Thе central issue in this case is whether a seaman may be awarded punitive damages in addition to reasonable аttorney’s fees for the arbitrary and willful withholding of maintenance and cure benefits. Other circuits have reached different results on the issue, considered in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Vaughan v. Atkinson,
This seaman’s suit was brought by George Hines under the general maritime law to recover damages for wrongful termination of maintenance and сure. Hines was injured on January 17, 1985 when he was struck in the mid-back by the counterweight of a crane while working on a vessel owned by the defendant J.A. LaPorte, Inc. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, LaPorte’s insurance carrier and agent, han *1189 died Hines’ claim. Liberty Mutual terminated Hines’ maintenance benefits on April 22, 1985 when Hines became re-employed and refused to рay for cure after July 30, 1985, notwithstanding Hines’ continued treatment for back and neck pain. The district court found that Liberty Mutual terminated cure despite a lack of information concerning whether Hines had reached maximum medical cure. Hines has been unable to return to work since September 11, 1985.
On a finding of an arbitrary and bad faith breach of the duty to furnish maintenance and cure, the district court awarded $5,000 in punitive damages and attorney’s fees of $10,150 to Hines.
On appeаl, LaPorte contends that, as a matter of law, a court cannot award both attorney’s fees and punitive damages. The Supreme Court in
Vaughan v. Atkinson,
There is no definitive precedent in this Circuit. In
Complaint of Merry Shipping, Inc.,
The other Circuits are divided. The Fifth Circuit in
Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,
In contrast, the Second Circuit reached a different result in
Kraljic v. Berman Enterprises, Inc.,
Of course, Vaughan is not dispositive because in that casе only a claim for attorney’s fees was asserted, not separate claims for both fees and punitive damages. Following the guidance of Merry Shipping, supra, it seems clear that even if exemplary in nature, attorney’s fees, if fixed reasonably tо cover only a proper fee award, would not foreclose the punitive purpose of a punitive damage award. We follow the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit and hold that both reasonable attorney’s fees and punitive dаmages may be legally awarded in a proper case.
LaPorte argues that the evidence does not suрport the court’s: (1) award of counsel fees and punitive damages, (2) award of $5,000 in general damages, and (3) award оf counsel fees in the amount of $10,150. Since the liability for fees and punitive damages depends upon the conduct of the defendant, the case turns on whether the findings of fact as to that conduct are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
*1190 The district court’s finding that Liberty Mutual handled Hines’ claim in an arbitrary and willful manner is amply supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. Although there is no bright line to measure arbitrary conduct, the Fifth Circuit has identified examples of willfulness meriting punitive damages and counsel fees:
(1) laxness in investigating a claim; (2) termination of benefits in response to the seaman’s retention of counsel or refusal of a settlement offer; [and] (3) failure to reinstate benefits after diagnosis оf an ailment previously not determined medically.
Tullos, 750 F.2d at 388. The district court found that Liberty Mutual’s conduct closely matched thеse examples.
Subsumed in this determination is the correctness of the award of general damages. Seamen have a claim for compensation for the suffering and for the physical injury which follow when the failure to give maintenanсe and cure aggravates the illness.
Vaughan,
Finally, LaPorte argues that the district court’s award of counsel fees in the amount of $10,150 is not supported by the evidence. Hines did not submit evidence as to the actual hours expended by his counsel. The district cоurt, while noting that the introduction of time records would have been preferable, nevertheless set the attorney’s fee award on the basis of expert testimony concerning the estimated hours expended and reasonable hourly compensation. After reconsidering the expert testimony, the court amended the judgment to reflect an increase in the attorney’s fee award from $6,000 to $10,150. Since the amount is well supported by this evidence, we will not remand for strict adherence to the normal procedures.
AFFIRMED.
