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General Motors Corporation v. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York
897 F.2d 34
2d Cir.
1990
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*1 bag the cocaine and teristics of cross-ex- the absence of such a basis re- amination, Libreros fails to demonstrate quires greater a general confluence of rulings that these constituted an abuse of present factors than are here. In this re- discretion, or, any event, in that he was gard, I note although majority prejudiced by them. asserts that Libreros’s statement that the bag false,” contained “evidently food was I

Conclusion am any finding by unaware of made judgments of district court concerning point. conviction are af- finding probable firmed. cause is further under- cut stopped the fact that Libreros when PIERCE, Judge, dissenting Circuit asked, he was voluntarily opened his part: bag. view, have, If we are to as we a failure to stop requested when by a law agree I majority that the convic- enforcement supporting official as “a ris- appellant tion of Moreno should be af- ing suspicion” involvement, tide drug However, firmed. as far as the affirmance id., might we view cooperation Libreros’s appellant Libreros’s conviction is con- supporting contrary inference. cerned, “I dissent from the conclusion that the confluence of earlier events and the sum, In brings this case us uncomfort- experience agent substantial of the federal ably holding close to that the mere viewing agent’s] ‘plain warranted view’ seizure [the package of a type present here, of the [brick-shaped] package appellant’s itself, probable constitutes cause. See id. open bag.” United States v. Barrios- at 17 (rejecting suggestion that “the mere Moriera, 12, (1989)(Pierce, J., 872 F.2d viewing and evaluation of the package dissenting). probable cause.”). alone constituted I feel constrained to reverse as to

Initially, I Libreros. note that in both v. Texas Brown, 730, 1535, 460 U.S. 103 S.Ct. (1983) (plurality opinion),

L.Ed.2d 502

Barrios-Moriera, upon today’s which ma-

jority relies, there particularized existed a suspecting

basis for the defendant drugs pos- involved with and that his

session particular item was not inno- Brown,

cent. In police “the officer ... [, CORPORATION, uninflated, saw in GENERAL addition to the MOTORS tied-off Plaintiff-Appellee, eventually balloon by him,] seized ‘several plastic small quantities vials [and] ” powder.’ loose Barrios-Moriera, white ABRAMS, Attorney Robert General of (Pierce, J., 872 F.2d at dissenting) (quot- York, the State of New ing Brown, 460 U.S. at 103 S.Ct. at Defendant-Appellant. 1539)(emphasis added Barrios-Moriera). Similarly, Barrios-Moriera, majority No. Docket 89-7338. emphasized that the defendant had evinced Appeals, United States Court prior “interest in Audi automobile [an] Second Circuit. enforcement surveilling were [law officers] in connection with a drug -related homi- Argued Nov. 1989. cide.” (emphasis Here, Id. in original). Decided Feb. however, there is an absence of circum- viewing stance—other than the pack-

age specifically itself—that links the defen-

dant drugs.

I do suggest particularized basis always view,

should required. my *2 Davis, (Weil City Richard J. New York address whether the instant FTC Consent Manges, City, Craig & New York Gotshal requiring Order Corpora- General Motors Allely, Corp., M.J. Gen. Motors (“GM” Francis H. Motors”) or “General oper- Dunne, counsel), for plaintiff-appellee. auspices ate under the of the Better Busi- (“BBB”) ness Bureau an informal arbitra- Brown, Atty. D. Ronna Asst. Gen. for *3 resolving consumer com- N.Y., Atty. Gen. of State New York plaints preempts either the substantive de- (Robert City, Abrams, N.Y. Atty. Gen. of cison-making procedural criteria or the and N.Y., State of Bureau of Consumer Frauds record-keeping requirements of the New Protection, Corwin, and John W. Asst. York New Car Lemon ch. Atty. Charge, Mary Hilgeman, Gen. N.Y., 1882, amending laws New York Gen- Azia, Gen., Attys. Jane Asst. Bureau of (“Lemon eral Business Law 198-a Law” Appeals Opinions, Harvey Berman, and M. “Statute”). Gen., Atty. counsel), Asst. for defen- dant-appellant. Kamp, Atty. John K. Van De Gen. of BACKGROUND Cal, Cal., Diego, State of San Andrea Sher- dispute arose after New York State Ordin, Gen., idan Atty. Chief Asst. Her- amended its require business code to Elkins, schel Gruskin, T. Sanford N. Sr. any existing manufacturer’s informal dis- Gen., Attys.

Asst. Shelden, Albert Norman pute settlement mechanism conform to the Tapper, Deputy Gen., Lawrence Attys. requirements of the State’s new Lemon curiae, amicus State of Cal. Law. brought General Motors suit on De- KAUFMAN, WINTER, Before cember in federal Circuit district court MOTLEY, Judges, seeking and Judge.* a declaration provi- District that certain sions of the state Statute were unconstitu- KAUFMAN, R. IRVING Circuit injunction tional and an restraining the en- Judge: forcement of these respect federally As an GM’s independent federal mandated consumer arbi- administrative program. tration agency charged Attorney preventing “unfair moved to dismiss competition” methods of the suit under and Fed.R. “unfair or 12(b)(6) deceptive Civ.P. practices,” acts or for failure to the state a cause Federal (“FTC” of action for Trade which relief granted. Commission or “Commis- sion”) historically summary cross-moved for operated judgment. in areas of dual regulation. state-federal Consumer Denying the State’s motion to dismiss warranty example. law is one While the granting summary judgment, Judge protection of consumers from prac- unfair Haight of the Southern District of New tices is a traditional police power York held that the 1983 FTC Consent Or- function, federal laws and administrative der requiring GM to establish a consumer regulations may operate in tandem with— program preempts the New preempt even law under the Su- —state grounds. York Statute on several The dis- premacy Clause of the United States Con- trict court found that the FTC order “occu- stitution, VI, Article Cl. 2. field,” pies the to the exclusion of state appeal general raises question the regulation, within the narrow context of whether a consent order by entered into disputes between GM and its consumers. similarly the may preempt FTC F.Supp. 1103, state law. 703 (S.D.N.Y.1989). lili Unlike an regulation which has in- The district court further held that dustry-wide effect, a consent order is bind- Lemon Law conflicts with the arbitral ing only parties on the agreement. cesses mandated FTC Order Answering affirmative, in the we also creating must manner “an obstacle to the accom- * Honorable Motley, York, Constance Baker sitting by Senior District designation. of New Judge United States District for the Southern ar- are the use untrained characteristics the full execution plishment and segments of chosen from broad expressed objectives, as bitrators purposes community “make common sense who Id. the consent order.” own sense of adjudications based on their and order judgment We reverse include, might fairness.” complaint. GM’s dismiss preemption “lawyers, professors, account- example, may in some consent order anWhile FTC executives, housewives, ants, company law, we do not preempt state circumstances The third- personnel.” trade association into GM entered agreement believe wholly voluntary for party arbitration to have was intended the Commission only and the results consumers provisions of the state this effect on i.e., GM, 102 consumer F.T.C. issue. Law at 1761— participation in summary *4 begin We pursuing or a bar to precondition is not a legislation that form state negotiations and remedies. other dispute. In this background of the complaint against GM for ad- provides a for the BBB to the FTC issued The Order serious failing notify consumers about in Motors the minister in certain defects engine and transmission of the Con- provisions accordance Avoiding the light trucks. cars and Order, for the BBB’s Uniform Rules sent the litigation, delay and risks of expense, Arbitration, Motors Zone the General a Consent negotiated and entered into FTC and Party Arbitration for Third Handbook implement a nation- requiring GM to Order Consumer Arbitration General Motors the program, ad- third-party arbitration wide appeal, Significant to this Handbook. BBB, complaints by the to settle ministered documents, incorporated into the these relating to the defec- owners of individual Order, explicit two refer- contain Consent components. 102 F.T.C. powertrain tive law. to state ences preceded final Order was 1749. The Rules of the BBB’s Uniform Section 27B pub- proposal which was preliminary by a states: Arbitration for comment public and lished submitted decision, any make The arbitrator Fed.Reg. 20730 rules. under eq- and deems fair which the Arbitrator (1983). your agree- scope within uitable con- opposition of numerous Despite the arbitrate, law provided state ment (includ- attorneys general and state sumers part all or of that deci- prohibit does Abrams defendant-appellant Robert ing sion. settlement, the York) proposed New at 102 F.T.C. 1774. on Novem- Order issued the Consent of the provides that law Section 3 “[t]he case-by-case ar- 16, 1983, providing ber shall your dispute is arbitrated to con- than direct redress rather bitration at 1771. apply.” 102 F.T.C. sumers.1 1, 1983, Sept. York Effective by the Consent program established Law, original Lemon legislature enacted by the FTC “experiment” marks an Order of the Gen- 198-a State as section codified re- the consumer designed to assure The Law created Business Law. eral equitable treatment ceives fair and warranty requiring a manufac- statutory principal Its manufacturer. of the hands win, many deserving truly will consumers Consent Order issued the The Commission reme- only rational won’t. The Pertschuk Commissioner to one. a vote of four injury in a case dy suffered 102 F.T.C. for the common separate statement. in a dissented compensation dam- position this is automatic of his like thrust 1743-44. pitting the following excerpt: ages, standardless mini-trials evident against largest com- consumer individual de- a common case-by-case arbitrations of pany in the world! prove a fect, each consumer in which Id. redress, concept wrong right George Bailey P. Patricia Commissioners clear, binding without operation. Arbitration separate Douglas ex- also filed statements W. still responsibility will establishing rules for of the in favor Order. plaining their votes dice"—some a "roll than be little more repair charge any free of “lemons,” turer to new determined automotive that does not compared motor vehicle conform to its equitable” with the “fair and express statutorily speci- open warranties for a standard of program; years period eighteen fied of time—two 3) Law, Under the Lemon arbitrators miles, thousand whichever comes sooner. arbitration,” must be “trained “famil- 198-a(b). § iar Law, with” the New York Lemon “provided with a copy written addition, any during defect period provisions of” the Lemon rather “substantially impairing] the value of the merely than community untrained proves unrepairable motor vehicle” that af- Order; trators called for in the attempts” ter a “reasonable number of ren- 4) The “lemon,” recordkeeping Statute adds ders re- entitling the vehicle quirements reporting to the purchase consumer to a refund of the full contained in the price 198-a(c). Consent Order. replacement. § Statute defines “reasonable number of at- The New York Statute also directed the tempts” if as four or the vehicle is out for Attorney General to create an “alternative repair for a cumulative total of 30 or more arbitration mechanism” to be conducted 198-a(d). days. These remedies are professional appointed by available to consumer who first resorts Attorney General apply who must *5 to a dispute manufacturer’s informal mech- Law standards and remedies.2 sepa- (if exists) anism one complies with rate arbitration forum has been available to minimum federal standards. 198-a(g). § 1, January consumers since 1987.

The 1986 amendments to the Lemon Law added that a manufacturer has estab- “[i]f DISCUSSION lished dispute an informal settlement mech- I. Authority Preempt anism, such comply mechanism shall in all respects initially address, We provisions must of this sec- as a matter of impression court, first 198-a(g). (m) tion-” Subsection whether a sets § forth consent by the “minimum” order entered into require- Lemon Law a federal agency ments for a administrative preempt manufacturer’s informal can ever dis- pute state agree settlement law. We primarily Judge Haight’s mechanism. challenges conclusion requirements below that consent may that arbitra- orders preemptive tors be afforded weight be “trained in arbitration and familiar some cir- cumstances. [the Law]” they and that apply Lemon Law remedies. Supremacy The Clause of the United 198-(m)(l)(i), (iii). § Constitution, VI, States 2, Article Cl. vides: major differences between the Con- sent Order and the New Car Lemon Law Constitution, “This and the Laws of the may be summarized as follows: United States which shall be made in

1) Pursuance thereof ... shall requires Statute the consumer be the Su- preme Law of the Land resort to a the Constitu- dispute manufacturer’s reso- or Laws of lution State to the seeking judicial mechanism before Con- trary notwithstanding.” relief under the Lemon whereas the Consent participation Order makes in the While the Framers of the Constitution program wholly op- GM-BBB arbitration could not have envisioned the burgeoning tional; procedure, modern administrative 2) The specifies Supreme standards interpreted Court “laws” un- for liability statutorily Supremacy and redress for der the Clause to embrace both a(k) provides: pursuant regulations N.Y.Gen.Bus.Law lished promulgated 198— by hereunder option attorney New York Each consumer shall have the mitting any of sub- general. Upon application dispute arising under this section of the consumer fee, upon payment payment filing prescribed filing of a fee to all manufactur- an alternate arbitration mechanism estab- ers shall submit to such alternate arbitration.

39 itself; by Congress taken regula only from action and administrative statutes federal agency acting scope within the a federal v. Savings Loan Ass’n. Fidelity & tions. congressionally delegated authority may its 141, 153, S.Ct. Cuesta, 102 458 U.S. de la regulation.” pre-empt state Louisiana (1982)(“Federal L.Ed.2d 664 73 FCC, v. 476 Public Service Commission effect pre-emptive have no less regulations 355, 369, 1890, 1899, 106 S.Ct. 90 U.S. also, statutes.”). Hills federal See than (1986). L.Ed.2d 369 Just as when review- Med. Fla. v. Automated borough County, regulation, ing a federal we should not 707, 713, Inc., S.Ct. Labs, 471 105 U.S. agency’s action intended disturb (1985) (“We 2371, 2375, L.Ed.2d preempt state law which embodies “rea- that state can be repeatedly laws have held conflicting poli- sonable accommodation regulations as well by federal pre-empted agency’s cies that were committed to the statutes.”); Capital Cities federal Savings, 458 Fidelity care statute.” 104 S.Ct. Cable, Crisp, v. U.S. Inc. 153-54, {quot- 102 S.Ct. at 3022-23 U.S. (same, (1984) quoting 2694, L.Ed.2d 580 Shimer, ing United U.S. States Fidelity). 1554, 1560, 383, 81 6 L.Ed.2d 908 urges to hold Attorney us (1961)). determining whether a consent may never be accorded a consent order effect, preemptive order have we fo- lacks the ad- weight because it preemptive inquiry our on whether the cus safeguards ministrative acting reasonably and within the choice policy considered not reflect a does scope congressionally delegated of its au- argument as reject this agency. We thority. of form over substance. an exaltation clearly authorized to The FTC enter the FTC to Congress has authorized regulating into the instant Consent Order supervisory powers under exercise between GM and its consumer arbitration variety Act in a Trade Commission Federal *6 decision to consumers. The Commission’s rule- industry-wide from ways raning of — of agree to a the face settlement adjudication, includ making case-by-case to litigation expense, delay ap- and risks of Trade orders. Federal ing issuing consent policy been a reasonable pears to have ¶ 45. 5(a)-(g), 15 U.S.C. Act § Commission choice, light of the intensive particularly Texaco, also, F.Supp. Inc. 630 Russo v. See public extensive comment negotiations and F.2d 221 682, (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd., 808 684-85 Moreover, the informed its decision. that Cir.1986). that (2d is well established It product a Order is of fact that the Consent subject, agen an developing on a law when pre- negotiation does not compromise and method usually has a choice between the cy having power preemp- of it from clude adjudication. of rulemaking and that tion; rather, factor in becomes one 202, 194, Corp., 332 U.S. Chenery v. SEC determining the Commission’s ac- whether (1947). 1580, 1575, 1995 91 L.Ed. 67 S.Ct. preemptive ef- to have was intended quasi- frequently described as Although fect. see, power, e.g., gwasi-judicial legislative or Thus, order re- hold that a consent we 654, Olson, 108 S.Ct. 487 U.S. v. Morrison flecting policy choice a reasonable (1988); 2597, 2618-19, C.P. 101 L.Ed.2d 569 to a pursuant agency and issued federal States, Co., 810 v. United Inc. Chemical authority may congressional grant Cir.1987), types of (2d both 34, 37-38 F.2d The mere fact legislation. preempt state force actions have entered, has been the instant Order Davis, generally, law.” See K.C. “federal supple- preclude is insufficient Treatise, 14.01 Law § 3 Administrative any pre- regulation. As with mental state (1988). of our in- analysis, the lodestar emption entering of the FTC recently quiry is the “intent” has Supreme Court Fed- Order.3 into Consent may “[preemption result stated that California by an examination of is settled Thus, dissenting the matter our brother the view of Better Business Bureau language the Uniform Rules and intent the evidence of "[w]hatever 40 Specifically, we Order. Guerra, the FTC poses of v. Ass’n. Loan and Savings

eral anything there is whether determine 683, 613 must L.Ed.2d 93 272, S.Ct. 107 479 U.S. require- Inc., the Statute’s Airlines, about objectionable v. Delta (1987)(citing Shaw 2898, resort to GM’s 77 2890, that consumers 95, ments 103 S.Ct. 85, 463 U.S. to seek- precondition as a (1983)). tration 490 L.Ed.2d Law; Lemon under the in court ing relief Preempt apply community II. Intent that GM’s procedures. Law standards fashioned has Court Supreme for in search guiding our rules clear an indication Absent Requirement in this area. tent A. The of "First Resort" regulation, state preclude express intent No one contests that New York ways. in two implied would preemption separate dispute establish a consumer reso may be regulation scheme federal mechanism, replete lution with substantive it area that specific in a comprehensive so procedural regulations, in addition to an intent to infer may be reasonable federally program. GM's stead, mandated In leaving room field,” no “occupy the challenges 198-a(g)'s purport GM v. Rice regulation. state supplemental requirement seeking ed relief under the Lemon Law first submit to that a consumer 218, 331 Corp., U.S. Elevator Fe Santa 1447 1152, L.Ed. existing pro a manufacturer's gram-e.g., been there (1947). Even program. the instant GM-BBB of state displacement complete argues provision that this eliminates area, preempted law state particular in a voluntary aspect pro the gram of the GM-BBB law, federal actually conflicts it when and forecloses consumer choice federal both compliance with so that "requir [ing] consumers to resort to the impossible, physically regulations state FTC-GM consumer arbitration as Growers, v. Inc Avocado Lime & Florida precondition seeking relief under the 142-43, 83 S.Ct. Paul, 373 U.S. urges New York Statute." GM us to im (1963),or the 1217-18, 10 L.Ed.2d legislation munize its from state accom to the obstacle “stands law preserve so that it would for the consumer pur full execution plishment and opting non-binding the "choice of for a Congress objectives poses [or system eq informal arbitration based on Davidowitz, 312 Hines agency], judgments by lay persons.""4 uitable 399, 404, L.Ed. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. *7 U.S. leg (1941). state that the recognizing While clarity, we a from model is far islation in the FTC explicit statement nois There partially dissenter and the that believe preclude to an intention Order Consent the Lemon provisions of misinterpret these ex- Accordingly, we must regulation. state require 198-a(g) to section We read Law. was intend- 1983 the Order amine whether a manufacturer’s submit to a consumer to GM-sponsored field” of “occupy the ed to bring before program existing arbitration warranty dis- over consumer Law, but the Lemon under ing suit to impossible it would putes or whether newly under the relief pursuing to prior the Order the FTC comply with both General arbitra Attorney State’s created compliance whether Lemon Law or prior applying Lemon pur- the frustrate would the F.Supp. But Statement at 1106. 703 binding under issue. on GM are cf. ... which Arbitration (Consent omitted) Order (citation Oliver is woeful- “princi- FTC Chairman consent decree" the ly Law). Id. is the dissenter’s Lemon misguided. preempts Yet this the opinion. Adherence disagreement” with our pal effect, view, opinion replaces the that to to this allusions makes several 4. General Motors judgment of this for the W. Determan Dean varying slightly aspect Law of the Lemon reasons, we have declined For similar court. See, Appellee's at e.g., Brief interpretations. view, weight to the FTC's even give talismanic Dunne, 9, 23; H. Assistant of Francis Affidavit curiae submitted expressed brief amicus in its Counsel, Corporation. Motors General court, that its of the district upon the invitation at preempt the statute does not Order Consent

41 the Lemon now the seeking judicial relief outside We address thrust of GM’scom- effect, plaint: (g) namely, requirement creates an the Law.5 In subdivision requirement par- comply which makes must with the exhaustion existing substantive decisional criteria ticipation in a manufacturer’s dis- and record- keeping procedures prerequisite of the Lemon Law. pute resolution mechanism a relief the seeking judicial under Lemon Requirements B. Other view, statutory scheme Law. In our harms the consumer nor unconsti- neither GM claims that it is inconceivable that tutionally regulation. burdens federal permit FTC intended to of issues covered the Consent Order in only permits The Lemon Law not three light “having of its negotiated a detailed separate avenues of relief to remain avail- agreement, having gone through lengthy pro- able to the consumer—the GM-BBB process, having comment resolved de- gram, Attorney New York’s General arbi- bated issues about the decree.” We draw mechanism, judicial tration relief—but opposite inference. meaningful these routes of redress become under its terms. various subtle but Congress legislates When in a ways these as ve- significant forums differ traditionally occupied by states, field affording example, hicles relief—for “we start assumption pay filing fee police the consumer have powers historic of the States were under the mechanism while is superseded by State’s GM’s not to be law and [federal free;6 program binding generally unless that was the clear action] purpose Congress.” manufacturer while State’s and manifest only on the Pa Accordingly, we view Energy both.7 Gas & Electric Co. v. Re cific Comm’n, 190, 206, requirement the Statute’s exhaustion as sources U.S. 1713, 1723, merely inducing (1983) use manufacturer’s S.Ct. 75 L.Ed.2d 752 program, preserving (quoting while the consumer’s Corp., Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator 218, 230, 1146, 1152, option to choose between the State’s and 331 U.S. 67 S.Ct. (1947). programs. fea- L.Ed. 1447 Preemption GM’s arbitration These “is not contrary lightly presumed.” tures intent of Fed California Savings, Order which assures that consum- at Consent eral U.S. protection ers will receive fair and decisions 685. Because consumer law is a states, they traditionally regulated by when to GM’s arbitration field submit gram. compelling an intention to evidence of aspect 5. The dissenter overlooks this in describ- service of this Order.” After November ing purpose merely charge imposed the statute’s "to allow “no shall be on consum- voluntarily an arbi- manufacturers to establish third-party ers General Motors or the arbitra- mandatory tration that would be a first charges specified tor that exceeds in the Uni- step under the Law." for consumers published by form Rules of Arbitration the Bet- (k) paragraph Subdivision 10 of the ter Business Bureau.” *8 RIGHTS,” “NEW LAW BILL OF CAR LEMON provides: 6 BBB’s Section of the Rules however, the manu- make it clear that resort to arrange provide BBB will or for facilities precondition facturer’s is a to a law your hearing and it to hold arbitration will relief, seeking suit but not to the your proceed- maintain records Paragraph State’s alternative mechanism. 10 ing. you transcript tape If want a record- states: ing you bring your proceedings, or if AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ARBITRA- witnesses, lawyer paid you respon- own TION PROCEDURE MADE AVAILABLE sible for these costs. MANUFACTURER, THROUGH THE YOU MAY INSTEAD CHOOSE TO SUBMIT YOUR (k) not inform the 7.While subdivision does ARBITRA- CLAIM TO AN INDEPENDENT pro- under consumer that an award the State’s TOR, APPROVEDBY THE ATTORNEYGEN- gram consumer as well would be TO A FEE FOR ERAL. YOUMAYHAVE PAY manufacturer, apparently this would as on the SUCH AN ARBITRATION.... N.Y.Civ. follow from its cross reference to Givens, Order, C., Richard R. provides Prac.L. & R. Article 75. See IV. that the § 6. The Consent Commentaries, charge Practice N.Y.Gen.Bus.Law conducted at no to GM-BBB be 1988). (McKinneys years at 317 two after the date of 198-a the consumer ”[f]or 42 3 of to state law found Section in this area. reference required See preempt is encompass only choice may BBB rules City Corp. v. Encapsulating Envtl. governing arbitration. procedural laws (2d Cir.1988); York, F.2d 58 855 however, claim, 27B of that Section U.S., Inc. v. Ass’n Motor Vehicle Mfrs. provides that an arbi- the BBB Rules which (S.D.N.Y. 730 Abrams, F.Supp. may any make fair and trator 1988). “provided state law does not decision has cau Supreme Court As only re- part of that decision” hibit all or tioned: law outside the context fers to substantive an pre-emption whenever To infer process seems strained: of the arbitration problem comprehensively deals with a can provision means that no decision saying virtually tantamount party perform an action require any agency decides to a federal whenever party jeopardy put the that would field, will regulations be step into a example, if any For under other law. course, rule, would exclusive. Such would decides a vehicle arbitrator bal- with the federal-state be inconsistent economy if the cata- achieve fuel better Supremacy Clause our ance embodied removed, may he lytic converter were jurisprudence. catalytic con- “award” the removal County, 471 U.S. at

Hillsborough of state law. verter contravention This concern is reinforced at 2377. S.Ct. could not order Similarly, an arbitrator finding preemp- by the imbalance that remedy, part removed as seat belts manufactur- among create car tion would them. required cars were to have pre- provision ers. If we read Consent Order does not Again, regulation of the GM-BBB to substitute state clude all state and is not intended gain an law for the sense of fairness program, GM would substantive judgment of the arbitrator as to what state law while manufactur- immunity from any appropriate. remedy, if voluntary dispute resolu- establish ers who comply would have to tion mechanisms of Dean W. Determan.9 Affidavit Although we are the Lemon Law.8 last statements are Determan’s first and the GM-BBB mindful examples he by the on which contradicted “experimental,” we are un- intended to be correct, relies. While his scenarios also in- infer that the FTC Order able to in Section 27B a distinc- we fail to discern special grant such insulation. tended to state law which establishes a tion between Moreover, to state law obligations respect the references manufacturer’s incorporated into (personal in the documents or environ- safety found features mental) indicate that the FTC law which estab- the Consent Order of a car and state “occupy respect intend the Order to a manufacturer’s duties with did not lishes view, warranty remedying In our field” of consumer law defects. logically from disgruntled example, and its it should follow tration between GM Conceivably, boilerplate these illustrations that an arbitrator should consumers. - -, Cir.1989), denied, (8th Warranty. Magnuson-Moss cert. U.S. 8. The —Federal §§ Act, (state (1989) Improvement 101 et Trade Commission 107 L.Ed.2d 154 (1982) seq. seq., codified at 15 U.S.C. 2301 et by Magnuson-Moss); §§ preempted lemon law not regulates voluntary dispute ("Magnuson-Moss”), Comm’n, Chrysler Corp. Vehicle v. Texas Motor pending appeal mechanisms. In a recent case Cir.1985) (same). (5th The cen F.2d 1192 court, the same before this some of criteria and reme tral issue here of decisional namely, the train- of New York’s ing, Law— before the district court. dies was not *9 recordkeeping requirements— notice event, a feder the instant case concerns because preempted Ve- the Act. Motor were found voluntary ally mechanism, and not a mandated Abrams, U.S., Ass’n Inc. v. hicle F.Supp. of Mfrs. inapposite. Magnuson-Moss is also, (S.D.N.Y.1988). See Wolf Co., Cir.1987) (4th Motor 829 F.2d 1277 Ford of the Council of Former General Counsel law, (consumer won a verdict under state lemon Vice President in Better Business Bureaus and action was but state common law fraud Charge Division. of its Mediation/Arbitration preempted by Magnuson-Moss). But Auto. cf. Minn., Importers F.2d America v. State of specific compromise and violates the fair value of a Order award the to not be allowed bargaining process. in attempt that was struck the on the fifth transmission defective reject arguments each of these equitable award— We arguably repair —an refund or similar reasons. requires a full state law vehicle after of the “lemon” replacement calls for a While the Order “nationwide” attempt. fourth the program, it does not mention the word goal Because the of consumer both the “uniform.” compliance find Nor do we protection Law can achieved under the Lemon be without resort to criteria decisional impossible. uniformity, equate nationwide we decline to Consent Order and the FTC by inferring Similarly, the Order, are “free the two latter. arbitrators the FTC Under argument accept we do not GM’s that the adjudications based make common sense Certainly Lemon Law is inconsistent with FTC of fairness.” their own sense Order the Order struck a untrained arbi- Consent because circumstances an in some specific compromise resolu- in the manufacturer’s trator —standardless binding only at an tion on GM—in lieu of a broad might arrive guidelines sets no which sweeping program automatic redress de- under the prescribed other than award results, signed aid consumers. the com- While A mere difference Lemon Law. promise that was struck did not include two schemes not render the does addition, federal uniform standards of fairness and note that the incompatible. In we preclud- statutory equity, there is no evidence that it supplies specific regulation by the area ed further states. only relief in the limited standards establishing con- what of “lemons.” While give concluding, pause Before we fur- repair at- reasonable number stitutes a objections ther consideration to the of our the terms of auto- tempts prescribing Winter, colleague. According Judge (i.e., replacement), refund or matic redress of an arbitration GM’s establishment order, Statute, like the FTC otherwise mandatory.... gram “appears the discretion of arbitrator defers to of sheer appears to be result [which] relief. fashioning appropriate legislative drafting....” happenstance clearly contrary to the record analysis that the This view from our It follows language of section training to the all-inclusive requirements of and and Law Indeed, chose to enter into a preempt- 198-a(g). GM recordkeeping are not additional FTC, mandating the merely requires consent order with York ed. The New Statute third-party implementation of a nationwide “trained in arbitration” be that arbitrators unpleasant program, to avoid provisions. the Law’s “familiar with” litigation arising out of the FTC’s they “for- requirement that There is no intentionally nor inad- complaint. Neither in con- “professional” or mal” singled out vertently York GM record- has New Order. The flict with the Consent Any manufactur- disparate treatment. section 198- keeping requirements of in a situation places itself similar a(m)(3) the exten- er not in conflict with requirements. subject to the same would be requirements under the Con- reporting sive sent Order. argues that dissenting opinion also not the traditional issue before us is Con- “the

Ostensibly, purpose a federal question of whether preemption consumers fair and is to assure sent Order poli- a state procedure invalidates submitting policy com- equitable treatment when procedure.... whether cy performance vehicle’s plaints [but] about a unnecessarily interfering with does not York is program. GM fail to procedure.” We remedial Lemon Law federal application of the argue that untraditional anything novel or discern liability and redress necessar- standards Moreover, Instead, of the law. this restatement inequitable. unfair or ily would be given regulation in a dual state and federal legislation is argues that the state forms; e.g., the may assume various disrupts goal area it preempted because in tandem may operate in the uniformity engendered nationwide *10 program law. that would be a man- arbitration independent or datory step Order does first for consumers under FTC Consent instant pro- insulate GM’s for the defendants intent to Lemon Law. Counsel indicate regu- supplementation argument provi- at oral that this conceded gram from primarily was for the benefit of manufacturers. lation. Since sion what is fair and However, mandatory for appears standards it for supplies of its standards and application equitable, the arbitration GM because discretion to (which leave wide remedies consent decree are treated as a arbitrator) in the by arbitrators GM manufacturer’s arbitration unnecessarily interfere program does question.1 purposes of the law federal remedial mea- open-ended happen- appears to be the result of sheer sures. legislative drafting, for there is stance legislature no evidence that New York our that the emphasize belief Finally, we single intended to out or that New ever GM and fair—not principled we reach result any policy goal York has or reason to make unwisely “mischie[vous],” as the dissenter maintenance of arbitration Companies will not be it. characterizes competitors. mandatory for GM and not its de- entering into consent from dissuaded involving BBB arbitration because of crees aspect The second unusual arises from Rather, they will be mindful our decision. legal before us is not first. issue preemption in bargain of the need preemption question the traditional wheth- they reach. compromises specific policy procedure er a federal or invalidates policy procedure. No one is a state or CONCLUSION arguing that York cannot enact a reverse the foregoing reasons we arbitration, For the provide Lemon Law and includ- summary judgment dismiss order of arbitration, ing optional manufacturers’ complaint below. remedy. New York could also have one programs mandat- declared WINTER, Judge, dissenting: Circuit ed federal law are not to be used for colleagues Lemon Law enforcement but that manufac- my that a con- agree I programs turers bound to such federal the force of federal law sent decree with However, separate programs I could establish for Lem- a state statute. may preempt preemptive purposes. on Law Even if New York want- as to the disagree with them single mandate that it ed to out GM and the Federal Trade Commission effect of program, maintain an it could (“FTC”) in issue. This case consent decree required have to establish a second legal unusual and factual highly involves a situation, program separate from that under the con- approach I it rather differ- Every policy goal legis- colleagues. sent decree. ently my from question easily lation in could thus have aspect is that the New The first unusual creating achieved without even an been effect on appears to have an York statute arguable preemption issue. (“GM”) entirely different Motors every question not whether a New York other manufactur- from its effect question policy procedure statutory provision can coexist with fed- er. The procedure policy manufacturers to eral but whether New designed to allow programs provide federally York can that a mandated operate their own arbitration require procedure remedial be used to enforce its they choose to do so and though it could have policy resort in the first instance to local even consumers to procedure if one exists. vided an identical under state program, the manufacturer’s preemption finding thus intended to allow law. A here would The statute was way power lessen New York’s voluntarily to establish an thus no manufacturers applies present question the statute case. 1. The whether raised in the GM's arbitration is not *11 actually operated has provide and enact substantive proce- of remedial comprehensive many years regard arsenal and without to how or other con- concerning automobiles dures parties rules, BBB and other to these upon by my Cases relied products. sumer present have no connection who against unneces- caution colleagues that litigation, interpret them. of state with the exercise sary interference quality of available evidence as to point. The powers are beside the police meaning operation BBB York is rather is whether New question exceptional. In rules is the record and a federal re- unnecessarily interfering with unchallenged by the is an defendants affi- procedure. medial Determan, davit of Dean W. former Gener- York colleagues conclude that New My al of Better Counsel Council Busi- use of the any other state’s Bureaus, Inc., and ness Vice President in the FTC consent procedure is valid because charge of its Media/Arbitration Division. for the designed to a vehicle decree was ques- Mr. Determan authored the rules I law. of state substantive enforcement years many supervised tion and for indisputable that disagree. virtually It is program, during BBB arbitration which he was intended to authorize the decree responsible interpreting was the rules. solely on to issue decisions based trators equity of common sense their view Among things other stated Mr. Deter- law, regard to state substantive without man in that affidavit is that the BBB rules expressly forbade the re- unless that law “provided incorporated the FTC order incorporated into the language sult. that decisions were to be arbitrators’ based that the arbitrator original decree stated legal equity principles. and not on state decision, any which the Arbi- “may make operating This has continued to be the ..., fair and deems to be trator program.” premise of the Mr. Determan prohibit all or provided state law does not further stated that the BBB 27B, Rule Uniform part of that decision.” 25,000 persons more nation- trained than Bureau Arbitra- Rules for Better Business BBB and has in- wide to be arbitrators Order, tion, reprinted in FTC Consent them structed Moreover, the lack of F.T.C. federal standards was the either state or concept apply their own of fairness to Commissioner Pertschuk’s basis they They facts in the cases hear. Attorney General dissent and defendant taught state laws are not various it opposition to the decree before Abrams’ disputes they apply would if the which adopted by the FTC. brought in hearing had been court. were language Whatever the evidence fact, the arbitrators are told while intent, the matter is settled they may parties present allow that Rules for Bet- examination Uniform law from the state substantive Arbitration, Bureau ter Business sitting, or even from other they are 1771-74, are on GM F.T.C. at which states, they specifically instructed It should be under the consent decree. apply any particular they are not to Business Bu- understood that the Better law, they instead are to do what but (“BBB”) application rules have an be- reau personally right. believe They bind yond the FTC consent decree. specifically It is understood all kinds across the nation businesses of Rules should under the BBB participate in the BBB agreed have who legal principles established not enforce program. They thus have a life Code, Commercial such as the Uniform litigation, in- apart their own from this law, substantive warranty other op- cluding history interpretation law, principles might except as those disagree- practice. My principal erational inde- of the arbitrator’s form the basis my colleagues concerns their ment with ideas of fair- common sense and pendent that these rules are somehow view regard to how the BBB ness. interpreted without *12 light also shed statute commands that arbitrators be Determan’s affidavit

Mr. trained in the Lemon Law and it. follow to state law in the references on the two Compliance GM with the consent decree specifically He stated that Sec- BBB rules. interpreted with the Lemon Law as is your of the state where tion 3—“The law possible, not Florida Lime Avo- thus see & apply,” shall dispute is arbitrated Growers, Paul, 373 U.S. cado Inc. designed only “to set- at 1771—was F.T.C. 1217-18, 142-43, 10 L.Ed.2d law,” procedural questions tle of choice BBB, (1963), unless the which is not and was legal duty comply any under anticipate situations in which included to Law, voluntarily cooperates in both state, in one a consumer lives but arbi- revising the standards followed its by BBB located in a different serviced allowing and in its trators arbitrators example, state. For New York law re- retrained. eight days’ notice an arbitration quires my colleagues’ I would note further that hearing, Jersey only requires but potential for decision creates the considera- provision seven. This does not and is not extending beyond mischief far this ble incorporate state intended to substantive Companies hereafter rather case. will be pro- the arbitration decisional law into entering federal con- more cautious into cess. providing pro- sent decrees for arbitration colleagues rely heavily upon My Section grams may put later to unantic- may any 27B—“The Arbitrator make deci- ipated Certainly, uses. no counsel for a sion, the Arbitrator deems to be fair which agreeing manufacturer recommend will ..., provided involving state law does BBB a consent decree arbitration. decision,” Moreover, part this decision concludes prohibit all or of that because particular warranty gov- that a law compelling at 1774—as an 102 F.T.C. erns BBB arbitration and that BBB arbitra- trator to follow state substantive law. trained, properly tors are not the decision Section, regard to that Mr. Determan With suggests that a matter BBB as of law the stated, misinterpreting has been and misadminis- provision means that no decision can tering its arbitration all these require any party perform an action result, years. As a mischief follow put party jeopardy that would for businesses and consumers in other in- example, other law. For if under Litigation claiming dustries as well. decides a vehicle would arbitrator applied BBB arbitration has not state sub- economy fuel if the cata- achieve better law, unthinkable, stantive until now removed, may were he lytic converter likely. been made more catalytic the removal of the con- “award” Finally, I my colleagues’ would note that of state verter contravention law. pointless exertions are rather other than to Similarly, an arbitrator could not order single out GM for harsher treatment. If part remedy, removed as seat belts we were to hold that New York could not required where cars were to have them. use the FTC arbitration as a ve- provision Again, does not law, impose hicle to its own substantive and is not intended to substitute state position GM would be restored to the held law for the sense of substantive fairness by all other automobile manufacturers in judgment of arbitrator as to what State New York and would have a remedy, any, appropriate. if up choice whether to set an arbitration that the Lemon I thus conclude (in case, program) a second palpable interpreted, is conflict with the use under the Lemon I Law. therefore The BBB arbitration consent decree. dissent. expressly precludes application

gram law. The New York stat-

state substantive it. BBB are not

ute commands in state law and are instructed that

trained mandatory. is not The New York

its use

Case Details

Case Name: General Motors Corporation v. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: Feb 15, 1990
Citation: 897 F.2d 34
Docket Number: 127, Docket 89-7338
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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