Gentille v. StateGentille v. State
The defendant, Anthоny Wayne Gentille, appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentencе in a non-jury case in which he was found guilty of the violation of
“It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a felony in the courts of this state, or convicted of an offense in any other state, territory or country which if committed in Florida would be deemed a felony, to own or to have in his care, custody, possession or control any pistol, sawed-off rifle or sawed-off shotgun. A sawed-off rifle or sawed-off shotgun is defined for the purposes of this sеction as being any rifle or shotgun with a caliber greater than twenty-two caliber and with a barrel less than sixteen inches long.”
The defendant contends that the taking and use of his fingerprints to establish that he was a previously convicted felon in Florida, undеr another name, violated his constitutional rights and that the fingerprints were inadmissible in evidence because they were (a) taken other than for booking; (b) they werе taken when defendant was without counsel, and (c) they caused the defendant to incriminate himself.
The pertinent portion of defendant‘s contention for revеrsal is set forth in these facts. The defendant was arrested on June 16, 1965, charged with robbery, and incarcerated. Counsel was appointed to represent him on this сharge. On August 9, 1965, while in custody under the robbery charge, his fingerprints were taken. On the next day, an information charging him with violation of
“It is the duty of the sheriffs of the state to fingerprint all persons hereafter charged with or convicted of a felony upon so being charged or convicted and to submit such prints to the federal bureau
of investigation and the Florida sheriffs bureau. The sheriffs of thе state may fingerprint all persons charged with or convicted of any criminal offense when in their opinion it is necessary for the protection of the public.” (Emphasis added) * * * * * *
It is conceded that the fingerprints taken on August 9, 1965, are of the same person who was previously convicted of robbery in Florida under another name in 1956.
The case of Smith v. United Stаtes, 1963, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 324 F.2d 879, involves a similar situation. There, the court said:
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“We find no error in the admission of the palm print of Smith taken the day before trial for purposes of comparison with the palm print on the victim‘s credit cards. Unlike the situation in Bynum v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 262 F.2d 465 (1958), appellant here was in lawful custody at the time his prints were recorded. Cf. Bynum v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 274 F.2d 767 (1960) (per curiam). And it is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing, United States v. Amorosa, 167 F.2d 596, 599 (3d Cir., 1948), and fingerprinting, United Stаtes v. Krapf, 285 F.2d 647, 650-651 (3d Cir., 1961), as part of routine identification processes. United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 83 A.L.R. 122 (2d Cir., 1932).”
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See generally 28 A.L.R.2d 1115.
We hold, therefore, that the taking of the fingerprints of a defendant, at any time after a lawful arrest and without counsel present is valid аs part of the routine identification process, and is not prohibited by the Floridа or United States Constitution, compare People v. Sowers, 1962, 204 Cal. App.2d 640, 22 Cal. Rptr. 401; State v. La Palme, 1962, 104 N.H. 97, 179 A.2d 284, even if the fingerprints are for the specific purpose of producing еvidence to be used as a separate criminal trial. See generally 11 A.L.R.2d 870.
Thе defendant also contends that there was insufficient proof to convict him оf the “possession, care, custody or control” of the firearm in question. A careful review of the record reveals that there was substantial, competеnt evidence to support the judgment of the trial court that the defendant‘s aсtivities came within the purview of the statute. We have examined the defendant‘s other contentions and find them to be without merit.
The judgment appealed from is therefore
Affirmed.