Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER and Judge KEENAN joined.
OPINION
The question in this case is whether a Montgomery County, Maryland exaction on carbon dioxide emissions, levied only upon GenOn Mid-Atlantic’s electricity-generating facility, is a tax or a fee. After holding that the carbon charge was a tax, the district court determined that the Tax Injunction Act deprived it of jurisdiction to hear GenOn’s challenge. We think, however, that because the charge was levied upon a single “taxpayer” and formed part of a wide-ranging regulatory program, the district court had jurisdiction over Gen-On’s claims. We accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
The Montgomery County Council enacted Expedited Bill 29-10 on May 19, 2010 to impose a levy on large stationary emitters of carbon dioxide within the county. The County Executive signed the bill on May 28. Bill 29-10 imposes what it terms an “excise tax” of $5 per ton of carbon dioxide emitted, but only on emitters that end up exceeding 1 million tons of carbon dioxide in a year. For those large emitters, the $5 per ton charge applies to every ton emitted. The revenue generated by the levy is to be deposited in the Montgomery County general fund, with 50% earmarked for funding greenhouse gas reduction programs such as mass transit and 50% available for the County’s general use. The County projеcts that the levy will raise annual revenue between $11.7 and $17.6 million.
GenOn operates an electricity plant in Montgomery County that emits carbon dioxide. As the only entity in Montgomery County expected to exceed 1 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually, Gen- *1023 On is the only entity likely to be subject to the $5/ton levy on its entire volume of emissions. After consulting with the County’s electricity service provider, the Council determined that GenOn would not be able to pass the cost of the carbon charge on to its Montgomery County customers because its power is sold via competitive auction.
Four days after Bill 29-10 was signed into law, GenOn sought to enjoin enforcement on the ground that it violates the United States and Maryland Constitutions. The district court noted that the charge had some indicia of a regulatory fee, but ultimаtely concluded that it was more like a tax for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act. The court then dismissed GenOn’s suit without prejudice. GenOn now appeals.
II.
The Tax Injunction Act “is meant to prevent taxpayers from ‘disrupting state government finances’ ” with excessive litigatiоn in federal court.
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder,
When determining “whether a particular charge is a ‘fee’ or a ‘tax’ ” for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act, we do not focus on the superficial “nomenclature provided to the charge at issue.”
Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Cajfrey,
III.
Montgomery County claims that the carbon charge is a tax under this three-part inquiry for two primary reasons. Its initial argument is that thе process by which Bill 29-10 was enacted was the process by which taxes are typically enacted.
See Collins Holding Corp. v. Jasper County,
*1024
The county also argues that the levy is a tax because it is еxpected, at this point, to raise significant revenue. The fiscal impact statement prepared by the County’s Office of Management and Budget estimated that the charge would collect annual revenue between $11.7 and $17.6 million from GenOn. In addition, 50% “of the monies obtained by the charge” are dedicated to the county’s general fund,
see Valero,
IV.
While Bill 29-10 does bear some of the indicia of a tax, “we can readily conclude, withоut a seriatim analysis, that [it] is not a tax provision.”
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n,
A.
The chief problem with Montgomery County’s carbon charge is that the burden falls on GenOn alone. But the whole idea of a tax is that it is, to some extent, a burden generally borne. Thus, an “assessment imposed uрon a narrow class” is less likely to be a tax than an “assessment imposed upon a broad class of parties.”
Bidart Bros. v. Cal. Apple Comm’n,
Montgomery County nevertheless contends that the bill’s process оf enactment and revenue-raising potential render it a tax despite this singular focus on GenOn. We find this contention unpersuasive. It would be an extraordinary tax that applied only to one taxpayer — so extraordinary, in fact, that Montgomery County has been unable to identify even one exaction that applies only to a single entity that has been held a tax for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act. For even when the tax base encompasses less than a society in its entirety, taxes generally apply to at leаst more than one entity.
See, e.g., Valero,
Our conclusion that Bill 29-10 imposes a punitive fee is strengthened by the fact that GenOn will likely be unable to pass the cost of the charge on to its customers. As we recognized in
Valero,
a charge is less likely to be a fee when the payer can “spread thе cost to a significantly wider proportion of the population.”
B.
In addition to its punitive scope, Montgomery County’s carbon charge falls outside the ambit of the Tаx Injunction Act because of its plainly regulatory purpose. We have noted that the Tax Injunction Act turns on the difference “between broader-based taxes that sustain the essential flow of revenue to state (or local) government and fees that are сonnected to some regulatory scheme.”
Collins Holding Corp.,
The County Council has made little effort to hide its regulatory intent in the text of Bill 29-10. After noting EPA findings that greenhouse gases pose a threat to public health and the environment, the preamble states: “Montgomery County has embrаced an 80% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and has begun to engage in programmatic efforts to reduce these emissions.” Montgomery County Code, § 52-95(b); see also id. §§ 18A-13(h), 18A-14(b). The bill then declares that “[i]t is appropriate that the largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the County contribute to paying for these greenhouse gas reduction programs.” Id. § 52-95(c). And the revenue raised from the carbon charge is an integral part of the County’s greenhouse gas regulatory agenda, for “50% must be reserved for and allocated in the annual operating budget tо funding for County greenhouse gas reduction programs.” Id. § 52-100.
Bill 29-10’s place in Montgomery County’s “programmatic efforts” is thus twofold: it creates disincentives for GenOn to continue polluting and provides funds for others to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions. These may be good and lаudable goals. But where an assessment of this type forms such a significant “part of a regulatory program,” it is not the sort of mere revenue-raising measure that the Tax Injunction Act leaves solely to the jurisdiction of state courts.
Bidart Bros.,
Nothing in Bill 29-10’s legislative history calls into question thе notion that the purpose of this carbon charge is largely regulatory. Councilmember Berliner stated candidly that his “proposed carbon tax ... will ineentivize [GenOn] to reduce its emissions.” Memorandum from Roger Berliner (Apr. 27, 2010). He further noted that the bill is a way of saying to emitters “I’m going to induce you to do more.” Michael Laris, Montgomery official proposes carbon tax on major emitters, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 2010, at B5. And regarding the ultimate aim of the legislation, the councilman explained that it is “the threat of local government action like this that will drive the industry crazy to the point they are more willing to accept a national regime.” Id. Again, greenhouse gas reduction may indeed be a commendable aim, but to say that it was not the goal of the County Council here blinks reality.
Montgomery County nevertheless disavows this characterization and instead contends that Bill 29-10 “is utterly devoid of any attempt to regulate [GenOn], or any other emitter of carbon dioxide.” Brief of Appellee at 8. In the County’s view, the bill is not regulatory because it “does not compel any standard of conduct by those who *1026 emit сarbon dioxide, nor does it mandate that [GenOn] limit the amount of carbon dioxide it emits.” Id. at 16-17.
The regulatory toolbox is not so limited. Courts have recognized that “[t]he classic regulatory fee ... may serve regulatory purposes directly by, for example, deliberately discоuraging particular conduct by making it more expensive.”
San Juan Cellular Tel. Co.,
V.
We cannot overlook the fact that the absence of federal jurisdiction in this case would turn what are truly interstate issues over to local authorities. Applying the Tax Injunction Act might encourage punitive financial strikes against single entities with national connections, for the federal courts would be unavailable to protect companies against local discrimination, preempted state laws, and other federal constitutional violations. The implications of allowing localities to impose finаncial exactions exclusively upon single entities of national reach with no accountability in federal court are profound, and we decline to foreclose these federal claims with a jurisdictional bar.
Of course we do not resolve this casе on the merits, nor do we suggest that one party or the other should prevail on remand. We do not at all begrudge Montgomery County its regulatory purpose here, and there is much to be said for the worthy office of environmental stewardship. All we hold is that the Tax Injunction Act is no bar to federal jurisdiction in this case. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for consideration of GenOn’s claims.
REVERSED AND REMANDED