143 Mo. 399 | Mo. | 1898
This is a proceeding in equity by creditors of John Ellis, deceased, whose demands were allowed against his estate and classified by the probate court of Boone county before the beginning of this suit, for the purpose of having set aside and held for naught, as fraudulent as to his creditors, a certain warranty deed from him to his grandson, John E. Field, conveying four hundred and nine acres of land in said county. After the suit was instituted Mrs. Amanda E. Field was made a party defendant. She entered her appearance and adopted the pleadings of her son, John E. Field, as her own. Pending the suit in the circuit court Mrs. Field died, and the cause was revived in the name of John E. Field, her executor, and also in the name of John E. Field and Lizzie D. H. Field, her only heirs at law, legatees and devisees, all of whom entered their appearance and' adopted the pleadings of defendant John E. Field.
The trial resulted in a finding and judgment for plaintiffs in accordance with the prayer of the petition, from which defendants appealed. The petition alleges that no consideration passed for the land, and that it was conveyed by John Ellis, deceased, to John E. Field, for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding the creditors of said Ellis, of which John E. Field had full knowledge and was a party to the fraud.
The consideration expressed in the deed was $2,000, while the land was worth at the time of the
Plaintiffs read in evidence over the objection of defendants from the records of'the probate court of Boone county, the certificates of allowance under the hand and seal of the judge of that court, showing that a large number of claims, including those of plaintiffs, amounting to the sum of $11,555.80, had been allowed against the estate of John Ellis, deceased, and in this it is insisted that error was committed. By section 191, Revised Statutes 1889, it is provided: “The probate court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all suits and other proceedings instituted against executors and administrators upon any demand against the estate of their testator or intestate, and of all offsets and other defenses allowed by law, set up thereto by the administrator or executor, and a concise entry of the order of allowance, or finding, shall be made on the record of the court, which shall have the force and effect of a judgment.” By section 4881, Revised Statutes 1889, it is provided that the records of proceedings of any court of record of this State, attested by the clerk thereof, with the seal of the court annexed if there be a seal, or if there be no seal with the private seal of the clerk, shall be received as evidence of the acts or proceedings of such court of record in’ any court of this State. The certificates of the judge of the probate court are not copied into the record, so that it is impossible for us to determine whether they were in proper form or not. If they were, they were admissible in evidence both for the purpose of showing that plaintiffs were judgment creditors of the estate of J ohn Ellis deceased at the time of the commencement of this suit and also that
There is no merit in the contention that error was committed in admitting in evidence the inventory of the estate of John Ellis. It was clearly admissible for the purpose of showing what property he owned at the time of his death. It is perfectly clear from the evidence that the deed from John Ellis to his grandson, John E. Field was not voluntary, for whether a full and fair consideration passed from Mrs. Field to her father for the land or not, there was a valuable consideration, and in such circumstances the deed was not voluntary. “A voluntary conveyance is a conveyance without any valuable consideration. The adequacy of the consideration does not enter into the question. The character of purchase or voluntary, is determined by the fact whether anything valuable passes between the grantor and grantee, as a consideration for the transfer. If there is a valuable consideration, no matter how trivial or inadequate, the conveyance is not voluntary.” Bump on Fraudl. Conv. [3 Ed.] 267. The evidence showed that the note for $1,000, given by John Ellis to Mrs. Field in April, 1888, and the note for $500, executed by Ellis in 1869, to John H. Field and by him transferred to his wife, made up in part the consideration expressed in the deed. But plaintiffs claim that the $500 note was barred by the statute of limitations and was of no value. The defense of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege of which Ellis might have taken advantage had he chosen to do so, but the law does not prohibit a man from paying an honest debt if he chooses, notwithstanding all legal remedy thereon be barred by
The evidence as to whether or not the $500, sent by Mrs. Field to her father in December, 1890, and which also was included in the expressed consideration for the land, was a loan to him or a birthday present, left that matter somewhat in doubt, but the weight of the evidence we think showed that it was a loan. The statements of John Ellis in the presence of the witnesses Peter H. Ellis and H. B. Craig that it was a birthday present was not permissible as evidence against Mrs. Field for the purpose of showing that fact and should have been excluded. Her rights could not be affected by any statements made by her father, not in her presence. Beside, the evidence showed that this $500 was taken into account by John Ellis as a part of the expressed consideration for the land, and in this way recognized by -him as'-a loan and not as a gift. But as this case was heard by the court sitting as a chancellor, we will not reverse the judgment upon that ground, but consider the case as if no such evidence had been introduced.
The notes read in evidence, and the $500 loaned by Mrs. Field to her father, formed the expressed consideration for the land, which including interest amounted to several hundreds of dollars more than the consideration expressed in the deed. There were also at the same time two school mortgages on a part of the land which amounted to about the sum of $1,816.76, and a judgment lien in favor of one Conley for about $730. The deed was of course subject to these liens. But we think it clear from the evidence that Mrs. Field did not assume the payment of the Conley judgment nor the Tip Bass debt as part of the consideration for the land, otherwise these creditors would
Mrs. Field did not surrender the notes which she held against her father at the time of the execution by him of the deed to the land, which were a part of the purchase price therefor. This was somewhat out of the
When the failure of Mrs. Field to surrender the notes of her father which were paid by the conveyance of the land, the payment in the same way of a note which had been barred by the statute of limitations for about fifteen years, the inadequacy of the price paid for the land, the insolvency of John Ellis the grantor, and the relation of the parties, are considered, there is no escape from the conclusion .that the deed was made by
What has been said is in accordance with the conclusion reached by the trial court to whose rulings we usually defer in such cases.
We have not overlooked other questions of minor importance raised by counsel for ’defendants in their brief, deeming it unnecessary to do so.
From these considerations we affirm the judgment.