38 N.Y.S. 643 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1896
In the month of February, 1868, William R. Clarkson procured from the New York Life Insurance Company a policy of insurance
William R. Clarkson was a merchant residing in Plainfield, New Jersey. His age at the time this policy was taken out does not appear. Jennie Clarkson was his only daughter, and was, at the time the policy was bought, four years of age. At the age of twenty-six years she married the plaintiff, and died a year or so afterwards, and on the 27th of June, 1891, her father surviving her. He lived until the 16th day of March, 1895, when he died. Geoffroy, the plaintiff, was appointed the administrator of his wife, the daughter of William R. Clarkson, and the present defendants are the executors of William R. Clarkson by his will.
At the time of his death Mr. Clarkson left his wife surviving him, having had no children except Jennie Clarkson. After Mr. Clarkson’s death the plaintiff made the proper proof to entitle him to the payment of the sum agreed to be paid by the policy, but he was unable to produce the policy itself, which was in the possession of the executors of Mr. Clarkson, and the New York Life Insurance Company declined to pay until the policy was surrendered, which Mr. Clark-son’s executors refused to do. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action to obtain a judgment requiring the executors of William R. Clarkson to deliver up the policy, and that the life insurance company thereupon pay the amount of it to him.
The Jennie Clarkson Baptist Orphanage was made a party defendant because it claimed to be a legatee under the will of "William R. Clarkson, deceased.
The New York Life Insurance Company, which was originally made a defendant, paid the money into court and the action was discontinued as to it.
Upon the trial at Special Term the court held that the policy was payable to the executors of William R. Clarkson, and directed a judgment that the complaint be dismissed, and that the money in court he paid to the defendants, executors of William R. Clarkson, From the judgment entered upon that decision this appeal is taken,
Whatever may have been the notion heretofore, the rule, we think, with regard to an insurable interest in the life of another is well settled by Judge Field in the case of Warnock v. Davis (104 U. S. 755). At page 779 he says: “ It may be stated generally, however, to be such an interest arising from the relations of the party obtaining the insurance either as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage, or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation ; for a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child and a child in the life of his parent; a husband in the life of his wife and a wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in cases of this kind is considered as more powerful — as operating more efficaciously — to protect the life of the insured than any other consideration. But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured.” Such, we think, is a fair statement of the law' on this subject as
If she had a vested interest in this policy, there was nothing in
The respondents cite the case of Griswold v. Sawyer (125 N. Y. 411) to sustain their contention that in this case the phrase “ legal representatives ” does not have its ordinary and usual meaning, but must receive another construction. In that case the court conceded the rule to be as is laid down above; that those words, ordinarily, and unless their meaning is explained and altered by the context, must be held to mean executors and administrators, and the court there lays hold of certain facts which were made to appear, from which it concluded that the words used in the policy which was there construed, did not have the usual meaning which is given to them. But the facts of that case were very different from those of the case at bar. In that case, as the court held, it'was a necessary inference from facts outside of the policy that the words did not have the meaning ordinarily to be given to them. In this case no facts were shown which would give to the court any power to put a different construction upon those words than their ordinary meaning.
But it is useless to speculate as to the intention of the father in taking out this policy upon any outside facts. It is sufficient to say that nothing has been shown which would warrant the court in giving to these words any other or different meaning from that which they ordinarily have in common use. For that reason the conclusion of the court below cannot be sustained, and the judgment must be reversed and judgment ordered that the fund in court belongs to the plaintiff and that it shall be paid to him.
The costs of the action and of this appeal should be paid by the-defendants.
Van Brunt, P. J., Williams, O’Brien and Ingraham, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed and judgment ordered that the fund in court be paid to plaintiff, costs in the action and of appeal to be paid by defendants.