170 Pa. 96 | Pa. | 1895
Opinion by
Joseph Gensemer, being the owner of a farm in Lancaster county, he, joined by his wife Susanna, on April 1, 1878, conveyed it to George S. Withers, subject, however, to a charge of $3,470 in favor of the grantors, the interest to be paid annually to Joseph Gensemer during his life, and after his death to his widow during her life, then the principal to enter into and form part of his estate. The charge thus remained for several years, when on 20th of August, 1886, by deed duly executed and recorded, the husband and wife assigned the security to their grandson, Joseph G. Miller, and his assigns. On September 20, 1886, just one month after assignment to Miller, on petition to the common pleas of Margaret Miller, a daughter of Gensemer, proceedings were commenced to have him declared a lunatic ; a commission issued on decree of the court to J. W. Denliuger, Commissioner. Here this proceeding stopped.
On April 23, 1889, Joseph G. Miller, by deed duly acknowledged, transferred to this appellant the charge on the land, for a money consideration equaling its face value. Some time after this date, the wife, Susanna Gensemer, died. Next, Margaret Miller, without moving further in the first proceeding, on July 9,1891, presented another petition, averring her father to be a lunatic, and incapable of managing his business affairs. The court, on the same day, dix-eeted a commission to issue to W. H. Roland, Esq., to inquire into the truth of the averments in the petition ; the inquisition found Gensemer a lunatic, and that he had been one for five years prior to the date of the finding, which was August 6, 1891, and that he had no lucid intervals. On return of this inquisition, it was confirmed nisi August 15, 1891; oxx Januaiy 8, 1892, John H. Fry was appointed committee, who qualified and gave bond. Oxi May 3, following, Sarah K. Davidson, on leave of court given, filed a travei'se of the ixxquisition, and on October 10,1892, issue was framed for trial between her as plaintiff and Johxi H. Fry, committee, defendant. Before this issue came orx for trial, Gensemer died. Then, June 6,1894, at instance of counsel for committee, the court awarded a rule to show cause why the traverse should not be quashed, and two days afterwards, on motion of counsel for Mrs. Davidson, awarded a rule on committee to show cause why both commissions and all proceed
From this decree, quashing the traverse of the second inquisition, Mrs. Davidson has appealed.
It is argued by counsel for appellant that, notwithstanding the death of the alleged lunatic, the issue, in so far as the finding of the inquisition affected any property right of hers, survived, and should have been proceeded with to trial.
The ground of the traverse by Mrs. Davidson was that, according to the finding of the inquisition, the insanity of Gensemer antedated the transfer of the security to Miller, and consequently was prima facie evidence against her right, which depended upon the validity of Gensemer’s transfer to Miller.
Undoubtedly, a material part of the finding is the length of time the incapacity has existed. The statutory command to the inquisitors was to inquire whether Gensemer was a lunatic; “and if you find him to be a lunatic, then how long he hath been so.” The finding was, that he was a lunatic, and had been so for five years, a period extending back of the transfer to Miller, and therefore prejudicially affecting it. This at once gave Mrs. Davidson a standing as suitor to contest the finding. The statute declares, “ Every person aggrieved,.... may traverse the same.” She adopted the remedy provided by the act, filed her traverse, and issue was framed for trial; then Gensemer died. By no act or default of hers, it became impossible to proceed to judgment in that issue. The proceeding was purely statutory, and the statute made no provision for the contingency; it clearly provides for a trial during the life of the lunatic, and contemplates no determination of anything after his death, any more than it contemplates the commencement of proceedings by inquisition after his death, to determine whether he was a lunatic when alive. The decisions, holding that the jurisdiction of the court over the property of the lunatic is complete on return and confirmation of inquisition, are
Our own authorities on this point are numerous. In Ebling’s App., 134 Pa. 232, the lunatic died before return of inquisition; it was sought to make his estate answerable for costs;
And her burden as a suitor is not increased, because the fact at issue must be determined in another form of procedure. If this issue had not been ended by Gensemer’s death, the return would, at the trial, have been prima facie correct; the burden would have been on her to overcome it; at a future trial, in another form, of the same fact, the return to the inquisition will have no greater weight; the record, prima facie, will show the finding of lunacy a few days before the transfer to Miller, but the same record will show that, as to her, there was an immediate denial of the correctness of the finding, and no trial of the issue, solely because of the death of Gensemer.
We do not see that the lunatic’s estate is any better off, or
The decree is affirmed, and appeal dismissed at costs of appellant.