A mineral lease signed in 1969 requires Peabody Coal Company to pay a royalty based on the coal’s “sales price”. During the 1970s Congress enacted two excise taxes. One, for the benefit of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, is 55<t per ton of surface-mined coal, with a cap at 4.4% of the coal’s selling price. 26 U.S.C. § 4121. (The amount of this tax has varied since its enactment in 1978; 55<c is the current rate.) The other, designated a “reclamation fee” by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, is 35c per ton of surface-mined coal, capped at 10% of “the value of the coal at the *257 mine”. 30 U.S.C. § 1232(a). In 1983 Peabody began to charge its customers a “mine closing and final reclamation payment” of 25$ per ton. Peabody’s invoices list a per-ton charge for coal, the two taxes, and the mine closing fee. In an invoice that Peabody calls typical, the charge for coal was $28,635 per ton, and the three additional charges were $1.10 per ton. Peabody paid royalties only on the coal charge, which represented 96.3% of the invoice total.
In this suit under the diversity jurisdiction, plaintiffs (assignees of the original lessors’ royalty interests) contend that the two taxes and the mine closing fee are part of the “sales price” for royalty-calculation purposes. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on this theory but rejected their further contention that Peabody defrauded them. To arrive at a judgment the district court also had to select a statute of limitations. Plaintiffs contend that the period is 20 years because this is a suit on a written contract; Peabody contends that it is 6 because an underpaid mineral royalty is delinquent rent in Indiana (whose law governs); the district court chose 8, adopting Peabody’s position but adding 2 years because these plaintiffs were members of the class in an abortive suit against Peabody in Kentucky. The final judgment is about $88,-000, plus $67,000 in prejudgment interest.
Before we take up the merits, a few words about jurisdiction are in order. The complaint alleges plaintiffs’ residence rather than their citizenship. This defect is fixed by a proposed amendment tendered after the oral argument on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Post-argument motions explored a second jurisdictional issue: a national banking association, as trustee, is among the plaintiffs. The citizenship of a trust is the citizenship of the trustee.
Navarro Savings Association v. Lee,
I
The lease defines “sales price” unhelpfully as the “average invoice price of coal mined, removed and sold”. Are excise taxes part of the “average invoice price”? In one sense this is a trivial question. Of course they are. They appear on the invoice as part of the price the customer must pay. But the idea that a mine operator must pay the mineral owner a royalty on taxes, as opposed to coal, is jarring, and Peabody insists that the parties could not have contemplated this result in 1969. (The “mine closing” charge does not appear to represent an excise tax, but the parties make nothing of this. Like the parties, we treat all three surcharges as excise taxes.)
A tax lowers the demand for coal, and its burden is distributed according to the elasticity of demand. ■ The district court supposed that demand for coal is perfectly inelastic, and if so buyers bear the whole tax and sellers are unaffected. Richard A. Posner, *258 Economic Analysis of Law 525-29 (5th ed.1998); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Incidence Analysis and the Supreme Court: An Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1982 S.Ct. Econ. Rev. 69. If demand is not perfectly inelastic, then the sellers bear some of the loss, which participants on the seller’s side normally would share (or would have so agreed in advance, had they thought about the possibility). But if the excise taxes are included in “sales price,” then if elasticity is less than 1 the mineral owners will be better off and Peabody worse off. (If elasticity exceeds 1, both the mineral owners and Peabody can be worse off, because total revenues will fall.)
Consider a simple' example. Suppose coal sells for $10 per ton, the royalty paid to the mineral owners is $1 per ton (10% of sales price), and Peabody makes a profit of $1 per ton. Now Congress adds an excise tax of $1 per ton, so that (at first approximation) the price rises to $11. If the tax is part of the “sales price” then the mineral owners’ royalty rises to $1.10 per ton and Peabody’s profit falls to 90$ per ton. If because of elastic demand Peabody cannot raise the price to $11 (or sells fewer tons at that price than at $10) then • Peabody’s share will be less than 90<t per ton, it will make that return on fewer tons, or both. Economists believe that many mineral and (other) property taxes fall on the land owner, because real property lacks alternative uses. See Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave,
Public Finance in Theory and Practice
412-13, 419-20 (5th ed.1989). This implies that if mineral owners and mine operators could bargain in advance they would be likely to assign the economic effects of future taxes to the mineral owners. (The tax is not on any asset specific to coal
extraction,
so operators that can bargain with many mineral owners won’t deal with those who
seek to
shift its incidence
to wine
operators.) A pact that makes the mineral owner better off, and the mine operator worse off, as a result of a tax makes little economic sense—plaintiffs have not suggested why they would have bargained for this result, or why a mine operator would have agreed to it—and leads to caution in employing a plain-language reading of the text. Especially when plaintiffs agree that a
sales
tax, nominally imposed on the buyer but collected and remitted by the seller, would not be part of the “sales price” under the contract. The choice between a tax formally on the seller (as these two taxes are, cf.
Gurley v. Rhoden,
But it takes more than an economic puzzle to justify giving an unusual spin to contractual language. Contracts allocate risks, and judicial decisions changing those allocations after the fact not only lead to expensive litigation (as each side invests in the pursuit of advantage) but also make the institution of contract less useful
ex ante.
Parties to contracts may prefer simple-minded textualism to costly disputes later on, even knowing that a plain-language reading sometimes goes wrong, and they may make adjustments—in other parts of the contract, or in the royalty rate—to compensate for this possibility. Or perhaps they just made a mistake and now rue the choice. Learned Hand remarked that “in commercial transactions it does not in the end promote justice to seek strained interpretations in aid of those who do not protect themselves”
(James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.,
*259 One of Peabody’s two themes emphasizes “of coal” in the formula “average invoice price of coal”. The excise taxes were not part of the price of the coal; they were surcharges. Yet this line of argument proves far too much. It gives Peabody the power to curtail royalties by changing how it designs the invoice. Recall our example, in which coal was $10 per ton. Peabody’s position implies that if it broke out the components — coal $3, labor $3, machinery $3, environmental precautions and waste removal $1 — it would need to pay a royalty only on the component explicitly identified as “coal.” That’s nót a plausible reading of the contract, especially not given that other taxes (income and payroll taxes, plus the sales and excise taxes Peabody pays on the purchase of equipment) and the costs of satisfying the epa’s environmental regulations are indubitably part of the “average invoice price of coal”.
Peabody’s other theme is that federal excise taxes on coal were introduced after 1969, which, Peabody insists, necessarily renders the contract ambiguous. How could the parties have resolved the treatment of nonexistent taxes?, Peabody asks. Peabody wants us to deem the treatment of excise taxes an omitted term, on which “the court will admit evidence to show how the parties would have dealt with the contingency had they made specific provision for it.”.
Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft,
Yet contracts often handle contingencies. Peabody’s own contracts with the utilities that use its coal to make electricity permit it to add excise taxes to the price of coal (which is why the invoices were structured as they were). Many of these were negotiated before 1977, when the first federal excise tax was enacted, so the contention that no contract signed in 1969 can mean anything with respect-to excise taxes falls flat. The 1969 contract does not address taxes with the same directness as the sales contracts Peabody negotiated, but plaintiffs insist that this is because it did not have to; the “average invoice price” formula does the necessary work.
What evidence has Peabody to undermine this conclusion? It does not want to argue industry custom or usage of trade; its fundamental position is that there was in 1969 no relevant custom or usage, and anyway the formula “average invoice price” is an unusual one. (A search of online legal databases turned up no references to this formula.) Peabody does not want to offer parol evidence of the negotiations preceding the contract’s formation; its position that no one thought about the subject is incompatible with this kind of evidence. Nor does Peabody seek to show how other mineral leases from the 1960s handle taxes, when the parties dealt with that possibility expressly. Such evidence could enable a court to address the question posed in
Amoco Oil,
but it is not on the horizon. (Documents in the record suggest that mineral leases from the 1990s cover excise taxes explicitly; some include the taxes in the royalty base while others do not.) Evidence about the beliefs, wishes, hopes, and fears of its negotiators and managers would be inadmissible, for only objective evidence may be used to elaborate on a contract’s meaning. See
AM International, Inc. v. Graphic Management Associates, Inc.,
The sort of objective evidence that Peabody
does
proffer has no bearing on the meaning of a 1969 contract. For example, Peabody wants to argue to a jury that Congress differentiated the excise taxes from the price of coal. Each statute limits the tax to a percentage of the price or value of coal; this supposes, Peabody believes, that the “price” of coal does not include the tax. This evidence would be unhelpful — and not only because federal judges do not hold trials so that jurors may deliberate on the meaning of federal statutes. See
DePaepe v. General Motors Corp.,
In the end, the parties do not dispute any issue of material fact; they just offer different interpretations of their agreement. Whatever meaning the contract conveys must be found within its four corners plus the uncontested economic context (such as the tax provisos in Peabody’s sales contracts). That the task of drawing out this meaning is difficult does not transfer the job from a judge to a jury. See
PSI Energy, Inc. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc.,
Context implies that the phrase “average invoice price” includes excise taxes. These parties gave a good deal of thought to the potential for change in the coal market during the contract’s lengthy term. Peabody must pay a royalty of 12$ per ton, plus 10% of the amount by which the “sales price” exceeds a “base price.” The base price was pegged at $2.28 per ton in 1969, but it does not stay there. It rises (or falls) as the cost of mine labor rises (or falls). There is a separate exclusion of 50$ per ton for coal shipped on barges at the Yankeetown Dock Corporation. That, however, is the end of the list. Higher wages for workers thus yield a higher “base price” (and prevent a change in royalties even if the labor costs are fully passed on to Peabody’s customers), but higher costs of heavy earth-moving equipment do not change the base price. If Peabody substitutes capital for labor it must pay greater royalties than if it substitutes labor for capital. Peabody pays many taxes that do not affect the “base price,” and which therefore lead to greater royalties for the mineral owners if the taxes affect other firms in the energy business and permit an increase in the price of coal without reducing consumption so much that total income falls. Equally apropos, since 1969 Peabody has been required to follow an increasingly expensive regimen of regulatory constraints designed to make the coal business cleaner and healthier. The Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1970 were but opening salvos. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 is only one among many follow-up statutes, cercla, SARA, RCRA, and the rest of the alphabet soup of environmental regulation all postdate this contract. Sometimes the federal government levies taxes to fund environmental cleanup, but more often it requires firms in the business to bear these costs directly. Many of the costs of environmental compliance require capital expenditures (or outlays to third-party contractors, such as environmental engineers) and therefore do not affect the “base price” even though they elevate the “sales price.” It is- safe to say that these costs of environmental compliance and cleanup substantially exceed 35$ per ton, yet all (other than labor outlays) increase the gap between “base price” and “sales price”, and therefore increase plaintiffs’ royalties even as they decrease Peabody’s profits. We observed above that the choice between an excise tax on the seller and a sales tax on the buyer (but collected by the seller) is arbitrary; the political choice between a tax and additional regulations can be equally arbitrary. But this contract unambiguously includes regulatory costs in the royalty base, which implies that excise taxes in lieu of regulations also are in that base. This contract effectively requires Peabody to pay royalties on its gross billings, less the “base price” and the Yankeetown barge allowance. Excise taxes are omitted from both the “base price” and the barge allowance. It would not have required prescience for parties to subtract taxes as well, had they wanted to do so; even in 1969, death and taxes had a certain inevitability.
One more consideration supports this conclusion. Although few of Peabody’s con
*261
tracts use “average invoice price of coal mined, removed and sold” as a benchmark, many more use the term “gross realization”. Peabody’s brief treats these terms as equivalent, which suggests that the treatment of excise taxes under “gross realization” contracts is instructive. A number of contracts with Indian tribes define “gross realization” as “the gross sales price at the mining site without any deduction therefrom of overhead sales costs or other business expenses.” The Interior Board of Land Appeals concluded that the excise taxes must be included in the “gross sales price” because the buyer pays the tax as part of the price, even if the United States is the ultimate recipient.
Peabody Coal Co.,
53 I.B.L.A. 261 (1981);
Peabody Coal Co. v. Hopi Indian Tribe,
72 I.B.L.A. 337 (1983). A panel of arbitrators reached the same conclusion regarding a commercial coal contract containing that term, and several state and federal judges in states other than Indiana have done likewise. Peabody emphasizes that none of these cases has been tested on appeal, and that one of the gross realization cases ended in its favor when a jury concluded that the excise taxes are not part of “gross sales price”.
Willits v. Peabody Coal Co.,
No. 4:90-CV-34-O(C) (W.D.Ky. Mar. 12, 1998), appeal pending (6th Cir.). We do not put any weight on these decisions, for we must decide the question independently.
Salve Regina College v. Russell,
II
Plaintiffs want to add punitive damages to their winnings. Indiana does not permit the use of punitive damages to redress breach of contract, see
Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc.,
Unlike the contract claim, which was decided on summary judgment, the fraud claim was dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). One ground of this decision—the district court’s observation that plaintiffs did not plead reliance on Peabody’s silence—is mistaken. Complaints need not spell out every element of a legal theory; that’s the big difference between notice and code pleading. See
Bennett v. Schmidt,
Plaintiffs stress that under Indiana law a non-fiduciary may have a duty to reveal information to its trading partner, if it has superior access to the facts and the other side is entitled to rely on its disclosure.
Colonial Penn Insurance Co. v. Guzorek,
Indiana disfavors punitive damages even when outright lies have been established. “The correct standard ... is whether ... the defendant acted with malice, fraud, gross negligence or oppressiveness which was not the result of a mistake of fact or law, honest error of judgment, overzealousness, mere negligence, or other human failing.”
Budget Car Sales v. Stott,
Only a few words need be said about plaintiffs’ contention that the district court should have compelled Peabody to produce certain documents in discovery before dismissing the complaint. Discovery and Rule 12(b)(6) are unrelated. A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it would be impossible to prevail, consistent with the pleading. Application of this standard requires the court to assume that the plaintiffs will be able to prove whatever allegations they care to make, and we have assumed for purposes of this opinion that plaintiffs would be able to prove everything they sought to establish by discovery. What they wanted to obtain—Peabody’s internal documents showing that at least some of its executives and lawyers viewed its handling of the excise taxes as problematic under “gross realization” contracts, and papers from the settlement Peabody reached with Beaver Dam—is *263 more in the nature of litigation analysis than proof of fraud. Large corporations generate many options papers, but the choice of one option over another in a world of legal uncertainty is a long way from proof of fraud. Plaintiffs’ fraud claim fails because they were not lied to, because their contract specifies what information Peabody was to disclose (and when), and because there really is legal uncertainty about the meaning of the contract. None of these is undercut in the slightest by the documents plaintiffs wanted to use.
Ill
Plaintiffs began this suit in 1992, fifteen years after Congress enacted the first of the excise taxes. They want damages for the entire period, but the district court limited the recovery to eight years—six from the statute of limitations the court selected, plus two years of tolling. We’ll come to tolling eventually but start with the question whether the basic period of limitations is six years or twenty.
A
Two statutes are in the picture. I.C. § 34-11-2-7 (formerly I.C. § 34-1-2-1) provides:
The following actions must be commenced within six (6) years after the cause of action accrues:
(1) Actions on accounts and contracts not in writing.
(2) Actions for use, rents, and profits of real property.
(3) Actions for injuries to property other than personal property, damages for detention of personal property and for recovering possession of personal property.
(4) Actions for relief against frauds.
And I.C. § 34-11-2-11 (formerly I.C. § 34-1—2—2(6)) provides:
An action upon contracts in writing other than those for the payment of money, and including all mortgages other than chattel mortgages, deeds of trust, judgments of courts of record, and for the recovery of the possession of real estate, must be commenced within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrues. However, an action upon contracts in writing other than those for the payment of money entered into .before September 1, 1982, not including chattel mortgages, deeds of trust, judgments of courts of record, or for the recovery of the possession of real estate, the action must be commenced within twenty (20) years after the cause of action accrues.
The district court concluded that plaintiffs’ action is one “for use, rents, and profits of real property”, § 34-11-2-7(2), and therefore covers only the period of six years before its filing. Plaintiffs deny that coal royalties are “rents” or “profits” of real property, but they would be content with a conclusion that if § 34-11-2-7(2) applies, then so does § 34-11-2-11 (the lease is in writing); and because the lease was signed before September 1, 1982, this statute supplies a 20-year period. When two statutes of limitations apply, plaintiffs contend, Indiana uses the longer. See
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Fattore Construction Co.,
Both statutes cover underpayment of mineral royalties under a lease. Because the lease is a “contract in writing other than [one] for the payment of money entered into before September 1, 1982,” the 20-year period of § 34-11-2-11 applies directly. Because the contract is a lease, providing for (in its own terms) “royalties or rentals”, § 34-11-2-7(2) fits equally well. Mineral leases
*264
often use rents and royalties as synonyms, see
Bicknell Minerals, Inc. v. Tilly,
Thus we arrive at the battle of maxims— and what an unedifying spectacle it is when each side lobs volleys with its own legal canons. Take the maxim that the more specific statute prevails. That’s all well and good when one statute is a subset of another. Suppose § 34-11-2-7(2) applied only to written leases. Then every suit within the scope of § 34-11-2-7(2) would be within § 34-11-2-11, and unless Indiana applied § 34-11-2-7(2) to suits seeking rents or profits from real estate, the statute would yield to § 34-11-2-11 in every case. When one statute applies to a subset of another, the canon about general and specific statutes does not really do anything; all the useful work is done by the presumption that every statute serves a function. When the two statutes apply to intersecting sets, however, neither is more specific (or perhaps both are more specific). Section 34-11-2-7(2) applies to every action concerning rents and profits from real property, whether or not the contract is in writing; § 34-11-2-11 applies to every action based on a written contract, whether or not the contract concerns real property. Which is more “specific”? That depends on which end of the telescope you look through. Compare
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,
Which leaves the fundamental question. Like the district court, we think that § 34-11-2-7(2) must win the conflict between periods of limitations. Otherwise it has become surplusage, and the anti-surplusage canon is in Indiana’s arsenal.
Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. Chemical Waste Management,
B
Indiana offers only a little more guidance on the final issue: whether the period of limitations was tolled during the pendency of a putative class action filed in 1990 on behalf of Peabody’s lessors. After that suit had been pending for three years, it was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Kelce v. Peabody Coal Co.,
No. 90-0148-0,
Peabody asks us to limit
American Pipe
to cases in which, after the order refusing to certify a class, the members of the class intervene in the original case, but neglects to mention that this possibility was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in
Crown, Cork & Seal,
Well, then, should it matter that
Kelce
was dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction rather than because class status was inappropriate? Both
Armstrong
and
Basch v. Ground Round, Inc.,
AFFIRMED
