George HAMILTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William ELEBY, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 08-4499.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Aug. 12, 2009.
Even if reasonable minds could differ on whether, by virtue of the extensiveness of the evidence of the details of Bartmеss‘s murder, there was a risk that the jury placed undue emphasis on the actual murder of David Bartmess in convicting Mann of offenses that did not actually require that Bartmess be murdered, that possibility strikes us as insufficient to warrant habeas relief. It bears reminding that Mann faces a substantial burden of proof to demonstrate that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Mann must demonstrate not just that the state trial court erred in admitting evidence of Bartmess‘s murder, but also that the error was so egregious as to deny him a fundamеntally fair trial. On top of that, Mann must demonstrate that the state courts, in finding no error, issued a decision that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. This, Mann has failed to do.
III.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that Mann is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Mann has not demonstrated that the state trial court committed error, much less error denying a fundamentally fair trial, in admitting evidence of the actual murder of David Bartmess. Mann has not demonstrated that the Michigan appellate court‘s decision finding no abuse of discretion resulted in a decision which was an unreasonable application of сlearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court. Although an argument could be made that evidence of the details of Bartmess‘s murder, although relevant and not unfairly prejudicial, was a bit more extensive than necessary, that is not an argument that рrevails in habeas corpus. The relevant inquiry is whether the trial court‘s admission of evidence amounted to an error so egregious as to deny Mann his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial and whether the state courts’ resolution of the issue resultеd in a decision that contravened or unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent. In this case, those inquiries must be answered in the negative.
Accordingly, the district court‘s decision finding that Mann was not entitled to habeas corpus relief is AFFIRMED.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Jack Bendolph—an Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) official—appeals the district court‘s denial of qualified immunity on Plaintiff George Hamilton‘s civil-rights action against him. We affirm.
I.
The following facts are undisputed for the purposes of this appeal. Hamilton was an inmate at Ohio‘s Ross Correctional Institution (RCI) in November 2003, when he received the following letter:
We knew you been back there for a while It‘s just a matter of time before we get you. You sliр threw our hands before, Porky But it‘s a small world isn‘t it? You are a walking ghost, will see you soon won‘t be long. Stop asking Questions about us. They tell us you‘re a dead man walking. Your friend for life.
The letter bore two lightening bolts, emblematic of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang. Hamiltоn reported the letter to RCI staff, asserting that the Aryan Brotherhood had taken out a hit on him because documents from his cell had been used to prosecute Daryl Bocook—who, along with Daryl‘s brother, Jesse, is a member of the
The RCI staff then initiated a referral for Protective Control (PC), which would separate Hamilton from the general prison population for his own safеty. See
The Bureau‘s сhief, Defendant William Eleby, did not review Hamilton‘s request, because he had delegated PC-placement authority to his assistant, Bendolph, and another staff member. Bendolph questioned the risk that Hamilton faced, because Hamilton had kept Cremeans—the Bocooks’ sister—on his visitor list, and because some of the RCI investigative staff thought that Hamilton had sent himself the threatening letter. Bendolph reasoned that any problems were localized to RCI, and that moving Hamilton to another prison would resolvе them. Accordingly, Bendolph denied PC placement and instead approved Hamilton‘s transfer to the general population of a different prison, the Warren Correctional Institution (WCI).
Hamilton was transferred to WCI on December 17, 2003. There he met Sаin, an inmate who turned out to be a “leprechaun,” which is a member of the Aryan Brotherhood without tattoos or other identifying marks. On July 3, 2004, Hamilton accepted some “hooch“—homemade alcohol—from Sain, who then told Hamilton to go into the yard‘s rеcreation shed. Inside, members of the Aryan Brotherhood attacked and brutally assaulted Hamilton. The ambush left Hamilton with impaired senses of smell, vision, hearing, and taste, as well as mental-health problems and headaches.
Hamilton brought this
This appeal followed.
II.
A.
We review de novo the district court‘s denial of summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds. Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2008). An interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified
Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‘” Pearson v. Callahan, — U.S. —, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). It does not apply if the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the violation. Harrison, 539 F.3d at 517. This court has also examined whеther “what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights.” Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
The right at issue here is the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, which among other things requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates[.]” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984)). Although Farmer clearly established that a prison official‘s failure to prevent harm to an inmate can implicate the Eighth Amendment, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another ... translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim‘s safety.” Id. at 834. Rather, to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on a failure to prevent harm, Hamilton “must show that he [was] incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm” (the “objective component“), and that Bendolph acted with “deliberate indifference” to that risk (the “subjective component“). Id. “Deliberate indifference” is a state of mind akin to criminal recklessness: “the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
B.
We first consider whether Hamilton was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. After documents from his cell wеre used to prosecute Daryl Bocook—an Aryan Brotherhood member—for murder, Hamilton received a death threat bearing the Aryan Brotherhood‘s symbol. He further learned, first-hand from the Bocooks’ sister, that the Aryan Brotherhood had taken out а hit on him. Hamilton also maintains that Aryan Brotherhood members had previously “broke [his] face” and attempted to stab him at a different prison. This record permits a finding that Hamilton faced a substantial risk of serious harm in RCI‘s general population, thereby meeting the objective component of his claim.
We turn next to the subjective component, namely, whether Bendolph was both aware of facts from which he could have inferred that Hamilton faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and actually drew that inference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Bendolph was undisputedly aware of the threatening letter, the Committee‘s findings, and the recommendations of both the Committee and the warden that Hamilton be placed in PC. Moreover—and most importantly—Ben-
But even if Bendolph drew the inference that Hamilton faced a substantial risk of serious hаrm, however, he “may be found free from liability if [he] responded reasonably to the risk[.]” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Bendolph argues that, for several reasons, his decision to transfer Hamilton to WCI‘s general population was a reasonable response to the risk that Hamiltоn faced. First, Bendolph says that the Committee‘s belief that Hamilton probably wrote the death threat himself, and the fact that Hamilton kept Cremeans on his approved-visitor list despite his avowed fear of her brothers, weighed against concluding that Hamilton faced a substantial risk of serious harm. That may well be true, but those facts do not weigh enough to foreclose that conclusion. Second, taking the death threat on its face, Bendolph maintains that the statement, “[w]e knew you been back there awhile” supports his conclusion that Hamilton‘s problem was localized to RCI. Appellants’ Br. at 9 (emphasis in original). But “back there” could mean prison in general as much as a specific facility, and Bendolph acknowledged that the Aryan Brothеrhood can convey a “hit” from one prison to another. That acknowledgment likewise undermines Bendolph‘s third point, which is that his actions were reasonable because he transferred Hamilton to a facility where he “had no institutional sepаrations from any inmate.” Id. Fourth, Bendolph argues that WCI “housed one of the two PC units in the ODRC system, which would serve as a reminder to Hamilton that if the transfer did not solve the problem ... he could always renew the PC request.” Id. But that argument begs the question whether Hamilton should have even needed to renew the request. And finally, Bendolph argues that the reasonableness of his response is demonstrated by the fact that Hamilton was not assaulted for six months after his transfer to WCI. That too might weigh in Bendolph‘s favor in the jury‘s determination of rеasonableness; but the facts of this case themselves suggest that prison hits sometimes take time to carry out. The six-month delay, therefore, is not enough to take away from the jury the question whether Bendolph‘s response was reasonable.
The district court‘s denial of qualified immunity is affirmed.