1 N.Y.S. 554 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1888
The action is ejectment, brought to recover possession of a piece of land situated in the village of Mount Morris, county of Livingston. This land was appropriated by the state for the purpose of the Genesee Valley Canal, which was completed in 1841, and the appraisal of damages made pursuant to the statute of 1843. The canal was operated by the state until in the fall of 1878, when it was abandoned pursuant to statute, (Laws 1877, c, 404, § 2,) and a sale of it was directed, (Id. § 3, amended by Laws 1879, c. 522, § 1.) Then, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 326, Laws 1880, sale and conveyance of the right, title, and interest of the state in and to the banks and prism of the canal was made to the plaintiff in November, 1880; and the latter complied with the terms and conditions imposed by the act, except so far as it has been relieved by further legislative enactments extending the time of performance by it in the respects therein mentioned. In the act providing for sale to a railroad company, the canal is divided into three sections, so as to provide for the sale of that portion between the village of Mount Morris and the village of Cuba; that between the village of Mount Morris and the Erie canal, in the city of Rochester; and that between the village of Cuba and the village of Millgrove or village of Olean. It is therefore contended that the portion of the canal within the village of Mount Morris was not embraced in the provisions of the statute giving the power to make the conveyance to the plaintiff. The evident purpose of the act was to provide, by such authorized sale, so far as it would, for a railway substantially along the line of the abandoned canal, with a view to the provision of the means of travel and transportation, and that the opportunity should be thus furnished to make it continuous between the extreme termini; and in view of the apparent legislative intent appearing by the provisions of the act, and within its obvious purpose, the construction adopted in the resolution of the commissioners of the land-office, and in the letters patent, making the grant to the plaintiff of the canal land its entire length between those two extreme points, was fairly warranted. The state took the fee of the land appropriated for the canal. The statute so provided, (1 Rev. St. 226, § 52;) and its abandonment produced no reversion to the former owners, (Rexford v. Knight, 11 N. Y. 308.)
The further question is whether the plaintiff’s right of action was barred by the statute of limitations. It appears that by deed of partition of date February, 1842, land, including that in question, was conveyed to one Giles, who conveyed the same land to the defendant by deed of date April, 1860. The referee found that the land in question “was,, and for more than forty years prior to the commencement of this action has been, in the possession and occupancy of the defendant, and his grantors, claiming title under” such conveyances. This action was commenced in October, 1882. From and after the year 1830 to 1849 the statute provided that “the people of the state will not sue or implead any person for, or in respect to, any lands, * * * or for the issues or profits thereof, by reason of any right or title of the said people to the same, unless (1) such right or title shall have accrued within twenty years before any suit or other proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or unless (2) the said people, or those from whom they claim, shall have received the rents and profits of such real estate, or some part thereof, within the said space of twenty years.”. 1 Rev. St. pt. 3, c. 4, tit. 2, § 1. And the same provisions were applicable to an action brought by any person claiming under letters patent or grant from the people of the state. Id. § 3. By the provisions of the Code of Procedure as amended in 1849, the period of limit
Barker, P. J., and Haight and Dwight, J.J., concur.