the taking account, a limited mens rea into statutory enough failure justify alone is is, justify a penalty. death That the defen- a remand. play dant’s intent should role at dual the compellingly Second—and more sentencing phase. —there Intent relevant likelihood, is a strong commonsensical first instance whether determine record, gains support which that table, death penalty is even on it is trial judge neither the nor state Su relevant in the second instance deter- preme Court believed that intent should whether, balance, mine on aggravating count as a At the factor. time and mitigating characteristics of defen- Lopez’s sentencing, the United States (or dant and crime favor militate in decided En recently Court had against) leniency. The individualized anal- mund, Florida, v. U.S. S.Ct. Eddings ysis requires must include (1982), 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 and had even analysis holistic of whether the character- Arizona, recently more Tison decided istics of the defendant and the circum- 107 S.Ct. 95 L.Ed.2d stances of including defen- (1987). crime— Both of those cases considered justify dant’s penalty. mens a death the role that intent defendant’s should rea— play Eighth in an Amendment determina case, In this strongly implies record tion of penalty whether death is an considered punishment particular excessive for a de role, intent argument in its first as a Enmund held Specifically, that, fendant. Tison challenge. The Arizona Amendment, Eighth under the the defen repeated neglect- then that error general dant have a must intent to kill ing the argument altogether, presumably may given before he be a death sentence. because the court assumed intent Enmund, Tison holding then clarified no longer in light relevant fail- disregard life, reckless for someone’s a Tison ure to bring engage challenge combined with intent to direct con duct endangers that person’s appeal. life and *19 course, majority

1. The here opinion, concludes: “Of man’s the failure to an make intent specifically the did trial court discuss finding, the findings unlike failure to make mitigating Lopez present- of the evidence that non-statutory mitigators, legal related to is a ed, so a failure to factor discuss this does not error, failure, not mere That churlishness. necessarily indicate it was not considered.” therefore, significance has far more than the Maj. Op. 1038. As be clear should from majority opinion assigns to it. this discussion and from Chief Justice Feld- is, phrasing, finding cause of its the as A believed, am- Chief Justice Feldman too Lo- only reference to judge’s The trial 13-703(D). biguous satisfy § The that her pez’s intent was statement draw clear judge’s statement does not a intentionally physically “willfully and intended conclusion as whether care and child entrusted his abused the for his son to die. makes death.” This statement caused his Second, not, § the statement does 13- as clearly finding; a it as Tison perfect sense 703(D) requires, any articulation of include engage Lopez intended to that concludes § finding’s the effect on the overall 13-703 life, endangered Anthony’s in conduct that is, assuming the balance. That even that dangerous the clearly it that and concludes judge’s sufficiently trial statement clarified Anthony’s death. Under conduct caused Lopez did, fact, that intend kill his Tison, Eighth Amend- is all that the son, judge the also trial should have stat- ment demands. resulting explicitly on record —the ed— concluded, As Justice Feldman Chief proffer conclusion that failed falls however, judge’s trial statement the mitigating circumstance. In oth- provide 13-703(D) First, finding. § far short of a words, judge if the trial had considered er it makes grammar the of the statement as a Lopez’s argument factor— to determine impossible difficult if not just challenge and not as Tison —she only to finding attaches whether the intent more. would have said is, That abuse or also to homicide. sum, real transcript the trial raises a only meant judge might trial have that the took ar- possibility judge abused Lopez willfully intentionally and challenge, failing gument only abuse as Tison Anthony and that the intentional unintentionally) argument to consider the same its sec- actually (though perhaps Indeed, statutory mitigator. role Anthony’s On the other ond as a caused death. hand, support except may transcript provides meant she have — judge intentionally by speculation specif- the trial willfully physically and —that ically mens rea as a Anthony willfully inten- considered abused and and Be- tionally Anthony’s death.2 factor. caused sentencing transcript gives sentencing tionally” Interestingly, transcript

2. entry, independent lasting signif- which phrase the minute both of include slightly finding, punctuate finding icance, intent might read to attach to such that be missing important differently; an comma is following phrase. ab- both halves sentencing entry. In the from the minute comma in the written order sence quoted hearing transcript, judge is the trial "willfully significant and intention- then since "[Tjhe following commas: part ally” of the immedi- becomes seamless doubt that the de- beyond finds a reasonable ately following phrase, "physically abused child, fendant, Anthony, will- the father of the phrase to his care." That child entrusted fully intentionally, physically abused separated finding by murder then his child entrusted to his care caused "and,” "willfully conjoining that the such however, entry, death.” In the minute might carry intentionally” language FINDS, judge wrote: “THE COURT the "and” to attach to the homicide. over MURDER, be- to Count FIRST DEGREE Reading entry, which is the find- the minute defendant, yond that the a reasonable doubt might have been herself Anthony, willfully and in- father the child highly possi- punctuating, it seems involved in tentionally physically en- abused the child finding attached ble that the intent caused death.” to his care and trusted abuse, not to murder. "willfully following and inten- The comma *20 B without involving a malicious intent on the part of the intoxicated driver. On direct the Arizona appeal, Supreme majority Court’s opinion implicitly con- For purposes, our it is highly therefore firmed this view of the trial record and relevant that the Supreme Arizona Court ultimately repeated the error. The Su- relied solely on the last two factors when preme opinion strongly implied Court’s upholding finding of heinousness and majority specific found no depravity intent in Lopez’s case. The court’s kill, but the opinion proceeded to ex- conclusion that none of the first three fac clude that finding from its consideration of tors were present in this case strongly mitigating factors. implies that the court found little to no of specific intent to kill. Id. In fact, the evidence that the Arizona Su preme

Although support Court cited to Supreme finding its Court senselessness specific made no was the finding,3 very intent evidence that major- Chief ity Justice Feldman opinion when strongly arguing did cited indicate its belief probably did Lopez did not intend to kill not intend to kill Anthony. his son. In the words the Supreme The court’s implication to that effect came majority opinion: Court’s “The analysis murder of its of a statutory aggravating Anthony was senseless. Lopez factor that admitted based was on the finding that that after given he had Anthony a bath Lopez was in a depraved “heinous and putting him, lotion on the infant state of mind when he beat Anthony.” ” ‘peed, I so smacked him.’ Lopez, 174 Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 847 P.2d 1078. As Ariz. at 847 P.2d 1078. This finding is the Supreme noted, Court there are five exactly the same as the concurring opin may circumstances that support finding finding ion’s that “the probable most ex “(1) and depravity: heinousness planation for the child’s death was [not (2) murderer’s relishing murder; that Lopez intended to Anthony, kill but the infliction gratuitous violence on the rather] Defendant enraged, became (3) victim; the needless mutilation of the control, lost and beat the quite child seri (4) victim; the senselessness of the mur- ously.” (Feld Id. at 847 P.2d 1078 (5) der; and, helplessness of the vic- man, C.J., specially concurring). short, tim.” Id. (citing Gretzler, State v. majority apparently 42, 52, Ariz. (1983)). 659 P.2d The support could not the aggravating factor of factors, first three of those if present, heinousness and depravity by reference to would certainly specific demonstrate a in- intent; evidence of on contrary, kill; only tent to someone intent killing on majority opinion implicitly agreed with the act, would relish the gratuitously beat the concurrence’s murder, view that the while victim, and needlessly mutilate body. senseless, likely unintentional. But the last two circumstances —the sense- lessness of the murder and helpless- The upshot of this discussion is that the ness of the victim—do not any- indicate Arizona Supreme logic Court’s confirms thing about the specific defendant’s intent. the view that this case probably involved— A vehicular manslaughter of an pas- infant and the probably found—inten- senger, for example, clearly would involve tional resulting death, abuse not inten- the senseless death of a helpless victim tional murder. Although Lopez’s mens noted, 3. As therefore, did not raise a Tison chal- did specific not even make a Tison lenge Court, appeal. direct finding. *21 by majority’s culpable complete to allow a as indicated sufficiently rea was under Tison and to support death sentence failure to include intent its discussion of depravity, finding a of heinousness evidence, the for mitigating disagree- basis that courts found Lo- of the state neither a question ment must have been as to for son die. actually intended his pez statutory whether mens rea counts as a majority at all. The of the Ari- mitigator Supreme apparently zona Court believed accepting that did implicitly After noted, previously that it did not. As that son, the Arizona not intend kill time, belief was not unfathomable at the majority opinion then Supreme Court’s given Supreme that the United States that factor from its completely excluded recently given had mens Court rea of mitigating evidence. consideration unique penalty role death decision mak- noted that majority opinion “[t]he ing. might The Arizona majority mitigation vast have believed that Emnund and Tison re- being on his presented Lopez centered aggravation/mit- moved mens rea from the fact good parent and on the that balance, igation that factor an giving en- inap- acted cared for children never tirely separate role. Lopez, with them.” 174 Ariz. propriately Nevertheless, by Lopez’s in- excluding opinion then 847 P.2d 1078. The argument tent from its consideration of easily mitigating argu- that disposed of factors, rejection opinion affirming majority the trial court’s ment— Eddings by noting character Lopez’s committed even clearer viola- evidence— that had conviction for child another Although tion than trial court. molestation, the trial which before any transcript listing trial does not include But judge at the time. Su- thereby making it mitigating factors — of Lo- preme rejection review Court’s to determine which fac- somewhat difficult pez’s comprised character evidence its en- actually tors trial judge’s entered the mitigating factors. In tire consideration of process Supreme Court’s thought —the paragraphs majority in which the three majority opinion specifically mentions the opinion mitigation, there considered considered and mitigating factors Lopez’s mention mens rea. single (and clearly neglects Lopez’s Chief Justice Lopez’s argument The absence of intent Feldman’s) argument. intent analysis is par- Court’s ticularly telling light special con- C The entire raison d’etre of currence. Chief conclusion, Feldman’s Chief Justice opinion point was to out Justice Feldman’s opinion important light concurring sheds 13-703(G) § trial required majority opin- judge’s on the trial mitigat- mens rea as consider thought processes. Neither the ion’s majority ing opinion factor. The com- appellate court nor the court found (though silently) rejected that ar- pletely Lopez did intend to Anthony; kill the Su- noted, however, majority As gument. majority preme opinion implied Court’s certainly implicitly agreed with—and made Lopez probably did not intend to kill to rebut —the concurrence’s con- effort Anthony; and neither court made probably clusion that did intend potential finding as to role that son, thereby indicating to murder his analy- in its played or actual lack of intent disagreement between the basis a find- sis factors. Because could not majority the concurrence Rather, mitigation statutorily required have been the factual conclusion. *22 they may give weight rea as by whenever the courts consider mens it no exclud- factor, a the the mitigating ing failure to make such evidence from their consider- ation.”). findings itself to required Eddings is sufficient in The opinion also relied Ohio, 586, presumption rebut the Parker that the on v. Lockett 438 U.S. 98 S.Ct. 2954, (1978), actually Lopez’s proffer. considered explicit- courts 57 L.Ed.2d 973 which Furthermore, case, ly in this the indi- record held the sentencer must consider judge the trial and the “any aspect cates both of a defendant’s character or Arizona in- any Court took record and of the circumstances of the only challenge, tent argument proffers as Tison the offense defendant as a argu- reevaluate neglecting to the same basis a sentence than death.” for less 438 604, mitigating ment in role its second as U.S. at 98 S.Ct. 2954. There is no legitimate indeed, potential factor. There is for reasonable minds to differ on — strong evidence to the support question of whether the defendant’s —record courts, contrary conclusion that both scope intent falls within the of Eddings Eddings, failed consider mens It Lockett. does. §

rea 13-703 balance. The role play dual that mens rea must Particularly given Justice O’Connor’s death penalty cases does not undermine speculation, conclusion; admonition against fact, I would strengthens this it it. conclude that an has demonstrated Eighth The fact Amendment con- Eddings violation. minimum culpability requirement tains a importance demonstrates the critical of the

TV defendant’s mens rea in a death penalty whether, Although decision. question The final under intent’s dual role understand,able AEDPA, makes it that a sentencing the state courts’ consid- failure to might judge er fail to mitigating intent switch hats after mak- factor constitutes unreasonable,”4 ing an an Enmund dual “objectively finding, the role does rather erroneous,” than not make the same simply an “incorrect failure reasonable. or Even after application Eddings. establishing eligibility Lockyer See v. Andrade, 63, death 1166, penalty, Eddings clearly requires 538 U.S. 123 S.Ct. (2003) sentencing judge 155 (citing L.Ed.2d 144 continue evaluat- Williams crime, ing Taylor, 410, 412, including rea, the whole 529 U.S. mens S.Ct. (2000)). determine penalty In whether the 146 L.Ed.2d 389 this death case, actually appropriate there can little it for the individual be doubt that does. de- fendant. held,

Eddings without qualification, that case, process applicable due requires sentencer consid- state law and er all at arguments presented factors that a sentencing defendant proffers. 869 make the state courts’ all S.Ct. failures the more (“The sentencer, First, and the [appellate unreasonable. court] to the extent that the review, may determine weight requirement to be might Lockett have been am- given relevant mitigating But biguous, evidence. requirement same was codi- 4. Because neither trial the Ari- nor that intent is not a factor under zona specific Eddings, made men- I certainty cannot conclude with standard, Eddings tion of the they I my will not did so. I ana- will therefore confine anal- lyze standard, question "contrary ysis under AEDPA’s stricter which allows 2254(d)(1). to” § clause. See U.S.C. Al- reversal if the state courts’ decisions though appears applied that the state application” courts an "involved unreasonable of the entirely legal incorrect standard assum- correct federal rule. Id. As statutes. criminal in Arizona’s fled Gomez; BURNSIDE; Francisco Robert noted, § 13- A.R.S. Feldman Justice Chief Individually, Arnett, on behalf of Ray trial 703(G) requires specifically similarly circum- others “any of and all consider themselves judges to judge’s Lingenfelter; offense.” Ron situated; stances Charles *23 therefore, rea, mens Williams, neglect Individu- Crues; R. Charles misapplication only a was and all ally, themselves on behalf also a defiance but precedent Court situated, similarly Plaintiffs- others unreasonable- statute, enhancing the state Appellants, Eddings violation. ness of clearly proffered Second, Lopez —in- CORPORATION, PACIFIC KIEWIT miti- as a rea deed, mens emphasized —his Does, Corporation; Delaware Lopez focused Although factor. gating Defendants- through 100 inclusive. during the good his character primarily Appellees. coun- hearing, his mitigation aggravation/ exclusively on intent No. 04-57134. almost sel focused hearing. sentencing throughout of Appeals, States United trial to the fact, statement in his last Ninth Circuit. imposed, was the sentence before 16, 2007. Argued Feb. attorney said: important single most the one I think 20, 2007. June Submitted case, here, is that there’s in this thing 20, 2007. Filed June all, George that showing, at been ... I baby to die[.] that ever intended everything points say that

would intent, if were-his

contrary. That you facts before be different

there would circumstances, I think

and, these under enough by punished to be going

he’s has the Court sentence

getting the impose. argument Lopez’s intent

Given most single one thing “the

the last —and of- attorney his thing” important —that judge’s and mitigation, fered failure Supreme Court’s

the Arizona objectively unreasonable.

consider it conclude

I would therefore AEDPA on relief under

entitled to claim, grant I and would Eddings

certified respect to corpus habeas writ of Ari- claim, case to the remanding his resentencing.

zona courts

Case Details

Case Name: George Lopez v. Dora B. Schriro, Arizona Department of Corrections Director Megan Savage, Warden
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 20, 2007
Citation: 491 F.3d 1029
Docket Number: 06-99000
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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